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Abstract 
 
 In this thesis I describe the claims that a group of people living in rural 
Scotland make about maternal surrogacy. For them, surrogacy is a topical issue 
that provokes speculative ethical judgements. This is in a context in which they 
are building good lives, strongly informed by environmentalist ‘ethical living’ and 
local wildlife conservation. I describe the kinds of ideas they employ and 
reproduce in discussing the ethics of surrogacy to capture the nuanced 
judgements that go into ethical claim-making. I argue that, in order to 
understand these people’s ideas about what is natural and what is moral, they 
should be considered along with their more ordinary ideas and practices. I 
describe how some of the same concepts they use to talk about surrogacy 
figure in their conceptions of goodness and what makes a good life, in order to 
both contextualise and extend their ideas about the ethics of surrogacy.  
 Through ethnography of their everyday lives, I show the importance of 
effort and care in the making of relationships with other people, animals and the 
land and in fashioning an ethical subjectivity. I analyse the connections between 
nature, kinship and ethics in lives that are structured by efforts to protect the 
natural world, feel closer to other people and experience a fulfilling life. I 
examine the importance of choice and money in enabling these lives and raise 
questions about the location and status of transcendent values in contemporary 
Britain. I discuss the temporal orientation of these people in relation to the 
influence of environmentalist ideas of impending ecological crisis and consider 
how this links with their ideas about how to live in the present as well as how 
these connect up with their ideas about parenthood and kinship. 
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I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river 
Is a strong brown god – sullen, untamed and intractable, 
Patient to some degree, at first recognised as a frontier; 
Useful, untrustworthy, as a conveyor of commerce; 
Then only a problem confronting the builder of bridges. 
The problem once solved, the brown god is almost forgotten 
By the dwellers in cities – ever, however, implacable. 
Keeping his seasons and rages, destroyer, reminder 
Of what men choose to forget. Unhonoured, unpropitiated 
By worshippers of the machine, but waiting, watching and waiting. 
His rhythm was present in the nursery bedroom, 
In the rank ailanthus of the April dooryard, 
In the smell of grapes on the autumn table, 
And the evening circle in the winter gaslight. 
T.S. Eliot, The Dry Salvages 
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 Prologue 
 
 
The Sperm Whale’s Jaw 
 
I found this jawbone at the sea's edge  
Ted Hughes, Relic 
 
 
 Early one Friday morning in December 2006 I went with some of my 
friends and neighbours to see the body of a sperm whale that had washed up at 
Roseisle beach. The whale was an adult male that had died from malnutrition, 
which my friends attributed to environmental change and the threats of human 
activity to cetacean habitats and food sources. At the beach there were about 
ten others including a local journalist. Each person simply looked at the whale, 
occasionally talking in hushed tones. It lay on its right side in a shallow 
indentation of sand filled with bright, clear blood – a jolting reminder that this had 
once been a living being. Later, Sophie said she felt an atmosphere of 
reverence amongst the onlookers, which I had also sensed. On the way home 
she said, “It’s so sad to see something so beautiful in life in death. Although it’s 
still beautiful in a way, it’s just sad because you get so excited about seeing a 
sperm whale in the place where you live and then the only opportunity you get is 
when it’s dead”. One person touched the animal gingerly, as if letting everyone 
know that she harboured no ill intention; a few others followed as though they 
had received permission. Despite not having touched the body, Willow said 
afterwards, “I know it’s irrational but I feel sort of unclean, like I need to wash my 
hands”. 
 The most striking thing about this body was that its jaw had been removed 
during the night. The remaining stump dripped fresh blood into the pool below. 
Disgust at this post-mortem mutilation was on the lips of everyone present. Later 
that day it transpired that the jaw’s disappearance was the subject of a criminal 
investigation. The theft or removal of cetacean body parts is a criminal offence 
in the UK, not only because of their endangered status, but also because under 
the Royal Prerogative such bodies legally belong to the Crown. Amongst those I 
spoke to and in the media there was a great deal of discussion about what 
would happen to the body and the infamous jaw1; no-one seemed to be able to 
conceive of what to do with this tragic leviathan. After some negotiations a 
                                                
1 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/highlands_and_islands/6169055.stm and 
http://www.newscientist.com/blog/shortsharpscience  
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wildlife crime officer from Grampian Police retrieved the jaw and the council 
moved the rest of the body to the local rendering plant. What remained of the 
head and part of the jaw was later delivered to the wildlife centre in Spey Bay so 
that they could exhibit the skeleton for visitors. 
 
 
Figure 1: Onlookers at the scene of the stranded sperm whale’s body, Roseisle, Moray, 
December 2006.  
 
 It was unclear exactly what had happened to the jaw in the intervening 
hours between its disappearance and reappearance until the following May, 
when I attended a local environmental action meeting led by another wildlife 
crime officer. He asked if anyone in the audience lived in Burghead, a village 
close to Roseisle, explaining that if we were from there we would know who had 
stolen the jaw, implying that “a large family who act as if they are the local lairds” 
had taken it. Most people I spoke to had assumed that the jaw was stolen 
because sperm whale teeth are financially valuable. However, in the media it 
had been reported that locals believe the teeth are ‘lucky’; the police officer 
noted that in some parts of Scotland these teeth represent fertility and there is a 
tradition of large families handing them out amongst their sons.  
 The jaw had eventually been recovered after the police offered the 
Burghead family immunity from prosecution in return for its surrender. In the 
course of their investigation, they uncovered three worn out diamond bit 
chainsaw blades, numerous pairs of waders filled with congealed blood and a 
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Landrover Discovery which they quickly returned to its owner because of the 
unbearable stench of rotting flesh that it gave off. Whatever the true reason for 
this macabre theft – and it remains shrouded in mystery – it is clear that the 
perpetrators were prepared to go to some lengths to acquire this jaw and its 
teeth, and the expense entailed suggests that it was not simply for financial 
gain. 
 In the Moray Firth area of Scotland where this took place, whales and 
dolphins are constant presences, being regularly sighted from the villages 
perched along the coast. They are, amongst other things, a source of local pride 
and tourist revenue. Therefore, this – admittedly sad – story of the Roseisle 
sperm whale makes a fitting initial frame for this ethnography. In starting with 
this mystery, my aim has been to show some of the preoccupations of people in 
this part of the world and thus to indicate some of the major themes that I will 
explore here.  
 For those I visited the scene with, the whale’s body symbolised the 
ecological catastrophes that the world faces in the near future unless we can 
arrest anthropogenic effects on the environment. This whale had strayed from 
its ‘natural’ home in the deep open seas, searching desperately for its usual 
food of squid – whose numbers, I was told, have declined with industrial fishing 
methods – only to die exhausted and starving in the Moray Firth, its body 
washing up on Roseisle beach where it suffered the final indignity of having its 
jaw plundered. For these people, who are largely incomers to the area, attracted 
by its “better” lifestyle and wild, natural beauty, everyone has a responsibility to 
care for and protect nature. In their incomprehension at the actions of those who 
took the jaw, there is a tension between ‘traditional’ and ‘contemporary’ values, 
the claims of those who are attached to the land by time and blood and those by 
personal effort and feeling. It also suggests alternative conceptions of wealth 
and value, competing and conflicting models of nature and the ubiquity of ideas 
about ethics and human nature.  
 I went to Moray to find out what people there think about maternal 
surrogacy, a practice that provokes pressing ethical questions in the British 
context, and for them. In this thesis I will argue that it is highly beneficial to 
consider people’s ideas about such practices in conjunction with the context of 
their everyday lives. What I want to suggest by beginning with this strange yet 
telling vignette, then, is the ubiquity, salience and inter-connectedness of ideas 
about nature, ethics and belonging for these people, all values which structure 
and inform their claims about surrogacy as well as their everyday lives.  
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Map 2: Spey Bay and surrounding area 
 14
 
Introduction 
 
Where the River Meets the Sea 
 
How long was his love for that river 
In its unbound abandon 
And the headlong salmon 
Soaring high from its spate 
And how broad his contempt 
For the efforts of those 
Who tried to impose 
The violence of order 
On its deep dark flow 
John Mackie, Where the River Meets the Sea  
 
 
 Spey Bay is the name of the tiny village in the county of Moray in 
Scotland in which I lived during fieldwork. It is perched along the picturesque 
Moray Firth coast, a place at times windy, salty and spindrift-flecked, at others a 
tranquil, sunny haven. Here, the Spey’s peat-browned, pure freshwater, filtered 
through the Cairngorm mountains, reaches the end of its long journey in a 
cataclysmic encounter with the chilly saltwater of the North Sea. Being at the 
confluence of a powerful river and a churning sea, the sand and shingle banks 
of the bay are in constant flux, the river’s force constantly hewing fresh margins 
to its passage. Both the Moray Firth and the River Spey are Sites of Special 
Scientific Interest (SSSI) and the Inner Firth is designated a Wetland of 
International Importance. The village of Spey Bay lies within a 450ha nature 
reserve, beside the Speyside Way long-distance footpath, and its shingle beach 
is also a SSSI.  
One of the longest and fastest-flowing rivers in Scotland and world-
famous for its natural resources, the Spey provides delight to anglers, adventure 
sports enthusiasts and whisky connoisseurs as well as locals. Amongst other 
‘native’ species, the Spey is home to Atlantic salmon, which provided the 
original reason for the area’s settlement and development as an economic 
centre. Tugnet, at one end of Spey Bay, was, as the name suggests, the base 
for a significant fish-processing operation in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, supplying wealthy Londoners’ burgeoning taste for Scottish salmon. 
The main complex of buildings in Tugnet served as the accommodation and 
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offices of this operation. It now functions as the flagship wildlife centre of an 
international conservation charity, the fourth most visited tourist destination in 
Moray (Moray Council n.d.). During fieldwork, I lived in the former station 
manager’s house, which has been split into two adjoining residences. along with 
various wildlife centre employees and volunteers (see Figure 4).  
The Moray Firth boasts a resident population of bottlenose dolphins and 
receives occasional visits from whales and porpoises migrating and hunting 
around the British Isles like the sperm whale described in the Prologue. Drawn 
close to the coast by the salmon, trout and other fish, dolphins and whales can, 
in theory, be spotted from any cliff or vantage point along the Firth during the 
summer months. The human inhabitants of the villages along the coast 
associate themselves with dolphins on village name-signs, in the décor and 
products of local businesses and in the blue plastic dolphins that hang from so 
many residents’ car rear-view mirrors. Spey Bay is a particularly good place for 
land-based wildlife-watching, with frequent dolphin sightings during the summer 
months and if one were to ask locals what makes the area special most would 
include the dolphins in their answer.  
The opportunity to spot dolphins in the wild is a major draw for tourists. 
For those who work in the wildlife centre in Spey Bay, who are jokingly referred 
to by other locals as “the dolphin people”, as for the increasing number of 
wildlife-watching tour operators in the area, the dolphins are literally their reason 
for being there, but they are significant for all residents. While the Highlands 
which border Moray to the west enjoy a well-established and internationally 
recognised identity, northeast Scotland, being somewhere in between Highland 
and Lowland, has a more nascent identity, though its picturesque coastline, rare 
wildlife and dramatic landscape all contribute to a local and national sense that it 
is an altogether more ‘natural’ place offering a ‘better’ way of life.  
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Figure 2: Spey Bay from Garmouth, on the opposite bank of the Spey. Tugnet sits in the 
middle of the picture, with the bay to the left and the rest of Spey Bay village extending 
to its right. Beyond, lies the sea.  
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 Apart from the wildlife centre, with its shop and café, the only other public 
facility in Spey Bay itself is the village hall, which is the venue for community 
events and leisure activities. Residents sometimes voiced disappointment that 
there is no pub in the village, and thus no obvious social focal point. There is in 
fact a hotel, but all but its golf course has been closed for the last three years 
due to a lack of investment. At the start of the twentieth century, this golf 
complex was the most important village industry alongside fishing. The golf 
links, and a hotel, were built in 1907 and this was by all accounts a popular 
leisure destination, so there has in fact been over a century of tourism in the 
village. However, this declined during the Second World War, when the hotel 
was requisitioned for RAF troops based at Nether Dallachy, one mile southeast 
of Spey Bay. The hotel was largely destroyed in a fire in 1965 and later rebuilt 
with little of its former grandeur. 
 The golf resort’s current owner runs self-catering accommodation in 
converted steadings next to the hotel. Another middle-aged couple run a bed 
and breakfast operation from their home, which, like many other houses in Spey 
Bay, enjoys superb uninterrupted views out to sea, while another retired couple 
from Yorkshire make crafts including handbags, home furnishings and paintings 
of the local area, which they sell in local shops and craft fairs. The wildlife centre 
is therefore the largest employer in Spey Bay itself and most other adult 
residents who are not already retired travel outside the village for work.  
 The nearest pub and food shop are in Garmouth, on the other bank of the 
Spey. However, they are only nearest as the crow flies or if one is walking – by 
road, the closest amenities are in Fochabers, five miles inland. Fochabers, with 
a population of around two thousand, is home to the Baxter’s food 
manufacturing business, famous for its tinned soups, and its ‘Highland village’, 
the most popular tourist destination in the county. Tourists can take tours of the 
Baxter’s factory, modelled on those run by whisky distilleries. The Highland 
Village also has five shops, specialising in ‘fine’ and ‘ethical’ foods, gifts and 
cookware and a café, aimed at the tourist and coach-party market and 
promoting Baxter’s products. Fochabers has a primary school and high school, 
three pubs, two Co-operative (“Co-op” or “Co-opie”) convenience stores, two 
butchers, a fish and chip shop (“chippie”), two antiques shops, a large garden 
centre with gift shop and café and an outdoor clothing shop as well as two 
schools, a doctor’s surgery, an estate agent, a veterinary practice and two 
churches. 
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The closest large town is Elgin, home to twenty thousand people. Elgin, 
famous for its seventh Earl’s escapades in Athens, has a fairly standard 
provision of shops that would be difficult to distinguish from those in many other 
British towns. Respondents2 view Elgin, which, although set in beautiful rolling 
countryside, is not the most attractive town in Scotland, with a coy affection 
tinged with embarrassment. Trips to Inverness, Aberdeen or even Edinburgh 
were seen as opportunities to take advantage of the more fashionable shops 
and leisure facilities in these bigger cities. When I made a return visit to Moray in 
November 2008 and went into Elgin with a couple of friends they took me to the 
newly opened Starbucks café, remarking ironically that they had at last caught 
up with the rest of the world. 
Like the rest of the UK and Western Europe, Scotland has in the last 
generation been experiencing something of a fertility ‘crisis’ and, until recently, a 
declining population.3 Compared with England, Scotland’s situation seems 
particularly acute given its history of economic emigration, sparse inhabitation4 
and the relative political and social marginality of many of its rural areas. 
Scottish life expectancy and population growth rates are both behind the 
average for western Europe. In recent years, the live birth rate has been 
dropping, reaching its nadir in 2002, in which the fewest births since registration 
began in 1855 occurred, though 2006 marked a reverse of this trend, with the 
highest number of births since 1998. The average age of Scottish birthing 
women has increased over the last few generations, standing at 29 years old in 
2006. Births to unmarried parents in Scotland are rising markedly, with an 
increase from 36% to 48% between 1996 and 2006. Not surprisingly given this, 
marriage rates are falling, though ‘tourist weddings’ have buoyed up figures: in 
2006 more than a quarter of Scottish weddings were between non-Scots.5 
Divorce figures have also been rising on average over the last twenty-five years. 
                                                
2 I use the term ‘respondents’ as a generalised term to refer to those I regularly spoke to in the 
field including those I did and did not formally interview as I reject the negative connotations of the 
word, ‘informant’, on political and ethical grounds but also because it does not capture the 
participatory and personal nature of my relationships with these people (cf. Edwards 2000: 82). I 
have changed all of their names (and do not name the conservation charity in Spey Bay) to protect 
their anonymity, though most other details are unchanged.  
3 The following data is available in the government publication Scotland’s Population 2009 (GROS 
2007). 
4 Of the UK’s sixty million inhabitants, only five million live in Scotland despite it covering over a 
third of Great Britain’s landmass. 
5 Many of these took place in the small Borders town of Gretna. Gretna became a popular 
marriage destination for English people in the eighteenth century, when a law was introduced 
requiring parental consent for marriages where either party was younger than twenty-one. A 
number of couples travelled to Gretna as it is very close to the border with England and was on 
the stagecoach route between London and Edinburgh. Today, it remains a popular wedding 
location because of this ‘romantic’ reputation. 
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Numbers of teenaged mothers have risen slightly over the years, though teen 
pregnancy rates are lower in Moray than the Scottish average (Information and 
Statistics Division Scotland 2007a, 2007b). 
As these figures suggest, there are grounds for ordinary people to 
perceive that Scotland is in the midst of significant demographic change. Like 
the rest of the UK and much of the developed world, Scotland has an ageing 
population. In 2006 19% of Scots were of pensionable age while 18% were 
under sixteen years old. A number of (typically, older) respondents did remark 
on Scotland’s ageing population to me, explicitly linking it with their concerns 
about the future, phrased in terms of “pressure” on financial, medical and natural 
“resources”. Scottish households are typically one or two adults, and the number 
of large households (one or two adults with children) is projected to continue 
falling in the future, as well as an increase in households headed by older 
people. However, respondents in this study generally buck this trend, as the 
vast majority of them live in shared accommodation with friends and colleagues 
or co-habit with partners and, if they have them, children.  
This nationwide demographic change is an important context for this 
study, not only in that surrogacy is a technique to alleviate infertility, but also in 
that 80% of respondents here are themselves migrants to Scotland. They have 
also experienced some of these changes in family structure and gender roles 
characteristic of this period themselves, as we shall see. Various ‘solutions’ to 
the decline in population have been discussed in public, including incentives to 
encourage more births, increasing access to fertility treatment and attracting 
migrants, including a much-publicised campaign to increase migration to 
Scotland of skilled foreign nationals to fill the population ‘gap’ (GROS 2009).6  
Between 2002 and 2006, Scotland’s population increased, due to in-
migration from elsewhere in the UK and abroad. Scotland’s cities enjoy in-
migration of young Scots as well as people from abroad, while rural areas tend 
to see the opposite flow of young Scots outwards balanced out by in-flows of 
people from older age groups. In 2004, residents of eight Eastern European 
accession states were extended the right to work in the UK as part of a wider 
deal that allows migration between EU states for their citizens, resulting in an 
influx of migrants into the UK, with nearly nineteen thousand registering to work 
in Scotland in 2006.7 Many respondents were aware of this and welcomed it, 
                                                
6 See Sweeteners plan to bring immigrants to Scotland, The Scotsman, 2nd October 2004; Plan to 
boost population, BBC News Online, 25th February 2003. 
7 See Eastern influx helps boost Scotland’s population, The Herald, 27th April 2007. 
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and there was a general perception that Eastern Europeans fitted in because 
they are “hard-working” and their culture was thought to be not dissimilar to 
Scots’. 
 Spey Bay consists of about thirty dwellings, each inhabited on average by 
two to three people. The accommodation for the wildlife centre, which is the two 
houses that once made the fishing station manager’s house, accommodates 
three people on one side and five on the other, plus frequent guests. There are 
two properties adjoining them, which together form a square courtyard. All four 
properties are rented to their inhabitants by the Crown Estates. One house 
accommodates a middle-aged couple originally from northern England, the 
husband of which is a retired maintenance worker in the RAF and the wife a 
nurse. Their son, who is in his early thirties and studies in Aberdeen, visits 
regularly at weekends and school holidays with his children, of whom he has 
shared custody with his ex-partner. The other house is rented by a couple in 
their thirties. Rob, a former theatre technician, met Helen, who comes from 
southeastern Scotland, through her work as arts manager in the local council 
when he came from England with a touring theatre company. They had their first 
child shortly after moving to Spey Bay from Fochabers in 2007.  
 The majority of people living in Spey Bay are middle-aged commuters or 
retired people, mostly couples with independent adult children, and often 
grandchildren, living elsewhere. Commuters work in a range of jobs, though 
most that I knew worked in the caring professions and service sector, 
particularly in the local food industry, NHS, RAF, schools and local council. 
There are six families with children under eighteen living in the parental home in 
the village. As far as I can tell, this greater proportion of older people compared 
to young families is also typical of the neighbouring hamlets of Bogmoor, Nether 
Dallachy and Upper Dallachy. Larger villages and towns like Fochabers, Buckie 
and Elgin seem to have higher proportions of families with children, presumably 
due in no small part to greater proximity to the schools and other facilities that 
Spey Bay and similarly tiny settlements lack.  
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Map 3: Spey Bay – detailed map
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Home, belonging and community in Moray 
 
 As with England and Wales (Frankenberg 1957; Rapport 1993; Strathern 
1981), much of the anthropology of Scotland has concerned small, often rural 
and politically marginal places (Cohen 1982, 1987; Ennew 1980; Macdonald 
1997; Mewett 1986; Nadel-Klein 2003; cf. Charsley 1991). This reflects the fact 
that the village has been the principal location for ethnographic investigation 
since the beginning of the discipline. One major effect of this focus has been a 
preoccupation with questions of identity, belonging and community in the 
ethnography of the UK, which of course reflects old concerns in anthropology 
but also increasing attention to such questions in the popular discourse of 
Britain as elsewhere. Cohen (1982, 1987) has sensitively approached these 
topics through focusing on the reproduction of symbolic boundaries, based on 
his fieldwork in Whalsay, a remote Shetland island. Cohen describes the 
symbolic values of what it means to be part of Whalsay, including egalitarianism, 
modesty and controlled behaviour, which all prevent dominant personalities from 
emerging in social life and create an image of a collective to be projected 
outside. What he also captures, though, is the skills and attributes of individuals 
and the way that social life is characterised by a constant oscillation between 
these individualising and collectivising forces (see also Rapport 1993).   
 An important theme in Cohen’s work is the place of history and tradition 
in collective and individual identity in Whalsay. This reflects a wider sense in 
popular discourse that Scotland is an ancient place with an important heritage 
(see Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Trevor-Roper 1983), an idea that has been 
thoroughly utilised by the tourism industry. The Highlands, in particular, have 
been romanticised since the Victorian ‘discovery’ of Scotland and Macdonald 
has noted that, in the Highlands, ‘geographical marginality, empty spaces, lack 
of urbanisation, the Gaelic language, Highland hospitality, crofting, the apparent 
relatedness and closeness of the inhabitants, and the alleged slowness of 
everyday existence are all taken as evidence of a way of life which 
modernisation has largely passed by’ (1997: 2; see also Basu 2007).  
 My fieldwork took place in an area that is less marginal than Shetland or 
Skye, but definitely rural and with a consciousness of its difference from other 
parts of the UK. Perceptions of Moray are of course influenced by wider 
collective imaginings of Scotland and as it borders the Highlands it shares many 
of the associations of timelessness and natural beauty of northern, rural 
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Scotland in contrast to the cosmopolitanism, culture and crime of Glasgow or 
Edinburgh. One striking difference between the respondents in this study and 
the people that both Cohen and Macdonald worked with is their relative lack of 
interest in Scotland’s past. That is, they know the main features of Scotland’s 
history and think of these events as important, yet generally show little interest 
in knowing more than basic information. In particular, as I shall show in Chapter 
Three, ideas of history and heritage are largely unimportant in their sense of 
themselves and how they might belong to Scotland. In creating a sense of 
belonging they instead employ images of Scotland as a natural place with a 
beautiful landscape and rare wildlife that lack a foregrounded sense of 
timelessness, suggesting that they have quite a different relationship to the 
contemporary world. It may also be that, as most of them are migrants to the 
area, they resist images of ‘traditional’ Scotland in order to preserve a more 
egalitarian sense of belonging that can be shared and accessed by all.  
 Much of the anthropological work on Scotland predates the founding of 
the devolved Scottish Parliament, established in the Scotland Act 1998. By the 
time my fieldwork started, however, it was well established and in fact the more 
significant event during the time I spent in the field was the 2007 elections after 
which the Scottish National Party (SNP), led by Alex Salmond, took over as a 
minority administration in the Scottish Government. The SNP are a centre-left 
party committed to re-establishing Scotland’s independence from the UK, which 
they aim to fund by wresting control of Scotland’s oil and gas resources.  
 Political attitudes in Scotland are markedly different from those in 
England and it remains a staunchly anti-Conservative area with widespread 
support for Labour and the Liberal Democrats (McCrone 2001). Northeast 
Scotland is, however, the heartland of the SNP and First Minister Salmond’s 
constituency is Buchan, which borders Moray to the east. A few respondents – 
each of them English by origin – did express support for the SNP based on a 
mixture of dissatisfaction with Labour after the war in Iraq and with the Liberal 
Democrats who had just lost their popular leader, Charles Kennedy. Particularly 
important for them, also, was their perception that the SNP has better policies in 
terms of local environmental issues and Angus Robertson, the SNP MP for 
Moray, is known and respected for being vociferously pro-environmental. 
 The rivalry and at times hostility between England and Scotland is well 
known. Although I was warned a couple of times by relative strangers to be 
careful given my English accent in places such as Aberdeen and Peterhead, I 
was never subjected to anti-Englishness. From respondents, I only heard one 
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example, which was the bullying suffered by one respondent’s brother at school 
when their family moved to Edinburgh in her teenage years. During fieldwork, 
the only notable incidents occurred in relation to football, which is of course a 
divisive issue within Scotland, in the Old Firm rivalry, just as much as in its 
relationships with other nations. During the 2006 World Cup, two cases made 
national headlines, both of which involved attacks on people wearing England 
shirts. A seven-year-old boy and his (Scottish) father were assaulted by a man 
while playing football in an Edinburgh park, while another man, who happens to 
be disabled, was dragged from his car and beaten while driving in Aberdeen.8 If 
what I present in the coming chapters seems too rosy in its lack of seething 
resentment between Scots and incomers from England and elsewhere, I can 
only say in my defence that that is because I did not experience this. I would 
suggest that the fact that Moray is an area with a recent history of quite 
widespread in-migration (see below) has to a large extent normalised migrants.  
 As Basu says, ‘Scotland is not merely a place: it is an idea and an ideal’ 
(2007: 47; see also Macdonald 1997). Basu carried out an ethnographic study 
with ‘roots tourists’, who travel to Scotland to trace their origins. Roots tourists 
have homogenous ideas of what Scotland is like and what is means to be 
Scottish. This ‘imagineering’ is, he says, reproduced in the interchange between 
the ‘homeland’ and the ‘diaspora’. Basu describes roots tourists’ ‘selectiveness’ 
in their identity-making and notes that there is an implicit ranking of different 
ethnicities amongst them so that Scottishness is prioritised over Englishness 
and Highland roots over Lowland ones. He links this with the Gaelic 
Renaissance and romanticisation of Scotland, showing once again the power of 
popular representations of Scottishness. In particular, for roots tourists, it seems 
that Scotland as a place and Scottishness as an identity offer up for them 
stability, community and tradition, which they explicitly contrast with a depiction 
of America and elsewhere as wracked by atomism, consumerism and 
meaninglessness (2007: 48; see also Basu 2005b). Basu notes that many of the 
examples of Scotland’s historicity utilised by roots tourists are in fact the result 
of quite recent developments, just as its wild, natural landscape is in many ways 
a direct result of human activities such as the Clearances (see also Macdonald 
1997: 77-80). 
                                                
8 See Blair condemns attacks on England supporters, The Guardian June 21 2006; England shirt 
attacks condemned, BBC News Online June 21 2006; Park disgrace as boy, 7, in England top 
punched by yob, The Scotsman June 21 2006. The reporting of this event in itself stirred up 
something of a hornets’ nest of national(ist) sentiment, as in Tartan army vents its fury over ‘slur’ 
by Blair, The Scotsman June 22 2006. 
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 Roots tourists seek knowledge of their roots in order to construct a 
constitutive idea of the self. Basu argues that self-identity has come to seem 
increasingly malleable, whilst also being called upon as the seat of a 
personalised morality as ‘traditional’ values have eroded. With this, he argues, 
‘the need to “know” the self has become one of life’s imperatives, whilst, at the 
same time, the nature of the self (its “knowability”) has become increasingly 
complex and problematised’ (2007: 160; cf. Pike 2001a: 221). Basu argues that 
roots tourists’ attempts to find themselves in Scotland are not, therefore, about 
excavating the ‘true self’ but constructive processes, though ‘the constructive 
nature of this project must remain obscure, and must, instead, be misrecognised 
by the subject as a reconstructive process’ (2007: 162; original emphasis). Their 
genealogical identities are discovered not simply through historical records, but 
from the self through the increased identification with their homeland that comes 
from embodied familiarity with Scotland, its history and culture.  
 The example of roots tourism suggests some of the popular ideas about 
Scottishness in the twenty-first century and the interchange between views 
inside and outside the country. The people I met in Moray tended not to 
reproduce ideas of Scotland’s particular history or to emphasise clan in their 
claims of belonging. Basu notes that as roots tourists become increasingly 
familiar with Scotland many start to reject the populist tartan and bagpipes 
image in favour of claims of intimate knowledge of its landscape and a superior 
understanding of what it ‘really’ means to be Scottish, which is more in keeping 
with the ideas of Scottishness employed by respondents here.  
 The contrast of the experience of respondents here with roots tourists or 
those in Macdonald’s (1997) study in Skye suggests not only the different ideas 
of Scottishness that might be employed by particular individuals and groups, but 
also what is at stake in making such claims. This also of course implies that the 
ability to claim such identities is important and valuable in the twenty-first 
century, however much opportunities for movement and mobility seem to have 
opened up.9 The pertinent question here is what Scotland is seen to signify, so 
that it seems the right place to build a good life, though, as Basu makes clear, in 
the claiming of any identity, one should consider what is being left out of the 
picture as well as what is being taken up, since belonging is simultaneously an 
action of inclusion and exclusion (Edwards and Strathern 2000). While 
                                                
9 Even those respondents who are ‘native’ to the area have typically spent time abroad and moved 
during their lives, so in some sense have similarly made a conscious choice to stay or return to 
Moray. 
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respondents rarely dwelt on the lives they had left behind, choosing to move to 
Moray rather than staying in London, Scarborough or even Munich implies that 
these places did not offer the right conditions for building a good life.  
 It is quite difficult to know with real accuracy the numbers of people from 
within the UK and EU who have migrated to Scotland, as they are not legally 
required to have visas or register their arrival with authorities. However, the 
General Register Office for Scotland (GROS) has published in- and out-
migration data for Scotland’s regions, based on data from sources such as NHS 
GP registration. Data from the 2001 Scottish census (GROS 2001; see also 
GROS 2009) shows that the percentage of people living in Moray whose country 
of birth is Scotland is 79% while those whose who were born in England make 
up 16% of the population. This is compared to the figures for Scotland as a 
whole, where those born in Scotland represent 87% and English-born people 
are only 8% of the population. The percentage of people living in Moray who 
were born elsewhere in Europe is slightly higher than the Scottish average, at 
1.68% compared to 1.1%, while those originating from outside the UK and 
Europe is higher in Scotland as a whole than Moray, 2.25% in Scotland 
compared to only 1.79% in Moray. Between 2002 and 2006, the peak age for 
migration to Moray, both in and out, was eighteen years old. The young child 
age group of between two and six years old is also high for both in- and out-
migration, along with the early twenties and early thirties age groups. While I 
would not want to claim that the respondents here are representative of other 
migrant groups to Scotland in any straightforward way, what this shows is that, 
as mostly English and European migrants to Moray, they are not particularly 
unusual.  
 One of the questions raised by the experience of most of the respondents 
here is what it means to feel at home in a place with which one does not share 
primordial connections. Their experience raises the question of how such 
feelings are produced, as well as suggesting the important factors in creating 
attachments to place and people. One of the major focuses of Cohen’s analysis 
of Whalsay is the way in which the concept of community relies on symbolic 
boundaries, which both confer a sense of identity to those inside (and outside) 
but also serve as a means of policing entry to and exit from the group (cf. 
Mewett 1986). As he says, in this practice, ‘when reference is made to kinship, 
or crew membership, or neighbouring, the salient topic is not their configurations 
as elements of social structure. It is, rather, their efficacy as idioms which 
encapsulate the foundations of social knowledge’ (1987: 58). 
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 In her work in Elmdon, Essex, Strathern (1981) describes a place, like 
Moray, that has attracted incomers looking for the benefits of country living (see 
also Edwards 2000; Hughes 1997; Little 1997; Rapport 1993). In Elmdon, ideas 
about the village and family are connected through the concept of class, but 
villagers do not simply reproduce dominant ideologies of class. In Elmdon, class 
represents the labile intersection between ‘given’ and ‘made’ knowledge; it is 
both what is fixed and what may move in a person’s constitution (see also 
Edwards and Strathern 2000). In Part Two, I will argue that, by locating 
themselves in relationships of care with the local environment, appreciating the 
landscape and cultivating close connections with other people and animals, 
respondents here negotiate a place for themselves in the fabric of the area and 
thus eclipse their lack of given ties to the land and community. One of the key 
ways in which they achieve this is in their relationships with the local wildlife and 
particularly the iconic Moray Firth dolphins, which are metonymic of their ideas 
of the good life and what makes a place home but are also, crucially, thought of 
as a local and natural asset. So, while they lack ‘blood ties’ of birth or kinship to 
the place, they use some of the same idioms of connectedness, mutuality and 
attachment to land that might just as easily by used by long-standing residents.   
 Scotland has a long and illustrious industrial history, though the economy 
shifted towards the service sector during the twentieth century, now accounting 
for 72% of Scottish economic activity in 2006 (Scottish Executive 2006). Scottish 
gross domestic product was £86 billion in 2005 (Scottish Executive 2006). 
Today, industries like computing, electronic engineering and biotechnology are 
growing rapidly, benefiting from links with Scotland’s academic centres and 
global investment. Food and drink production is an important industry in 
Scotland. The Speyside whisky industry dominates Moray, with over half of 
Scotland’s distilleries in the area. Oil was discovered in the North Sea in 1966, 
creating many jobs, especially in Aberdeen, which is just over sixty miles from 
Spey Bay. Scotland has great potential as a producer of renewable energy, and 
the countryside of Moray and neighbouring Aberdeenshire is dotted with wind 
farms and there are plans to increase energy production through developing 
wind, wave and tidal power. 
 Scotland currently has the highest employment rate of the four nations of 
the UK. During 2007, 80% of Moray’s working age population were employed, 
compared to 76% for Scotland as a whole. In both cases, slightly more men 
than women were working (Scottish Executive 2006). In Moray, as in Scotland 
as a whole, the major economic sector is the service industry and administrative 
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and public sector jobs including education and health provide over a third of 
employment. Moray has slightly higher employment in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing and in manufacturing compared to Scotland as a whole, while it has 
many fewer people employed in finance and business (Scottish Executive 
2006). These figures largely reflect the work of those respondents who do not 
have paid jobs in the wildlife centre, who work in social care, nursing, local 
government, food, the arts, forestry and tourism in nearby towns and larger 
settlements including in particular Elgin, Fochabers and Aberlour. 
 Though it is now in decline due to the restrictions imposed by the EU to 
curb over-fishing in response to a global decline in fish stocks, the fishing 
industry is still active along the coastline of Moray and Aberdeenshire (Nadel-
Klein 2003). Unfortunately I did not come into contact with those who worked in 
the fishing industry except for the occasional encounter with retired fishermen 
visiting the wildlife centre, who might remark with wistful authority upon the 
number of times they had seen dolphins and whales bow-riding on fishing trips. 
Undoubtedly, further investigation into the relationship between members of the 
fishing industry and environmentalists in the area would provide some 
fascinating insights but this was beyond the scope of this project. While I argue 
that whales and dolphins provide a source of local identity in this area, it seems 
likely that this is a relatively recent phenomenon that has emerged alongside the 
decline in fishing and the political concerns about sustainability and 
environmental conservation that that reflects and so it would be illuminating to 
know more about what those in the fishing industry think about cetaceans.  
 It is popularly assumed that Spey fishing has prehistoric roots. The 
Tugnet salmon fishing station was built in 1768 and was the major industry in 
Spey Bay apart from the golf complex. The fishing station employed one 
hundred and fifty people at its peak, fishing on the river in handmade coracles. 
Originally, salmon was salted for preservation, but in the nineteenth century the 
industry turned to ice packing. Tugnet icehouse, reputed to be the largest in 
Scotland, was built in 1830. It was used to store the ice, cut from the river in 
winter, in which the fish were packed before being sent south towards London 
on the railway, which ran along the Moray Firth coast and stopped just south of 
Spey Bay itself.  
 The salmon fishing operation closed in 1991. Fittingly, this same 
complex of ashlar buildings is still the home of the major contemporary industry 
in the village, the wildlife centre, which opened in 1997. Reflecting on the 
contrasts between these kinds of work suggests much about the way that work 
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has changed in this village. It also speaks to wider changes in the area, as the 
Moray Firth coast has shifted from being focused on the North Sea fishing 
industry to becoming associated with leisure and tourism. While deep-sea 
trawlers are still common sights in the harbours and ports along the coast, they 
are increasingly likely to be moored next to wildlife-watching tour boats (some of 
which are converted from old fishing boats) and even in some places private 
leisure craft.10 Clearly, these shifts in industry will have had significant effects on 
popular and local perceptions of the area and the people who live there and 
must therefore be implicated in the current perception amongst respondents and 
others that this is a place that offers a good life.  
 
 
Figure 3: One side of Fochabers town square with the larger of its churches.  
 
 
 
Surrogacy: Public, legal and anthropological representations   
 
Britain is known as a country whose attitude to reproductive technology 
and biomedicine is permissive yet strictly regulated (Franklin 2007). Innovations 
in this field tend to provoke public controversy and media coverage, which has 
been analysed by anthropologists (Cannell 1990; Edwards et all 1993; Rivière 
                                                
10 Spey Bay actually lacks a harbour. The nearest harbour is in Buckie, about seven miles 
eastwards. 
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1985; Shore 1992; Strathern 1992b, Wolfram 1989). The law relating to 
biomedicine and reproductive technology in the UK is based on the report of the 
1984 Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, or 
Warnock Report. As the media coverage and the fact that the Warnock Report 
was chaired by a moral philosopher suggest, assisted conception and 
embryological research raise profound ethical questions for British people.11  
 According to Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy (COTS), the 
major non-profit support group for British people involved in surrogacy, as of 
2007, there have been over six hundred births to surrogate mothers in the UK 
(COTS website). Uptake of surrogacy is relatively low in Scotland and certainly 
proportionally much lower than England and Wales (GROS n.d.). Upon entering 
the field, I was keen to investigate whether this reflected hostility to the practice. 
In fact, I did not find this, but instead interviewees’ responses were marked by 
their attempts to empathise and understand the perspectives of all parties to 
surrogacy arrangements. My decision to study ‘ordinary’ people’s ideas about 
surrogacy rather than those involved in the process themselves was partly a 
practical one due to this low uptake. I also wanted to pursue the idea that 
surrogacy is a topic about which public and media coverage is 
disproportionately large, suggesting that it indexes wider cultural anxieties.  
 I decided to focus my study narrowly on surrogacy as opposed to 
reproductive technologies in general as I felt that, compared to the other 
relatively established assisted conception techniques of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) 
and sperm and egg donation, this is a topic that has been relatively under-
theorised in the British context, despite the fact that it seems to be particularly 
provocative. In particular, surrogacy seemed to me to offer up enticing 
opportunities to get at British people’s ideas about motherhood, femininity and 
money. I had also assumed that, given its contentious treatment in public 
discourse, surrogacy would provoke lively debate and thus act as a lightning rod 
for sensitive and even divisive attitudes. As will become evident, though, this 
naïve assumption was quickly overturned by respondents’ sophisticated 
responses. 
                                                
11 Surrogacy has received varied coverage in Western popular culture. Margaret Atwood’s The 
Handmaid’s Tale (1992) is a dystopian vision of a socially and religiously conservative society in 
which ‘handmaids’ provide the reproductive labour for higher status couples inspired by the 
Biblical story of Hagar, Abraham’s handmaiden and is illustrative of a wider trend in contemporary 
culture to use surrogacy and other forms of reproductive technology to stand for unsettling 
scientific progress. In British popular culture surrogacy tends to be relegated to the more 
sensationalist plotlines of television soap operas.  
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 Surrogacy is interesting because it is a practice that seems to represent 
particular changes in society, economics and demography, but also 
contemporary currents of thought. In addition to this, while anthropologists have 
worked on the public and media representations of surrogacy and other assisted 
conception techniques and on the experience of those in surrogacy 
arrangements, relatively little work has been done on the ideas of laypeople who 
are not personally involved in surrogacy (although see Edwards 2000; Hirsch 
1993). My ethnography captures this discourse ‘in between’ public 
representation and personal experience. As such, one of the questions 
informing this study is whether media, legal and academic debate accurately 
reflects lay attitudes to this practice. This is a question with some significance 
given that the British approach to legislation around surrogacy has been to try 
and represent public attitudes, as in Warnock’s soliciting of laypeople’s 
testimonies to inform the deliberations of her Report.  
 ‘Traditional’ surrogacy, in which a surrogate mother is inseminated with 
the intending father’s sperm, predates IVF, though, like artificial insemination 
(AI) itself (which started to be used in humans in the 1930s), it is difficult to know 
whether it was in fact practised historically.12 ‘Gestational’, or ‘host’ surrogacy, in 
which eggs and sperm from the intending parents are fertilised in vitro and 
implanted in a surrogate mother’s womb, is a more recent innovation that only 
started to be practised once IVF became an established procedure. As the birth 
of Louise Brown, the world’s first ‘test tube baby’, in Oldham in northwest 
England in 1978 suggests, Britain has long been at the forefront of reproductive 
medicine. Scottish scientists and research institutes have been heavily involved 
in these developments and there is a sizeable biotechnology industry in 
Scotland and groundbreaking embryological research including, most famously, 
the birth of Dolly the sheep, the world’s first cloned animal, at the Roslin Institute 
on the outskirts of Edinburgh in 1996.  
Demand for surrogacy and other assisted conception techniques not 
only suggests important ideas about reproduction, genetics and relatedness for 
British people, but also reflects the practical consequences of a rapid decline in 
children available for adoption with the advent of hormonal contraception and 
legalisation of abortion in the UK (except Northern Ireland) in 1967. In 2006, 418 
adoptions took place in Scotland, half the number in the early 1990s and only a 
                                                
12 The first recorded surrogacy contract in the USA was made in the late 1970s, arranged by 
(in)famous American surrogacy ‘broker’, Noel Keane (see Markens 1007; Satz 1992: 122; 
Stanworth 1987a: 27). 
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quarter of the average figure in the 1970s (GROS 2008b). Of these 418 
children, 11% were aged under two years and most of these were adopted by 
non-relatives, compared to 30% of the overall figure being adopted by step-
parents. This again points to a demographic shift, as adoption becomes less a 
‘solution’ to childlessness and more a response to changing family constitutions. 
The first ‘commercial’ surrogate mother in the UK was Kim Cotton, a 
mother of two who gave birth to a baby girl in London for an anonymous infertile 
Swedish couple who paid her £6,500 in 1985. This was arranged by an 
American agency working in southeast England. Cotton’s case provoked a 
media furore and led to the establishment of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 
(1985). Cotton later went on to be an unpaid, or ‘altruistic’, surrogate for a friend 
and founded COTS. According to the Surrogacy Arrangements Act, it is illegal in 
the UK to initiate or negotiate a surrogacy arrangement ‘on a commercial basis’, 
or to cause anyone else to do so (1985: 2). Both surrogates and intending 
parents are also prohibited from advertising in order to broker a surrogacy 
arrangement and anyone publishing surrogacy adverts in the UK is breaking the 
law (1985: 3-4). As this suggests, while in popular usage, ‘commercial 
surrogacy’ tends to mean any sort of surrogacy arrangement in which the 
surrogate mother is paid more than a token amount or reimbursed for costs 
directly related to the pregnancy, in British law it specifically means those 
arrangements which have been ‘brokered’ by a third party agent.  
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990: 36 [1A]) amended 
the Surrogacy Arrangements Act, adding that ‘No surrogacy arrangement is 
enforceable by or against any of the persons making it’.13 This raises thorny 
questions about who should look after a child born through surrogacy if a 
surrogate changes her mind about handing it over to the intending parents. In 
UK law, the ‘carrying mother’ of a child is always its legal mother. Therefore, 
once a child is born, the intending parents must wait six weeks before applying 
for a Parental Order, which gives them full and permanent rights over the child; 
the surrogate relinquishes all rights over her at this point. Also enshrined in the 
1990 Act is a proviso that Parental Orders will only be granted when payment 
between parties to a surrogacy arrangement has not exceeded ‘expenses 
reasonably incurred’ (1990: 30[7]). As such, payment of surrogates is not illegal 
per se, but if intending parents give surrogates more than ‘reasonable 
                                                
13 In contrast to some states in the US, where surrogacy contracts are legally enforceable, the UK 
has not experienced the fraught legal battles between surrogates and intending parents as in the 
Baby M case (see Chesler 1990; Dolgin 1994), since intending parents would have little legal 
basis to contest a surrogate mother’s claim to custody of the child. 
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expenses’, they can lose any parental rights over the child, which is clearly a 
strong incentive to comply with these guidelines. Intending parents must also be 
married, over eighteen years old and at least one of them should be genetically 
related to the child for a Parental Order to be granted. Otherwise, they must 
apply to adopt the child. 
In her essay on British public attitudes to surrogacy as seen through the 
reaction to the Kim Cotton case, Cannell has described the importance of the 
assumption that the family is a natural phenomenon that comes under threat in 
the case of surrogacy, in which the normal connection between sex and 
reproduction has apparently been severed and says that these debates reflect a 
‘gendered ideological division in advanced capitalism … between a world of 
work and a world of the family, to which it is opposed’ (1990: 670; see also 
Markens 2007). As Cannell’s work suggests, in the UK as elsewhere, surrogacy 
has been treated as an anomalous practice that raises profound questions 
about the ‘naturalness’ of kinship, reproduction and gender.  
There have been a handful of anthropological studies with those involved 
in surrogacy arrangements. Most notable amongst these is Ragoné’s (1994) 
study of commercial surrogacy agencies in America. In her ethnography she 
describes many of the strategies that surrogates, intending parents and 
programme directors employ to normalise and naturalise the surrogacy process 
in order to make the arrangements successful and to counter the threats to 
cultural axioms that surrogacy represents. These threats include the ideas that 
surrogacy ‘splits’ motherhood into biological and social components; that it is 
tantamount to infidelity between the intending father and surrogate mother; that 
surrogates are ‘selling’ children or at least their reproductive capacities; that 
intending parents are ‘buying’ a child or ‘renting’ a womb and that surrogates are 
forced to abandon ‘their’ babies.  
Roberts also describes the way that American surrogates, intending 
parents and clinicians challenge dominant ideas that technology threatens and 
corrupts the natural processes of reproduction to re-establish links between the 
foetus and intending parents and sever any tie between the surrogate and the 
child she is carrying. She observed that many surrogates subvert the critical 
language of anti-surrogacy writers by describing themselves as ‘baby machines’ 
and ‘vessels’. This has the effect of implying that the intending parents’ 
relationship to the child is more natural than the surrogate’s while also 
suggesting the surrogate’s hyperfemininity in contrast to the depictions of 
surrogates by some critics as unfeminine and unnatural women who reject 
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maternity (1998: 206). Teman (2003) has written about similar practices in 
Israeli surrogacy clinics, where various strategies are used to treat the intending 
mother as the mother, for example in her experiencing couvade-like symptoms 
of pregnancy. These strategies naturalise the arrangement, equalise the 
relationship between the two mothers and allow for the intending mother to 
claim authoritative knowledge through her body. Thompson (2001) has also 
shown the work of ‘strategic naturalizing’ that goes on in American infertility 
clinics. 
 Many who object to surrogacy reflect the problematic nature of the 
practice by using different terms such as ‘birth mother’ or placing quotation 
marks around the word, ‘surrogate’, implying that a surrogate mother is the 
child’s de facto mother and that a denial of her natural rights as the woman who 
has gestated and given birth to a child is the result of gender inequality. Arguing 
that Euro-American thinking contains within it mechanisms to integrate new 
knowledge about things like surrogacy, Strathern says that the fact that the 
woman who gestates the child quickly became known as the surrogate in the 
UK ‘showed an openness to new possibilities long before they became overtly 
debated’ (2003: 286; original emphasis). She identifies a tendency in Euro-
American thinking to distinguish between two orders of reality, creating meaning 
‘by dividing phenomena into those whose meaning is self-evident or self-
signifying and those whose meaning has to be made explicit by reference to 
what is being signified’, an argument that has echoes with her work in Elmdon 
(1981).  
 In the case of surrogacy, contests over whether a woman is a surrogate 
only emerge when the relationship breaks down and she asserts herself as the 
‘real’ mother. The problem that surrogacy presents, therefore, is that it creates a 
contest about reality. When contested in this way, Strathern argues, appeal is 
made to further ‘foundations’ to ground assertions about reality, but in so doing, 
their foundational status is destabilised. So, ‘Disputes over carrying and birth 
motherhood show the point at which biology ceases to be an axiomatic 
foundation for motherhood – not because ‘social’ motherhood is opposed to 
‘biological’ motherhood, but because what is biological about biological 
motherhood has to be made explicit’ (2003: 291; original emphasis).  
Anderson’s piece, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity? exemplifies the 
explosion of popular and academic polemic against commercial surrogacy 
during the 1980s and 1990s:   
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The case of commercial surrogacy raises deep concerns about the 
proper scope of the market in modern industrial societies. … When 
market norms are applied to the ways we allocate and understand 
parental rights and responsibilities, children are reduced from subjects of 
love to objects of use. When market norms are applied to the ways we 
treat and understand women’s reproductive labor, women are reduced 
from subjects of respect and consideration to objects of use. If we are to 
retain the capacity to value children and women in ways consistent with 
a rich conception of human flourishing, we must resist the encroachment 
of the market upon the sphere of reproductive labor. Women’s labor is 
not a commodity. (Anderson 1990: 91-2; original emphasis) 
 
Anderson’s argument reflects a Kantian view of humans as properly treated as 
ends in themselves rather than means (see also Blyth and Potter 2003; Rae 
1994; Shannon 1988), based on the assumption that humans are properly 
‘above’ the market sphere. Ironically, this separation of persons and things has 
been identified as an attribute of capitalism (Parry and Bloch 1989).  
 For Anderson, commercial surrogacy’s ‘commodification’ of female 
reproductive labour and of children is fundamentally degrading. Satz (1992) 
rejects this ‘asymmetry thesis’ in its treatment of reproductive labour as a 
special case. For her, Anderson’s objections rest on an essentialist view of 
women, motherhood and maternal bonding. Satz argues that the sale of 
reproductive labour is not ipso facto degrading, but that in a context of 
‘pervasive gender inequality’ (1992: 109-10), surrogacy contracts ‘will turn 
women’s labor into something that is used and controlled by others and will 
reinforce gender stereotypes that have been used to justify the unequal 
treatment of women’ (1992: 123-4).  
Many writers who reject Anderson’s arguments have pointed out that 
much anti-commercial surrogacy polemic rests on the assumption that the 
surrogate mother is the ‘real’ mother (Wilkinson 2003: 145); a woman can only 
be alienated from a child if it belongs to her in the first place. It also implies a 
view that ‘altruism’ preserves the inalienability of things while payment makes 
them alienable, reinforcing dichotomous thinking about gifts and commodities. 
Anderson and other anti-surrogacy writers argue from the point of view that 
markets are inevitably disempowering and exploitative of women in particular. 
This argument has been rejected as both difficult to show empirically and 
insufficient basis for a paternalistic prohibition of surrogacy (Wertheimer 1992; 
 36
Wilkinson 2003). As quite a few writers suggest, if women turn to surrogacy out 
of poverty and a lack of options based on gender inequality, then it may be 
reprehensible to limit their options further by prohibiting commercial surrogacy.  
 Parry and Bloch argue that ‘in order to understand the way in which 
money is viewed it is vitally important to understand the cultural matrix into 
which it is incorporated’ (1989: 1). Because of a failure to do this, they say, 
economic anthropologists ‘have commonly fallen into the trap of attributing to 
money in general what is in fact a specific set of meanings which derive from 
our own culture’ (1989: 1). Anti-surrogacy polemic betrays specific assumptions 
about what ‘market norms’ entail and imply that doing something for love and 
doing something for money are fundamentally at odds with each other. Healy 
(2006) has shown, through his discussion of the social organisation of blood and 
organ distribution systems, the cultural work employed by organisations in order 
to sustain a sense of altruism. This preserves a culturally acceptable spirit of 
altruism in order to separate human goods from the marketplace and ensures a 
steady supply of such goods through promoting a sense of social responsibility 
(see also Tutton 2002: 528). Like Zelizer’s (1997, 2005; see also Miller 1998) 
important work on money and social life, Healy shows the impossibility of 
separating out gifts and commodities, love and money and altruism and self-
interest in reality while also attesting to the persistent significance of such 
distinctions in ethical rhetoric.  
 One of the most interesting aspects of surrogacy for anthropologists is 
the way it highlights how people in western, capitalist societies think about 
money, materialism and commodities. In Schneider’s ‘cultural account’ of 
American kinship, the opposition between love and money is fundamental. For 
Americans, ‘Money is material, it is power, it is impersonal and unqualified by 
considerations of sentiment or morality’ while ‘Love is not material. It is highly 
personal and is beset with qualifications and considerations of sentiment and 
morality’ (1980: 48). While Schneider’s account has been criticised on the 
grounds that it is difficult and/or unhelpful to isolate such a ‘pure’ account 
(Schneider 1984; Yanagisako 1978; Yanagisako and Delaney 1994), many of 
the symbols of American kinship that he identifies endure in popular 
assumptions about the basis of American, and British and western European, 
kinship thinking, as we see in the polemic surrounding commercial surrogacy. 
Ideas about maternal bonding, materialism and altruism relate to concerns 
about the surrogate mother’s motivation. This is interesting anthropologically 
since, by making claims about the ethics of surrogacy and particularly the 
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surrogate mother, the claim-maker is also ‘performing’ her own ethical stance. 
One of the points of connection between respondents’ ideas about surrogacy 
and their everyday practice, then, is their ideas about human motive and how 
this intersects with money, choice and morality.  
 Respondents felt that the best motive for a surrogate mother would be to 
help another to have a child. This assumption that ‘altruism’ is the best motive 
for surrogates reflects the value of altruism, along with compassion and love, for 
them. Philosophical models of altruism distinguish between generalised altruism 
in which an individual acts with others’ interests in mind and supererogatory 
altruism, in which this is extended to actions for others without regard for 
oneself. The first type, avoiding harming others, is simply a part of one’s duty as 
one living amongst others, whilst the latter is an effort to directly help others 
(Seglow 2002: 2). Altruistic surrogacy seems, as it is framed in public discourse, 
to lean towards the more supererogatory end of the altruistic spectrum, as 
pregnancy and labour are, despite the improvements of modern obstetrical 
medicine, onerous bodily processes with occasionally fatal consequences for 
mother and/or child. ‘Pure’ altruism is a cultural ideal, much like the pure gift, but 
real-life decisions by particular individuals will necessarily entail a complex 
intermixing of motives that may be construed as ‘altruistic’ or ‘selfish’ according 
to when, where and by whom such assessments are made. While apparently 
aimed at the common good, purely altruistic or self-sacrificial actions, 
meanwhile, may be excessive and therefore in some sense anti-social (Douglas 
1990).  
 Proponents of altruistic surrogacy often invoke the idea of the gift as a 
means of placing this ‘exchange’ on acceptable moral ground. Overlapping 
altruism and gift-giving in this way reinforces surrogacy’s acceptability since in 
the UK as elsewhere in the Western world, the motives for giving are typically 
viewed as positive, warm and non-instrumental, belonging to the world of 
affective relationships between friends, lovers and kin (Carrier 1990, 1995, 
1997; Strathern 2003). This is in contrast to Mauss’ (1990; Douglas 1990) 
original point that gift exchange also reproduces hierarchy, expresses 
aggression and creates bonds of obligation. In Ragoné’s study, the surrogates 
claimed that, although they were paid, they were motivated by altruism (1994: 
59) and the agents in her study found gift rhetoric invaluable in recruiting 
surrogates (1994: 32). Describing surrogacy as ‘the gift of life’ is, she found, 
beneficial to all parties in ensuring the ‘success’ of the arrangement and doing 
least to threaten cultural norms. Ragoné’s findings complicate assumed 
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dichotomies between commercial and altruistic surrogacy, as the ‘altruistic’ gift 
becomes entangled in what is also a commercial exchange.  
 As Parry says, ‘The interested exchange and the disinterested gift … 
emerge as two sides of the same coin’ (1986: 458) – an elaborated ideology of 
the pure gift arises in a context of an advanced division of labour, a significant 
commercial sector and a ‘salvationist’ religious milieu. In his insightful reading of 
Mauss, Parry reminds us that attempts to quantify self-interest and disinterest 
(or ‘altruism’) in gift exchanges miss the point that such a distinction is itself a 
feature of the context (1986: 458; see also Strathern 1992a: 2; cf. Konrad 2005). 
This ethnography provides a window onto some of the realities of living in a 
cultural context framed by a dichotomy between gifts and commodities (cf. 
Strathern 1988) and the importance of nuanced judgements in balancing out 
such ideals in real life.  
Ragoné (1994: 51) says, ‘The tendency to cast surrogates’ intentions 
into dichotomous, often antagonistic, categories such as either altruism or 
monetary gain may reveal more about American culture than it does about 
surrogacy itself’; the same point can be made for the UK. In the public discourse 
around surrogacy and assisted conception of the 1980s and 1990s, altruism 
was defined as a distinctly British value (Wolfram 1989), bolstered by rhetorical 
association with the gift. Titmuss’ study of blood donation systems provides a 
related example of the power of altruistic and anti-commercial rhetoric in the UK. 
He concluded that, overall, the ‘altruistic’ model of blood donation as used in 
Britain is a healthier and more efficient basis for a transfusion service than the 
largely commercial one in place in the USA at the time. This conclusion is not a 
morally neutral one. For Titmuss, blood donation motivated by altruism and 
voluntarism, which for him is best exemplified by the British system, is a 
fundamental goal of public policy and the ‘right’ way for people to behave: 
 
Where are the lines to be drawn – can indeed any lines at all be 
pragmatically drawn – if human blood is to be legitimated as a 
consumption good? To search for an identity and sphere of concern for 
social policy would therefore be to search for the non-existent. All policy 
would become in the end economic policy and the only values that would 
count would be those that could be measured in terms of money and 
pursued in the dialectic of hedonism. Each individual would act 
egotistically for the good of all by selling his blood for what the market 
would pay. To abolish the moral choice of giving to strangers could lead 
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to an ideology to end all ideologies. (1997: 58) 
 
 Despite his belief in a natural altruistic impulse (1997: 311), paid blood 
donation systems are, says Titmuss, one sign of a potentially totalising 
economistic world-view. As he says, differences in blood donation systems tell 
us ‘something about the quality of relationships and of human values prevailing 
in a society’ (1997: 59), and his book is in itself an interesting artefact of British 
attitudes to money and human motive in the post-war era. Of course, such 
attitudes have changed since Titmuss was writing. The Thatcher period was 
experienced by almost all respondents and many of the younger ones grew up 
in it. Thatcher’s policies of course had seismic effects on British models of 
money, choice and political economy (see Franklin 1997; Strathern 1992a), 
though it is worth noting that she was always deeply unpopular in Scotland and 
indeed the SNP are particularly resistant to the more Thatcherite policies of the 
contemporary Labour party in Westminster such as public-private initiatives in 
the health sector.14 
 
 
 
Kinship, knowledge and morality 
 
 The people I have defined here as respondents refer to the sixty people I 
regularly talked to and spent time with, including those with whom I lived and 
worked, so they include those I interviewed but not those visitors I met briefly 
such as tourists in the wildlife centre, though I will occasionally refer to these 
more fleeting acquaintances. Only a third of respondents are male, which in part 
reflects the fact that more women than men work in the wildlife centre, but may 
also be related to my own gender and the perception of a few that I was 
interested in “women’s issues”. 30% of respondents are parents, though only a 
third of those work in the wildlife centre themselves (as volunteers). 
Respondents are evenly split in numbers who are divorced and those who are 
married, both representing 18% each. These percentages reflect past and 
current status, so some people will fit into both categories if this is their second 
marriage. Nearly 40% of respondents are single and nearly a third are in long-
term relationships. Two respondents are widowed, but both now have new 
                                                
14 See, for example, Plans to end private cash for NHS, BBC website 21st June 2007 
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partners. Only three respondents’ parents are divorced. Within the group of 
respondents, there are eight couples. All of the respondents’ current 
relationships are heterosexual, though a few have been in single-sex 
relationships at some point in their lives. 
 In Born and Bred, Edwards illustrates through a range of examples how 
Bacup people ‘put to work’ both ‘born’ and ‘bred’ categories of knowledge to 
make certain claims and connections: 
 
The power of Born and Bred kinship is in its hybridity, and the kinds of 
connection made through the interplay between being born and being 
bred are robust and ubiquitous. Focusing on the way in which idioms of 
relatedness, such as birth and breeding, are put to work by residents in 
the north of England towards the end of the twentieth century reveals the 
cultural repertoire from which different kinds of experts select. As experts 
in kinship, the people whose words I have borrowed in this book mobilize 
different strands of connectedness: strands they trace through such 
things as blood, or genes, or care, or love and which together make up 
kinship. Perspectives (vantage points) are created when one set of 
connections is made instead of another. And perspectives can be 
congealed and often are for particular political purposes. Thus for 
another kind of expert (say in science) it may be instrumental to 
emphasize one set of connections over and above another. But to do 
this – to extract just one strand of kinship thinking and present it as the 
whole story – is partisan. The kind of kinship on which I have focused is 
generated from the interplay between born and bred perhaps couched in 
terms of nature and nurture, or the biological and the social. It not only 
makes fine differentiations between categories of person and 
relationship, but also lumps them together in broad encompassing 
categories. It formulates “communities” as well as “families”, and it 
connects people to, and disconnects them from, places, pasts, and each 
other. And it is not confined to Bacup. (2000: 248) 
 
I have quoted this passage at length because it is a clear and thorough 
summary of Edwards’ model. In addition to illustrating the interplay and 
mixedness of given and made knowledge in British kinship, it makes clear some 
of the effects of this model. In particular, Edwards describes born and bred 
kinship as ‘robust and ubiquitous’ but also as mobile, generative, differentiating, 
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homogenising, connective and disconnective, capturing the way that it contains 
within it sometimes contradictory meanings. Importantly, she shows also the 
way that this model can be used to make claims that are both ‘partisan’ and 
individualising but also collective and ‘encompassing’.  
 Of course, Moray and Lancashire are quite different places.15 In addition 
to the different national, political and historical contexts of northwest England 
and northeast Scotland, the people Edwards worked with in Bacup were 
predominantly working class, while the respondents in this study are almost all 
middle-class.16 However, they are both places which seem to offer elements of 
the rural idyll or good life to incomers. Despite the differences, it seems that 
Edwards is correct to assert that the born and bred model of thinking is 
identifiable further afield than Bacup. In Moray, I found that people similarly drew 
upon and played with given and made domains of knowledge and made 
connections between the familiar and unfamiliar in discussing surrogacy. Making 
connections in this way was a regular part of their claim-making as well as a 
means of suggesting implications and it permeated speech not only at the level 
of ideas, but also in the very fabric of what was said, which was frequently 
marked by tropic language.  
 Describing the born and bred model of kinship as ‘robust’ suggests its 
force and Edwards notes the relationship between knowledge and authority. In 
The Sport of Kings, Cassidy (2002; see also Borneman 1988) extends these 
points by depicting the close connection between kinship and power in 
Newmarket. Horseracing people are highly selective about ‘recognising’ their kin 
and success in racing may be just as important as genealogy in making kinship. 
Newmarket is a place marked by status difference, where mobility and 
communication between different groups is discouraged and Cassidy carefully 
delineates the various ways in which the structure of this society is reproduced 
and how boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are maintained, largely through 
ideas about kinship and reproduction as seen through the particular lens of 
pedigree and Thoroughbred breeding. 
 In Newmarket, women and men are conceptualised as different based 
on their physical attributes and Cassidy says that ‘using a primarily physical 
idiom of gender has eased the crossover of ideas from animals to men and 
                                                
15 Having said this, one respondent who volunteered in the wildlife centre comes from Wigan in 
Lancashire and I met quite a lot of people in Moray who originated in Yorkshire, which borders 
Lancashire, though given the traditional rivalry between the two counties they would no doubt be 
the first to claim the differences between them. 
16 If asked to categorise the respondents in this study in Bacupian categories, they would perhaps 
fit best in the subgroup of ‘th’ippies’. 
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women, so common in Newmarket … Women are associated with birth and 
nurturing, perceived as “natural” processes, but “nature” is also powerful and 
violent and … associated with male virility’ (2002: 37). Just as the ‘empty’ mare 
is ‘covered’ by the stallion and mares are thought to contribute weakness and 
temperament to foals that must be compensated for by the strength of the 
stallion, women in Newmarket can only access success through marrying or 
being born into already successful families (2002: 38).  
 Theories of reproduction are central to the maintenance and regulation 
of the horseracing world, as in other social worlds. In Newmarket, this relies on 
the use of a specific and highly elaborated idiom of breeding, but the wider 
point, that ideas about kinship and procreation reproduce normative ideas about 
gender, remains salient (see also Davis-Floyd 1992; Delaney 1986; Franklin 
1997; Ginsburg 1989; Ginsburg and Rapp 1991; Konrad 2005; Martin 1991, 
2001; McKinnon 1994; Paxson 2004; Ragoné 1994; Rapp 1999a; Stanworth 
1987a). In Part One, we shall see in particular that, in making speculative 
judgements about the ethics of surrogacy, respondents frequently supported 
their claims with reference to normative ideas of motherhood and different 
gendered roles for men and women in parenthood. This is one place in which 
specific ideas about gender and kinship expressed by respondents here, 
particularly their ideas about altruism, love, responsibility and emotionality, can 
be seen. I will take up these points in Part Two in exploring further how such 
ideas are expressed through experiences of work and in people’s relationships 
with and ideas about cetaceans. 
 Edwards describes Bacup people’s anxiety about nameless donated 
gametes and embryos uprooted from their kinship connections and relational 
context while removed from parental bodies and manipulated in clinics: ‘The 
notion of moral obligation … emerges when people talk about the vulnerability of 
detached entities such as gametes and embryos. ... Responsibility goes with 
connection and clinicians, for example, are unconnected to the embryo and 
gametes with which they work and are not therefore axiomatically responsible 
for them’ (2000: 229). In this and other examples, Edwards’ co-
conversationalists seem to me to be talking not only about connections or 
contextualising novel reproductive practices by linking them up with their own 
experience, but also expressing moral judgements (see Hirsch 1993). This is 
further implied by Edwards’ related observation that ‘roots’ provide examples 
and experience that contribute to people’s character (2000: 216).  
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 It is my view that kinship is inextricably linked with morality and that this 
should be reflected in anthropological analysis, yet the development of the 
subfield within anthropology, especially through the structural-functionalist 
models of the earlier twentieth century, has led to a situation in which this point 
has at times been neglected in favour of a focus on ‘natural facts’ and juridical 
function. In Western societies, kinship has been assumed to exist in a separate, 
private realm that can be isolated from other domains like politics, economics 
and religion; the same shift marks our perception of morality. Surrogacy is 
interesting as it is a practice that seems to fit most comfortably within the 
‘private’ domains of kinship and morality or ethics, yet it is explicitly regulated by 
the State. Through my analysis here, I will investigate how kinship acts as a site 
of moral authority in order to reunite the common concerns of kinship and 
morality and to show that neither can be relegated to the private domain since 
the way that people think about these issues can be an expression of wider 
concerns as well as a means of reproducing particular ideologies. 
 As I will demonstrate, respondents treated surrogacy as an ethical issue, 
which, since they are not personally involved in it, provoked them to make 
speculative moral judgements about the practice and motives of those who 
might become involved in surrogacy arrangements. Respondents’ ideas about 
surrogacy therefore provide an opportunity to explore further the relationship 
between kinship and morality, and how this is crosscut with normative ideas 
about gender. British models of kinship, as elsewhere, not only provide the 
bases for claims of belonging or a means of creating and maintaining 
connections between people, but also model moral values and proper behaviour 
between people. 
 In her work on British ova donation Konrad (2005) describes relations 
between anonymous donors and recipients as ‘transilient’. Transilience – 
literally, leaping across – is in Konrad’s usage a notion of linkage and extension 
between people and across time and space. In contrast to Maussian notions of 
reciprocity, an Ego-centric kinship model and the idea of the alienable individual 
with property-like rights over her body parts, she shows how anonymous 
recipients and donors make ‘irrelational kinship’ between themselves and others 
through the webs of relations, real and imagined, known and unknown, that 
connect them through the act of donating part of oneself. While Konrad 
describes the experiences of those personally involved in anonymous donation, 
her ideas about transilience and irrelational kinship may have some relevance in 
this context of a group of unrelated people whose relationships to each other 
 44
have many of the qualities of relations between kin. In particular, I would 
suggest that respondents’ relationships not only with other people, but also with 
the natural world and animals, have a transilient nature. These people are 
located in extensive relational networks premised on qualities of altruism, love 
and care with people, animals and places to which they mostly do not have 
biogenetic ties. Especially since they use the idioms of kinship, nature and 
community to talk about these relationships, it is perhaps therefore appropriate 
to describe this as a form of irrelational kinship.  
   
 
  
The power of nature 
 
 The fact that Spey Bay contains an official nature reserve points to the 
importance of conceptions of nature in this ethnography, and this is one 
particular place where we can see most clearly the fertile intersections between 
respondents’ ideas about surrogacy on the one hand and their everyday 
practice building good lives on the other. In the coming chapters I will trace 
these intersections in order to demonstrate my point that ideas about surrogacy 
and other similar ethical issues need not be divorced from their cultural context. 
As I started to talk to them about surrogacy and participate in their everyday 
lives, I noticed that respondents have particular and specific ways of thinking 
about and acting towards nature and the natural world and it quickly became 
clear to me that to leave this out of my account of their views on surrogacy 
would be analytically sterile. 
 One of the key contributions of anthropologists in recent decades has 
been their thorough reconsideration of nature as a variable, contingent category 
that encompasses many different meanings, not just in the contrasts between 
Western and non-Western societies (Descola and Pálsson 1996; Strathern 
1980), but also within Western societies (Franklin 2003; Franklin et al 2000; 
Gould 2005; James 1993; Keller 2008; Macnaghten and Urry 1998; Strathern 
1992a, 1992b, 2003; Thompson 2001, 2002; Tsing 1994; Yanagisako and 
Delaney 1994). That nature is a polysemous category is evident from 
considering the many meanings that it has in the English language alone 
(Cronon 1996; Franklin 1997: 54; Keller 2008: 118; Schneider 1980). Williams 
(1983: 221-224) was an early contributor here and identified nature’s various 
personifications in British thought as a god or king associated with natural forces 
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and potential for destruction, as a lawyer whose workings are rational and can 
be discovered by science, as the innocent and beautiful world untainted by 
human activity exemplified by the English countryside and as selective breeding 
and survival of the fittest. As Keller (2008) argues, blurring nature’s sometimes 
disparate meanings is an inherent feature of Euro-American thinking about this 
concept.  
 In this study, the distinction, and constant elision of, ideas of naturalness 
and the natural world is salient and in juxtaposing respondents’ various ideas 
about nature, from representations of local wildlife to their consumption of 
natural foods to claims about maternal bonding, we will see how naturalness, 
nature and the natural world are implicated in each other, as well as the 
historically and culturally specific nature of their ideas about nature and the 
natural world. Respondents are particularly influenced by environmentalist 
conceptualisations of nature. Of course, the environmental or green movement 
by no means presents a monolithic vision of nature, encompassing a spectrum 
of views. ‘Nature’ is nonetheless central to the movement and in many sense 
what holds it together. It is therefore particularly interesting to consider how it 
works in the lives and thinking of a group of people for whom it is so vital. 
 Environmentalism has begun to receive sustained interest in 
anthropology alongside its increasingly greater purchase on Western, and to 
some extent non-Western, politics, economy and culture (see Berglund 1998; 
Descola and Pálsson 1996; Macnaghten and Urry 1998; Milton 1993). Since the 
Second World War, the green movement has grown from its initial (and often 
patronising and dismissive) associations with the hippie counterculture to 
become a staple of the mainstream political agenda that crosses party political 
lines. Theorists have shown how the contingent meanings of nature may be 
employed to support particular claims and in order to effect specific aims by 
those working in the environmentalist movement and with animals (Thompson 
2002; Yearley 1993). As these studies suggest, much is at stake in making 
claims about, with and on nature. 
 Most of the respondents in this study work in nature as paid staff or 
volunteers in the wildlife centre in Spey Bay. Many other people I met during 
fieldwork also making a living from nature, most obviously the wildlife-watching 
tour operators in the area, but also people from such disparate fields as forestry 
management, tourism, food, outdoor education and the arts. Even whisky 
distillers have come to associate their industry with images of natural purity and 
the traditional use of natural resources (see, for example, the Glenfiddich 
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website). As noted, the presence of rare wildlife in Moray provides local people 
with ideas about who they are and the special nature of the place they live in. 
One way this is evident is in how people claim a connection to nature and the 
natural world through their work, whether in making art that demonstrates an 
appreciation for the landscape and environment, sharing the ‘magical’ 
experience of watching dolphins in the wild with tourists or in the more nebulous 
sense that the ‘slower’ pace of life and closer proximity to wildlife in this part of 
the world facilitates a more natural way of living and working.  
 The importance of ideas about nature and the natural world in people’s 
lives have been particularly successfully demonstrated by anthropological 
studies of relationships between people and animals. As Cassidy has shown for 
horses and as we will see in respondents’ contingent and nuanced ideas about 
cetaceans, the animals that human groups identify with may be thought of as 
family at one moment and an alien species at another and such ideas can 
reproduce particular ideologies about gender, class and reproduction in 
humans. Like the natural world more generally, animals are fecund with 
sometimes contradictory meanings: 
 
Whether one believes that a horse can be loyal or brave, is secondary to 
the observation that, in Newmarket, horses are both, and also naughty, 
funny, wicked and spiteful. They are at times “people just like us” and at 
others “man’s noblest creation”. It is the tension between these two 
positions that enables horses in Newmarket to be such flexible resources 
for thinking about relations between humans and between humans and 
nature. (Cassidy 2002: 129) 
 
 In a review of work on human-animal relations in anthropology, Mullin 
(1999) notes the relationship between trends in anthropological thinking and the 
treatment of animals in ethnography. She sees the ‘windows and mirrors’ 
approach as a productive one, and makes the related point that, just as 
ethnographic accounts of Western kinship can help expose some of the 
underlying assumptions of anthropologists that have informed kinship theory 
(Bouquet 1993; Edwards 2000; Franklin 1997), ethnographic explication of the 
ways that people think about the other species in their lives similarly reflect the 
preoccupations of social science. So, an interest in identity politics and 
reflexivity in the social sciences along with a concurrent increase in the influence 
 47
of environmentalist discourse has gone alongside a recent mushrooming of 
attention paid to the relations between people and animals. 
 As Franklin (1997, 2003, 2007) has shown, ideas about nature and the 
natural are fundamental not only to how Euro-Americans think about the natural 
world and animals, but also to kinship and reproduction (see also Becker 1994; 
Bouquet 1993; Cannell 1990; Carsten 2000a; Cassidy 2002; Davis-Floyd 1992; 
Delaney 1986; Dolgin 1994; Edwards 2000; Ginsburg 1989; Hayden 1995; 
Hirsch 1993; Martin 1991, 2001; Ragoné 1994; Rapp 1994; Schneider 1980; 
Strathern 1992a, 1992b, 2003; Thompson 2001; Tsing 1994; Yanagisako and 
Delaney 1994). Franklin argues that understanding the idiom of naturalness is 
essential to grasping Anglo-American cultures (1997: 57), and this is particularly 
acute given the close connections that she identifies between anthropologists’ 
own ideas about nature in reproduction and kinship and what they find in their 
ethnographies, as was particularly evident in the Virgin Birth debate (see Leach 
1969; Delaney 1986; Shore 1992). Franklin asks, ‘How might ethnographic 
representation work in relation to the production of cultural theory, when the 
ethnographic subjects share the same confusions as the anthropologists?’ 
(1997: 72) This is a pressing question for any anthropologist of Britain 
attempting to handle nature – and of course other key concepts in British culture 
– which it would be unwise to ignore.   
 Tsing (1994: 114) argues for American culture, and this can be extended 
to the UK, that nature fills in gaps in our knowledge, providing a basis for 
understanding that which is apparently unknowable. Defining that which is 
natural and unnatural is an exercise of power, therefore one of the key 
questions that I address in this thesis is, what are the effects of claiming that 
something is natural or unnatural? A major contribution of anthropological theory 
on kinship and reproduction in the last few decades has been to show the 
workings of power in human relationships with the natural world and the way 
that nature may be used to legitimise and reproduce inequality. For Yanagisako 
and Delaney, nature has picked up where Christianity left off after the decline of 
institutionalised religion in western European and North American societies: 
‘what was left was a rule-governed Nature, Nature stripped of its cosmological 
moorings and therefore presumably generalizable to all peoples. Rather than 
the dichotomy between the natural and supernatural, what was left was “nature” 
vs. what man did with it – namely, “culture”. This move obscured the specificity 
of the concept of “nature”’ (1994: 4; see also Sahlins 1996).  
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 Because of an Anglo-American belief in natural facts as the basis for 
kinship and reproduction (Franklin 1997; Strathern 1992a), Western models of 
kinship posited a system in which culture simply elaborated on a natural 
baseline. This has consequences not only for our theories of reproduction and 
relatedness, but also relations of power in intimate relationships and especially 
gender (Martin 1991, 2001; McKinnon 1994; Rapp 1999a). As Yanagisako and 
Delaney (1994: 9) make clear, given nature’s position as the heir to Christian 
theology in contemporary Western society, this means that current public 
debates about procreation such as those surrounding new reproductive 
technologies or changing patterns in gender relations reflect ontological and 
cosmological concerns.  
 One of the major concerns with which I will engage in this thesis is the 
relationship between nature, ethics and morality and in tackling respondents’ 
relationships with nature from various different angles I aim to show the 
interrelatedness of claims about each of them. In my view, the fact that what 
was once called the green movement has been reconceptualised and 
remarketed as ‘ethical living’ is one crucial reason for the increasing currency of 
environmental thinking in British culture and politics (see also Grove-White 
1993). As Cronon writes:  
 
Popular concern about the environment often implicitly appeals to a kind 
of naïve realism for its intellectual foundation, more or less assuming that 
we can pretty easily recognize nature when we see it and thereby make 
uncomplicated choices between natural things, which are good, and 
unnatural things, which are bad. Much of the moral authority that has 
made environmentalism so compelling as a popular movement flows 
from its appeal to nature as a stable external source of nonhuman values 
against which human actions can be judged without much ambiguity. 
(1996: 25-6) 
 
Such moralism has long been a feature of environmentalist writing and of course 
thinkers as diverse as Henry David Thoreau, James Lovelock and William 
Morris have all simultaneously suggested particular (and notably different) ways 
of life alongside an ethic of caring for the natural world.  
 In line with the meaning of nature as that which is untainted by human 
activity or artifice, a view of nature and culture as two points on a dichotomy has 
a long history in both anthropological theory and native Western thought (see, 
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for example, Lévi-Strauss 1962, 1966; Schneider 1980). This has in recent 
years come to be replaced by an awareness that nature is as inextricably bound 
up in human thought as any other concept (Butler 2007; Cassidy 2002; Descola 
and Pálsson 1996; Keller 2008; Franklin 2003; Franklin et al 2000; Mullin 1999, 
2007; Strathern 1992a). This awareness has provoked some theorists to 
proclaim that the many meanings of nature are all ‘cultural constructions that 
reflect human judgments, human values, human choices’ (Cronon 1996: 35), 
though of course as Strathern (1992a: 2, passim) makes clear, while seeing 
nature as a product of human thought in many ways moves the debate forward, 
using the term ‘cultural [or social] construction’ retains the sense that there is 
some baseline from which to build (Latour 1993).  
Franklin writes that as a consequence of this critique of the nature-
culture dichotomy in the social sciences, some theorists have concluded that 
nature is now redundant. Instead, she states, ‘the category of the natural 
remains central to the production of difference, not only as a shifting 
classificatory category, but through processes of naturalization, de-
naturalization, and re-naturalization’ (2003: 68; original emphasis). She 
therefore argues for an analytical approach that considers the ‘traffic in nature’ 
(Franklin et al 2000). As she says, a key feature of Euro-American ideas about 
kinship, biology and nature is their ability to encompass, and thus constantly 
vacillate between, ‘given’ and ‘made’ elements of knowledge; hybrid elements of 
nature and culture, individual and society are inherent in these concepts. 
Consequently, nature may have come to seem more fluid, but instead of 
weakening it, this has in fact strengthened its appeal and force (Franklin 2003: 
68).  
The connections that Euro-Americans make between given and made 
knowledge that Franklin describes are conceptualised by Strathern as 
‘merographic’. She defines merographic connection in the following way: 
 
Consider: domains such as “culture” and “nature” appear to be linked by 
virtue of being at once similar and dissimilar. What makes the similarities 
is the effort to “see” connections; what makes the dissimilarities is the 
“recognition” of difference. Difference thereby becomes apparent from a 
simple fact of life: it is a connection from another angle. That is, what 
looks as though it is connected to one fact can also be connected to 
another. Culture and nature may be connected together as domains that 
run in analogous fashion insofar as each operates in a similar way 
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according to laws of its own; at the same time, each is also connected to 
a whole other range of phenomena which differentiate them – the 
activities of human beings, for instance, by contrast with the physical 
properties of the universe. This second connection makes the partial 
nature of the analogy obvious. It presupposes that one thing differs from 
another insofar as it belongs to or is part of something else. I call this 
kind of connection, link or relationship merographic’. (1992a: 72-3; 
original emphases) 
 
In this ethnography, I will show that nature works primarily in two 
important ways for respondents, as a grounding concept and as a source of 
goodness. I use the term grounding concept (cf. Strathern 1992a: 195, passim) 
to refer to those ideas that respondents use to support particular claims. The 
idea of grounding points to the fact that, although these concepts may in 
practice be contingent and encompass contradictory meanings, when they are 
used to support particular claims, they are referred to as if they are 
incontrovertible and uncontested. They provide the grounds or reference points 
in a particular argument. Nature also works as a source of goodness in 
respondents’ ideas. As with the concept of the good life, I use goodness here to 
denote both virtue and fulfilment. Living ‘closer’ to or ‘in harmony with’ nature is 
for respondents a source of pleasure and happiness, but also a means of acting 
in accordance with one’s moral and ethical obligations to care for the natural 
world. As this suggests, recognising, caring for and building a relationship with 
nature is inextricably linked with respondents’ ethics, again both in terms of their 
moral values and their ideas about how to live.  
This ethnography offers a portrayal of how nature looks for a group of 
people living in northeastern Scotland in the early twenty-first century, a period 
marked by environmental awareness and ethical living but also by apparently 
proliferating technological development and demographic change. This 
depiction is of a specific, local culture of nature, then, but wider cultural, political, 
economic and ideological currents are of course relevant and there may well be 
many points of connection with other like-minded communities in Scotland and 
the rest of the UK. Respondents’ relationships with specific animals are 
extremely important in structuring their ideas about nature, belonging and ethics, 
but they have by no means cut themselves off from ‘mainstream’ society and 
many of their ideas about how to live well can be traced to environmentalist 
writing and campaigning – which has itself become increasingly accessible in 
 51
recent years – as well as more diffuse cultural ideas about the natural world and 
humans’ place in nature. 
While terms like ‘grounding’ and ‘source’ suggest nature’s earthliness, it 
also has a transcendent quality (see also Berglund 1998: 152), though in 
contrast to the American homesteaders described by Gould (2005: 4), I see it 
more as an ethical than spiritual17 category for respondents, which is no doubt 
due in no small part to the different histories of both nature and god in British 
and American thought (Gould 2005: xxi, passim; Strathern 1992a: 93-98, 
passim; see also Franklin et al 2000; Tsing 1994; Yanagisako and Delaney 
1994). Of course, cultural and ethical ideas are difficult to disentangle from 
religious ones (Cannell 2005, 2006; Lambek 2002; Sahlins 1996), and we shall 
see that Christian themes including salvation, sacrifice and charity are very 
important in their everyday lives.18 There are also many points of similarity in 
Anglo-American ideas about nature and the Christian god. Nature has not 
replaced god, but as a concept it works in similar ways and can have similarly 
powerful effects. Nature is powerful and even omnipotent for the respondents in 
this study. This potency is due to its polysemy and specifically because, 
amongst its many meanings, it is a grounding or baseline, and thus 
fundamentally knowable, but at the same time a transcendent and cosmological 
principle that is ultimately unfathomable.  
In After Nature, Strathern (1992a) juxtaposed English people’s ideas 
about nature in kinship and in their concerns about ecological crisis, suggesting 
the fruitful and important connections between these ideas as well as nature’s 
capacity to travel. Nature is powerful not only because of its meaning as a pre-
cultural, timeless essence, but also in its ability to permeate all areas of life 
since one of its meanings is as the baseline that precedes all else. Given this, 
one of the contributions I hope to make in this thesis is to suggest the fertile 
links between ideas about nature in human relationships with the natural world 
                                                
17 Gould’s definition of nature as a spiritual category for homesteaders reflects contemporary 
ideas about spiritualism as a form of religious life that embraces more personalised and non-
institutional forms of practise (see Pike 2001a: 14). 
18 Indeed, as Lambek (2002) notes, not only is religion notoriously difficult to define cross-
culturally, but it is also closely related to some of the key concepts I will discuss here including 
particularly nature and ethics. I would suggest that for respondents, most of whom do not practise 
any world religion such as Christianity, nature is a concept that could not exist as it does without 
the deep-rooted influence of certain religious – and, specifically, Christian – ideas in their cultural 
and intellectual milieu. However, while religious concepts are important in respondents’ ideas 
about nature – as well as kinship, gender, work and ethics – this is not their primary manifestation 
or only aspect. For this reason, I see nature more as a transcendent cultural and ethical category 
for respondents than a religious doctrine or immanent deity.  
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and in kinship and reproduction, and in particular to consider environmentalist 
ideas about nature in connection with Strathern’s analysis.  
 In After Nature, Strathern presents her seminal thesis on nature in 
English culture. As she makes clear her designation, ‘the English’, is not 
intended to represent a simple empirical reality, but to exemplify a particular way 
of thinking. In my view, the people who I met during fieldwork in many ways fit 
into this category of ‘the English’. This is partly because most of them were born 
and bred in England and because, despite some important differences, the 
English and Scottish have an enormous amount in common. It has to be said 
that, had I conducted fieldwork with a group of Scots who were native to or 
longer settled in the area, then this would have been less straightforward, as it 
seems likely that the differences between ‘Scottish’ and ‘English’ kinships would 
have been more salient, as is suggested by Cohen’s informants in Whalsay and 
Basu’s work with roots tourists. One significant reason for arguing that 
respondents here are similar to Strathern’s ‘English’ is her definition of them as 
‘the class that does not just advertise but analyses its own conventions [and] … 
that makes its implicit practices explicit to itself’ (1992a: 26; see also Firth et al 
1969: 17). It will hopefully become clear in the coming chapters that this 
tendency towards reflexivity is also characteristic of the respondents here. 
Similarly, much of their awareness of issues like surrogacy, and for that matter 
environmentalism, is filtered through news media, literature and the arts.  
Strathern describes an English tendency to make explicit, or ‘literalise’, 
things to themselves. In the late twentieth century, she argues, this has an 
important culmination:  
 
There is one specific move towards literalisation whose effect I wish to 
make explicit: in the currently prevalent idea that nature and culture are 
both cultural construction, the one term (culture) seems to consume the 
other (nature). We might put it that an antithesis between nature and 
culture as it might have shaped certain discourses in English life has 
become flattened; if so, it is flattened in a mode specific to the late 
twentieth century, and one that has indeed had an interesting effect as 
far as culture is concerned. (1992a: 5)  
 
In the ‘postplural’ period, she says, nature comes to lose its grounding function 
(1992a: 195), with the consequence that one can no longer perceive context or 
identify a particular perspective. This has fundamental consequences for ideas 
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about individual, society and culture and speaks to key issues of contemporary 
Western life including choice, consumption and morality:  
 
What is in crisis here is the symbolic order, the conceptualisation of the 
relationship between nature and culture such that one can talk about the 
one through the other. Nature as a ground for the meaning of cultural 
practices can no longer be taken for granted if Nature itself is regarded 
as having to be protected and promoted.  
  
After nature: modification of the natural world has become consumption 
of it, in exactly the same way as modification of the world’s cultures 
(through colonisation) has become consumption of them by the 
international tourist. The old double model for the production of culture – 
society improves nature, society reflects nature – no longer works. The 
individual consumes cultural and natural products alike, but in 
consuming them him or herself reproduces only him or herself. (1992a: 
177)  
 
 I will address Strathern’s claims about personalised morality in Chapter 
Five and will return to her sense that nature has lost its relational facility in the 
Conclusion. What I want to draw attention to for the moment is the claim that 
nature can be, or even has been, ‘flattened’. As noted, nature was one of the 
recurring ideas (or set of ideas) that respondents spoke about during my 
fieldwork and the contingent and divergent ways that they used it, in different 
situations, in relation to different topics and to particular claims, all suggest its 
polysemy and thus its apparent ‘constructedness’, but also, as I have just 
suggested, its persistent potency. Has it, then, been flattened? This is a 
question that runs through the chapters. I will argue that, for the people we shall 
meet in the proceeding chapters, fifteen years after After Nature was published, 
nature has not been flattened, but instead works as a grounding for particular 
claims and as a site of transcendent value. In particular, we shall see that for 
this group of people, nature has a particularly ethical flavour and that this is a 
vital part of its ideological and rhetorical force. 
Following Strathern’s argument about the flattening of nature, 
Macnaghten and Urry conclude that, ‘if nature is no longer viewable as simply 
“natural” but is socially and culturally constructed, then nature does not and 
cannot provide, as has often been argued, the simple and unmediated ethical or 
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moral foundation for the good life’ (1998: 30). As I have suggested here, this 
statement contradicts my experience of how nature works in respondents’ lives. 
It is of course vital to remember that Strathern’s ideas about a postplural nature 
are inferences based on certain ideas in public discourses and the social 
sciences. In saying that nature loses its grounding function or that it becomes 
flattened, she is not pretending to describe an empirical or even ideological 
reality, but the intellectual consequences of how nature was conceptualised at a 
particular moment in history. The status of nature in a postplural or postmodern 
world is a particularly thorny one, not only because of its endless layers of 
overlapping meaning, but because of its ideological, normative and intellectual 
ramifications. 
 
 
 
Extraordinary and everyday ethics 
 
Surrogacy is, like cloning (Franklin 2007), ova donation (Konrad 2005), 
amniocentesis (Rapp 1999a), pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (Franklin and 
Roberts 2006), abortion (Ginsburg 1989; Paxson 2004) and IVF (Franklin 1997), 
one of a family of biomedical techniques that are seen to provoke profound 
ethical questions for the people in the countries where they can be accessed. 
Indeed, the development of these techniques has been accompanied by the 
expansion of an inter-disciplinary field of bioethics as well as the rapid growth of 
science and technology studies in the social sciences. As we saw earlier, 
feminists have been particularly vocal in the debate about surrogacy, with many 
arguing against it on the grounds of commodification and exploitation of 
women’s reproductive labour (Anderson 1990; Anleu 1992; Blyth and Potter 
2003; Rae 1994; Satz 1992; Shannon 1988. Cf. Arneson 1992; Wertheimer 
1992; Wilkinson 2003), damage to maternal bonding (Anderson 1990; Chesler 
1990) and the spectre of the development of a ‘breeder class’ of women 
(Chesler 1990).  
  In this ethnography I will show how these people talk, think about and 
live ethics. Of course, there are differences in the way that respondents talked 
about surrogacy and about their everyday ethics. Further, talk about 
environmentalism, wildlife conservation and ethical living were routine topics of 
conversation while I deliberately instigated most of our conversations about 
surrogacy, though there were occasions on which I was introduced to a stranger 
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or someone enquired how I was getting on with my research, which led to my 
being offered a spontaneous opinion on surrogacy. Both surrogacy and 
environmentalism straddle the dual meaning of ethics, as a normative 
framework for moral judgement and as everyday practice aimed at producing a 
virtuous life. As such, I aim to capture both the differences and the interplay 
between these two forms of the ethical as they manifest themselves in speech, 
thought and action.  
 The participants in this study tended to treat surrogacy more in terms of 
moral judgements, while environmentalism was more closely associated with 
ways of living. The material presented here reflects that particular stress, though 
of course surrogacy and environmentalism speak to both meanings of ethics. 
Living an environmentally responsible life is not only about the daily practices 
that enable one to eat, form relationships or work, but also always entails 
normative judgements of just what is good about a good life. Similarly, while 
surrogacy is primarily a topic that caused these people to expound moral 
principles and express gut feelings about right and wrong, it is also something 
that suggests much about how we should live and conduct ourselves on an 
everyday basis. As such, it seems to me that these people, as a group already 
explicitly concerned with ethics – and as we shall see with ethical issues that 
overlap with the kinds of concerns that surrogacy provokes – are a particularly 
interesting one with which to explore the dilemmas of surrogacy.  
 Foucault defined ‘technologies of the self’ as techniques ‘which permit 
individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and 
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (1997: 225). Respondents 
in this study have refashioned their lives and selves and reoriented themselves 
towards particular goals that are informed by specific moral, political and ethical 
values. I would therefore argue that there is good reason to describe their 
ethical actions as akin to technologies of the self, though with some caveats.  
 Foucault contrasts the ethical edict to ‘care for oneself’ in the Classical 
world with a suspicion in Christian societies of excessive attention paid to the 
self. In the latter, he says, ‘being concerned with oneself was readily denounced 
as a form of self-love, a form of selfishness or self-interest in contradiction with 
the interest to be shown in others or the self-sacrifice required’ (1997: 284-5). 
While selfishness is indeed associated with immorality in British culture, this 
may obscure the subtleties of actual ethical practice. Foucault seems to imply 
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here that there is no space for action done on the self in the building of an 
ethical subjectivity in the contemporary West, yet work done for others is also 
inevitably work done on the self (see Gould 2005; Pike 2001a, b). For the 
respondents in this study, ethical living, ostensibly aimed at others’ good – 
whether that other be the environment, animals, the land or people – is also 
work done in order to attain personal fulfilment and which necessarily involves 
care of the self.  
 Foucault notes that technologies of the self are inseparable from the other 
technologies, though each is associated with specific forms of power. 
Technologies of the self are ‘technologies of individual domination’ (1997: 225) 
through which an individual exercises power over herself. Paxson criticises 
Foucault for neglecting gender in his analysis of ethical subjectivities: ‘Ethics, 
the moral values and agreed-upon virtues of a society, is a major mechanism 
not only for subjectification … but also for the consolidation and reproduction of 
social inequality, including that organized through gender’ (2004: 17; see also 
Mahmood 2005). Drawing on Aristotelian virtue ethics, in her analysis of 
motherhood in contemporary Athens, Paxson describes gender as a ‘system of 
virtues’, arguing that, ‘people’s experiences as gendered beings are embedded 
in moral principles, and thus gender theory should take into account historically 
and culturally contingent ethical systems’ (2004: 19). Of course, not only should 
we consider ethical systems in the study of gender, but also ‘historically and 
culturally contingent’ gender systems and gendered power dynamics in the 
analysis of ethics.  
 Foucault’s claims about freedom are also somewhat problematic. Ethical 
action, he says, is a practice of freedom (as opposed to liberation): ‘for what is 
ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious [réfléchie] practice of 
freedom? Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the 
considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection’ (1997: 284; 
cf. Faubion 2001). Laidlaw (2002: 323) argues that Foucault did not prescribe 
what human freedom might be and emphasised the exercise of freedom rather 
than its realisation, in line with his point that choices are always constrained by 
particular power dynamics, which shift with historical periods. As Laidlaw puts it, 
‘the freedom of the ethical subject, for Foucault, consists in the possibility of 
choosing the kind of self one wishes to be. Actively answering the ethical 
question of how or as what one ought to live is to exercise this self-constituting 
freedom’ (2002: 324). He is however critical of social scientists’ talk of human 
‘agency’: 
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In so far as talk of agency raises the question of whether persons' 
choices are genuinely their choices – in so far, that is, as it points to 
questions of freedom – it does so in a way that is necessarily and 
systematically conflated with the question of the capacity or power which 
their choices have in causal terms. This means that, as an index of 
freedom, the concept of agency is pre-emptively selective. Only actions 
contributing towards what the analyst sees as structurally significant 
count as instances of agency. Put most crudely, we only mark them 
down as agency when people's choices seem to us to be the right ones. 
(2002: 315; see also Mahmood 2005)  
 
 Faubion similarly argues for an anthropology of ethics that takes full 
account of power and how it is implicated in the exercise of autopoiesis in 
particular historical and cultural moments (2001: 96-97). As this suggests, 
notions of freedom, choice and agency present some knotty problems in 
analysing ethical action. Choice is a fundamental part of respondents’ ethical 
practice in that they have made certain conscious and momentous choices in 
choosing to live a good life in Scotland. Furthermore, the freedom to choose, 
enabled by a certain amount of social and economic capital, is necessary in 
allowing them to carry out their ethical projects.  
 Lambek (2008) distinguishes between obligation, choice and judgement, 
arguing that the latter is most appropriate to describe ethical practice. 
Judgement, he says, has four overlapping characteristics: it involves achieving 
balance amongst extremes such as egoism and altruism; it requires practical 
judgement (he uses the Aristotelian term, phronesis); it entails balancing 
incommensurable virtuous ideals and it necessitates discerning between values, 
which may be arranged in a hierarchical fashion so that some seem 
transcendent ‘meta-values’ while others are more ordinary and contingent to the 
individual (2008: 145).  
 Lambek is clearly influenced by Aristotelian virtue ethics, which is 
perhaps appropriate here given Aristotle’s interest in the good life. Lambek says, 
‘Virtue ethics asks not how we can acquire objects of value nor how we can do 
what is absolutely right, but how we should live and what kind of person we want 
to be’ (2008: 134; original emphasis). Virtue ethics therefore offers a way of 
moving from considering ethical action in stark terms as either following the 
rules or making free choices to a more sophisticated approach that ‘shifts the 
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focus from having, to doing, to being’ (2008: 134). The idea of conscious 
reflection in ethics suggests once again the fundamental place of the self in 
ethics. It reminds us that describing an action as ethical does not simply denote 
a good outcome but, perhaps more importantly, suggests the motives and 
purpose behind it, since an ethical action is one that has been considered and 
reflected upon. 
Virtue ethics is often contrasted with Kantian philosophy, especially 
Kant’s ideas about priceless values such as human dignity, which, as noted, 
have been central in the polemic against commercial surrogacy. Lambek (2008: 
138) identifies a distinction in Western thinking between economic value, which 
is seen as relative and measurable, and ethical virtue, which is fixed and 
immeasurable. The two are thought to be incommensurable to each other, yet, 
he says, in practicing ethical judgements, we inevitably qualify and balance 
absolute values and thus begin to relativise them. As anthropologists, he says, 
‘we need to examine the claims made for relative and absolute values and the 
efforts taken for constructing, maintaining or reducing the distance between 
them in any given period or argument’ (2008: 138). This relates directly to my 
aim in this thesis of describing and analysing the form and functions of the 
values that structure respondents’ claims and practice.  
 Lambek identifies a tendency in human thought to posit culturally 
variable ‘meta-values’ which, he argues, constantly run the risk of being 
relativised and even displaced. Earlier I suggested that nature is for this group of 
people a transcendent value that provides a grounding function in their claims 
but works as a source of ultimate goodness in their lives. Nature is in this way a 
meta-value for them. Lambek notes, following Rappaport, that meta-values or 
‘ultimate sacred postulates’ are ‘deeply meaningful to their adherents but they 
are effective and enduring because they are referentially empty and 
unfalsifiable’ (2008: 144). Again, this relates to my earlier point that nature’s 
polysemy is what provides it with transcendental and cosmological potency.  
 In the coming chapters we shall get a glimpse of what it means to be 
actively involved in building an ethical life and doing ethical work in the 
contemporary Western world. In my analysis of these efforts, I aim to show the 
way in which this group of people practise judgement and conscious reflection in 
their claims about surrogacy and their everyday practice of building a good life. 
We shall see, in particular, the workings of particular values and the way that 
these people handle and negotiate meta-values and the dichotomies, such as 
that between love and money, inherent in their ‘cultural repertoire’ in their 
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everyday practice. As noted, this is a group of people who come from a social 
class that is reflexive and analytical of its own postulates and values and we 
shall see this in their thoughts, actions and speech. 
 As anthropologists have repeatedly shown, the major strength of 
ethnography as a research method is its ability to capture the extraordinary 
minutiae of everyday life. I noted earlier my intention to extend on Edwards’ 
work in Bacup by considering further the place of ethics in models of kinship, 
nature and morality and the relationships between them. Like Edwards (see also 
Hirsch 1993), I asked people who are not personally involved in assisted 
conception to talk about surrogacy as an example of something that seems to 
imply pressing and timely questions, and like Bacup people they interpreted 
these questions as opportunities for moral and philosophical speculation. While 
Edwards’ aim was to demonstrate the particularities and practices of English 
kinship through these examples as a complement to her previous work on their 
everyday lives as ‘ordinary people’, I am taking a slightly different approach in 
showing how claims about surrogacy not only show kinship thinking in practice, 
but also ethical judgement. I aim to illustrate how such claims are shaped by 
innovative forms of conscious reflection and that this can be captured in 
ethnography. This difference in approach reflects the particularities of what the 
people I met during fieldwork talked about. As we shall see, while they do make 
connections between their own lives and experience of kinship in thinking about 
surrogacy, they treat it primarily as something that poses ethical and moral 
questions. Furthermore, my ethnography shows the importance of specific 
values in their lives and claims, as is clear from their conceptions of nature 
which are clearly rooted in wider historical and cultural ideas about nature in the 
UK, but also heavily influenced by environmentalist thinking.  
 The approach to ethics that I take here rests on the congruence I see 
between the content and form of the ideas expressed to me by respondents and 
the theoretical framework developed by Lambek. That is, I will use data from 
both interviews and participant observation to capture the contingency of 
individuals’ ethical judgements and the place of the self in ideas about 
goodness, while also paying due attention to the workings of meta-values in 
structuring, grounding and providing an impetus to claims and practice. In this 
way, my work once again speaks to Strathernian models of kinship, culture and 
nature in British life such as Edwards’, in suggesting the difficult tightrope one 
must walk between representing the reflective and conscious nature of the 
everyday judgements of specific individuals and groups while also noting how 
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such ideas work on an abstract and normative level in reproducing certain 
models of thought and behaviour. 
 
 
 
Methods 
 
 I was in the field between November 2005 and September 2007. I also 
made three short follow-up trips in January, March and August 2008 during the 
writing-up process. I have stayed in contact with almost all respondents, helped 
in part by the timely innovation of the Internet ‘social utility’ Facebook, as well as 
the more old-fangled methods of e-mail and telephone. The analytical process 
has benefited from my closeness to respondents in that I have had the 
opportunity to make follow-up trips and further elucidate their responses through 
continuing the conversations we started when I was living amongst them. 
 The data that I collected during fieldwork is based on two primary 
methods, which are reflected in the layout of the thesis, though I would 
emphasise that the links between the two are crucial. Most of my time during 
fieldwork was spent doing participant observation, whether volunteering in the 
wildlife centre, accompanying someone on a walk or a trip to the shops, cooking 
for and eating with people, taking rubbish to the recycling plant, watching for 
dolphins, feeding chickens, collecting driftwood kindling for the fire from off the 
beach, giving someone a lift somewhere, having fancy dress parties and many 
more diverse activities besides. It is on this participant observation, and my 
fieldnotes recording that, that much of my impressions of respondents’ everyday 
lives are based. In addition to this, I carried out semi-formal interviews on their 
ideas about surrogacy with about half of respondents. Most of the interviews 
were carried out in the latter months of fieldwork, as I felt it was important to 
have established a rapport with interviewees before I interviewed them. As a 
result, none refused to be interviewed, and most seemed intrigued by the 
prospect.  
The interview questions included general questions about interviewees’ 
experience of family life, their plans for or experience of parenthood, their views 
on assisted conception and adoption and a series of questions about surrogacy. 
Interviews were only semi-formal, so I did sometimes ask further spontaneous 
questions based on interviewees’ responses. With interviewees’ knowledge and 
consent, I recorded the interviews using a digital voice recorder, uploaded them 
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onto computer and transcribed them verbatim, largely while still in the field. 
When I returned from fieldwork, I began the process of analysing my transcripts, 
coding certain responses to find patterns, while also highlighting tensions within 
respondents’ own responses as well as differences of opinion between them. As 
noted, the respondents here are ‘laypeople’, not personally or professionally 
involved in surrogacy or any other techniques of assisted conception. As such, 
their responses to my questions were abstract and speculative in nature and 
recording them has afforded me the opportunity to carry out a deep analysis on 
this rich, often equivocal content. 
 As for many ethnographers, especially those working in the Western 
world, my immersion into respondents’ lives was not immediate. When I first 
arrived in northeast Scotland I lived in another coastal town, Macduff, some 
twenty-five miles away from Spey Bay. During these initial months, I built up my 
knowledge of the area by visiting a number of tourist sites including a number of 
local whisky distilleries, Chanonry Point, Loch Ness, Culloden and the 
Cairngorms. I continued these trips throughout the fieldwork period, often with 
other respondents where possible and made some trips further afield in 
Scotland. A few months into fieldwork, I visited Spey Bay for the second time 
(the first time had been on a preliminary recce before fieldwork) and met Sophie, 
who had agreed to talk to me about becoming a local volunteer. Luckily, she 
decided to take me on and I soon started regularly going to Spey Bay to 
volunteer and thus quickly met and formed relationships with many of the other 
people who worked there. My ‘studies’19 were from my colleagues’ perspective 
all too easily put aside in the service of giving a talk to the public on whale-
watching, helping erect a marquee, supervising a beach clean, counting stocks 
of plastic sealife or donning a dolphin costume and rattling a collection tin.  
 As soon as space became available in the wildlife centre’s volunteer 
accommodation I moved to Spey Bay, thus embedding myself at the centre of 
an extended web of friends, colleagues and acquaintances. I lived in the 
volunteer accommodation, the eastern half of the old fishing station manager’s 
house in Tugnet, until May 2007, when I moved next door to live with Sophie 
and Luke when Steve moved out after buying a flat in Elgin. Nearly all 
                                                
19 Despite the numerous times I explained that I was doing fieldwork-based ethnographic 
research, and the fact that many of them had taken part in interviews at some point, respondents 
still found it difficult to shake off the not unreasonable impression that, as a PhD student, I should 
be spending most of my time studying books. This reflects not only their impressions of what 
research is, but their rather modest assumption that I could not be particularly interested in what 
they had to say, but was instead always on the brink of driving off to interview someone far more 
interesting or expert than them.  
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respondents work or volunteer in the wildlife centre themselves. Those few 
others who do not are relatives, partners or friends of wildlife centre workers, 
other residents in Spey Bay or people I met along the way. As such, the way 
that I ‘recruited’ respondents for this study is based on the connections I made 
through the everyday work of the wildlife centre. 
 Spey Bay is a very small village and while it accommodates a number of 
staff including of course the residential volunteers, not all people who are 
involved in the work there live in the village. Patterns of residence are generally 
quite scattered in this area as most people have cars, which they rely on – 
despite concerns about carbon emissions – in the absence of a well-developed 
public transport infrastructure. As such, respondents live in a network of 
settlements surrounding Spey Bay, many in other coastal villages, and a few in 
nearby Fochabers. Spey Bay is the central locus of my fieldwork, not just 
because it is where many respondents and I lived, but also because it provided 
the grounds and the opportunity for most of the connections I made with 
respondents. It was, also, the location of a great deal of social interaction and 
where I carried out most interviews.  
 As noted, respondents are generally middle-class. They are also 
exclusively white, which reflects the ethnic make-up of this part of Scotland, 
which is – jokes about the weather aside – noticeably white compared to urban 
Britain. Of the 80% of respondents who do not originate in the area, nearly all 
are English. A few are from southern Scotland, one is American, two are 
German and one is French. Respondents’ ages range from late teens to sixties, 
along with a couple of respondents’ children.  
 Almost all respondents do not practise a religion, though there are 
notable exceptions: Erin, her husband Duncan and their daughter Rosie are the 
only Catholics and attend church every Sunday. Willow grew up in a non-
religious family but converted to an evangelical Christian sect in Edinburgh in 
her late teens. Her faith is very important to her and she attends church when 
she is in Edinburgh, but does not regularly attend in Moray, as none of the local 
churches seem to offer the right setting for her to worship. A few other 
respondents would describe themselves as Christian, based on their current 
beliefs and their experiences of attending churches in their younger lives, but do 
not feel the need to practise their religion. For example, Sophie went to a 
convent school in northwest England but other than this has never been a 
regular churchgoer. While she does not define herself as a particularly religious 
person, she does believe in god, largely based on the Christian god, though this 
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is along with a rather eclectic set of beliefs influenced by her exposure to 
different faiths and ideas from her diverse set of friends and experiences when 
travelling. Other respondents have typically experienced going to church and 
especially Church of England primary schools, so have had exposure to 
Christian ideas in their upbringing but do not practise any beliefs that they may 
have now. Their general attitude is that explicitly religious practice such as 
prayer and church attendance is unnecessary, that belief is largely a personal 
matter and that in many ways the most important part of a faith are the values 
and ethical principles that it professes. 
 The data that I present in the coming chapters is of a mixed nature. This 
can of course present problems in handling the differences and overlaps 
between each type of data, but it also offers advantages and opportunities. By 
living amongst the interviewees and participating in their everyday lives, I was 
able to build up a much better, in some ways intuitive, understanding of them as 
individuals, how they live their lives, the values that are important to them and 
their relationships with others. While I am not suggesting that my interpretation 
of what they said to me is foolproof, I do believe that my deeper familiarity with 
them as a participant in their lives helped me interpret their responses. In 
presenting these two types of data together I am suggesting not only that tracing 
the connections between people’s claims in interviews and the way they live 
their lives provides fertile ground for anthropologists, but also that existing 
ethnographic research methods already offer the means to do this. While there 
are many excellent anthropological studies of people’s experiences of assisted 
conception based in clinical encounters and on rich interview responses, many 
of these accounts lack the everyday context of interviewees’ lives. This may be 
because of an underlying assumption that such everyday lives in North America 
and western Europe are already familiar to us, but, especially since ideas about 
reproductive technologies seem to touch so deeply on other ideas in cultural life, 
this is an assumption we can ill afford.  
 
 
 
Plan of chapters 
 
 In Part One, Extraordinary Ethics, I present the main findings from my 
interviews with respondents about surrogacy. These two chapters provide 
insight into the kinds of ideas that they employed in making claims about ethical 
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and moral behaviour and the grounding concepts and values that are 
particularly important to them. The first chapter focuses on the idea of the 
maternal bond as a grounding concept that is closely linked with ideas about the 
relationship between nature and society. I will show how the concept is used in 
respondents’ claims and what ideas it reproduces. In Chapter Two, I will focus 
on respondents’ ideas about the distinction between ‘commercial’ and ‘altruistic’ 
surrogacy. Here, we will start to see their nuanced approach to money, work 
and commercialism and get some insight into their ideas about human nature 
and motive. One aim of these chapters, then, will be to examine whether 
popular representations of British people’s ideas about the ethics of surrogacy, 
as captured in the media, legislation and philosophical polemic, does justice to 
the complexities and contingencies of this particular group of laypeople’s 
judgements about surrogacy. We shall see that respondents’ claims about 
surrogacy are marked by equivocation. This seems to suggest that tolerance of 
others’ viewpoints and perspectives is ethical in itself for them. As such, in these 
first chapters I will explore the ethics of claim-making as well as their claims 
about ethics.  
 Part Two, Everyday Ethics, contains three chapters, in which I provide 
an ethnographic window into the ordinary lives of these people I lived amongst 
during fieldwork and who agreed to tell me their thoughts about surrogacy. In 
Chapter Three, I will show what everyday life is like in Spey Bay and Moray. In 
particular, we shall see how residents use ideas about nature, landscape and 
community to create a sense of belonging and connections with other people, 
land and the natural world. This chapter also introduces the importance of effort 
and care in these people’s lives in making connections with others and their 
environment but also in structuring their lives as ethical people. In Chapter Four, 
I extend this point in focusing on the work of the wildlife centre to show how 
notions of social responsibility and ethical imperative are used to garner support 
for the cause of wildlife conservation and the values that inform this. Following 
on from Part One, I will return to respondents’ ideas about money and altruism, 
this time in relation to their fundraising efforts in the wildlife centre. I will also 
consider how the experience of working for charity speaks to particular 
assumptions about work and gender in the contemporary UK and consider how 
profession is implicated in respondents’ ethical subjectivities.  
 Throughout Part Two, I will reflect on respondents’ relationships with the 
local wildlife and particularly the Moray Firth dolphins. In Chapter Five, I will 
consider how ideas about dolphins are implicated in their ideas about 
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themselves, their community and the place where they live and how ideas about 
ethics, morality and power are implicated in people’s relationships with animals. 
A key theme in this chapter, which I extend upon in Chapter Six, is the role of 
choice in these people’s ideas about having good lives and being good people, 
and in Chapter Five we shall see this in particular in my description of their 
consumption decisions. In these chapters, and in the links between the first and 
second Parts of the thesis, I shall consider the location of morality and ethics in 
the contemporary UK. 
 In Part Three, I will return to my interview data to look further at the role 
of choice in these people’s everyday ethical judgements in relation to their own 
plans for parenthood. I will also present some of their responses to the more 
problematic aspects of assisted conception in order to show again how nature 
works in their claims. In this chapter, then, I will argue that nature has not lost its 
grounding function, but in fact works as a transcendent meta-value that provides 
meaning and structure to these people’s lives. I will also consider ideas about 
time, crisis and change in relation both to respondents’ ideas about assisted 
conception and their ideas about the environment. In particular, I will consider 
what the effects are of building a life that is modelled around an idea of future 
crisis as opposed to a halcyon past. 
 As noted, the layout of this thesis reflects my use of different research 
methods in gathering data. I have largely placed the two sets of data side-by-
side rather than mixed together for clarity’s sake but also in order that we might 
see the contrasts, as well as the similarities, between the results of each 
method. This hermeneutic split between extraordinary and everyday ethics 
reflects the dual nature of ethics itself, as both normative moral judgement and 
everyday practice aimed at building a good life. Despite this analytic separation, 
I do not mean to suggest that their different meanings and uses can be neatly 
chopped up with the omniscient ethnographer’s blade and arranged into their 
‘proper’ categories. ‘Extraordinary’ and ‘everyday’ ethics are in fact implicated in 
each other. As I have argued, ethnographic methods can capture the way that 
particular models, norms and ideas are employed in ethical claims and practice 
and the connections between them. My contention, then, is that we cannot fully 
understand ideas about nature, ethics or morality by looking at them in isolation 
from other ideas and practice in people’s everyday experience. Furthermore, 
bringing together claims and practice, the extraordinary and the everyday, in this 
way allows us to use ethnography to capture the contingency and nuance of 
people’s ideas and the conscious reflection that goes into ethical judgements.  
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PART ONE: 
EXTRAORDINARY ETHICS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But soon they’ll have the artificial womb, I wonder how I feel about that. 
Margaret Atwood, Surfacing 
 
 
 
With unrelaxed and breathless eagerness I pursued nature to her hiding-places. 
Mary Shelley, Frankenstein 
 67
 In these first two chapters, I focus particularly on the ethical claims 
respondents made about surrogacy. Both ethical claim-making and practice 
entail the performance of particular moral and ethical subjectivities. Whilst claim-
making may seem to demonstrate the potency of ethical rhetoric most obviously, 
everyday practice also involves making moral judgements. Whatever the 
differences between the details of their individual lives, respondents here have 
made conscious decisions about how to build their lives that cannot be divorced 
from their conceptions of what is good and, thus, what is bad.  
 It will become obvious that there is something of a change in register 
between Part One and Part Two, as is perhaps inevitable in the shift from the 
extraordinary to the everyday. The contrasting ways in which people speak in 
each Part is of course related to the different methods I used to gather data. In 
these first chapters, we shall see that respondents’ ideas about surrogacy, 
which I deliberately solicited in interviews and subjected to close textual 
analysis, have a more normative and even at times scripted flavour compared to 
their everyday ideas and practice. In these first two chapters, then, we will see 
how grounding concepts like nature and altruism work as limiting factors in the 
formation and expression of ethical and moral judgements. 
 Despite these general differences in tone, we shall see that respondents’ 
judgements about surrogacy are nonetheless nuanced and sometimes even 
contradictory. When I asked them if I could interview them, many respondents 
told me they were concerned that they lacked the sufficient expertise or 
experience to provide me with any useful answers and some were worried that I 
might think they were “stupid”, even though I reassured them that I was 
interested in their views rather than testing their biomedical knowledge and that I 
was no medical or bioethical expert myself. Listening to them in interviews, I 
often felt as if they were in conversation with themselves as they weighed up 
different sides of each argument within their own responses, sometimes 
appearing to change their minds mid-sentence. I have aimed to preserve a 
sense of this equivocation in my selection of quotes.  
 The judgements respondents made were often prefaced with the proviso 
that this was just their “personal view” and bracketed within various caveats, 
suggesting a discomfort with imposing a prescriptive set of ethics as well as 
particular assumptions about the status of lay knowledge and expertise. Jenny, 
who I will introduce in Chapter One, demonstrated this in her response when 
talking about assisted conception: 
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I think each case is probably very individual and I think that it’s, there’s a 
great desire in society probably to draw a conclusion that, it’s like a 
round-hole conclusion, and then, as soon as you’ve done it, you get 
somebody with this square problem that doesn’t fit that round hole! And I 
think that broad-brush approach – I’m using all my metaphors here – but 
I think it doesn’t work terribly well in things like this at the moment. I 
know there have to be underlying general principles – I do understand 
that, but I think, often these cases are so particular, and have particular 
needs, you know, that, ideally there would be some discretion around the 
ethics of an individual case, I think. … There probably does need to be 
some over-arching, general concepts, but I would hate to be drawn into 
having to draw something like that up, I think. 
 
Jenny’s hesitancy here suggests that, while she felt freer to speculate about 
surrogacy in one sense as it does not come within her immediate personal 
experience, she is still sensitive to – albeit anonymous and putative – others 
who might actually be involved in the practice. 
 Edwards writes of her co-conversationalists’ similar equivocation about 
assisted conception:  
 
[T]he views of Bacup residents with whom I spoke about NRT were 
marked by ambivalence [references omitted]. On the one hand there is 
an empathy with what is often referred to as the heartache of infertility 
and on the other a call for limits on possibilities presented through 
medical and scientific intervention. Some techniques are more 
problematic than others, and there is a general agreement that ‘science’ 
can go too far and its excesses need to be curbed; there are some ways 
of conceiving and growing a child deemed not only inappropriate but 
beyond the pale. But limits are not fixed points. It is not possible to 
discern, from what people say, a line between appropriate and 
inappropriate intervention. The same criteria are not applied to every 
instance and what is relevant in a particular context depends on the 
question formulated in interaction and itself provides the context for 
subsequent ideas. (2000: 236; original emphasis) 
 
Discussing the ethics of surrogacy and other assisted conception techniques 
demonstrates the fact that ‘limits are not fixed points’, but, as Edwards shows, 
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grounding concepts may be referred to in specific and contingent ways and to 
illustrate apparently contradictory values without necessarily losing their 
grounding capacity. It is therefore perhaps not completely accurate to describe 
respondents here, or in Bacup, as ambivalent, since it implies that they are 
unsure or that they are let down by their native categories of thought, when in 
fact it is precisely the inherent polysemy of grounding concepts that enables 
their effective use.  
 Perhaps a brief observation from my interview data will illustrate these 
points before I begin the first chapter proper. In discussing surrogacy with me, 
many respondents, like Jenny, used metaphor to aid their own understanding of 
surrogacy and I have used some of their more memorable phrases (in italics) as 
subtitles throughout the thesis. The British have a reputation for enjoying 
wordplay and the mixed origins and large vocabulary of the English language 
afford great potential for analogy and metaphor, which may be used to 
humorous effect in the case of punning or to help express difficult or novel ideas 
(see Strathern 1992b). Two male respondents saw prostitution as an apt parallel 
to surrogacy. Andrew, a graduate student and conservation volunteer, said, “I 
certainly don’t agree with people paying for surrogates, or ladies selling 
themselves. It’s a much larger scale of prostitution in a way, I guess, selling your 
body for nine months rather than a night”.20 Richard, a writer in his sixties with 
three adult children, did not straightforwardly object to prostitution or commercial 
surrogacy on moral grounds, but was, rather, concerned for the welfare of the 
women involved and their likely exploitation, asking rhetorically, “a country that 
can’t even regulate prostitution properly without there still being some harm 
being done to the women, can it handle surrogacy?”  
 Prostitution is effectively illegal in the UK21 and an established moral 
discourse surrounds it, so referring to it signals particular social ‘ills’ (Day 2007). 
As with all analogies, there is some freedom for the listener in which overlaps he 
perceives between the two domains brought into relation in this way, as 
suggested by Andrew and Richard’s differing attitudes. Eleanor, a former artist 
and single mother of three school-aged children, initially argued in favour of 
commercial surrogacy when I discussed it with her:  
 
                                                
20 In order to differentiate and highlight respondents’ thoughts, I put any non-block quote from 
them in double quotation marks. All other quotations are placed in single marks. 
21 To be precise, soliciting, ‘pimping’ and profiting from brothels are all against the law. The 
Prostitution (Public Places) (Scotland) Act 2007 added to the existing laws, making the purchase 
of sex a criminal offence in Scotland. 
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I don’t have too much of a problem with [surrogates] being paid for it, 
actually, I don’t have a problem. If someone’s good at carrying babies 
and they promise not to take any [illicit] drugs and do all this, you know, 
perhaps you could look after their welfare better if they were paid, 
because you could say, ‘come and live in such-and-such a place’. You 
could have surrogacy farms! [Laughs ironically] That doesn’t worry me. It 
might almost be more fun! Why not put a whole lot of surrogate mothers 
together?  
 
However, as she explored this possibility more, she conceded that there would 
be some potential for exploitation in such an idea, eventually referring to 
surrogacy, like Andrew and Richard, as “a sort of alternative to prostitution”.  
 Eleanor, who grew up in rural Northumberland (though in a family of 
engineers rather than farmers), initially uses this agricultural analogy to suggest 
a bucolic wholesomeness to her vision of commercial surrogacy if it is handled 
the right way. Yet, as she realises, this analogy leaves room for a more negative 
image of commercial surrogacy. Given the current concern in the UK about 
industrial farming (Franklin 2007; Reed 2002; see Gould 2005 and Mullin 2007 
for the USA), there is conceptual space on Eleanor’s surrogacy “farm” to 
imagine a surrogate as either a contented cow unconcernedly chewing cud in a 
sunny green field or one of a mastitis-ridden herd pumped with antibiotics giving 
birth to veal calves. Making an analogical connection between commercial 
surrogacy and prostitution is not the same as saying that surrogate mothers are 
prostitutes, but it does suggest that there is some overlap between them. These 
examples demonstrate the complex way in which respondents approached 
surrogacy, suggesting already the way that certain ideas may be employed in 
complex, contingent and even contradictory ways. 
 The following two chapters are structured so as to reflect the two major 
ethical sticking points that surrogacy seems to pose both in British public 
discourse and for respondents: the idea that a woman can relinquish a child she 
has borne and that she can accept monetary compensation in return for 
reproductive labour. This structure also reflects the fact that, instead of 
considering all parties to a surrogacy arrangement in their discussions with me, 
respondents focused to a very large extent on the surrogate mother. This 
suggests the importance of ideas about femininity in their responses and the 
interrelation of gender and ethics (see also Ginsburg 1989; Paxson 2004; Rapp 
1999a); the fact that these ethical claims are crosscut with normative ideas 
 71
about gender also points to the fact that moral and ethical issues are always 
about power.  
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Chapter One 
 
Scrambled Eggs 
 
Mater semper certa est 
 
 Upon entering a surrogacy arrangement, intending parents place a great 
deal of trust in a surrogate mother; she literally and figuratively carries a great 
responsibility. Amongst respondents, the motivations of the intending parents 
did not elicit much speculation, based on the assumption that they simply 
wanted to have a child ‘of their own’. The surrogate mother, meanwhile, was far 
more mysterious. Not only were her motives for acting as a surrogate a source 
of uncertainty and potential concern, but, whether or not she received payment 
for her part in the arrangement, she seemed to represent a deviation from 
normal maternal behaviour. In order to understand this, it is necessary to 
explore the meaning and status of the maternal bond. Maternal bonding is 
crucial to respondents’ understandings of surrogacy and motherhood more 
generally. The maternal bond is a concept with wide cultural appeal and a 
fundamental element of psychoanalytic theory, perhaps most elaborated in 
attachment theory (Bowlby 1984; see also Miller 2004). 
 Embedded in the idea of the maternal bond are normative expectations 
about motherhood that have significant and tangible effects for the way in which 
women’s lives are structured and experienced. For respondents with and 
without their own children, the maternal bond was seen as a natural, inevitable 
phenomenon that arose out of physical experience. By analysing some of the 
ways they talked about surrogacy here we shall get a glimpse into the 
mechanics of ethical claim-making. In particular, we shall see how the concept 
of the maternal bond can be appealed to as if it were stable yet is in fact used in 
creative and mixed ways to make particular and partisan claims. In this way, we 
shall see the kind of work that maternal bonding does and the ideas that it 
reproduces. 
 
 
 
A vital difference: The maternal bond 
 
 I met Erin, her husband Duncan and young daughter, Rosie, a few months 
into fieldwork through a kinship connection of my own – Duncan is an old friend 
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of my father’s. Due in no small part to their great warmth and generosity, we 
quickly became friends and I spent many evenings with them in their cottage in 
Hopeman, a coastal village close to RAF Lossiemouth, and Erin and Rosie 
visited or met me for tea quite a few times during the day while Duncan was at 
work. Erin, who is in her early thirties, is currently looking after Rosie full-time 
and studying for a second degree with the Open University part-time. She 
previously worked as a mental health nurse; Duncan also works in this field. As 
noted, Erin and Duncan are some of the few respondents in this study who 
practise any religion, and the only Catholics. After being seriously injured in a 
car crash when she was a teenager Erin was told that it was unlikely she would 
ever conceive ‘naturally’. She and Duncan, who has four adult children from his 
previous marriage, attempted to adopt but were turned down because of his 
age. They married after a few years co-habiting and Erin found out she was 
pregnant after returning from their honeymoon. They had been living in Moray 
for about six months when I met them.  
 When I asked Erin what being a parent meant to her, she described being 
“hit with this massive responsibility, or a notion of responsibility, which just 
explodes when the child arrives”. Throughout my interview with her, she made it 
clear that motherhood was one of the most important and transformative 
experiences of her life. Her ideas about maternal bonding are largely 
representative of others’, though they were particularly fully formed and I got the 
impression that this was something to which she had given a good deal of 
thought.  
 Erin identified a “different” kind of bond between her and Duncan in each 
of their relationships with Rosie: “The bond is different. The emotional bond is 
different. The basics are the same, obviously, you know, I think … either one of 
us would do what it takes, we’d probably kill for our child, we’d behave in 
characteristic and uncharacteristic ways to protect her safety and protect her 
environment. But the bond is different”. Reflecting further, she continued:  
 
I also think it’s special in my case by having my own child, carried 
myself, delivered. Your mind, psychologically, you’re attached to this 
bundle of cells before it turns up. So arguably you’re a mummy from the 
first day the pregnancy test produces two lines and you think that your 
vision has gone momentarily and I think there is a bond and if you like, 
albeit imaginary, it’s real, it’s literal, but there is an element of sheer 
imagination and I think the bond there is created that is built on and 
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extended. I also think, for me, part of this special bond was, all the way 
through the pregnancy, my intestines were being kicked to bits, I was the 
one on the loo twenty times a day, but it was actually something that 
Duncan could only participate in to a point. You know, I could say, ‘ooh 
look, come and feel this baby kicking’, but you already have a 
psychological and emotional bond that, if you like, I got a nine month 
head-start on the bloke concerned and I think you can’t compete with 
that and I think that makes mummies that carry their own children special 
in their own right. 
 
Erin talks here of having a “nine month head-start” on her husband in terms of 
the “special” bond that she enjoys with their daughter. She says that, while she 
has this intimate connection with her daughter from having had her growing 
inside her, Duncan can only participate up to a certain point as he lacks such a 
physical connection. In this way, she locates the maternal bond in both a 
different time and place from the paternal one.  
 Jenny brought up her adult twin sons, one of whom is mildly brain 
damaged, on her own after their father’s death. She works in social care and is 
in her early fifties. She lives in Lossiemouth with her partner, Paul, who also has 
adult children from a previous marriage. When I asked her whether she thought 
men and women approach parenthood differently, she made a similar argument 
to Erin: “I think the process of a woman actually giving birth … Yes, there has to 
be a uniqueness about that that simply can’t be present for a man in his 
parenting role. It’s just different, it fundamentally has to be different, because 
that nurturing of, the breast contact with the child if they try to breastfeed, and all 
of that”.  
 As noted in the Introduction, English kinship recognises ‘both the 
biological and the social’ and ‘emerges from an interplay between the two, 
rather than from the social elaboration of natural facts’ (Edwards 2000: 28). Erin 
drew on similarly ‘hybrid’ ideas when describing motherhood and maternal 
bonding to me: 
 
Women, biologically, are more genetically predisposed to nurture in a far 
greater way, a different way from men. But I think that’s been increased 
a thousand-fold by the fact that this nurturing instinct has been 
thoroughly utilised by the stay-at-home mummy principle, by the fact that 
until very recently women didn’t get top jobs, there was a whole, you 
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know, you couldn’t have a career and a child, you had to make a clear 
choice and even then you could choose career and wouldn’t necessarily 
earn as much as a man. … [M]odern motherhood is special because of 
this immense emphasis on our nurturing role. So, as a modern feminist, 
it’s quite difficult to say, thanks to people that stay at home, I feel more in 
touch with why people felt women needed to stay at home. And it isn’t 
just the domestic, I think there’s an emotional value in that, and – don’t 
get me wrong, don’t mistake me, I don’t believe that mothers that work 
full-time have a different bond with their children, not at all – but I think 
that a modern condition has evolved where our bond, and even men, 
even my husband would say and would defer Rosie in some situations 
that involved emotional bonding or nurturing, would push her towards me 
because he feels that’s what I do. And maybe not best, but that’s my 
role, and I think that’s related to the mother bond. (Original emphasis) 
 
Erin sees female nurturance as both a “role” and a “predisposition” and views 
the bond between mother and child as doubly special because it is both ‘natural’ 
and ‘social’. The implication of this view is that both elements should be present 
in the mother-child relationship, a point with obvious significance for surrogacy. 
By associating the responsibilities of parenthood with the maternal bond, which 
is seen as being closely related to the physical intimacy of pregnancy and birth, 
it becomes both a biological and ethical expectation for a gestational mother to 
form a close bond with her child (Ginsburg 1989; Paxson 2004; Rapp 1999a). 
 Nina is in her early twenties and works for the conservation charity in Spey 
Bay. She comes from a small village near Nairn and her boyfriend is in the RAF. 
She told me that she planned to have children in the future and that if she had 
trouble conceiving ‘naturally’ she would prefer to use assisted conception rather 
than to adopt, though, like others, she felt that adoption was a social good (see 
Chapter Two). I asked her to explain more why she felt adoption would not be 
“enough” for her: 
 
Yeah, it’s just carrying on the family line, I guess, and I don’t know if 
you’d ever have quite the same bond with a child that you’d adopted, 
even from a baby, with a child that had actually come from you and you’d 
had inside you for nine months. I think that’s – it might be different for 
men and women – because, you know carrying a child for nine months, 
you’re bonding with it for all that time. Whereas, adoption, you don’t 
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really get the whole thing, you just get the baby, you don’t get the whole 
experience that goes with it. I think just being pregnant, before you even 
get the child, is a big part of it, and something that every woman maybe 
wants to experience.  
 
For Nina, adoption lacks the opportunity to carry on “the family line” but also, 
and perhaps more importantly for her as a woman, the embodied experience of 
pregnancy and labour, which she suggests is key to the formation of the 
maternal bond and an important part of female experience. Interestingly, this 
formulation also makes room for motherhood as fulfilling a personal or even 
‘selfish’ need of the individual woman for a particular experience.  
 Erin similarly contrasted her bond with her daughter to one that she might 
have had, had she successfully adopted a child, saying, “I think I would’ve 
developed a different bond, but I’m in no doubt that … [it] would have been 
exactly the same in terms of love, opportunities and ideas, and hopes and 
aspirations”. In Born and Bred kinship, ideas about both birth and breeding ‘are 
mobilized in a constant process of including and excluding persons from social 
categories which are, in turn, reproduced in the process’ (Edwards 2000: 28; 
see also Cassidy 2002; Edwards and Strathern 2000). Both Erin’s and Nina’s 
comments here similarly imply how ideas about maternal bonding may be used 
to include and exclude people from valued roles and identities. 
 All respondents shared the ideal of a “special” bond between mother and 
child. For respondents, this was a concept that required little explication or 
explanation. Most of the mothers that I interviewed told me about how difficult or 
even traumatic their children’s births had been and both mothers and fathers 
expressed the difficulties as well as the rewards of parenthood. So, while they 
did not state it explicitly, some of their experience did imply an underlying sense 
that maternal bonding must also be worked on, as is further suggested by wider 
discourse around managing pregnancy, birth and breast-feeding in order to 
facilitate bonding between mother and child. Yet, while maternal bonding may 
not always be easy or immediate, the mothers I spoke to told me they had 
bonded with their children and described that experience (albeit after the fact) as 
rewarding and fulfilling. Although I heard some remarkably ‘liberal’ views on 
surrogacy, as we shall see, not one respondent questioned the concept or value 
of the maternal bond per se, or the idea that mothers should form a close bond 
with their children. The maternal bond is not only a ‘natural’ phenomenon but 
also a moral and ethical one. 
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 I asked almost all respondents, parents and non-parents, about whether 
they perceived differences in how women and men approach parenthood. 
Responses were quite evenly split. Those who said mothering and fathering 
were different tended to believe that they were complementary roles (cf. 
Schneider 1980) and so were generally accepting of this difference. However, 
when those who initially claimed there was little difference between mothers and 
fathers elaborated on their views it was clear that this was more of an ideal than 
a reality. This suggests a tension between the ideal of gender equality and the 
belief that gendered parenting roles are in some way inevitable. Again, this was 
related to the maternal bond. For example, Amy, who grew up in England, is in 
her early thirties, single and works in the wildlife centre in Spey Bay, told me:  
   
I think the mum has a stronger bond at the beginning, but I think that’s 
just to do with carrying the baby around for nine months. But then, the 
dad seems to be kind of more doting and spoils the child a lot more 
sometimes. So, I think the mother – it’s kind of stereotypical – but the 
mother always seems to be the more kind of practical one and does the 
basic care of the child, whereas the dad is usually the one that comes in 
and spoils the children and plays with them and stuff.  
 
 Sophie is in her late twenties, single and works in the wildlife centre. I 
asked her how important she felt it was for children to have two parents while 
growing up: 
 
I think there’s probably still an element of quite ancient desire from the 
woman to sort of care and nurture and the male to provide. But then 
again, I think that’s a sort of stereotype and I do think people can fit into 
those roles and it sometimes can be mixed around, though I think it often 
works in that kind of partnership. I s’pose then that that does mean that 
in some situations if there’s only one parent they have to try and fulfil all 
of those sides as well, which is possible. And maybe we’re all growing 
towards both members of the family, of the parents, still providing both of 
those sides anyway, so, like, everybody has a bit to play.  
 
Other respondents also told me that they believe in the equality of men and 
women and similarly characterised ‘traditional’ parenting roles as “stereotypical”, 
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yet nonetheless expressed a sense that such roles are largely inescapable (cf. 
Moore 1988: 38). 
 Kirsty is a medical researcher in her mid-thirties with a toddler daughter. 
At the time of our interview she had recently returned to full-time work. Her 
husband, who is disabled, looks after their daughter full-time in their house in 
Aberdeen. When I asked Kirsty if she perceived differences between her and 
her husband’s parenting styles, she referred to the different physical 
experiences of parenthood for men and women: 
 
I think that men and women approach parenthood differently in the time 
leading up to it. Women have the nine months where they’re getting 
used to the idea – your body’s being taken over by this parasite that 
you’ve got growing inside you. Men, although they kind of know what’s 
going to happen, it doesn’t really hit them between the eyes until the 
moment that the baby arrives and then, in our case, it was a bit of a 
shock to the system. He was like, ‘oh my god, I’m a dad!’, but in a good 
way. 
 
In our case, we approach parenthood in exactly the same way. We have 
pretty much the same views on what is the right or wrong thing to do. 
The difference is that when my daughter cries, I have a physical reaction 
to it, not just an emotional reaction. It’s not quite so bad now she’s a year 
old, but you can feel the hormone rush in response to the crying, which 
he doesn’t have, so I respond more quickly and a little bit more 
anxiously, and he’s a little bit more chilled out – but that’s not a bad 
thing! I don’t think other than that that we approach it any differently. 
 
Kirsty is keen to emphasise what she and her husband share, which is the 
values they bring to parenthood. However, the difference between them is that 
Kirsty feels a physical reaction when her daughter cries, while her husband 
‘only’ reacts emotionally to the sound of her crying.  
 Like Erin, Kirsty refers to the nine-month period of pregnancy to 
differentiate her experience as a parent and the initial bond with her daughter 
from her husband’s, though she suggests this is only an initial difference, which 
will ultimately be evened out. Of course, Kirsty is somewhat unusual in that she 
and her husband have reversed typical roles, with him as househusband and 
her as the main breadwinner (indeed, this may be one reason why she was 
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careful to note the special physicality of her role as a mother). She stressed that 
she felt her daughter was still her priority over everything else and that a major 
motivation for her work now was to provide her with a “good role model”. Both 
Erin and Kirsty, as mothers themselves, here express their special bonds with 
their daughters, but implicit in their comments is a judgement about their 
relationships with their husbands as well.  
 Nicola is in her early forties and comes from England originally. She works 
in the local council and volunteers at the wildlife centre at the weekends. Her 
partner is in the RAF and neither of them has children. Like others she 
differentiated between maternal and paternal bonding and suggested that this 
difference may be more lasting than Kirsty believes: 
 
[Y]ou had that physical bond for like nine months, I mean it’s something 
that’s grown inside of you and it’s, I think there has to be some kind of, 
some kind of emotional bond, perhaps that, perhaps in time can form as 
strongly with a father, but certainly, initially, I think there has to be 
something more in the mother-child relationship that, say in time, can 
maybe be equalled in some respects by the father, but not, I don’t think 
it’ll ever be the same, somehow. I don’t know, perhaps until the child has 
left home, and once it’s actually out of the physical environment with the 
parents, then maybe the relationship can level off, I don’t know.   
 
What Nicola’s response here, along with the others preceding it, shows is the 
effect of the concept of maternal bonding in reproducing normative ideas about 
the relationships between ‘biology’ and ‘society’, between men and women in 
conjugal relationships and between mothers and fathers and their children. 
While respondents disagree about how far-reaching the effects of the mother-
child bond may be in time, they assume that the physical, hormonal and 
emotional realities of pregnancy and labour inevitably create a “special” 
relationship between mother and child. Respondents are broadly speaking 
supportive of gender equality, yet here they foreground biologically determinist 
ideas of gender difference, suggesting that when it comes to motherhood, this 
difference is particularly salient. 
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Naughty woman!22 The surrogate mother and the maternal bond  
 
 As we have seen, the initial location of the child in the female body 
means, for respondents, that the mother will inevitably form an attachment to the 
child, thereby reinforcing feelings of maternal responsibility and altruism. 
Surrogacy disturbs normative ideas of maternal bonding, suggesting that it may 
not be as inevitable as the quotes so far suggest. With surrogacy, the category 
of the natural maternal bond collides with the moral expectation to uphold a 
bond23 of trust, or ‘give the gift of life’ (Konrad 2005; Ragoné 1999) and facilitate 
a couple’s natural desire to reproduce, an obligation that women may feel 
particularly strongly (Raymond 1990).  
 Surrogacy raises the novel possibility that a child can have more than 
one mother (Cannell 1990; Ragoné 1994; Strathern 1992a, 1992b).24 This is 
thrown into stark relief in those cases where the surrogate decides she cannot 
give up the child she has borne, and respondents were clearly concerned that a 
surrogate mother might do this. Fiona, a divorced teacher in her early fifties with 
one adult daughter, was generally pro-surrogacy, but was concerned that a 
surrogate would find it difficult to hand over a baby and saw this as the great risk 
for all parties to a surrogacy arrangement. Like Erin and Kirsty, she described to 
me her own enriching experience of having a close bond with her daughter and 
drew on this when she explained her concerns about a surrogate mother’s 
ability to relinquish a child she has gestated: “I know that I could never have 
handed over a baby that I had borne. I would find that completely impossible, 
and that’s not a rational decision based on any kind of belief, I just simply 
couldn’t do it. … Some women don’t have nearly such a strong maternal sense. 
To me, it would be like cutting off my hand, I couldn’t do it”.  
 Luke, a graduate student and conservation volunteer in his late twenties, 
described the bond between a surrogate mother and child in a very similar 
manner to that used by others to describe the bond between a conventional 
mother and child: “I can fully understand the attachment after having gone 
through all the process of having the baby growing inside you must, you can’t 
shut yourself off from that, you can’t treat it like it’s a job, so I can understand 
                                                
22 This quote is from an interjection of Jenny’s, which she made when I began to ask her about 
whether she felt a surrogate mother had a legitimate claim to keep the child she had carried for 
the intending parents. It was said with a rather sardonic inflection.  
23 Of course, the word ‘bond’ has a further, financially inflected meaning, which is worth 
remembering in relation to the discussion on commercial surrogacy in the next chapter. 
24 Though of course this is not completely novel, given the parallels with nannying, and particularly 
wet-nursing. 
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the emotional attachment. … It must be very natural for a mother to want to 
keep the baby”. Willow, who works in the wildlife centre, is in her mid-twenties 
and grew up in southwest England and then Edinburgh, similarly worried about 
the surrogate becoming “too attached” to the baby and being unable to 
relinquish it to the intending parents. She said, “I just can’t imagine doing that, 
carrying a baby and knowing full well that you’re gonna give it to someone else, 
’cos I’m sure that there must be quite a strong bond formed”. She felt that a 
surrogate mother would have a claim to keep the child, explaining, “I just have 
this feeling that it’s sort of their body and … it’s them that’s been nurturing this 
baby and I just feel it’s kind of theirs”.  
 The physical fact of the child’s location inside the surrogate’s body during 
pregnancy adds to her claim on the child – as Willow explained, “it’s been theirs 
[the surrogate mother’s] for the time it’s been in them”. The bioethical dilemma 
of surrogacy here is that the bond between mother and child is fragmented. 
Where once maternity was ‘certain’ because a child’s mother could only be the 
woman who had given birth to her, with surrogacy and ova donation, 
opportunities to have more than one ‘biological’ mother are opened up (Ragoné 
1994; Strathern 2003). Luke and Willow suggest that it is natural that a 
surrogate mother should form a bond with the child she has carried, so it would 
be unnatural for her to ‘reject’ this bond by relinquishing the child to the 
intending mother. Yet, to do so is to abrogate her moral (since they are not, in 
Britain, legal) obligations towards the intending parents.  
 In talking with me about the hypothetical ‘nightmare scenario’ of a 
surrogate mother refusing to relinquish the child, many respondents interpreted 
this as a question of whether the child was, in fact, ‘hers’ (cf. Warnock 1985: 
47). Nina said quite bluntly, “Well, it’s not her baby, is it? … [B]iologically, it’s not 
hers. I mean, she’s carried it”. Many other respondents also assumed that 
gestational surrogacy, where the surrogate carries a foetus which has been 
conceived from the intending parents’ gametes using IVF, was the most 
common form of surrogacy, though in fact this is not the case and ‘traditional’ 
surrogacy is more common as the ‘technology’ of donor insemination has been 
available for much longer, and is easier and cheaper to administer. This in itself 
suggests a desire to minimise the more culturally problematic aspects of 
surrogacy.  
 The question of whether a surrogate can legitimately claim to be a mother 
immediately brought up questions of ownership, belonging, rights and 
connection. Here I quote Nicola: 
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I think the only place where she [the surrogate mother] would have any 
kind of say in [keeping the baby] or any kind of weight if she changed her 
mind would be if it was her egg. I think if she’s agreed to carry a child 
and it’s not her egg and it’s not, clearly not her sperm [laughs] … if she’s 
agreed to do it and it’s not her flesh and blood, then I don’t think she’d 
have any right to turn round and say, ‘well, actually I want to keep it’, 
because she’s offered herself as a carriage, basically, not as a donor. I 
think the same applies if it’s a donor egg. I think it’s only if it’s her egg 
that she should, at least, she’d have some kind of right, then, to say, 
‘look, you know, I want to keep it’, ’cos it’s half her.   
 
Andrew also argued that a gestational surrogate who lacks a genetic link with 
the child has a less valid claim to motherhood:  
 
I think that, while the nine month period is very, very important, I don’t 
think that, if she doesn’t have any genetic link and she’s been aware 
from the first instance that it was almost a business relationship – and I’d 
imagine they’d sign contracts these days, anyway – I don’t think I would 
grant custody [to the surrogate] if I were a judge in that situation. 
  
 Andrew, Nina and Nicola propose a much more prescriptive approach to 
maternal rights in the case of surrogacy than Willow, Luke or Fiona. The former 
three employ ‘biometric’ genetic reckoning (Cassidy 2002: 150) to argue that a 
traditional surrogate retains an inalienable claim to motherhood over a child that 
has resulted from her ova, while the latter highlight the experience of pregnancy, 
emphasising a surrogate’s gestational kinship to the child (cf. Konrad 2005; 
Ragoné 1994; Thompson 2001).25 Yet both approaches serve to protect the 
status of the maternal bond. As we have seen, the maternal bond is, ideally, 
both biological and social. Like Erin and Kirsty earlier, Willow, Luke and Fiona 
expect a surrogate mother to form a bond with the child they carry because the 
maternal bond arises naturally out of the embodied experience of pregnancy. 
According to this reasoning, it is impossible to deny either a traditional or 
                                                
25 Notably, when talking about her own reproductive plans as quoted in the previous section, Nina 
emphasised the importance of pregnancy to the experience of motherhood, yet in talking about 
surrogacy she sidelines gestation as a feature of motherhood. These examples are not, however, 
necessarily contradictory, as in each case she aims for a balanced picture of maternity in which 
biological and social elements are both present. It is also worth remembering that out of these six 
particular respondents, Fiona is the only one who has experienced pregnancy and labour. 
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gestational surrogate mother’s claim to the child since, to repeat Luke’s point, “it 
must be very natural for a mother to want to keep the baby”. Nicola, Nina and 
Andrew, meanwhile, claim that the maternal bond comes from genetic kinship. 
As such, they suggest that it would be impossible to deny a traditional 
surrogate’s claim to motherhood, while gestational surrogacy is acceptable as 
the intending mother’s claim represents a more comfortable balance of both 
biological and social motherhood.  
 In making these distinct claims, each set of respondents draws on the 
concept of the maternal bond as a natural, inevitable phenomenon, rejecting the 
idea that it may be sidestepped by choice, and thus reinforcing its status as 
inevitable and given. Here, they are also defining what is morally right through 
the idiom of naturalness. What allows them to differentiate their claims is the 
polysemy of the maternal bond as well as nature; the maternal bond is still 
‘natural’ whether it is based in gestational or genetic kinship. The maternal bond 
has a very wide reach, as it is a physical, hormonal, emotional and relational 
phenomenon that effects a fundamental transformation in women’s identities. 
The breadth of the maternal bond means that, at any one time and for any 
particular purpose, its different aspects may be appealed to in order to make 
specific claims, and it is this multifaceted nature that gives it its strength and 
purchase. In particular here we also see that this already powerful concept takes 
on extra potency when elided with morality.  
 A number of respondents suggested to me that the surrogate mother 
required a certain level of emotional “strength” for her task. Lizzy, a student and 
conservation volunteer in her late teens who comes from Forres in western 
Moray (but whose parents are English), explained that she would not be able to 
act as a surrogate mother: “I am a very emotional person and I am not sure if I 
would be able to cope emotionally being a surrogate mother”, adding, “after 
going through the emotional rollercoaster of having a child and then to give it to 
someone else even if that was already established beforehand, I don’t think I 
would be able to do it”. Earlier, we saw that the bond between mother and child 
is experienced and expressed in terms of emotional attachment based on 
physical experience. When respondents such as Fiona expressed their 
concerns about the consequences of a surrogate forming a bond with the child, 
they suggested the emotional and psychological ramifications of surrogacy 
arrangements on the parties involved. Respondents seemed particularly 
concerned about the surrogate mother’s emotional state, particularly at the 
moment of postpartum handover, once again showing the cultural and moral 
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significance of this act in the surrogacy arrangement.  
 The idea that a surrogate might decide to assert parental rights over the 
child was often expressed as a “change of mind”, based on the assumption that 
she might not realise that she would bond with the child, and that this natural 
emotion would “kick in”, causing her to feel that she was, after all, the child’s 
mother. The special emotional strength required of a surrogate mother is the 
strength to detach from a maternal bond that occurs naturally, an altogether 
unusual task. A surrogate represents conflicting obligations, being expected to 
experience feelings of maternal altruism and responsibility towards the child but 
also to uphold her promise to help the intending parents. In the next chapter, we 
shall see how ideas about gifts, altruism and sacrifice are implicated in 
respondents’ ideas about surrogacy and parenthood. It may be that for those 
who are in favour of surrogacy, the surrogate’s ‘unnatural’ act of renouncing the 
maternal bond to the child she has carried is obviated by the sacrificial and 
altruistic act of helping another against one’s own interests. 
 Many respondents believed that some semi-formal process of 
psychological assessment would be appropriate before a surrogacy 
arrangement was set up, suggesting that counselling should be provided to the 
parties involved (but especially the surrogate mother), not only to provide 
emotional support but also as a means of vetting potential surrogates by 
weeding out those who are not emotionally fit for the role.26 This idea that the 
assessment of a potential surrogate’s psychological state may act as a 
competent measure of her fitness for the role is commensurate with British 
clinical practice, as surrogates and intending parents are expected to attend 
repeated counselling sessions throughout the entire process (Brinsden 2003). 
Emotional strength is a useful measure in assessing surrogates, as emotion is 
by definition a labile yardstick. By insisting that the surrogate be emotionally 
strong, respondents set limits on surrogacy’s availability. By arguing that women 
should undergo rigorous emotional tests in order to qualify as surrogate 
mothers, they express their hope that surrogacy will not become more 
widespread and instead only be an option of last resort.  
   
 
 
                                                
26 One interviewee in Hirsch’s (1993: 73) study in southeast England suggested further that 
counselling may help individuals uncover their true motivations for wanting to use assisted 
conception, and, by implication, that understanding this will prevent them from going through with 
it. 
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Being fair: Upholding the surrogacy contract 
 
 As we have seen, competing claims to motherhood provoke knotty ethical 
dilemmas. For some, this was couched in terms of fairness, as in Amy’s 
response to my question of what happens if a surrogate mother decides to try 
and keep the baby: 
 
I think it’s just a really hard decision for someone to make in the first 
place and it kind of makes me think that surrogate parenting is bad, 
because how do you know? How can you kind of have a child and then 
give it away and then maybe down the line you would change your mind, 
but I don’t think you could really change your mind because I don’t think 
it’s fair on the people that have started bringing up the child. But I don’t 
know, if I actually came across that situation, I don’t know how I’d feel 
then. 
 
Amy’s framing of her argument in terms of fairness, a value that is popularly 
thought to be quintessentially British, suggests that upholding a surrogacy 
contract is just.  
 Many respondents assumed that intending parents would draw up 
contracts with surrogate mothers and that these should be enforceable. Paul, 
Jenny’s partner, is a conservation volunteer and trainee counsellor in his mid-
fifties. He grew up in London, but brought up his children in Orkney before 
moving to Moray after he and his wife divorced. He felt that a legal contract 
could preclude the formation of a bond between a surrogate mother and the 
child. Once again, I asked him if a surrogate would have a right to keep the baby 
she had borne: 
 
Paul: Not if she’d signed some sort of legal contract, which I assume 
people would do, because that’s where it all, for me, could go pear-
shaped, because human emotion would come in. I mean, that woman 
[the surrogate mother] could get attached to the baby in the womb, even, 
and once she sees it, you know, everything’s gonna kick in, biologically 
and emotional attachment, you know, it could be very tricky. And she 
might at a later date feel she’s got a right to see that child, and then the 
father might decide he wants to meet this woman who carried his child. 
He’s got some kind of relationship with her, in a way, hasn’t he? It’s very 
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complicated.  
 
KD: So, to you, it would be quite important that there was a legally 
enforceable contract? 
 
Paul: Well I think it would make things a lot easier. Because otherwise, 
you’re asking for trouble, I think.  
 
… Yeah, I think that would make it a lot clearer, that – you know, ‘I 
undertake to carry this baby, blah, blah, blah, and to hand it over when 
it’s born and I have no rights over access or ownership,’ – not ownership! 
But parental rights – ‘I waive my parental rights.’ I mean, surely you’d 
have to? Otherwise you’d be setting yourself up for problems as the 
parents of the child.  
 
KD: So presumably, from that, you think that parental rights can be 
waived? 
 
Paul: Yeah, I mean, I thought that was the whole point of it, that you’re 
undertaking to carry that baby and as soon as it’s born to hand it over, 
otherwise it’s false pretences if you intend to keep it, so I think that’s 
gotta be better to make that black and white, so everybody knew what 
the deal was.     
 
 Clearly, the argument for a legal contract is one that favours the rights of 
the intending parents over those of the surrogate mother. This serves to 
minimise the challenge to cultural axioms of motherhood and kinship that 
surrogacy represents. It also points to the ethical responsibilities of surrogacy. 
Surrogacy arrangements rely on the ability of the surrogate not to claim 
maternity to the child she has carried and, by implication, not to form a bond 
with it. In surrogacy between friends or relatives, it is assumed, reciprocal 
obligations between the surrogate and the intending parents encourage her to 
honour the surrogacy agreement (see Chapter Two). If the surrogate and 
intending parents do not know each other previously, a legal contract may 
provide an alternative means of enforcing her obligations towards the intending 
parents. As such, respondents like Paul refer to the law to support what they 
feel is fair. In doing so, they expect more from British law than it actually 
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provides, as surrogacy contracts are not legally enforceable in the UK 
(Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990). This disjuncture between respondents’ expectations and the actual legal 
situation is interesting precisely because these laws were aimed at reflecting the 
public’s ‘gut feelings’. In particular, the Warnock Report was based partly on 
evidence collected from ‘the public’ about their ideas about such practices.  
 Paul and others referred to the law as a higher authority that can provide 
ultimate judgement about who is a child’s mother, informed by an accurate 
recognition of natural maternity. While the Warnock Report assumed social 
consensus on bioethical issues like surrogacy, here we see instead an appeal 
being made to the law to try and settle something that seems instead to 
inevitably provoke ambivalence. Faced with the uneasy ethical dilemmas and 
kinship ramifications of surrogacy, respondents appeal to grounding concepts 
such as nature, maternal bonding and the law in order to support their claims, 
and they do so in such a way as to imply that these concepts are 
incontrovertible, though in fact we have seen that in practice it is precisely their 
ability to straddle different meanings that makes them effective.  
  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Mothers I spoke to during fieldwork told me repeatedly that having a 
child was a transformative experience, though with both positive and negative 
effects. While the maternal bond is a particularly robust concept, respondents 
disagree about its specific form and effects, with some saying that it is an initial 
difference while others suggested it is long-term or even permanent. Similarly, 
while this difference was closely associated with the physical experience of 
maternity, this could be in relation to pregnancy, labour and/or breast-feeding, or 
even hormonal and emotional responses to the sound of a child crying. While 
respondents did not suggest that fathers lack a physical connection with their 
children and took intending parents’ desire to have children ‘of their own’ as self-
evident, when talking about maternal bonding, they pointed to a different kind of 
bond between mothers and the children they have carried and borne, which has 
significant ramifications both for how parenting is organised and for the ethical 
status of surrogacy.  
 88
 Surrogacy has the potential to threaten both the ideal of maternal 
altruism and the naturalness of maternal bonding, as the surrogate mother 
seems to be rejecting a child to whom, according to the logic of the maternal 
bond, she should inevitably have become attached. For respondents, the 
maternal bond is both natural and social and thus appears to be a ‘total social 
fact’ (Mauss 1990) that requires no explanation. Yet, the discussion about what 
happens when a surrogate mother claims the child she has carried as part of the 
surrogacy arrangement as her own showed that nature may be used in different 
ways, albeit with similar rhetorical effects. In this case, one group of 
respondents claimed that all surrogates retain a claim to maternal rights 
because of the naturalness of gestational kinship, while another group claimed 
that only traditional surrogates could legitimately claim maternal rights because 
of the naturalness of genetic connection. Various anthropologists have shown 
the way that those personally involved in surrogacy arrangements manipulate 
concepts like nature and maternity strategically in order to place surrogacy 
within a more socially acceptable frame (Ragoné 1994; Roberts 1998; Teman 
2003; Thompson 2001). Respondents’ ideas about the maternal bond presented 
here demonstrate the balancing of different values in ethical judgement as well 
as the polysemy of grounding concepts. While surrogacy seems to literalise 
ideas like maternal bonding, thus exposing them to destabilisation, this facility 
for being manipulated is in fact here a strength rather than a weakness. 
 Not only do respondents here use nature in shifting and contingent ways, 
but they also often elide their sense of what is natural with what is morally right. 
This has the effect of strengthening nature, and the claims they make with it, 
further. It also at once suggests what is distinctive about this group of people’s 
responses to surrogacy. There is of course a long tradition of positive 
association between morality and nature in British culture, not least in the 
environmental movement. Yet, nature has also historically been a site of danger, 
bestiality and chaos, something to be controlled and tamed by people and 
inimical to society (see Cassidy 2002; Cassidy and Mullin 2007; Cronon 1996; 
Descola and Pálsson 1996; Gould 2005; Milton 1993; Schneider 1980; Strathern 
1992a; Williams 1975; Yanagisako and Delaney 1994). 
 Drawing critically on Schneider’s (1980) separation of symbolic and 
normative elements in American kinship, Edwards writes that Born and Bred 
kinship contains both of these elements and that they are interlinked (2000: 28-
29). The concept of the maternal bond as analysed here shows that models are 
not just abstract entities that describe how things are, they also show how things 
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ought to be done; they are never morally or politically neutral. The maternal 
bond has profound implications, informing expectations about women’s different 
responsibilities and identities in all spheres of life. In this way, ‘bond’ is an 
appropriate term, as it contains within it notions of physical constraint and 
obligation as well as emotional attachment. As we have seen, locating the 
formation of the maternal bond in the pregnant woman marks off motherhood as 
special, unique and somewhat mysterious. The maternal bond serves to delimit 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion around the deeply valued status of 
motherhood. Furthermore, thinking about surrogacy shows that natural 
expectations like the formation of a unique bond between mother and child carry 
with them gendered ethical responsibilities – (good) mothering is seen to entail 
self-sacrifice, selflessness and extreme responsibility, but it is also something 
profoundly and uniquely fulfilling. Motherhood is a key exemplar of the ethic of 
femininity (Franklin 1997; Ginsburg 1989; Paxson 2004; Rapp 1999a, b) and it is 
impossible to separate notions of proper feminine behaviour from ethical 
judgements about surrogacy (Cannell 1990; Ragoné 1994). 
 Respondents were often hesitant to be seen to be prescribing specific 
ethical principles in relation to surrogacy. Having said this, the example of 
maternal bonding demonstrates particularly clearly that in making ethical claims, 
they do nonetheless express and reproduce normative ideas about kinship, 
morality and gender. This suggests that one aspect of making claims is 
considering the effects of one’s pronouncements on one’s interlocutor. 
Empathising in this way is important in avoiding offence and in marking one’s 
own status as a sympathetic and tolerant person. This has clear implications for 
anthropological research methods that are significant both in recorded 
interviews and participant observation. This emphasis on avoiding ‘judgemental’ 
rhetoric also suggests the importance of freedom of choice as an ethical 
principle for these people, which has clear relevance to their own lives, as we 
shall see.  
 Tolerance, fairness, politeness and individuality are all popularly thought 
of as British traits and respondents’ speech here reflects this. Here we have also 
seen many examples of ideas about feelings and emotion running through their 
talk about maternal bonding and motherhood. This is clearly linked for them with 
physical, embodied experience, reflecting the idea that the maternal bond is 
primarily a feeling of attachment that creates the necessary conditions for a 
mother to respond to and nurture her child appropriately. Once again, surrogacy 
is troubling because the surrogate is expected to resist a feeling that is 
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supposed to be so strong and compelling that refuting it would be ‘unnatural’ 
and emotionally damaging.  
 The importance of feeling has another dimension here in terms of 
empathy. Respondents cannot draw on their own personal experience of 
surrogacy, though they can express their knowledge of maternal bonding. 
Again, we see this in their hesitance to express rigid views about surrogacy and 
many of them noted the speculative nature of what they were saying, such as 
Amy’s comment above about surrogacy contracts: “I don’t know, if I actually 
came across that situation, I don’t know how I’d feel then”. What Amy points to 
here is the difficult position I put her and other interviewees in, of speculating 
about a practice with emotional, physical and relational consequences but which 
they have not experienced themselves.27 So, one further function of this is to 
reflect their awareness of the abstract nature of what they were saying. While 
everyday life is lived amongst others, the claims respondents made about 
surrogacy were uncoupled from this relational context, and it is for this reason 
that Amy and others say that they might feel differently about surrogacy if they 
knew those personally involved in it. Relationality indexes moral obligations, but 
here in being asked to make claims about surrogacy they are somewhat freed 
up from such sympathies (cf. Konrad 2005). 
  
 
 
 
                                                
27 The divergent ways in which ethics is expressed and conceptualised finds a parallel in the 
different forms of ethical claim-making encountered here, in the different responses to different 
kinds of questions – claims that are solicited and speculative or spontaneous and reflective – and 
in the different kinds of values and concepts – grounding concepts or implicit moral values – 
employed to make these claims. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Love and Money 
 
We’ve made a great mess of love 
since we made an ideal of it 
D.H. Lawrence, Mess of Love 
 
How quickly nature falls into revolt 
When gold becomes her object!  
Henry IV Part 2, Act IV, scene 5 
 
 
Surrogacy seems to respondents to have the potential to disturb the 
formation of the maternal bond, a bond which models a perfect combination of 
natural response and altruistic impulse (Cannell 1990; Morgan 1985; Strathern 
1992b, 2003; Zipper and Sevenhuijsen 1987). As Cannell (1990) has shown, 
British media representations of surrogate mothers rest on a sharp distinction 
between the ‘good’ (altruistic) surrogate mother who acts to help a sister or 
friend out of love with no financial reward and the ‘bad’ (commercial) surrogate, 
exemplified by Kim Cotton, who was seen to be driven simply by desire for 
money. This response reflects importantly on the status of the mother-child bond 
‘as the essence of natural, family ties’ (Cannell 1990: 668; see also Zipper and 
Sevenhuijsen 1987). It also suggests the moral and ideological significance of 
this concept. Respondents here were clearly concerned about not only the 
consequences of a surrogate forming a bond with the child she has carried, but 
also the implication that this bond, while ‘natural’, is not necessarily automatic 
and must in fact be cultivated. Surrogacy appears dangerous because it implies 
that maternal bonding can sometimes fail. 
The public response to Kim Cotton also importantly reveals much about 
the nature of ‘market values’ and what they are seen to engender in British 
culture (Strathern 2003: 290). In this chapter I will explore respondents’ ideas 
about altruism, love, money and commercialism in relation to commercial and 
altruistic surrogacy. I will explore what respondents mean when they draw upon 
a cultural model that pits altruism and self-interest as opposing and 
irreconcilable forces when assessing a surrogate mother’s motives for entering 
a surrogacy arrangement and what effects they imagine that might have for 
those involved. 
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As noted in the Introduction and as we shall see here, proponents of 
surrogacy often employ gift rhetoric in order to normalise and ethicise the 
practice. While in popular and even academic rhetoric gifts may be called on in 
direct dichotomous relation to commodities, lived practice is more likely to be 
characterised by a mixture of these forces, though of course this in itself works 
through the reproduction of dichotomous ideals. As Lambek (2008: 136) has 
said of the gift, the Maussian ‘obligations’ to give, receive and reciprocate the 
gift are ‘neither mechanical acts of rule-following nor simple or maximizing 
choices’. Instead, as in other ethical judgements, gift-givers must weigh up and 
balance competing considerations and commitments. In respondents’ various 
ideas about commercial and altruistic surrogacy as well as paid blood, egg and 
sperm donation presented here, we shall see this contingency in practice.  
 
 
 
Being a mother 
 
We met Erin in the previous chapter. She was born in rural Ireland and 
moved to southeast England with her family as a teenager. Her father died when 
she was a child and she had to give up her place at Cambridge University to 
look after her younger brothers after her mother died when she was eighteen. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, becoming a mother brought with it a new 
sense of responsibility. She told me: 
 
[Being a mother means] an absolute emotional relationship, an immense 
emotional relationship that is tied in with a huge amount of responsibility, 
I think in essence. Attached to that are all the offshoots, you know, in 
terms of a positive change of lifestyle involving a child, and that affects 
day-to-day and your long-term – it changes your goals and ambitions. So 
that, if you like, alters your, not your personality, but it alters your 
perception on your life and where it’s going and where it’s going with 
regards to your child. So, if you like, the emotional bond is tied in with 
personal responsibilities and then social responsibilities.  
 
Motherhood effected a transformation of Erin’s very being, her sense of self and 
her place in the world, her lifestyle and her relationships with others. Despite her 
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extensive experience of caring for others, being a mother was singular in its 
transformative effects.  
Motherhood is transformative because it demands that one takes full 
responsibility for another dependent and vulnerable person. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, the bond a mother has with her child is thought to be “special”. 
Like her partner Paul, who described his own experience of fatherhood as “a 
two-edged sword”, Jenny considers parenthood to be a mixture of hard work 
and pleasure. She told me, “I’ve found it, on the one hand, rewarding and lovely, 
and I wouldn’t have wanted not to have been a parent, but it would be less than 
honest if I say that it’s been a good experience in total in my life. I think there 
have been elements of it that have been extremely difficult and challenging”. 
Eleanor was clear about the way in which ultimate responsibility for a 
child lies at the feet of its mother, based on having a quite different experience 
of new parenthood compared to her ex-husband (see also Oakley 1986; 
Rothman 1989; Wolf 2001):  
 
I think that women don’t know what’s happened when they’ve had the 
baby. And it’s a sort of ghastly realisation, because you prepare for the 
birth – all this talk about childbirth, and how you’re going to do it, how 
you’re going to breathe and how you’re going to do this and how you’re 
going to do that and, ‘oh and don’t forget to get some vests and some 
babygros’. But suddenly, it’s there and you haven’t a minute for anything 
else. And because you’re the mother you haven’t a minute for anything 
else and so you have to do it. But you’re all up and down and the man, 
because he doesn’t have to do it, he sort of doesn’t know what to do and 
doesn’t get involved at all in the same way. So it’s a very tricky time. 
(Original emphasis) 
 
In these descriptions, becoming a mother entails an all-encompassing sense of 
responsibility in which the mother’s previous status, identity, roles and sense of 
self are eclipsed by the needs of her child. However, on the other edge of the 
sword, motherhood is “fulfilling”, “rewarding”, “lovely” and “important”. In these 
cases, motherhood represented the realisation of a personal desire or, as Fiona 
put it, “a deep-rooted need”, which is also a natural expectation.  
 Erin summed up the rewarding side of becoming a mother: 
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[Y]ou feel very proud, you know, somebody that’s related to you, that you 
love, that you’ve created, so immensely proud and it’s immensely 
positive because you are given a chance for another identity, if you like. 
You’re given a chance to be somebody’s mummy, or somebody’s parent. 
So [when I gave birth] I sort of felt – I’m sure some of it was hormonal – 
euphoric, at the idea that you can recreate yourself. So if you like, it’s a 
second chance to deal with some of the mistakes you have previously 
made, so yeah, there’s definitely a reinvention of identity. 
 
Here, Erin points to the fact that reproduction produces both a mother and a 
child. Erin suggests that, in becoming a mother, her identity was reinvented in a 
positive way, that in a sense, she became a ‘good’ person who has dealt with 
previous “mistakes” (see also Miller 2004; Paxson 2004). In this way, she 
implies that birth is, for the mother, a purifying rebirth much like a ritual initiation 
(cf. Davis-Floyd 1992; Martin 2001). Erin’s description of motherhood is also 
reminiscent of the concept of the calling28 (Weber 1992), which points once 
again to the important connections between morality and kinship and between 
motherhood and ethics. She suggests that motherhood brings about a change in 
a woman not only because of physical changes and natural responses, but also 
because it is a deeply morally laden status, so that women bear an ethical 
responsibility to be good mothers.  
 In Euro-American cultures, maternal altruism, the expectation that a 
mother will be wholly dedicated to the care and nurturance of her child even to 
the point of abnegation, is a highly valued trait (Anleu 1992; Boydell n.d.; 
Ginsburg 1989; Miller 2004; Rapp 1999a; Raymond 1990; see also Paxson 
2004). Maternal altruism is closely associated with the expectation that a natural 
bond will form between mother and child and that mothers can be relied upon to 
provide care, nurturance and protection – in other words, to embody this ideal. 
Implicit in Erin’s comment that motherhood “alters your perception on your life 
and where it’s going”, along with the clear importance of responsibility identified 
in the examples here, is a sense that an important part of maternal altruism is an 
acceptance that, in order to best care for a child and to reap the rewards of 
motherhood, one may need to make some sacrifices. 
 
 
                                                
28 Erin is of course a trained nurse, a profession that has traditionally been particularly closely 
associated with the idea of the vocation. 
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An altruistic envelope or a sausage machine?29  
 
The ideal of altruistic surrogacy is enshrined in UK law, in reaction to the 
‘moral panic’ (Jenkins 1992) surrounding the Kim Cotton case (Cannell 1990; 
Wolfram 1989). In the clamour that surrounded the passing of the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act (1985) and Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990), 
an attempt was made to prescribe a morally acceptable version of surrogacy, 
and this was ‘altruistic surrogacy’, in which any vestiges of a financial 
transaction are eliminated. British law prohibits the granting of Parental Orders 
to intending parents who have given surrogates more than ‘reasonable 
expenses’, yet these are not in fact set. This suggests that the distinction 
between altruistic and commercial surrogacy is, in practice, a grey area even in 
Britain, despite the moral repugnance about commercialised surrogacy 
arrangements evident in the Warnock Report and the reaction to Kim Cotton’s 
case, and there is evidence that there have been ‘commercial’ surrogacy 
arrangements in the UK that have not been prosecuted (see Blyth and Potter 
2003; Brazier et al 1998). 
The model of surrogacy favoured by most respondents that I spoke to 
was, broadly speaking, ‘altruistic’: 
 
Emily: I would think that people would decide to become a surrogate 
mother probably because they know the couple involved, or at least one 
part of them and they want to provide the facility that the couple can’t do 
themselves, as a sort of altruistic – more than a gesture – deed. I can’t 
think there’s another good reason for doing it.  
 
Nina: You hear a lot of bad stories about, you know, people paying 
people to carry their children for them and people taking advantage of 
people and I think, say, getting a stranger to be a surrogate for you 
would be very weird, I think. You have to keep it within your circle and 
the people you know or else it just becomes, I don’t know, that’s when it 
becomes a bit of a moral issue, for me. And I think there’d be less 
chance, maybe, of the end result not being right, you know, as in 
someone keeping the baby and not actually giving it to the [intending] 
                                                
29 Emily, who is a writer, coined these two phrases when she told me her views on altruistic and 
commercial surrogacy respectively. She is in her early fifties and married without children. 
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parents. I think that would be less of an issue if it was a friend or family 
member who was being a surrogate. 
 
Sophie: I think it’s nicer [when it is altruistic] and it seems less ‘under the 
carpet’ and sort of like a business transaction. Yeah, I think that’s what 
makes the difference for me, I don’t like the idea of it as a business 
transaction. I do like the idea of it as a sort of almost a community thing 
and a family or a community caring for each other and trying to help out. 
That’s where the line is. (Original emphasis) 
 
 In these three illustrative examples, we see not only the claim that 
altruism is the best reason for acting as a surrogate mother, but also what is 
understood by altruism in surrogacy. In these examples, altruistic surrogacy is: 
an offer of support and assistance to known others that implies sympathy and 
mutual support; a means of preventing exploitation; knowledge between parties 
which ensures that obligations are fulfilled; a way of differentiating an 
arrangement from a “business transaction”; something that creates community 
and it is about “caring for each other and trying to help out”. We also see some 
examples of what it is not: “taking advantage” of others, being “weird”, creating a 
“moral issue” and a “business transaction”. Altruism is clearly a complex and 
multifaceted concept, and these examples do not exhaust its meanings. 
 Lizzy, who we met in the previous chapter, introduced me to her school-
friend, Alex, who is also from Forres. Lizzy thought it would be a good idea for 
me to interview Alex as she had offered to act as a surrogate mother for a 
mutual gay friend of theirs if he wanted to have children in the future.30 Alex told 
me: 
 
I wouldn’t consider being an anonymous surrogate. It would only be a 
consideration if it were for someone I knew very well that needed help. 
That way I would know what kind of a family the child would be going 
into, as well as I think it would make the whole experience easier, as in 
that situation you would not be thinking that you are having to give your 
baby away to a couple, it would be more of a case of knowing that you 
                                                
30 Two other respondents told me that had thought about being surrogate mothers themselves. 
Eleanor had considered offering to act as a surrogate for her younger sister, who, though she later 
had two sons, initially had had trouble conceiving. Charlotte also told me she had once offered to 
consider acting as a surrogate for a friend who had been diagnosed with spinal problems that 
meant her future ability to carry a child to term might be impaired, but noted that she was relieved 
that she had not taken this offer up. 
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are really helping someone you care about and you can be excited for 
them having their baby and it just happens to be that it’s through you. 
Also, you would be able to keep in touch and that would let the child 
know where they came from. 
 
In this quote, Alex talks explicitly about knowledge four times, encompassing 
and addressing a number of concerns that she has about anonymous or non-
altruistic surrogacy. Knowledge here seems to stand for context, (cf. Edwards 
2000: 229), it also stands for trust, identification (in specific contrast to 
anonymity), the needs of others and the promise of continuing future 
relationships. By focusing on knowledge, she separates out the act of giving up 
the child from that of “helping someone you care about”. This re-routing means 
that she can see herself simply as a means “through” which their needs are 
fulfilled rather than as someone who has given a baby away. The idea of helping 
someone you know grounds her claim that surrogacy can be socially and 
morally acceptable.  
 In Alex’s formulation “your” (the surrogate mother’s) baby becomes “their” 
(the intending parents’) baby. This not only reorients attention away from the 
means of the surrogacy arrangement (the surrogate mother) towards the end 
(the child), but also implies that thinking of others is a sufficient reason for doing 
something, in contrast to more capitalistic models of human action that see 
people as basically self-interested.  
 While Alex recognises that a surrogate mother may inevitably feel some 
attachment to the child, she believes that she should try and resist this in order 
to uphold her side of the surrogacy agreement. This anticipates the realities of 
commercial surrogacy arrangements as described in Ragoné’s ethnography of 
American surrogacy arrangements: ‘By focusing upon her relationship to the 
adoptive mother, in particular, to the idea that she is giving the adoptive mother 
a child, the surrogate shifts the emphasis away from her relationship to the 
father vis-à-vis the child and from the perception that she will be “giving the baby 
away”’ (1994: 124; see also Roberts 1998; Teman 2003). Ragoné concludes 
that this focus allows for the surrogate’s actions to be cast ‘in a more socially 
acceptable light’ (1994: 124). It also enables the arrangement to run 
‘successfully’, that is, to ensure that the child ends up with the intending parents. 
 Alex is clearly uninterested in acting as an anonymous31 surrogate, and 
                                                
31 By ‘anonymous’ she seems to mean not only a situation where the intending parents and 
surrogate mother remain completely unknown to each other, as is the case in sperm or egg 
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one reason for this is to know “what kind of a family” the child would be raised 
in. In her study of anonymous British ova donors, Konrad (2005) found that 
many donors, despite wishing to remain anonymous to the recipients of their 
eggs and unconnected to any resulting children, expressed a profound interest 
in the results of their donations, and specifically whether their ‘gift’ had resulted 
in any live births. As Konrad suggests, this complicates commonplace 
assumptions about both gifts and anonymity and the kind of sociality that they 
enact. Alex and others made the assumption that altruistic surrogacy is not 
anonymous, that it is about helping known others. This suggests an inability to 
conceive of a scenario in which a surrogate or donor would be willing to go 
through the pain, inconvenience and potential kinship ramifications of surrogacy 
or donation without some prior personalised relationship of reciprocity, obligation 
or love. Konrad’s respondents meanwhile focus on present intention rather than 
on prior or future relationships.  
 The personal reward for the surrogates that Ragoné spoke to is their 
sense that they are doing something special that takes them beyond their 
everyday roles. She says, ‘Surrogates do not want to mother a child; they want 
instead to be socially rewarded for having made a valuable contribution, made 
to feel special, and, at least for a short time, made the center of attention for 
having accomplished something that they consider to be of tremendous value 
and importance, giving birth to a child’ (1994: 86; see also Konrad 2005: 77). 
Only one respondent, Jenny, anticipated this idea, saying, “I would imagine that 
[as a surrogate mother] you would get a lot of high personal regard on a very 
profound level that you could never get probably in any other way, I would 
imagine. I would like to think that that would be the biggest payment that you 
could get back, that that would be a motivator”.    
 In the previous chapter we heard Erin and Nina’s ideas about adoption 
and maternal bonding. Respondents generally expressed the view that adoption 
is a morally and socially responsible option for childless couples, but that 
wanting to have a child ‘of one’s own’ was understandable and that the realities 
of adoption in the UK were often onerous and unsatisfactory. None had adopted 
children themselves, though some who did not have children said that they 
would consider doing so. In discussions about adoption, one of the commonest 
ideas I heard was that there are a number of children “out there”, and as Willow 
                                                                                                                                 
donation, but also a commercial surrogacy arrangement where the intending parents and 
surrogate are unknown to each other prior to the agreement but become acquainted through 
surrogacy. 
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said, “it would be nice in an ideal world if people would look after the children we 
already have”. This perception suggests the importance of having parents for 
children’s development and that providing children with parental care despite 
lacking a genetic relation to them is a social good. Jenny described adoption as 
“a good social responsibility choice” and linked this not only with her perception 
that there are many children without parents in Britain, but also with a wider 
demographic picture, saying that the world is already “overcrowded and over-
populated”. But she suggested that adoption was not as readily accepted by 
society as it might be and would benefit from better promotion. So, while it may 
be a “socially responsible” option, it has a somewhat second-class status 
compared to having one’s ‘own’ child.  
 Contrasting adoption with conceiving a child through IVF, Richard said, 
“what I would hope is that adoption would be as much about providing a home 
for an existing child as providing a couple – or not a couple – with a child. … 
[A]doption should be as much about that existing child as about that couple’s 
needs”. The decision to place a child with adoptive parents is ultimately made by 
social workers and other professionals who are supposed to be working in the 
best interests of the child, not by the adoptive parents.32 For respondents, 
adoption is a moral action because someone is prepared to take on the 
responsibility for a child to which they usually have no kinship connection, 
whose background may be unknown or undesirable and because they must 
bear scrutiny of their private lives and undergo onerous tests of parental fitness. 
Those who are prepared to subject themselves to this, it is assumed, must be 
doing so not only for themselves, but also for the child.  
 Those who adopt make a sacrifice, since they are not passing on their 
genetic inheritance and subordinate the ‘selfish’ yet ‘natural’ desire to have 
children of one’s own to the needs of someone else’s child. This sacrifice may in 
turn be rationalised as altruism or social responsibility. Bloch examines various 
examples of ritual sacrifice to argue that both gift-giving and the self-
identification of the sacrificer with the victim – based on an assumption of 
fundamental resemblance between parent and child – are crucial parts of 
sacrifice, and that this is because sacrifice is concerned, like other rituals, with 
regenerating the group’s strength and vitality (1992: 37). Pertinent here is 
Bloch’s point that, in revitalising the group, sacrifice enables an inversion of 
                                                
32 The Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act was instituted by the Scottish government in 2007. Its 
stated aims are to improve the provision of fostering and adoption care for vulnerable children, 
with the particular goal of finding more permanent placements for such children. 
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power relations: the sacrificer/victim gains new strength through hurting himself. 
Sacrifice is also a means through which social reproduction is reinvigorated, 
which is perhaps why in the classic cases Bloch discusses the victim is usually 
substituted at the last minute, implying that the sacrificer’s intention to submit 
her or his own interests to the greater good is more important than the act itself. 
This also returns us to the point made in the previous chapter that focusing on 
the abnegatory elements of the surrogate mother’s act may ‘restore’ her 
femininity and make her act of relinquishing the child more culturally acceptable 
in obviating the problem of maternal bonding. 
 Lambek sees sacrifice as a performative act that ‘casts intention forward’ 
(2007: 33) and ‘bring[s] into being a new conventional or moral state’ (2007: 29):  
 
Sacrifice is both a passionate culmination for the victim and a significant 
initiative by the person who offers it. It draws a line in blood between 
“before” and “after”. Once you have killed something there is literally “no 
going back” for either victim or killer. Sacrifice is thus a materialization of 
intention and a consummation of resolution. (2007: 23)  
 
In describing sacrifice as a ‘pure beginning’ (2007: 30) which sets a normative 
standard against which subsequent acts may be judged, Lambek makes clear 
the importance of intention and motive – and how those are perceived by others 
– in such acts. This has particular relevance for the cases of adoption and 
altruistic surrogacy33 as discussed here, as claiming altruism, or sacrificing one’s 
own interests, as a motive casts such acts in a morally acceptable light, but also 
allows for the donor/sacrificer to wield power.  
 In the first quote from Erin in this chapter, she said, “the emotional bond 
[of motherhood] is tied in with personal responsibilities and then social 
responsibilities” (emphasis added). Similarly, Sophie described the ideal 
scenario of altruistic surrogacy as “a family or a community caring for each other 
and trying to help out”. This suggests the importance of an ethic of altruism in 
these people’s lives, and the connection between individual and social 
responsibilities. We saw in the previous chapter that motherhood should contain 
a proper balance of biological and social elements and that, for some 
respondents, adoption was problematic because the mother would lack the 
                                                
33 The classic Biblical case of human sacrifice is Abraham’s sacrifice of his son Isaac, who is 
substituted at the last moment with a ram. Isaac’s mother was Sarah while his (half-)brother 
Ishmael was borne by Hagar, Sarah’s handmaid, who is often described as the first surrogate 
mother. 
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biophysical experience of pregnancy and labour, which might impair the 
formation of the maternal bond. We see here in Jenny, Willow and Richard’s 
comments a further imbalance. If having a child the ‘natural’ way is in some way 
selfish and adopting is a self-sacrificial act, then in adoption the proper (to them) 
balance between egoism and altruism in the decision to have a child is upset, 
which also necessarily has an impact on the power dynamic between parent 
and child.  
 
 
 
Sisters doing it for themselves? The ties that bind 
 
 Almost all respondents have siblings and most of them described the 
sibling relationship as special in some way, and different from a relationship with 
a friend. Sophie said about her relationship with her two older sisters, “you know 
family members right from the beginning and so there’s that feeling of, they 
really know you and if you try and pretend to be somebody you’re not they’re 
going to catch onto that quite quickly and sort of know the real you so you can’t 
get away with it”. In contrast to her friends, Sophie said of her sisters, “I probably 
take them for granted more and expect more – whatever I’ve done, I kind of 
know that they’ll still be my sister, and they’ll still probably be there for me, 
however horrific I am”. One of the benefits of a relationship with someone with 
whom one shares a deep knowledge, then, is that one can share the bad times 
as well as the good, without this threatening the relationship.34  
 Sophie’s experience suggests that sibling ties are indissoluble, and 
Lauren, who also works in the wildlife centre and is in her late twenties, said, 
“you can’t get rid of a sibling like you can get rid of a friend … the choice to 
basically write a sibling out of your life is a very hard one” (cf. Edwards and 
Strathern 2000; Schneider 1980). Emily, who has a warm relationship with her 
older brother and younger sister, was wary about the sibling bond, drawing on 
the experience of friends who have difficult relationships with their siblings: 
 
If that bond is emphasised too much against the will of the people 
concerned then it can be a really bad thing and very difficult to fight 
                                                
34 Notably, in her study of Scottish adoptees, Carsten (2000b: 693) found that for quite a few 
people who had sought their biological kin in later life, relationships with siblings proved to be 
more rewarding and successful than with their birth parents. 
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against. Friends can be the most important people in your life, and 
however you come together with them, they can be a billion times more 
supportive than most people’s families and that can happen to people as 
easily as people’s families can be supportive. 
 
 Surrogacy between sisters has been described as the ideal form of 
altruistic surrogacy in British culture, in that it seems to be least threatening to 
the formation of the maternal bond and which fits best with the ethic of maternal 
altruism (Cannell 1990; Wolfram 1989; Zipper and Sevenhuijsen 1987). Most 
respondents in my study did not specify a particular relationship that might work 
best in surrogacy arrangements (even though I asked them directly), though 
most favoured a close relationship between surrogate and intending mother 
and, as we have seen, thought altruism was the best motive. A few did talk 
about sister-surrogacy, but not in exclusively positive terms. Just as Sophie 
suggested that altruistic surrogacy might be, though more ethical, “more 
complicated” in practice, those respondents who talked about sister surrogacy 
felt that it would make surrogacy more difficult. Amy summed this up, saying, 
“when I’ve thought about it before, I’ve kind of thought it would be a bit weird it 
being your sister”. I asked her if this was because she felt the relationship was 
too close. She replied, “Yeah, I mean I think maybe it would be hard for the 
surrogate mother. Yeah, just really close, and they would be a family unit 
anyway because they’d still see the child and stuff, so, like, thinking about the 
child and how they would feel about it as well, then it’s kind of, yeah it’s quite 
difficult”. For Amy, difficulty arises from the surrogate mother’s proximity to the 
child, both in terms of kinship connection and the likelihood that she will see the 
child grow up but not be its mother.  
 When I talked to Jenny about sister surrogacy, she told me that her aunt 
had nearly adopted her in an informal surrogacy arrangement: 
 
[M]y mother thought she was having twins when she had me and her 
sister-in-law and my father’s brother, they couldn’t have children, and 
they were a lovely couple and they wanted children and my mum said 
that if she had twins, she would give one of the babies up to them, so 
that’s a type of surrogacy, because the DNA would have been similar ... 
but it was only me born, so there was that poignancy for them whenever 
they were with me because they were perhaps thinking, that could have 
been the child we were bringing up. 
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Although this arrangement never went ahead, this “poignancy” that Jenny 
perceived in her aunt and uncle’s relationship with her seems congruent with 
Amy’s feeling that surrogacy between sisters has its own set of potential 
problems. Emily also noted that surrogacy between siblings might have the 
unintended consequence of raising tensions in the relationship between 
surrogate and intending mother, suggesting that in some cases a friend would 
make a better surrogate mother than a sister as “all sorts of childhood jealousies 
and insecurities” might come out in a sister surrogacy arrangement, concluding: 
“Extra care, I would say, with members of the family!”  
 Sister surrogacy has both positive and negative connotations because of 
the notion of closeness (cf. Edwards 2000: 99; passim). In sister surrogacy, 
closeness is not only that of physical location – a sister surrogate would be 
expected to stay in contact with the child and the intending parents which might 
make it harder for her to detach – but also of emotional connection. This reflects 
an assumption that maternal bonding is inevitable (and with sister surrogacy, the 
biogenetic connection would presumably be all the more relevant), as well as a 
recognition of the obligatory nature of close relationships and gift-giving 
(Strathern 1992a: 15).  
 I noted the common tendency to use gift rhetoric in surrogacy 
arrangements in the Introduction. Mauss claimed of the gift, ‘the thing given is 
not inactive. Invested with life, often possessing individuality, it seeks to return to 
… its “place of origin” or to produce, on behalf of the clan and the native soil 
from which it sprang, an equivalent to replace it’ (1990: 16; cf. Konrad 2005: 49). 
Gifts are, in this view, endowed with an inherent tendency to move, they never 
fully belong somewhere, as they must always be reciprocated. The association 
between surrogacy and gift-giving points not only to altruism but also implies the 
potential pitfalls of close relationships. As Emily said, the emotional upheaval of 
surrogacy might cause memories of past slights or rivalries to surface in the 
relationship between surrogate and intending mother if they are sisters, and so 
have a negative affect on its outcome and the sibling relationship. If we take into 
consideration Sophie and Lauren’s point that siblings have a licence to behave 
in ways that they would not with friends, this fear is understandable. For a sister 
surrogate, also, there is an added poignancy, as Jenny suggests, to the 
inevitable ambiguity of her relationship to her niece or nephew, which would 
presumably become relevant to the child as she grew up too. It is clear, then, 
that, while public discourse might promote sister surrogacy as an ideal, for these 
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respondents, the likely realities of such a situation may outweigh the benefits of 
keeping it in the family.   
 Anleu (1992) argues that altruistic surrogacy between women who have 
existing affective and/or kin ties exploits feelings of duty and obligation that are a 
feature of kinship relations, and which are all the stronger for women, who are, 
more so than men, expected to behave altruistically towards others. Raymond 
calls this the ‘moral celebration of women’s altruism’ (1990: 8) and, like Anleu, 
identifies it as a normative expectation for women. Women are, in particular, 
expected to display supererogatory altruism more than men and this is clearest 
in the idealised figure of the selfless mother. Employing idioms of altruism and 
gift-giving in surrogacy not only casts surrogacy in a more socially acceptable 
light, but provides a regulatory structure to the relationships entailed in the 
agreement.  
 Ragoné shows that a surrogate mother must navigate between claiming a 
motivation based on altruism that is not maternal – as this would complicate the 
relationship between her and the child – but sororal with the intending mother. 
This has the effect of placing such arrangements under a socially acceptable 
rubric of altruism, yet may have the unintended consequence of establishing an 
expectation that there will be a continuing relationship between intending and 
surrogate mother, an expectation that is often held by the surrogate but not 
reciprocated by the intending mother (1994: 80). Gift exchanges contain 
inherent regulatory mechanisms – the parties involved know what is an 
appropriate gift and counter-gift, what an expression of reciprocity and what of 
hostility or domination (Mauss 1990). In contrast to the privatised market sphere, 
which appears to be ruled by self-interest, keeping surrogacy within the ties of 
friendship and kinship means that self-interest may be suppressed by inherent 
mechanisms promoting obligation, duty and self-sacrifice, yet this is precisely 
what respondents fear will sour the relationship between sisters as intending 
and surrogate mothers.  
 Reflecting on familial love, Miller argues that:  
 
Siblings and friends are understood to be cared for with more reason 
than obligation or reciprocity. Love is essential because it asserts the 
ideal of agency within any given relationship. What is rejected is any 
language of obligation that suggests we maintain relationships solely out 
of enforced behaviour. To define a relationship in any terms other than 
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love seems to be taken as a debasement of that relationship. (1998: 35-
6) 
 
The cultural ideal of love as freely given obscures its obligatory and even 
exploitive potential. Offering to act as a surrogate mother for one’s sister is 
construed as an act of love, yet if sisters go ahead with a surrogacy 
arrangement, respondents fear that this will cause sibling rivalries to surface. 
Respondents’ fears about sister surrogacy suggest that they feel that while love 
or altruism may be an appropriate motive for acting as a surrogate, it may not 
actually be the best basis for a successful surrogacy arrangement given the ties 
of kinship, but also the unbalancing of power relations between the parties that 
surrogacy will entail. 
 In talking about sister surrogacy, respondents expressed fear about the 
potentially repressive side of altruism and family love. However, as Bloch 
suggests, ‘sacrificial’ acts like altruistic surrogacy may invert power relations.35 
In Mauss’ analysis of the gift, just as the donor is obliged to give, the recipient is 
obliged both to accept the gift and to reciprocate it (1990: 50-55). This is the 
ambivalent nature of donation: in instigating a gift relationship, the donor wields 
power over the recipient and constrains him or her within a relationship of 
mutual dependence. Gift-givers, like sacrificers, gain power through offering 
(part of) themselves (Bloch 1992; Douglas 1990; Parry 1986; Ragoné 1994; 
Rapp 1999b), yet they may also be compelled to instigate the gift relationship in 
the first place by existing, and potentially repressive, bonds of love and kinship. 
 
 
 
Look out for squalls36: Commercial surrogacy and human nature 
 
 In the Introduction I summarised the divisive and heated public debate 
provoked by commercial surrogacy in the 1980s and 1990s. As noted, anti-
commercial surrogacy polemic of the time was based on a model in which 
humans are properly ‘above’ the market sphere, which anthropologists have 
identified as an attribute of capitalist society, in contrast to a Maussian view of 
                                                
35 Ragoné (1994: 72) observed that surrogate mothers feel that having babies is something that 
they are good at, and by implication better at than intending mothers. Similarly, she suggests that 
surrogates’ description of their act as a gift tacitly implies that no financial compensation could 
ever equate to the extraordinary thing they have done (1994: 59). 
36 This is another phrase of Emily’s, which she used in reference to the risks, as she saw it, of 
commercial surrogacy. 
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non-capitalist societies in which people and things are bound up with each other 
(Parry and Bloch 1989; see also Strathern 1988). Warnock states that, with 
surrogacy:  
 
Even in compelling medical circumstances the danger of exploitation of 
one human being by another appears to the majority of us far to 
outweigh the potential benefits, in almost every case. That people should 
treat others as a means to their own ends, however desirable the 
consequences, must always be liable to moral objection. Such treatment 
of one person by another becomes positively exploitative when financial 
interests are involved. (1985: 46) 
 
This comment reflects the moral revulsion that underlies much anti-surrogacy 
polemic and which was a particular sticking point for Warnock herself (Sarah 
Franklin, personal communication). 
One key feature of anti-commercial surrogacy polemic is the ‘slippery 
slope’ argument, that allowing money into surrogacy arrangements breaks down 
the barriers around those things, like blood and babies, that are considered 
properly outside the realm of commodity exchange, rapidly leading to a situation 
in which everything is commodifiable and every exchange is a financial 
transaction. Zelizer (1997) notes a tendency amongst economic theorists to 
assume that money has the capacity to penetrate all spheres of life, and that 
once it does so, emotional and social ties will be eclipsed by rational self-interest 
and the pursuit of material gain. This is exemplified, she says, by Simmel’s 
notion of money as ‘colourless’ and possessing the power to ‘flatten’ (cf. 
Strathern 1992a: 5) social ties with its great homogenising power. Zelizer (2005; 
1997) shows that in reality, it is difficult to uphold this position given that money 
is inextricably bound up in intimate relationships and is moulded into different 
forms through its use in social life.  
Kopytoff has shown that commodification is a process of becoming 
rather than being and that, ‘The only time when the commodity status of a thing 
is beyond question is the moment of actual exchange’ (1986: 83):  
 
Out of the total range of things available in a society, only some of them 
are considered appropriate for marking as commodities. Moreover, the 
same thing may be treated as a commodity at one time and not at 
another. And finally, the same thing may, at the same time, be seen as a 
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commodity by one person and as something else by another. Such shifts 
and differences in whether and when a thing is a commodity reveal a 
moral economy that stands behind the objective economy of visible 
transactions. (1986: 64)  
 
Appadurai similarly suggests that attending to the ‘social life’ of things and the 
moments in which they are transacted can illuminate the political dynamics at 
work in the processes of commodification and the different ‘regimes of value’ at 
work in the apparently straightforward worlds of consumption and commercial 
exchange (1986: 4). Both Kopytoff and Appadurai are discussing things here 
rather than services, a distinction with some salience as we shall see in a 
moment, but the processual and transitional nature of commodities that they 
identify is important. We know that goods may shift in and out of commodity 
status and there may be a parallel with the ‘service’ of motherhood.  
 Surrogacy entails a ‘splitting’ of motherhood into component parts, with the 
outcome that different women may compete for the status of being a child’s 
mother, but it also shows the more everyday splitting of motherhood into those 
parts that may and may not be financially rewarded. Surrogacy elucidates the 
distinction between these different aspects of mothering, as it is much more 
ethical in British culture to pay a woman for providing childcare, as in a nanny or 
childminder, than to pay her for gestating or birthing a child. As we saw in 
Chapter One, the physical experience of pregnancy and labour is seen as a vital 
part of motherhood, providing the natural, biological and social grounds for 
maternal bonding. Given this close relationship, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
pregnancy is the component of motherhood that is seen as least appropriately 
rewarded with money. 
 In distinguishing between the ethics of commercial and altruistic 
surrogacy, commentators like Anderson (1990) refer to particular ‘regimes of 
value’, with commercialism and egoism pitted against altruism and voluntarism. 
While few respondents drew such stark distinctions, the same kinds of 
dichotomies remain important values when it comes to making claims about the 
ethics of commercial surrogacy. An important factor in the ethics of commercial 
surrogacy for respondents is their perception of the surrogate’s motive (Cannell 
1990; Markens 2007; cf. Ragoné 1994; Roberts 1998; Teman 2003). In 
introducing Part One, I discussed the connection drawn by three respondents 
between commercial surrogacy and prostitution. This analogy, as well as one 
between surrogacy and slavery, was also frequently drawn in the public debates 
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about surrogacy of the 1980s and 1990s. One anxiety that this analogical move 
indexes is a fear of exploitation in an unequal world. Whatever level of concern 
they felt about commercial surrogacy, most respondents were worried about the 
possibility that poor women might agree to be surrogate mothers out of financial 
imperative, though they did not generally state that this was a sufficient reason 
to ban surrogacy.  
 Lauren is in her late twenties and lives with her partner, Jack. They do not 
have any children, but plan to in the future (see Chapter Six). Lauren was born 
and grew up in America, and had been living, studying and working in Scotland 
for around four years when I first met her in Spey Bay. Jack is from an English 
family who moved to a Hebridean island when he was a small child. Lauren was 
concerned that women would be drawn into commercial surrogacy impelled by 
financial hardship: 
 
I think I probably would have a hard time if they were paid so much that 
you had women who felt they had no other options to make money, 
being surrogates not because they chose to, but because they, you 
know, had no other options. Then I would have a problem with that. And 
I don’t know where that financial line is, because I mean I certainly think 
they should be paid to cover all the costs, any lost wages that they would 
have made if they were working before that, and probably some amount 
of money for their ‘efforts’, if you will. But, you know, if you’re paying a 
mother £5,000,000 for nine months, that’s going to put a lot of pressure 
on people to make that choice, not because they are comfortable with it, 
but because they need the money. 
 
 Many respondents were loath to condemn payment for surrogate mothers 
outright, arguing that they should receive some compensation for the time they 
are pregnant, especially if it stops them working, though they felt this would be 
difficult to regulate. Nina argued that the intending parents should help the 
surrogate with any out-of-pocket costs related to the pregnancy, but qualified 
this with characteristic clarity, saying, “I think paying a fee to get a life is just too 
much. I think it’s morally wrong and a bit sick”. Nina’s view here is, like those on 
other subjects, somewhat more rigid than most, but her distinction between 
exchanging money for “a life” and compensating someone for their time was 
salient for others. 
 Although Andrew was generally against money being involved in 
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surrogacy, he recognised the argument for compensation, saying with a hint of 
irony in his voice, “it’s like a job, having a job for nine months, I suppose!” Other 
respondents also made this point, like Eleanor, who said of the surrogate, “she’s 
doing a service. Having babies is hard work”. This reflects two important points, 
that surrogacy is like a job in the efforts it entails and that money is an 
appropriate reward for work done or services rendered; eliding the two suggests 
that there is an argument for commercial surrogacy. In everyday life one 
receives compensation to cover for or mitigate direct costs in doing something 
that is not financially motivated, such as volunteering as a wildlife 
conservationist, so the distinction between compensation and payment is 
therefore one based on an assessment of motive and incentive. For 
respondents, surrogate mothers may be financially rewarded for their “efforts” 
but should not be (primarily) motivated by money.  
 Erin was more outspoken than most others in her condemnation of 
commercial surrogacy:  
 
I think if there was money involved [in a surrogacy arrangement], I think 
human beings don’t – capitalist society that we live in, I think where 
there’s the exchange of human beings and money, it takes us far, it 
takes us back to the Dark Ages. It takes us, you begin to question, did 
Wilberforce do anything for the human race? You question where our 
morals are at in the twenty-first century.  
 
Erin’s argument is framed by a certain idea of progress, working from the 
assumption that human morality is progressing in a positive way, as evidenced 
by milestones like the abolition of slavery. The ‘Dark Ages’ is in the British idiom 
a time of archetypal moral corruption compared to the apparently morally 
enlightened twenty-first century in which slavery is seen as very wrong. This 
reminds us of the particular ways in which people think about time and progress, 
and that the commodification of people is neither a new phenomenon, nor an old 
one. 37  
 I have noted that, in contrast to other groups of British people who employ 
the past as a means of critically reflecting on the present (Basu 2007; Cohen 
1987; Edwards 2000), respondents here are more likely to be future-oriented in 
                                                
37 It is worth remembering, also, that connecting slavery with surrogacy may be both an argument 
for and against payment of the surrogate mother, since slavery has been condemned as morally 
wrong both as the buying of persons and as making people work without financial reward (cf. 
Wilkinson 2003). 
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their outlook, which is no doubt connected with their interest in environmentalist 
ethics, which is based on acting responsibly to avert future catastrophe (see 
also Hirsch 1993). This may also be connected to the fact that most 
respondents are migrants to the area, self-consciously building good lives (cf. 
Carsten 1995). Erin is concerned about moral degeneracy in the future, but in 
stating her case she is putting a limit on what is acceptable, suggesting that 
while such backsliding may be a tendency, it is not inevitable and can be 
averted. By talking about the past, Erin suggests also that commercial surrogacy 
cannot be seen simply as a symptom of the particular times in which it was born 
– the reasons for it are more complex, as the differing social attitudes and 
approaches to its legal regulation around the world reflect.  
 For Erin, the commodification of babies and bodies that commercial 
surrogacy represents is a cause for real anxiety: 
   
[T]here’s something quite emotionally – not to use a pun, but – barren 
about, barbaric, about, you know, handing over money and somebody 
walks off with a child. You know, you can’t put a price on human life. 
What message are we giving to that child? You know, what, is one child 
worth [£]15,000, another worth [£]20,000? It’s ludicrous, and I can’t 
morally justify that situation to myself.  
 
As Erin’s pun suggests, allowing money into the creation of human life negates 
the fecund potential of assisted conception. In her view introducing money and 
questions of price into human reproduction creates emotional sterility, implying 
further that assisted conception, despite alleviating an individual or couple’s 
childlessness, will have the effect of making the wider community “barren” in its 
corruption of normal social transactions.  
 Revulsion at the idea of ‘baby-selling’ – indexing the idea of the priceless 
child (Zelizer 1985) – is the cornerstone of the legal prevention of commercial 
surrogacy and it seems that, for many respondents, commercial surrogacy 
necessarily implies buying a life rather than paying a woman for her 
reproductive work. Just as many were afraid that commercial surrogacy would 
amount to selling babies, they were also concerned that it would mean the 
commodification of women’s bodies and reproductive capacities, though this 
was less of an explicit concern than baby-selling. Like Erin and Lauren, Andrew 
picked on the idea of price when explaining his objections to commercial 
surrogacy, wondering how this might affect intending parents’ motives for 
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selecting a particular surrogate: “Well, I guess if an egg and sperm match, do 
you choose the prettiest surrogate? Do you pay more for one with big breasts? 
How does it work?” 
 Jenny said she would prefer for surrogacy to occur between friends or 
family members based on ties of mutual support and was somewhat concerned 
about the potential for exploitation of women who acted as surrogates, but she 
suggested that the involvement of money in surrogacy arrangements was not 
necessarily immoral:  
 
[I]n the real world, I think there probably might well be good reasons why 
somebody should have some form of remuneration for [being a 
surrogate mother] and I don’t think it’s necessarily a bad thing. I think it’s 
valuing what somebody’s doing for you in a very profound way. And at 
the end of the day, money is, like it or hate it, and I’m certainly not 
somebody myself who puts a lot of store by money, but, I mean, 
realistically, it’s the currency by which we measure a lot of things.  
 
Jenny recognises that “in the real world”, money is the usual means of assigning 
value and so it makes sense to her to apply that to surrogacy like anything else. 
 In her comparative study of public and legal responses to surrogacy in 
New York and California, Markens (2007) has shown the work of two competing 
‘frames’ in arguments both for and against surrogacy, one as ‘baby-selling’ and 
the other as ‘the plight of infertile couples’. Markens makes the point that these 
two frames are both easily understood and likely to elicit sympathy, so that one 
cannot argue successfully against either but only highlight certain aspects of 
each frame in order to argue for a certain position. This reflects once again that, 
while many respondents feel that lines do need to be drawn, and logically must 
be in order to make a judgement, where that point will be is by no means 
obvious. Knowledge is never fixed in advance and the nuance and contingency 
of the responses of respondents in this study suggest that public and legal 
discourse does not do justice to the sophistication of ‘ordinary’ people’s attitudes 
and the complicated interstices of knowledge that they bring together when 
making ethical judgements.  
 These points were brought home to me most clearly when I interviewed 
Fiona, the most pro-commercial surrogacy of respondents. In the previous 
chapter, we saw a split in respondents’ ideas about whether gestational 
surrogates form bonds with the children they carry and how that influenced their 
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judgements of the ethics of surrogacy. Views about commercial surrogacy were 
similarly split and far from uniform, instead characterised by a nuance that would 
be very difficult to capture in a quantitative survey.  
 I asked Fiona if she was in favour of surrogacy: 
 
Yes. I think it’s absolutely fine under the very strictest and most stringent 
of conditions and I really do think that everybody in the triumvirate, as it 
were, needs to have their needs looked at very carefully. Yes, I think a 
surrogate mother is a wonderful thing. Some people who’ve perhaps had 
two or three children, really don’t want another but have somebody 
they’d really like to give this incredibly special gift to, I think that’s 
wonderful. An absolutely ultimate gift from one person to another, to give 
birth to a child for someone else – wow, I think that’s incredibly special. 
 
… I actually don’t have a problem with the idea of the [surrogate] mother 
being paid rather than compensated because it is an absolute human 
truth that we don’t give something up unless we have something better 
to put in its place. There are very few people who are so unselfish that 
the giving up of the baby is compensated for by how wonderful they feel 
about giving that gift to someone else; we’re just not made like that. So, 
lovely idyllic dream as it is, I think it’s fraught with problems. Whereas if 
you have a proper contract which says that, ‘giving up this baby is a 
simple exchange and I will get x amount of money to do x’, is actually a 
much, much better way of doing it because the surrogate mother is left 
feeling that they’ve got something out of it. Although it doesn’t sound 
very nice, I’m afraid I think that that is probably crucial. 
 
Fiona’s view that people do not give things up without a reward in one sense 
suggests that people are basically self-interested, but I do not think she intends 
this to imply a corrupt morality. What is “selfish” in her view, is keeping a child 
that one has borne – something that respondents agree is natural and, in usual 
circumstances, desirable. Fiona also told me that she felt that surrogacy on the 
whole would work best as a “transaction”, which underlines her sense that it 
should be an exchange based on reciprocity.  
 Like commercial surrogates in America (Ragoné 1994), Fiona describes a 
commercial surrogate giving a “gift” in return for payment. She thereby implies 
that a child can be exchanged for money without this necessarily compromising 
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the morality of the parties involved and that money could adequately reciprocate 
for a culturally ‘priceless’ child. Clearly, Fiona does not have a basic moral 
objection to commercial surrogacy on the grounds of commodification unlike 
Erin, nor does she seem to hold with the ‘slippery slope’ argument that once 
something becomes commodified there is no going back, but sees 
commodification as a matter of individual choice which does not necessarily 
compromise one’s morality. Fiona also complicates the gift/commodity 
dichotomy that flavours so much writing about surrogacy and underlies much 
economic theory, by describing a surrogate’s work as both “an ultimate gift” and 
as best rewarded with, and even motivated by, money. This radically contrasts 
with the dichotomous view of gifts and commodities that is usually attributed to 
Western societies and the moral philosophy that posits a rigid distinction 
between people and things, maternity and commodification. 
 I asked Fiona how she felt about the involvement of third parties in 
‘brokering’ such a contract along the lines of the American model. She told me, 
“Again, you come up against this nasty thing called greed, which is in most 
people, and they may well do a better job if they’re paid for it properly than if 
they’re not”. This argument is consistent with her one about surrogate mothers: 
a third party agent may ensure that the surrogacy arrangement runs smoothly 
because she has a vested (financial) interest in doing so. This not only suggests 
a belief in human “greed”, but also a faith in human choice and agency.  
 I asked Fiona what she thought would be the most valuable qualities in a 
surrogate mother. Along with emotional and physical health, she said, “In some 
ways you’re not looking for maternal qualities, in some ways you’re looking for 
the opposite. So in the commercial world, you may get the right surrogate 
mother”. The intending parents should, she said, have the opposite values: 
 
[T]he baby is going to the parents who want a baby desperately enough 
to pay a large sum of money. To me, that’s the right way around 
because that’s where the baby is going, so they’re putting the baby 
ahead of the material stuff. To me, that’s ok. Ok, [the surrogate mother] - 
that’s the commodification side of it, but, so what? They go off with their 
lives and they’ve chosen things over the baby, that’s up to them. 
 
As in her suggestion that a commercial surrogate is providing an “ultimate gift” in 
return for payment, Fiona here again mixes money, materialism and maternity. 
This suggests that, while she does not object to the involvement of money in 
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surrogacy on the grounds of a gift/commodity dichotomy, and so explicitly 
recognises that money cannot be separated from the sphere of personal 
relationships, she does not question the association between self-interest (or 
“greed”) and money (though perhaps without quite the same moralistic tone as 
other respondents), just as she assumes that maternalism is antipathetic to it. 
Unlike Erin, Fiona does not object to commercial surrogacy because it is baby-
selling, but argues that just because it might be baby-selling does not 
necessarily make it unethical. She is able to argue this because she 
simultaneously draws on competing ideas about human nature as on the one 
hand venal and self-interested (see Sahlins 1996 for the links with Christianity 
here) and on the other hand as inherently good. Significantly, it is maternalism 
that exemplifies this human good.  
 While Fiona went further than other respondents in her support for 
commercial surrogacy, others similarly did not see payment for the surrogate 
mother as necessarily reprehensible. Luke did not object to the compensation of 
surrogates, and even said that he had assumed that they would be 
recompensed:  
 
Luke: I think I would have thought that they’re doing it for the love of it, 
but then a lot of people do things for the love of it and still get paid. I just 
assumed that people get paid, some sort of compensation somewhere 
along the line, if not professionally.  
 
… [F]rom my point of view anyway, it’s not like a straightforward medical 
procedure that you can do on the NHS. I think it’s more of a personal 
thing, journey. But on the flipside, it is rather a massive undertaking and 
presumably the surrogate mother would have to take time off work or 
whatever she does if she’s not a professional surrogate mother. So I just 
assumed that there would be some sort of compensation, or something 
changing hands somewhere along the line in a few cases. But then the 
over-riding thing, I would have thought, would be compassion and love.   
 
KD: As a reason to do it? 
 
Luke: Yeah, rather than financial gain. But as I say, in terms of harsh 
reality, it’s difficult to do without some sort of remuneration, but not in 
terms of a living wage, I wouldn’t have thought. 
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What is particularly interesting about Luke’s response here is his point that love 
and money are not necessarily incommensurable motives for doing something. 
Just as Fiona describes the actions of a commercial surrogate mother as “an 
ultimate gift”, he says, “a lot of people do things for the love of it and still get 
paid”, which not only complicates the dichotomy of love and money, but also 
suggests once again that surrogacy may be properly viewed as work. Both 
Fiona and Luke make nuanced judgements here that positively value choice and 
personal autonomy and that suggest that money is not necessarily bad. Yet at 
the same time they demonstrate their sense that money is associated with many 
negative things, as in Fiona’s description of greed as “nasty” and Luke’s 
depiction of the “harsh reality” of capitalist society.  
 Lambek (2008) has written that, in the capitalist Western world, 
economic value is seen as measurable and variable, while ethical virtue is 
fundamentally incommensurable. However, as he makes clear, and as is 
illustrated by Luke’s comments above, in making ethical judgements, this 
distinction may come to seem less certain: 
 
Understood as judgment rather than obligation, ethics itself relativizes or 
at least contextualizes value. Practice emerges through evaluation, the 
sizing up and fitting of action to circumstance. Yet judgment selects 
among alternatives not by means of a binary logic of exclusive 
acceptance or rejection but by balancing among qualities. Such 
evaluation or judgment is grounded in more general, culturally mediated, 
understandings of the human condition and the ends of human life as 
well as those internal to the practice at hand. (2008: 137) 
 
 Aside from Fiona, respondents’ views on commercial surrogacy tend to 
reflect a split between whether they view remuneration as being a reward for the 
surrogate’s work or a payment for a child, with those in the former camp being 
much less concerned about commercial surrogacy. It may not be a coincidence, 
therefore, that, as a group, the mothers I spoke to were least concerned by 
commercial surrogacy, as they were clear that the surrogate was doing “hard 
work”, though of course Erin, also a mother, was strident in her condemnation of 
commercial surrogacy. As Jenny suggests, money is the usual means of 
valuation in contemporary British society and is typically the most appropriate 
means of rewarding work done and services rendered. Importantly, Fiona, Luke 
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and Jenny’s comments suggest there is room within the way that motherhood – 
as reproductive labour – is conceptualised in British culture for it to be 
associated with financial reward. 
 
 
 
A nice little earner: Money in blood and sperm donation  
 
 When I talked with respondents about commercial surrogacy I also asked 
them their views on blood donation, in order to gain another perspective on 
commercial surrogacy as well as to see what kind of linkages they might make 
between the two practices. Respondents were generally against paid blood 
donation, though many conceded that remuneration might provide an incentive 
for more donations, which is significant given that they perceived a shortage of 
blood in the British healthcare system. A couple of respondents even admitted 
that the offer of a cash incentive might encourage them to make a donation. Erin 
regularly donates blood for free, but admitted that she might be swayed by a 
cash incentive: 
 
[I]f they started a campaign saying, ‘right, if you come and give blood 
we’ll give you a free cup of tea,’ – which they already give you – ‘and £5,’ 
would that persuade me to go more? Probably not. Would I take the £5 
note when I got there? I don’t know. If everybody else around me was 
and I was thinking, well, if not, it’s only going to go back in the system to 
buy more tea bags, I might take £5 towards a new handbag.  
 
Other respondents tended to link the idea that money would work as an 
incentive for potential donors explicitly with exploitation, assuming that those 
driven to donate their blood for money would need that money for basic 
necessities rather than to go towards a new handbag.  
 Erin was keen to point out that, while she might accept money as a reward 
when donating blood, this did not mean that it would be her motive for donating. 
As we have seen, she was one of the most vocal respondents against 
commercial surrogacy and is very concerned about the exchange of human 
lives for money, yet she clearly does not believe that accepting a token payment 
for blood donation would compromise her morality. She explained later in our 
interview that selling blood and selling babies is fundamentally different, saying, 
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“if you pay for a blood bag … it doesn’t have a personality, it doesn’t have a 
soul, we’re removed from it by the science”. In the previous chapter, I noticed 
the more speculative and abstract nature of respondents’ ideas about surrogacy 
compared to those things that form part of their personal experience. Erin does 
not have personal experience, and therefore an instrumental reason, to 
rationalise commercial surrogacy. Significantly, also, she told me that she would 
not use assisted conception herself because of her faith, but would not stop 
others from using it. Lambek says: ‘any adherence to or advocating of an 
absolute value like truth or justice must be qualified in and through lived practice 
and this will entail the acknowledgment of additional values among which a 
balance appropriate to any given situation is sought’ (2008: 138). The difference 
in Erin’s attitude to receiving five pounds for her own blood donation and 
revulsion at the idea of commercial surrogacy clearly demonstrates this 
contingency. 
 Respondents claimed that, as with surrogacy, the best reason for giving 
blood is altruism. Some referred to a generalised altruism, such as Alex, who 
argued, “I don’t think that blood donors should be paid for donating as people 
should not need a cash incentive to help save peoples lives”. When I talked 
about this with Joanna, she referred to an earlier conversation I had had with 
her about voluntary work. As well as her regular (paid) job as a care-worker, 
Joanna is a volunteer at the wildlife centre, for which she never accepts any of 
the expenses for lunch and travel costs she is entitled to because, she told me, 
it is her choice to work there and she “doesn’t do it for the money”. On blood 
donation, she said, “I wouldn’t want to be paid for it. It’s like what we said about 
volunteering – you volunteer to do something and then if you’re getting paid for it 
you’re not actually volunteering anymore. So no, I don’t think people should”.  
 Lauren made voluntary blood donations in the US until she came to the 
UK. While she can see an argument for reimbursing donors’ expenses, just as 
she reasoned that a surrogate mother should not be left out of pocket by her 
pregnancy, she would prefer donation to be based on “community values”: 
 
[I]n a lot of cases, blood is in really high demand and so if there’s the 
funding available to make it feasible for more people to give blood I 
would be ok with that. … [B]ut if people are able to abuse the system, 
’cos it really depends on how regulated it is and there’s always ways to 
get around a system like that even if it is regulated. So I would worry 
about paying people. I mean, I think we’ve got very skewed community 
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values and social values – if we could educate people such that it was a 
part of, you know, that’s sort of how community works, if somehow you 
could use – I don’t know how you’d do it – but if somehow you could use 
that money to just fund understanding and create a sense of community. 
  
Lauren makes a neat inversion here, arguing that money which might be used to 
provide an incentive for donors should instead be used to fund an awareness 
campaign that would foster those community values which ideally provoke 
people to donate blood ‘voluntarily’. The difference for her seems to be that it is 
acceptable to fund a campaign that will promote social responsibility, in contrast 
to funding individuals directly for their ‘gifts’ of blood. 
 For Titmuss (1997), the ideal donor is someone who gives up her time and 
some of her blood in the interests of the greater good. It is an altruistic act, a 
voluntaristic gift (cf. Mauss 1990; Parry 1986). Tutton notes, based on his study 
with blood donors who participated in genetic research in Orkney, that reasons 
for giving blood or genetic material are inherently complex and multifaceted 
(2002: 532) and may not in fact be conceptualised as gifts. As the examples of 
Erin accepting five pounds towards a new handbag for her altruism and 
Lauren’s argument about using money to foster community values suggest, in 
practice the distinction is rarely so clear-cut.  
 Andrew is both a blood donor and a registered organ donor. When I 
interviewed him he was a volunteer in the wildlife centre, which he did out of a 
love for wildlife, a commitment to protecting the environment and to get work 
experience to further his career. He seamlessly combined altruism and self-
interest in explaining his reasons for donating blood: “I think you should do it 
because you think it’s going to help other people and you might be in the 
position that you need it yourself, not because someone gives you a fiver to do 
it”.  
 Erin was similarly candid about why she gave blood, saying “you do it in 
the hope that, god, if you ever need a blood bag or … one of your loved ones 
does, there’s one there for them. So it’s like, you know, we’re all human beings 
and we’re all in it together and we’re all trying to help each other out. It’s a 
humanistic principle”. Erin, who worked in the NHS for many years, gives blood 
as she or her family might one day need it, but also because she feels a 
responsibility to contribute to a sufficient public supply. Giving blood is therefore, 
according to this “humanistic” model, an investment in the future, whether a 
general pool or one’s kin network. In this model, which seems to be based on an 
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idea of sharing and social solidarity as opposed to the supererogatory pure gift, 
the distinction between altruism and self-interest is blurred: Erin and Andrew 
give blood because they feel it is a moral action that benefits other people and 
because it might benefit them or their family. Furthermore, their examples show 
that the boundary between self and kin is similarly hazy – and that actions done 
for kin may be both ‘altruistic’ and ‘self-interested’. Respondents recognise that 
money is necessary for everyday life and that it is mixed in with affective ties 
(see Zelizer 2005: 24), but in order to maintain propriety, they make certain 
distinctions and mark boundaries around the particular ways in which they 
combine economic transactions with intimate ties, and one important part of this, 
I have suggested here, is the framing of motivation. 
 Paul told me in interview that he was quite concerned about 
commodification in commercial surrogacy, but distinguished between paying a 
surrogate and paying a sperm donor: 
 
Katie, I don't see anything wrong with being paid to donate sperm. I don't 
think anyone would want mine now, otherwise you'd have given me a 
nice little earner. I feel it's a very different issue – excuse pun – to donate 
sperm and walk away not knowing where it's going, as opposed to 
carrying someone's baby for nine months, giving birth and then having to 
give away what is really your baby. 
 
… I don’t see there’s any problem there, if people want to get paid for 
donating their sperm, or their blood, or any other bit of their body they 
don’t particularly need or want! For some people, it might just be some 
way of making some money for people, and I don’t see any harm in that. 
But it’s not the same as creating and developing a human life. It’s not the 
same at all, is it? Blood isn’t the same as a baby, there’s a big difference 
there, you’re talking about a human being. A vast difference.  
 
As Paul says, the “vast difference” that makes commercial surrogacy 
unacceptable is that it is the exchange of money for a human being, rather than 
blood, organs or sperm, which he sees as fungible. When talking about blood 
donation, other respondents made a similar distinction between “bits of their 
body” and people.  
 While eating dinner with Steve, Sophie and Willow in a pub one night, the 
conversation turned to sperm donation. In contrast to Edwards’ (2000: 33) co-
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conversationalists, who were coy about assisted conception and subjects that 
touched on sex in public arenas, I often found myself having quite scatological 
conversations with younger respondents and those I was closest to. These 
conversations relied heavily on in-jokes and quite obviously ‘childish’ behaviour 
in contrast to their work personas, which for most of them involved 
communicating with members of the public in a professional manner.  
 Joking and banter are common marks of inclusion in this friendship group. 
Being subject to collective teasing is a sign that the target is a well-liked member 
of the group, that they can take it and can occasionally be a mechanism for 
defusing awkward situations or deflating an over-sized ego. On this occasion, 
Sophie was teasing Steve, who is in his early thirties and works in forestry, 
about consuming pornography and suggested he “put his sperm to good use” by 
becoming a sperm donor.38 Steve turned to me and asked if he could get paid 
for it and I said that he could receive expenses. Willow asked me if payment is 
legal for egg donors. As I responded, Sophie interjected with a sound of 
disapproval, then said, “it’s funny, my immediate reaction there was that it’s 
wrong to get paid for eggs but not for sperm, ’cos it’s just sort of different, but I’m 
not sure why”. Willow suggested it was to do with amounts, saying, “you know, 
like with fish, they have thousands of eggs and it’s a certain amount”. Sophie 
continued reflecting on her gut reaction, trying out loud to work out why there 
was a difference, then said, “you know, I think maybe I think that an egg is more 
like a potential baby and the sperm is just something you add, like, you always 
think of the sperm coming in and fertilising the egg”. I asked, “so, would it be like 
you were paying for a baby more if you paid for an egg?” She agreed. I asked 
them if they thought it was also to do with the process of collection. Steve and 
Sophie laughed and Sophie said it might be a factor while Steve noted that 
collecting sperm was more pleasurable than collecting eggs. Willow added, “with 
egg collection, it’s kind of dangerous, there’s much more risk”.  
 In this conversation, sperm donation was straightforward and comical, and 
therefore not problematically associated with money, while egg donation was an 
emotive and onerous procedure that should not be rewarded with money. While 
there are obvious differences between the physiological experiences of sperm 
donation, egg donation and surrogacy, these distinctions, and the implication 
                                                
38 Steve in many ways positioned himself as the ‘alpha male’ of the group in Spey Bay, rarely 
missing an opportunity to display his masculinity and often railed against being surrounded by so 
many women, whom he regularly teased (usually in a mimicking high voice) for talking about 
dolphins non-stop. He was, also, one of the respondents who took his environmental 
responsibilities the most seriously and was thought of as a sensitive and responsible person and a 
loyal friend. 
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once again of the association between such services and prostitution, point to a 
gendered difference in what is appropriately fungible and what kind of ‘work’ can 
be appropriately rewarded with payment. As such, when Willow commented that 
egg donation was “dangerous” or risky, she was referring not only to a more 
difficult process of collection but also the fact that if women are paid for 
elements of their (potential) maternity they are rejecting the cultural model that 
posits mothers as symbols of altruism, love and care.  
 When comparing different donations in this way, respondents drew 
distinctions in different places, using particular and competing logics. We saw 
earlier that Jenny was relatively unconcerned about surrogate mothers receiving 
payment on the basis that this was a typical means of assigning value in British 
society. She felt that the practicalities of sperm donation compared to egg 
donation and surrogacy were important, but argued that “out of pocket costs to 
any donor should be met, regardless of sex of donor”: 
 
In principle I feel there is nothing wrong in being paid but I imagine like a 
lot of people, I'd feel it's perhaps seen as an altruistic gesture and that 
probably plays into our mindset of feeling 'it's “better” if it's done for love 
of fellow mankind39 [sic], rather than for a straightforward financial 
transaction. I think this is because the whole concept of creating a new 
life is imbued with high emotional context and moral standards. 
 
Just as Jenny described payment as the prevailing means of marking value in 
British society, here she explicitly identifies the importance of altruism – “love of 
fellow mankind” – as a virtue within the cultural milieu in which she lives. When 
talking about blood and organ donation earlier in our interview, Jenny told me 
that she had donated blood in return for money when she had lived in Greece 
and said, “I think [blood donation is] promoted in [British] culture, our very 
localised culture, as being an altruistic action. I don’t necessarily think that 
payment’s offensive, but I think we’ve promoted it in our society hitherto as an 
altruistic thing”. Jenny’s response demonstrates the point made in the 
Introduction that respondents are reflexive about their own ideas. Public 
discourse about surrogacy, assisted conception and biotechnology in the UK is 
well established. The examples here demonstrate that this relative fixedness 
                                                
39 Here Jenny uses a model of altruism that is between a general “mankind”, who may not 
necessarily be known to each other, as opposed to the model of altruistic surrogacy between 
people in existing relationships described earlier. 
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does not reflect the contingency and mutability of ‘ordinary’ people’s ideas, 
despite the fact that the Warnock Report and similar documents were 
specifically designed to posit a normative ethical framework for British law (cf. 
Strathern 1995). 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Respondents’ ideas about altruistic and commercial surrogacy offer 
further illustration of the rhetorical efficacy of grounding concepts in informing 
ethical judgements. Their ideas about altruism, commercialism, money and 
human motive all say much about their social values and ethical principles, as 
well as suggesting a model for how we should live. Here I have pursued further 
the point that, in making ethical claims, respondents demonstrate the 
contingency with which grounding concepts are invoked, as we saw for instance 
in the contrast between Erin’s views on commercial surrogacy and paid blood 
donation. Such contrasts seem to emerge most strongly in the difference 
between lived experience and speculative moral judgement.  
 Since surrogacy is ‘extraordinary’, it becomes necessary to rationalise 
and understand the choice to act as a surrogate mother. We saw in the previous 
chapter the important relationship between nature and morality in the concept of 
the maternal bond, but in this chapter we have see another important facet of 
nature, as human nature, which is related to its meaning as pre-cultural 
essence. Most respondents saw ‘altruism’ as an appropriate motive for a 
surrogate, in contrast to avarice. This judgement condenses various 
assumptions about what altruism and commercialism mean and we have seen 
here the way that certain dichotomous values may be played off against and 
overlapped with each other in ethical claim-making. Yet, in contrast to more 
extreme models of altruism, sacrifice and asceticism, which might seem in some 
sense moral ideals, respondents typically draw on a model of human behaviour 
that mixes altruism and egoism.  
 Altruism, and its analogues including love, compassion and selflessness, 
is also culturally very closely associated with ideals of femininity and, in 
particular, maternalism. Altruism has a significant moral weight in its 
connotations of virtue, but this is also, and importantly, a gendered value. We 
shall see the close connections between ideals of feminine behaviour and 
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ethical living, and the complex way in which these connections are employed in 
respondents’ everyday lives, in Chapters Four and Six. In these two chapters, 
though, we have started to see how, in talking about surrogacy, normative ideas 
about proper maternal behaviour and femininity get reproduced. 
 Despite the fact that respondents are heavily influenced by 
environmentalism, which is in its rhetoric often explicitly anti-capitalist, their 
ideas about money and market values are far from straightforward, as we shall 
see further in Chapters Four and Five in particular. While a few were clear in 
their antipathy to commercialism when talking about commercial surrogacy, this 
was a minority view. In contrast to the model of money as a flattening and 
contaminating agent that inevitably causes corruption, exploitation and a loss of 
human dignity that is apparent in anti-commercial surrogacy writing and Kantian 
moral philosophy, most respondents suggested through the way they talked 
about payment for surrogates, blood and sperm donors that money is not 
necessarily an instrument of immorality. They also suggest that love or altruism 
can be mixed with money without dire consequences.  
 In this chapter and the previous one we have seen the way that ideas 
such as love and money, altruism and commercialism, are used in shifting ways, 
sometimes held in dichotomous relation but, more often, brought into 
conjunction with each other, in Strathern’s (1992a) terms, merographically. 
Grounding concepts like these encompass given and made knowledge, can be 
both ‘social’ and ‘natural’ and are both similar and different and, in their use, any 
and all of these elements may be brought into play in order to make and ground 
specific claims.  
 In agreeing to carry another woman’s baby to term, a surrogate mother 
is assumed to have made a choice and in assessing the ethics of that choice 
respondents judge whether it was free and whether it was done for the right 
reasons. Respondents’ ideas about what it might mean to become a mother for 
love, money or a mixture of the two suggest much about how they conceptualise 
human nature, choice and agency. None of this can be divorced from the 
context of their everyday lives, to which I now turn. As suggested in the 
Introduction, this is a particularly important point given the specificities of 
respondents’ ideas about nature, and human nature, and how this is associated 
with ethics and morality. 
 In delving into respondents’ more everyday concerns in the next three 
chapters, I will aim not only to add contextual flavour to their thoughts expressed 
here, but also to explore further the central themes that have come up here but 
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which are also manifested in everyday life, from their ideas of the good life to 
understandings of nature, relationships with others, ethical values and personal 
identity. As such, I will show that we cannot understand the claims that people 
make about particular practices or topics in isolation from their everyday lives 
since, although they will take different forms and have divergent effects, the 
same kinds of principles and grounding concepts inform both the extraordinary 
and the everyday. This is key to what this ethnography primarily describes, 
which is the sophisticated, contingent and nuanced way in which people balance 
ideals and meta-values against personal commitments and contextual 
judgements in the pursuit of the good.  
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PART TWO:  
EVERYDAY ETHICS 
 
 
 
 
 I consider this politicization of Green thought and action has led us 
dangerously astray. It stops us from realizing that it is not them, the multinational 
companies or the state industries of Russia and China that are wholly to blame 
for our fast degrading world. Our much too vociferous advocates, the consumer 
lobbies, and we the consumers are equally responsible for the gaseous 
greenhouse and the extinction of wildlife. The multinational companies would 
not exist if we had not demanded their products and at a price that forces them 
to produce without enough care for the consequences. In our belief that all that 
matters is the good of humankind we foolishly forgot how much we depend upon 
all the other living things on Earth. 
 We need to love and respect the Earth with the same intensity that we 
give to our families and our tribe. It is not a political matter of them and us or 
some adversarial affair with lawyers involved; our contract with the Earth is 
fundamental, for we are part of it and cannot survive without a healthy planet as 
our home.  
James Lovelock, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth40  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 While respondents are aware of the writings of Lovelock and other prominent environmentalists, 
most do not spend a great deal of time reading these works, because they read them when they 
were younger, or because they are resistant to adhering to any one particular view. Instead, much 
of their everyday knowledge about the environment and the environmentalist movement comes 
through newspapers such as The Guardian and The Independent (and occasionally through more 
specialist publications such as The Ecologist), travelling, the gradual attainment of knowledge 
through spending time in the countryside and talking to local experts and watching wildlife 
documentaries (the BBC naturalist and presenter, Sir David Attenborough, is a hero for many of 
them).  
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 A good life will necessarily vary somewhat from person to person, but 
there are common ingredients and principles in respondents’ ideas about this. 
As noted, the overarching influence on their ethical practice is environmentalist 
‘ethical living’, a contemporary development of the Green movement, in which 
advocates seek to minimise their own and others’ impact on the natural world by 
reducing carbon emissions and pollution and working to conserve and protect 
endangered habitats. For respondents, the local population of dolphins and 
other rare wildlife provide a special focus for such efforts. Recently, efforts to 
employ fairer and more sustainable modes of consumption, such as Fair Trade 
schemes, supporting local shops against supermarkets or even ‘growing your 
own’ and eating goods that are seasonal and have lower ‘food miles’ have been 
absorbed into the environmental movement, suggesting the current significance 
attributed to providing ethical choices to individuals who then feel they are ‘doing 
their bit’. A further popular element in this mode of thinking, and one that seems 
to many adherents to be connected up with these principles towards the natural 
world, is the promotion of a feeling of community. Of course, notions of 
community are as multifarious as ideas about nature, but in the case of 
respondents here, this is reflected in the simple but significant idea that 
connections with others are an important part of a good life and of feeling at 
home.  
 In her analysis of homesteading ideology and practice in America, Gould 
(2005: 2) suggests that homesteading is a response to a ‘problem of meaning’ in 
contemporary mainstream American life. Homesteaders provide a useful 
counterpoint to respondents here, as they share many values, but there are also 
important differences. Homesteaders reorient their lives around home and 
nature: ‘the ethic of living “at home in nature” is an ethic of simple living, of being 
a producer more than a consumer, and of letting nature set the terms for one’s 
daily choices’ (2005: 2). As Gould makes clear, these are self-consciously 
ethical choices informed by specific ideas about nature, economy and 
spirituality. In this way, homesteaders are similarly motivated to the respondents 
here. Both groups of people aim to live a good life, one that is enabled by 
choice, that positively values nature and home and which resists certain 
elements of mainstream life, especially unsustainable consumption. 
Respondents here are far less extreme in the changes that they have made to 
their lives than the homesteaders in Gould’s book. They do, however, greatly 
sympathise with their philosophy and values, though as we shall see the specific 
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historic and cultural versions of nature and home that they have inherited are 
somewhat different. This is an important point, as common appeals to ‘nature’ in 
the construction of good lives may (deliberately) obscure differences in belief 
and practice for each group (Thompson 2002; Yearley 1993). That 
homesteading, like environmentalist ethical living, is not ordered by a rigid code 
of practice may, in fact, be part of its appeal.  
 As Gould suggests (2005: 218), homesteaders’ choices to change their 
lives are enabled by the fact that most of them, like the respondents here, are 
middle-class and well-educated and so have significant financial solvency and 
cultural capital. The people I met in Moray and lived amongst in Spey Bay are 
seeking good lives that are both personally fulfilling and informed by ethical 
principles. They have chosen to build these lives in a place in which most of 
them are not native, with interesting implications for notions of home, belonging 
and community. Like homesteaders, then, they suggest that a good life is one 
that is chosen and made rather than given.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Tugnet, Spey Bay, on a sunny afternoon. The former salmon fishing station 
manager’s house in which I lived is the two-storey building in the middle. The Spey lies 
to the left of the photograph and the sea is behind the buildings.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Living on a Nature Reserve 
 
Knowing someone lives in Inverness is a very poor guide to their cultural background  
Alex Walker, The Kingdom Within 
 
 
The conviction that the world is facing ecological crisis is a vital factor in 
structuring respondents’ ideas of the good life. Tackling climate change has in 
the last few decades also become a permanent fixture on the British political-
economic agenda as previous doubts about the scientific veracity of this 
complex of phenomena have eroded. Here I will give a sense of what everyday 
life is like in Moray in order to begin to contextualise the responses outlined in 
the first chapters. I will describe what makes the area special for the people who 
live there and why it seems to lend itself to the building of a good life. I will show 
some of the ways in which respondents come to feel a sense of belonging, 
enacted through a sense of being closer to the natural world and part of a 
community. I will analyse what kind of claims they make about, for and on the 
place they think of as home.  
In her account of homesteading life in Maine, Gould describes nature 
and home as ‘central orienting concepts’ in homesteading practice (2005: 101). 
Of course, the USA’s geographic landscape is larger and more varied than 
Britain’s and a great deal of American land was settled much more recently. 
Alongside this, being ‘at home in nature’ in American culture seems to be more 
about embracing wilderness and frontierism compared to British, but specifically 
English, visions of living closer to nature. Scotland seems to offer a wilder, more 
rugged version of nature in the popular imagination than England. Nonetheless, 
visions of the good life in both England and Scotland tend to have a more 
pastoral flavour (Williams 1975) conjuring up not only hedgerows, empty 
beaches, fields and open skies, but also villages, close-knit communities and 
the local pub. This suggests that, while the British Isles are relatively small and 
have for centuries been populated in almost all habitable areas, living amongst 
others is an integral part of the rural good life for British people. 
For homesteaders home symbolises all that is good about the good life 
and wrong with the old one. Similarly, the choice to live in Moray might be seen 
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as a rejection of the prevailing values of ‘mainstream’ British society, which is, to 
a certain extent, true. In contrast to those born into rural communities (Cohen 
1982, 1987; Edwards 2000; Ennew 1980; Frankenberg 1957; Rapport 1993; 
Strathern 1981), respondents actively seek to be part of a marginal or remote 
community and in the final section of this chapter I will explore Foucault’s 
(1986a) notion of the heterotopia in relation to this ethnography.  
As in Whalsay, Moray is coloured by its (largely, past) association with 
the fishing industry. Like the Highlands and Islands, also, particular markers of 
Scottishness are readily accessible in this area, not least in the figure of the 
Speyside whisky industry, but also in the sense that Scotland is a place of wild, 
natural beauty. Life in Moray bears many similarities to life elsewhere in 
Scotland and the rest of the UK, not only, but not least, because it is a place 
marked by migration, though here we shall also see some of its particularities, 
especially in respondents’ relationships to a nearby religious community, the 
Findhorn Foundation, and to the local wildlife and landscape. Nonetheless, it is 
important to bear in mind the differences with other places with which we have 
become familiar through ethnography. For instance, Edwards’ description of 
Bacup, Lancashire, is of a place in which the present is scarred by memories 
and imaginings of its industrial past, manifested in both nostalgia and anxiety 
about the future. While Edwards is clear about the ambivalences of particular 
values such as community in Bacup, she also shows that in many ways 
community is celebrated and sought there because people feel they have lost it. 
The people I met in Moray also seek to build a community, but with quite 
different bases. Again, the fact that this is a group dominated by recent migrants 
is undoubtedly pertinent, but their ideas about community and relationships with 
others are influenced not by a sense of loss (cf. Nadel-Klein 2003), a desire to 
recapture something from their past (cf. Basu 2007; Macdonald 1997) or indeed 
a straightforward rejection of prevailing mores, but instead part of a process of 
coming to belong somewhere and building connections to others in a place in 
which they quickly come to feel at home.  
As well as its cultural associations with domesticity, in Western societies 
home also refers to origins and birth, though birth and breeding may be 
emphasised or de-emphasised according to particular circumstances (Cassidy 
2002; Edwards 2000; Strathern 1981). In order to live from their own toil and in 
harmony with the natural world, American homesteaders built or adapted new 
dwellings that had the land, space and conditions to facilitate these new lives. 
Like the respondents here, they uprooted themselves from their native 
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connections in search of somewhere that seemed to offer the right environment 
to build a life closer to nature. Homesteading, then, may be an act of going ‘back 
to the land’, but it is not an act of going back home. Gould focuses on the 
meaning of home as the site of domesticity, close family and the small-scale. As 
such, she does not fully address the implications of the fact that, while these 
homesteaders embrace one notion of home, as dwelling, they have apparently 
rejected the other side of home, as place of origin. In this chapter I will explore 
the implications of the idea that one can feel at home in a place with which one 
does not share native connections. 
In the British context terms such as ‘mainstream’, ‘conventional’ and 
‘alternative’ simultaneously hold positive and negative connotations, reflecting a 
sense that balance, tolerance of difference and pragmatism are more 
appropriate, attainable and even desirable goals to strive for in structuring 
everyday life. Halfacree (2007) has identified a common tendency to associate 
‘back-to-the-land’ projects with the 1960s counterculture movement. As he 
makes clear, such projects have deeper historical roots and a wider social 
provenance than this straightforward correlation might allow, and in the UK they 
tap into widespread positive perceptions of the benefits of living in the 
countryside and being closer to the natural world. While the concept of the good 
life implies the pursuit of higher ideals, in Britain middle-class good living is more 
likely to entail a decision to ‘downsize’ and move to the country as opposed to 
founding a vegetarian commune or religious enclave. Similarly, for respondents, 
a good life is one that mixes, and aims to achieve a balance between, what is 
good about both conventional and unconventional ways of living. While they are 
in many ways influenced by back-to-the-land ideals, they are ultimately resistant 
to the more extreme choices of groups such as these homesteaders. In 
describing their everyday lives and choices, then, I aim to show the kinds of 
negotiations, dilemmas and judgements that go into leading an ethical life, and 
thereby to suggest some of the overlaps with their claim-making as seen in the 
previous chapters. 
The long-standing idea that moving to the countryside can offer a better 
way of life has become increasingly popular in recent years. The 2008 Matthew 
Taylor Review on Rural Economy and Affordable Housing reports that in the last 
decade, the UK’s rural population has increased by 7%, compared to only 3% in 
urban areas and the Office for National Statistics predicts that this will continue 
to rise over the next decade. Half of survey respondents living in urban areas 
report that they would like to move to the country while only one in ten rural 
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residents report that they would prefer to live elsewhere (Taylor 2008). This 
pattern has created tensions between native residents and incomers in some 
areas, with the common perception that counter-urban migration to rural areas, 
which typically have lower wage levels than urban centres, drives up housing 
prices, effectively preventing long-standing residents and their children from 
getting a foothold on the ‘property ladder’. Such feelings were, in my experience, 
largely absent in Moray, perhaps partly because house prices are still very low 
compared to many other parts of the UK and rural Scotland has quite a sparse 
population but also, I would suggest, because of the area’s long and varied 
history of migration. One obvious reason for this recent history of local counter-
urban migration is the presence of two major RAF bases in Moray, at Kinloss 
and Lossiemouth, and five people who work at the wildlife centre are connected 
to the RAF through their partner’s employment. Of these, only one, Nina, is 
native to the area.  
 
 
 
At home in Moray  
 
The reason most often stated to me for being in the area was a sense 
that it was somewhere that offered a good life, a feeling shared by respondents 
and native residents. Residents in Moray show no timidity in declaiming the 
qualities of the area and they are united in their perception that Moray offers a 
positive lifestyle. Many of these ideas about what makes Moray a good place to 
live in overlap with popular perceptions of the rural idyll (Rapport 1993), but 
according to residents, what makes the area special is the presence of rare 
wildlife, and particularly the Moray Firth dolphins.  
Respondents’ ideas about what makes Moray a desirable place to live in 
afford an insight into their values and priorities. One of the main reasons cited 
for living there is its wild, natural landscape. In contrast to the Highlands that 
border it, Moray enjoys fertile and productive land and great swathes of the area 
are set aside for agriculture; this is particularly evident in the low-lying area of 
coastal Moray from Fochabers to Brodie called the Laich of Moray. The palette 
of the place is more varied that the browns, greens and purples of Highland 
Scotland, with bright yellow broom and coconut-scented gorse visible for much 
of the year, the ever-changing silver-grey-blue swirl of the sea, the pink pebbles 
and yellow sands of the beaches and the primary colours of the fishing boats in 
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the harbours.  
Those who live along the Moray Firth coast point to their good fortune at 
living so close to a dramatic coastline with many fine beaches and, of course, 
the resident dolphins and seals plus visiting whales, porpoises, basking sharks 
and rare fish. In Spey Bay and its neighbouring villages, visitors are told proudly 
about the River Spey and its world-famous whisky distilleries and salmon. Living 
in this area suggests to respondents that they live closer to the natural world, an 
idea that is not only deeply fulfilling for people who value nature so highly, but 
also promotes action, since there is a sense that having all this on one’s 
doorstep makes the imperative to live ethically all the more pressing.  
Residents in Spey Bay see it as typical of all that the area has to offer. 
This is due not only to its being a wildlife-watching hotspot and the fact that most 
of the houses have beach views, but also because it is a tiny village where life 
seems slow and peaceful. Since the village is a tourist destination, most of the 
people who pass through it each day are there for leisure, walking along the 
river or beach, watching for wildlife, playing golf or visiting the café. This is in 
contrast to the atmosphere in the private office of the wildlife centre, which can 
often be frantic as staff deal with the daily concerns of cashflow, managing 
volunteers and dealing with the errant septic tank system. Out of work hours, 
staff enjoy the positive lifestyle that Spey Bay seems to offer. Living next door to 
the wildlife centre, Willow and Sophie would often remark how lucky they are to 
have a ‘commute’ of less than a minute’s walk and many staff would spend their 
lunch-breaks (when they took them) walking by the river or idly chatting with 
friends and colleagues, often planning parties and other social events.  
Those who work in the wildlife centre see Spey Bay as somewhere in 
which people come and go, just as the wildlife does. This is particularly due to 
the biannual cycle of residential volunteers leaving and arriving, many of whom 
return, some permanently. The constant ebb and flow of visitors and tourists 
does not, however, detract from a common feeling that this is somewhere in 
which one can feel at home. One reason for this is the constant presence of 
certain well-known figures, such as Sophie and Steve who, although they have 
themselves only been there five years, have settled indefinitely and see the 
place as their home.  
The other residents of the village who do not work in the centre have 
generally been there for quite some time and many are retired, so they appear 
to act as fixed points in the landscape of the community. Wildlife centre staff and 
volunteers tend to socialise mainly within their own group, but have cordial 
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relationships with the other villagers. Since walking and wildlife-watching are 
common leisure activities amongst all ages in the area, much contact between 
neighbours occurs on an ad hoc basis as they bump into each other while out 
having an evening stroll or watching for dolphins and birds. Wildlife centre staff 
and volunteers also come into contact with their fellow villagers through 
occasional projects at the centre, such as Willow’s scheme to solicit donations 
of plant cuttings to start a wildlife garden and quite a few villagers have been 
involved at least briefly in helping out at the centre at some point in its history. 
Residents also come together at the regular events held in the village hall. 
These include parties to celebrate events such as Hogmanay, Christmas and 
Halloween, as well as pub quiz evenings and gigs by the local band, The 
Beaufighters (named after the RAF squadron based in neighbouring Nether 
Dallachy during the Second World War). The hall is also available for hire for 
private parties, invitations to which often extend to neighbours. These events 
offer opportunities for respondents to chat, dance and drink with their 
neighbours and to keep up-to-date with local news.  
As far as I could observe41, the attitude of local residents towards each 
other is, broadly speaking, genial. Respondents also feel that in many ways their 
largely older and retired neighbours represent continuity and stability as well, in 
a few cases, a bit of ‘local colour’. One retired resident, in particular, is known by 
everyone in the village as he offers to walk people’s dogs for them along with his 
own. Respondents have various anecdotes about getting caught chatting to this 
man for a long time after crossing paths with him while out walking. Luke had 
one notorious encounter with him in which he noted how lucky he was because 
his house, which overlooks the golf course, is “the highest house in Spey Bay” 
and so, he surmised, he would be the last remaining resident “when the seas 
rise” as, he observed, most other houses in the village only stand a few metres 
above sea level, while he had measured his own as a whole four metres above 
sea level. When Luke recounted this thesis amongst other respondents, the 
reaction was largely one of friendly amusement, though one person remarked 
rhetorically, “and who is he expecting to row out to his little island with food and 
everything to keep him going?”  
In this unsolicited comment about rising sea levels we see that even 
those residents not directly connected with the wildlife centre are concerned 
                                                
41 Of course, since I lived amongst the staff and worked at the wildlife centre, I was no doubt 
associated with them by other residents and so they might have been more cautious about 
revealing any resentments in front of me. 
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about climate change and have their own ideas about how it will affect them. 
This also shows that, while respondents and their neighbours may be speaking 
the same language on this issue, the ways in which this is translated into their 
everyday lives can be quite different. This illustrates the point that, while almost 
everyone I met throughout fieldwork valued the local wildlife and saw it as an 
important and positive feature of the place, and while the vast majority of people 
I spoke to expressed concerns about climate change and destruction of wild 
habitats, the amount they considered these issues in structuring their lives 
varied. What they share is a sense of ethical responsibility to at least minimise 
harm to the environment thorough daily practice, but those who work in the 
wildlife centre try to go beyond the least harm principle by actively aiming to 
arrest or prevent ecological problems.  
This example also shows the quality of the relationships between 
residents in Spey Bay. This man was the resident that respondents most 
frequently came into contact with because of his regular walks around the 
wildlife centre site. They valued his presence, as a “character”, but also as a 
compassionate man who cares about animals and tries to help other people, 
however eccentric some of his ideas might be. In their response to his 
comments about being the only survivor in Spey Bay after the seas rise, 
respondents bowed to his (notably proprietorial) version of future events, but 
managed to retain a place for themselves in the vision of them taking supplies to 
him in rowing boats, an apt and rather poignant image for a group of cetacean 
conservationists. While they are prepared to respect, and even prioritise, older 
and longer-standing residents’ claims to residence, this shows the importance 
they place on their attachment to the place – such that they would not abandon 
it even in flooding – but also their own self-appointed role caring for others.  
Spey Bay and Moray are locally portrayed as idyllic. Many tourists that I 
spoke to whilst walking about the village or volunteering in the wildlife centre told 
me that they would love to be able to live in a place like this and many times 
while I was outside Sophie’s house gardening, collecting logs for the fire or 
feeding the chickens, a passing stranger would remark how lucky I was to live 
there. Of course, the obvious reason why more people do not live in Spey Bay is 
the limited number of opportunities to make a living that the area offers as well 
as the constraints of space and housing stock. Similarly, Moray is seen as 
offering a limited social life and the young women at the wildlife centre often 
poked fun at themselves for “wearing fleeces and drinking tea” while their peers 
were, they implied, busy running around dressed in the latest fashions, listening 
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to trendy music and consuming sushi and cocktails.  
 We met Sophie in the previous two chapters. She is in her late twenties 
and has lived in Spey Bay for five years, volunteering and then working in the 
wildlife centre. She grew up in rural northwestern England and spent family 
holidays in a cottage owned by her parents on the Highland north coast of 
Scotland. After leaving home, she lived in Edinburgh for four years, where she 
went to university and later worked. Between leaving Edinburgh and moving to 
Spey Bay, she spent a year travelling and working on charitable projects 
abroad. She enjoys hiking, cycling, wildlife-watching and other outdoor pursuits, 
but also modern art, world music and foreign cuisine. She is never short of 
superlatives to describe Spey Bay, Moray or Scotland and frequently expresses 
a great love for the area. When I asked her if she felt that Spey Bay was her 
home she said “yes, definitely”, without hesitation, then added that what was 
important about belonging to the place was a feeling of being at home there.   
Sophie is thought of as the “lynchpin” of the group connected to the 
wildlife centre. She is an extremely warm, enthusiastic person who devotes 
almost all of her time and energy to doing things for other people. In this way 
she is also something of a role model. She is notorious for her tendency to invite 
people spontaneously to dinner or to stay at her house, which I quickly became 
accustomed to after I moved in with her myself. One of my foremost images of 
Spey Bay is her orange-painted sitting room with its flickering open fire, Indian 
throws for curtains, disco ball, multi-coloured rug, large and well-used dining 
table, huge stacks of CDs and hookah pipe in one corner. On the walls are a 
poster of a turtle, a memento of a Caribbean conservation project she worked 
on, a framed photograph of the mountains near her parents’ Highland holiday 
cottage, a world map annotated by hand with notes of her and her friends’ 
travels and a felt painting of a tern made by a former residential volunteer, who 
settled in the area after falling in love and having a baby with a local man.  
Some respondents reported examples of people they had met who had 
“escaped” to the area after misfortunes such as a marriage break-up, nervous 
breakdown or redundancy (see also Watson 2003: 77). It certainly proved a 
haven for a number of respondents’ friends over the time that I was there, such 
as a friend of Sophie’s who had recently suffered a relationship break-up and a 
broken neck in a car accident who came for a few weeks and stayed for three 
months after falling in love with the area. During one conversation with Sophie 
about this friend, she told me, “it’s nice that coming to Spey Bay has made her 
start to think about settling down” and reflected that when she came to Spey 
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Bay herself, she had realised that, “although travelling is really good and fun, 
staying in one place, when it’s the right place and you have a job you love and 
people you love, can be the really amazing thing”. This neatly expresses what is 
special about Spey Bay for Sophie, and is representative of many others’ 
feelings about the place.  
 While doing an enjoyable job and being surrounded by friends is vital to 
the desire to settle in Spey Bay for Sophie, what first attracted her to the place 
and what she constantly returned to when she spoke about it over the months I 
lived there, was its beauty. This idea of natural beauty was a recurring one 
amongst respondents in describing Spey Bay and Moray more generally. 
Although I share the view that many parts of Moray, and Spey Bay in particular, 
are very beautiful, they are not of course unique in this respect. As Hirsch (1995: 
2) has argued, as ethnographers we need to be aware of the way that 
landscape is ‘produced through local practice’ and that familiarity with the 
landscape of the field is a vital, though often unconscious, part of the experience 
of acculturation in fieldwork.  
 When respondents described Moray as beautiful they were referring to 
emotion and experience as much as an aesthetic appreciation. A beautiful 
landscape in this case conjures up images of being outdoors, looking out to sea, 
contemplating the distant hills, appreciating the flora and fauna, which goes 
along with the sense that this is a place with a slower pace of life where people 
have more time to appreciate their surroundings, whether that be land, animals, 
plants or other people (see also Vergunst 2004, 2007; Whitehouse n.d.). Hirsch 
argues for a view of landscape as ‘cultural process … which relates a 
“foreground” everyday social life (“us the way we are”) to a “background” 
potential social existence (“us the way we might be”)’ (1995: 22). The process of 
landscape in this view specifically concerns people’s efforts to achieve the 
idealised ‘background potentiality’ in their everyday lives, a process that sounds 
extremely similar to the idea of building a good life. It is therefore apposite that 
landscape should be so important to respondents’ ideas about the good life 
here. For respondents here, a ‘good’ landscape is one in which nature is 
evident, which suggests the interrelations between nature, landscape and 
ethics. 
 While the contours of Scotland may have been shaped by the movement 
of ice and rock over millions of years, the plants and trees that grow on it, the 
siting of human and animal populations and the boundaries of occupied land 
and wilderness are products of human will and history (Franklin 2007: 108-113; 
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cf. Prebble 1963). There is a perception, nonetheless, that Scotland is 
untouched or wild compared to the rest of Britain. For local residents, the 
presence of rare wildlife is one sign of this. The area is also subject to an, even 
by British standards, unpredictable climate due to the untempered influence of 
the north wind. Coastal Moray is bi-seasonal, seeming to come alive in the 
spring and summer, when migrating birds start to arrive, dolphin sightings begin 
and the first batch of tourists visit, whilst during the long autumn and winter it 
closes in on itself and one’s willingness to stay through the cold, dark nights is 
testament to one’s status as a resident rather than visitor. The daily weather in 
this corner of the world is changeable and highly localised. One week in Spey 
Bay in late March 2007, for example, opened with gale-force winds, horizontal 
snow and extremely rough seas, but a few days later I was eating lunch outside 
in Sophie’s garden in mild sunshine. Locals know how to manage themselves in 
the climate and can find beauty in a boiling sea or a fog-bound beach. This 
perception of beauty even in inclemency is crucial to their attachment to the 
area. While respondents would complain about the weather amongst 
themselves, there was a sense that it was part of the whole package, or even a 
price for the extensive rewards of living in this place. 
John Mackie42, the poet cited in the Introduction, is in his early sixties. 
He was born in Garmouth, on the opposite bank of the Spey to Spey Bay, where 
his mother still lives. He spent some of his childhood and much of his adult life in 
London, as well as living and working for some years in northern Africa. He has 
a doctorate in political science from the London School of Economics. He 
returned to Moray with his late wife, who was terminally ill, so that she could 
enjoy a healthier lifestyle in the final period of her life. After she died he decided 
to stay in the area. I first met John when he performed some of his poetry in 
Spey Bay icehouse. Like Sophie, he is a great admirer of the area’s beauty and 
the sensuous appreciation of Moray features repeatedly in his poems. John 
currently lives in Banff, a fishing town about twenty-five miles east of Spey Bay 
on the Moray Firth coast and for a period Banff Bay acted as a muse for his 
poetry, culminating in a series of poems based on his observation that the tide is 
in the musical key of A.  
While walking by the Spey one twilit August evening with John, Sophie 
and some others, we were treated to one of Spey Bay’s many stunning sunsets. 
On this particular occasion, the sea and sky towards Buckie, in the east, went a 
                                                
42 While I have changed the names of all respondents, I have made an exception here with John, 
as his poetry is pertinent to the discussion.  
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battleship grey, while the sky over Lossiemouth, to the west, was a mixture of 
greys and blue with bursts of bright pink and red. John remarked that this was a 
“metallic” sunset, labelling the greys in the east as “pewter and silver” and 
described the “carmine” of the sun behind the grey clouds “feminising” the 
sunset. In classifying this sunset, John showed not only his appreciation for its 
beauty, but also his intimate knowledge of the area (see also Cohen 1987: 40).  
In his study of contemporary English migrants to Scotland, Watson 
(2003: 80) analyses participants’ multilayered reasons for moving to Scotland. 
Many of these resonate with the ideas of respondents here, suggesting that their 
motives for seeking a good life in Scotland overlap with popular perceptions of 
what life in Scotland is like. In particular, many of his participants identified 
Scotland as somewhere where one can get away from the fast pace and 
pressures of urban British life to enjoy a better way of living (2003: 71); many 
also cited the landscape and scenery of Scotland as a motivating factor in their 
migrations (2003: 72). 
 Reflecting on the 1997 Scottish Election Study (i.e. prior to devolution 
and, later, the election of the SNP to head the Parliament), McCrone reports that 
amongst those respondents, while ‘birth, ancestry and residence are the main 
markers of Scottishness, probably in that order … over half accept a very liberal 
criterion for [Scottish] citizenship – residence alone – which would make 
Scotland one of the most open societies in western Europe in terms of 
citizenship’ (2001:172). McCrone argues that a key factor of Scottish identity is 
the association, and grounding, of national character and belonging in the land, 
rather than in any particularly well-defined sense of who the Scots are:  
 
Being Scottish seems much more attached to 'a sense of place' rather 
than a 'sense of tribe', as the historian TC Smout observed. That is, the 
sense of territorial, civic, identity appears stronger than an 'ethnic' one 
such that people can claim to be Scottish by living here. The parliament 
reinforces that sense of 'place' insofar as people participate because 
they live here, not simply because they were born here. Further, the 
evidence seems to suggest that the longer people who were not born 
here live in Scotland, the more likely they feel able to make a claim to be 
Scottish. (2002: 1) 
 
This suggests that, as well as common ideas about the importance of land and 
place to life in Scotland, there are inherent mechanisms in Scottish identity that 
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may be employed by migrants in creating a sense of belonging and that key to 
this is the ability to activate relationships with the land. 
 John is a local who has returned to his ‘homeland’ – as he puts it in Where 
the River Meets the Sea, he has ‘circled’ back to Moray ‘like the Arctic Terns of 
the Spey’. Themes of belonging, connection and identity recur in his poetry, 
including his poem Ancestral Voices – A Polemical Rant on Scottish Identity, 
where he draws on the scattered locations of his ancestors, which traverse 
Scotland, England and North America like a genealogical spider’s web. In the 
following passage from Ancestral Voices, he expresses, through his ancestors, 
his own ideas about identity:  
 
As we sit late in our high house in Banff, 
once owned by a Polish grocer, ancestral voices 
silent in their frames speak volumes 
they say – Nationality is a construct, its foundations symbols 
of a shared, often mythical, past – Identity 
is more particular and proven. 
 
John told me subsequently with some amusement that he had recited Ancestral 
Voices at an informal SNP event in Banff and been told by audience members 
that it was a good example of nationalist poetry. Yet, in concluding, he reminds 
us that nationality, like any other aspect of identity, must be maintained through 
certain performances and rhetorical claims:  
 
we polish and practice  
the people we'll be:  
selecting from ancestral voices,  
fashioning diversity. 
 
John’s sense of the contingency of identity and belonging is particularly 
interesting given his unusual status amongst respondents as a ‘native’ of Moray 
with genealogical connections there that are clearly significant to him and which 
he could choose to foreground rather than question. Instead, he expresses here 
the sense that feelings of belonging and identity with place must be made and 
maintained as well as given, pointing to the importance of “selection” in identity. 
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Caring for the environment 
 
The resident dolphin population provides a local focus of concern for 
residents of the Moray Firth area, but marine conservation is also seen to fit with 
wider environmentalist aims. Of course, environmentalism is not a monolithic 
doctrine and the construction of an enormous wind-farm in the outer Moray Firth 
in summer 2007 posed an ethical dilemma for respondents as they feared that 
underwater construction noise could harm cetaceans by interfering with their 
means of identifying food, echolocation, yet they generally support the use of 
sustainable energy sources like wind power to combat global warming. When 
respondents talk about the natural, wild beauty of Moray, this is not a 
straightforward positive appreciation. While nature is a vital source of goodness 
in their ideas about how to live, it is also a site of conflict, contradiction and 
contingency.  
Gould describes gardening practice amongst homesteaders to give a 
sense of the differences in how members of this group approach nature. 
Comparing Scott and Helen Nearing’s garden with that of their former acolyte, 
Sal, she shows that gardens are not only vital to homesteaders’ self-sufficient 
livelihoods but are ‘the center for aesthetic expression and ethical decision 
making’ (2005: 42). The Nearings’ garden is neatly ordered to maximise 
productive efficiency while Sal’s approach is influenced by an idea of nature as 
random and fortuitous. Each garden presents different effects of a tension 
between asceticism and pleasure, reflecting the good life’s dual status as 
virtuous and pleasant. While homesteading is in many ways a ‘retreat’ into the 
private world of home and family, the actions of homesteaders in re-ordering 
their lives closer to nature, she says, ‘always resonate symbolically’ (2005: 49). 
As such, she describes gardening as both a means of making the self and 
expressing dissent (see also Foucault 1986a: 25).  
Different elements of wildness and nature, as healing and benign on the 
one hand and dangerous and savage on the other, are sought and resisted by 
respondents in the pursuit of a good life. The mixed status of nature and the wild 
were evident in the way they thought about the local wildlife and in particular the 
Moray Firth dolphins. Dolphins and whales are wild animals, and campaigning 
against whaling and their capture for display in aquariums is a key feature of 
charitable work done on their behalf in Spey Bay. For respondents, dolphins 
could be both benign, playful scamps and wild, ferocious hunters. Similarly, the 
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natural world is for them a place of beauty that deserves protection and care, yet 
is also unpredictable and potentially dangerous. Many of the wildlife centre staff 
were somewhat uncomfortable with the fact that, in their daily working lives, 
dolphins were routinely anthropomorphised, though as we shall see, they were 
aware that this could also help in gathering support for their cause. I often heard 
stories amongst them about the ‘nasty’ side of dolphins, such as hunting 
porpoises for sport and indeed it seemed that, the more a particular individual 
knew about cetaceans, the more complex their view of them was likely to be.  
Respondents were similarly uneasy with dolphin ‘fanatics’43 and with 
those who erred too much towards the mystical end of the spectrum in their 
ideas about these animals. For example, they reacted with derision to a flier 
from a self-described “dolphin channel” who was holding “dolphin-singing” 
workshops at Findhorn beach in order to “send healing energy to the dolphins”. 
Having said that, even those who had been in Spey Bay for a long time and 
spotted whales and dolphins regularly never grew tired of seeing them and told 
me that it was “always exciting” to spot a dolphin in the Bay, just as it was 
profoundly moving to encounter a dead whale as we saw in the Prologue.  
When I first heard John Mackie recite his poetry in a performance in the 
Spey Bay icehouse, he finished with Whalesong. In a conversation many 
months later when John had become increasingly involved in the work at Spey 
Bay, he described Whalesong as his “‘70s” poem and said that it drew on the 
cultural idea that whales are sacred, wondering aloud “if whales and dolphins 
have taken the place of medieval gods”. He added that he had decided to re-
write Whalesong after going out on a dolphin-watching cruise during which the 
skipper, a member of another local conservation charity, had “gradually 
disabused him of all this New Age stuff”. “For example,” John told me, “you think 
you’ve seen a lovely leap in the air, but it’s four males gang-banging a female. 
That’s what we need to remember instead of all this New Age, sacred stuff – it’s 
biological. I want to re-write it with the marine biology facts in it”. 
 Staff at the wildlife centre told me a few times about visitors who had come 
into the centre and asked when they could see the dolphins, as if they were 
visiting a dolphinarium. This question frustrated them, as one of the key roles of 
their work in Spey Bay is education about cetacean welfare. The charity 
                                                
43 I joined wildlife centre staff at a screening of Herzog’s (2006) documentary Grizzly Man in Elgin, 
which tells the story of the death of grizzly bear conservation activist Timothy Treadwell in a grizzly 
bear attack in Alaska. In comparing their own work for cetaceans to his work with bears, many 
noted a frustration that they were not more “hands on” like him, yet concluded that Treadwell was 
ultimately a “nutter” whose death was sad but predictable.  
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produces literature to discourage people from visiting dolphinariums44, arguing 
that the capture of dolphins and whales for public exhibition is “cruel” and that 
keeping them in captivity drastically reduces their life span and quality of life 
(see White 2007). Telling me about these visitors who had misinterpreted the 
wildlife centre’s operation, one said, “We don’t keep dolphins in tanks like 
SeaWorld! 45 You have to come and watch and wait, you can’t just expect to get 
everything you want whenever you want it!” As this suggests, for them, 
dolphinariums represent the prioritisation of human desires for convenience over 
wild animals’ welfare. This comment differentiates their relations to dolphins as 
one based on respect and understanding compared to the patrons of SeaWorld, 
whose relationship to these animals is, they imply, one of commodification and 
consumption of nature (see Davis 1996). 
 These examples suggest the complexity of respondents’ relationships with 
nature. For those who are employed full-time in the wildlife centre, conservation, 
even though they may see it as their calling, is a job. They are acutely aware of, 
and ultimately resistant to, the popular imagining of whales and dolphins as 
majestic leviathans of the oceans46 or playful and benign helpmates 
respectively, and as we shall see they also resent the gender stereotyping that 
goes along with dolphin appreciation.  
 Although staff are on the whole passionate about treating animals 
respectfully and believe wholeheartedly in conservation and green ethics, they 
are reflective about the full implications of these causes. For example, Willow, 
who has spent her entire adult life involved in conservation projects, once 
explained to me that pandas were not worth conserving because the effort put 
into their conservation far outweighed the likelihood of ever reinstating a healthy 
population. Willow is trained in assisting stranded marine mammals. On a 
number of occasions, juvenile seals washed up on Spey Bay beach and she 
would often be one of the first on the scene, ready to jump in the car with the 
seal and drive it to the nearest marine veterinary facility in Perthshire, some 
three hours’ drive. Again, her attitude to this work had an unsentimental edge, 
as she told me that she often felt that others were too busy “fussing over” the 
seals and “feeling sad for them”, when the most important thing was to get them 
                                                
44 There are no dolphinariums in the UK because, although they are not illegal, the animal welfare 
regulations are so restrictive that they are financially unworkable. 
45 SeaWorld is a collection of three marine parks that exhibit dolphins and whales to the public in 
the USA.  
46 Indeed, they expressed a great deal of mirth when a misprint in one of the charity’s brochures 
described humpback whales as ‘the wandering gonads of the sea’. It should have read ‘wandering 
nomads of the sea’.  
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to medical attention as efficiently as possible. 
 In March 2007, I took part in a series of visits to local tourist sites with 
other wildlife centre staff, which included a guided visit to the Aigas field centre 
just outside Inverness. Sir John Lister-Kaye, an influential naturalist writer, has 
developed this estate as a conservation centre offering nature holidays and 
environmental education. His latest project, which he zealously described to us 
over coffee and cake, is a controlled reintroduction of European beavers to the 
estate. Lister-Kaye believes that beavers deserve reintroduction to Scotland not 
only because they were once native until hunted to extinction, but also because 
they would be of ecological benefit to the country. For proponents, reintroduction 
offers an opportunity to put right the damage inflicted by humans, whose 
attempts to control wild landscapes has led to the destruction of native 
populations which, in this thinking, have as much right as humans to occupy the 
land. Respondents were quite sceptical, wondering whether reintroduction was 
a positive step forward and seemed somewhat unconvinced that humans and 
once-native species to Scotland like beavers and wolves really could live side-
by-side.  
 In promoting relationships of care with the natural world, environmentalist 
rhetoric perpetuates distinctions between wild and domestic, animal and human 
and nature and culture (Cassidy and Mullin 2007: 1), prioritising positive 
associations of wildness over negative ones (Mullin 2007: 279). This has an 
extra layer of meaning in this context given popular perceptions of Scotland as a 
place offering wild, natural beauty. According to environmentalist rhetoric, 
wilderness is something to be valued and preserved, rather than tamed or 
domesticated and humans should only act on the natural world to give it a 
helping, rather than controlling, hand. However, we see here that even amongst 
people who value and try to live in accordance with environmentalist ethics, 
ideas about nature, the natural world and wildness are complicated and their 
feelings are mixed.  
 A further point that emerges from these examples is that having a 
sophisticated and well-informed appreciation of the natural world is a means of 
staking a claim on it. By claiming a role in Scotland’s fabric as guardians of the 
land and sea, respondents embed themselves in the landscape but also put in 
the work that supports claims of belonging, building reciprocal relationships 
between themselves and the place (Edwards and Strathern 2000: 151-2; 
Watson 2003: 117). It is not surprising, then, that they are so horrified by the 
idea that climate change will destroy Scotland’s nature, since as well as being 
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its most permanent asset, this is what grounds their sense of belonging. 
 Carsten (2000b; 2007; cf. 1997) has carried out research into the 
experiences of Scottish adoptees who sought reunions with their birth parents in 
adult life. For adults who were adopted as children, the process of finding out 
about one’s natal kin was, as the title of her paper indicates, one of ‘knowing 
where you’ve come from’. Carsten says that, while these adoptees seem on the 
one hand to be promoting the primacy of biogenetic connection by seeking their 
birth parents, they also ‘disturb’ this assumption (2000b: 689) since while they 
believed that it was important to find out where they came from, they ‘strongly 
assert the values of care and effort that go into the creation of kin ties’ (2000b: 
691; cf. Edwards 2000; Edwards & Strathern 2000). Of course, people who have 
been adopted may have a particular stake in promoting care, rather than 
biogenetic connection, in kinship and for this reason it is perhaps unsurprising 
that their experience resonates with the feelings of incomer respondents here 
towards their adopted home in Scotland, who use their relationships of care with 
their environment to support and maintain feelings of belonging. Both examples 
suggest the capacity within British kinship thinking to foreground both given and 
made elements of kinship to effect particular claims.  
 In Kinship at the Core Strathern describes two models of the village held 
by Elmdon residents. Incomers largely hold the ‘community model’ and feel that 
by acting in the interests of the village or getting involved in community life, ‘part 
of their lives becomes concretised as a contribution to an on-going system’ 
(1981: 46). ‘Real’ villagers, meanwhile, are more likely to have an ‘interest 
group’ model, which ‘assumes an ordering of roles in public life such that 
organisation on a “village” basis is always the prerogative of other people’. ‘Real’ 
villagers do not feel an obligation to participate, since they are ‘the legitimate 
recipients of welfare, charity and education’ (1981: 47-8; see also Cohen 1987; 
Frankenberg 1957; Watson 2003: 117).  
 Incomer respondents here seem to be more successful in creating 
belonging than those in Elmdon. The work of the wildlife centre is generally held 
in positive regard by other locals, partly because of the tendency of locals to 
associate themselves with dolphins, partly because the Centre does not charge 
entrance fees, partly because they include and work alongside local interest 
groups and partly because they emphasise the localness of the dolphin 
population. Crucially, wildlife centre staff also promote what they do under the 
rubric of altruism and social responsibility. One example of this is the beach 
cleans held at Spey Bay once a month on Sunday afternoons. As they work to 
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clean the beach, the staff hope that participants will see for themselves the 
amount and type of detritus that collects along their shoreline, from old car tyres 
to fishing nets and plastic food wrappings. Families are particularly encouraged 
to come, to do something together and to instil a spirit of charity in their children.  
 During my fieldwork, wildlife centre staff also set up a monthly Local 
Action Group held in a pub in Fochabers, in which members attended 
presentations about the local wildlife such as the talk mentioned in the Prologue. 
For respondents, ethical action undertaken on behalf of the local environment 
may be used to ground claims to be at home. It also creates a wider sense of 
social responsibility, implying a moral imperative to ally oneself with these 
principles that may ultimately bridge differences between natives and incomers. 
In contrast to commuters in Elmdon who seem to feel they can absorb a 
readymade sense of community just by moving to the country, respondents here 
work directly with the environment, developing knowledge and cultivating a 
relationship of care with it. 
 
 
 
You have to make your own fun 
 
 Living a ‘good’ life for respondents has a double aspect, referring to 
virtuous living and personal fulfilment. Along with ideas about the area’s beauty, 
pace of life and closeness to the natural world, respondents express a sense 
that they are part of a “community”. For those who live in Spey Bay in particular, 
friendship and the positive experience of intimate sociality are, as Sophie 
suggested earlier, important parts of belonging, and especially, feeling at home.  
 Apart from my friends and neighbours in Spey Bay, whom I shall return to 
shortly, Erin and her daughter Rosie were the people I spent most time with 
during fieldwork and the many conversations we had about life in Moray were 
significant in my getting to grips with life there. Erin and Duncan moved to Moray 
not only to take advantage of the lower cost of living, but, more importantly, 
because they felt it would be a good place to bring Rosie up. The idea that 
Moray, as a rural place with a sense of community, fewer pressures and 
beautiful scenery to play in, was a good place to bring up children was 
expressed to me by a number of others, too (see also Watson 2003: 122; cf. 
Gulløv 2003). 
 In talking about the differences between living in Moray and England, Erin 
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told me a couple of times about her observation of parents leaving their children 
in their prams outside village shops. When I came to interview her, quite late on 
in our acquaintance and asked her about life in Moray compared to elsewhere in 
the UK, she returned to this phenomenon: 
 
The Scottish are – it must be clan thing – more like, I’d say, the Irish, 
interestingly, in terms of they are very warm-hearted towards children. … 
[There is] remarkable charity and soft-heartedness and care about 
children and that comes across whether they get a free portion of chips 
on St. Andrew’s Day on the High Street in Elgin or if a child is lost in a 
park, and I’ve actually seen this in the village that I live in, that there is 
immense concern and kindness and a real arm stretched out towards 
children in the community. I think children are valued, even very young 
children, they are valued.  
 
I also think they have, because of their community spirit – and I think a 
lot of people take the piss of, even people like me now who live up in the 
north – that we’re not as sophisticated or as sharp as people in the 
Borders. I don’t see that. … Up here, there is a quite an accepted 
mentality or belief, they leave very young, newborn babies in prams 
outside shops, for example, in the village – not just in villages, I’ve seen 
it here in Elgin. I found this personally shocking, I know that in London or 
where I lived in England or even where I lived in real western Ireland, 
that would just, you just wouldn’t do it in fear of somebody snatching 
your child or a car careering up onto the pavement or something. … I 
don’t do it myself, I don’t judge people that do it, but I must say, if my 
hand’s on my heart, if I’m walking along, especially in my village where I 
live, where I care about, and I care about any child, I will get into my car 
more slowly, I will watch that pram until the mum or dad comes back 
because I think that, now I’ve seen it and if something happened, I would 
be, you know, implicit in that situation. … It doesn’t come out of 
ignorance, it comes out of a belief that – people, children are important 
up here like they are anywhere – but children are loved and respected as 
part of the whole community and no ‘normal’ person would harm a child 
so they feel safe to do that, but it’s something I’ve noticed that is very 
different from other places that I’ve lived. 
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Coming to understand that leaving children temporarily unattended is not about 
“ignorance”, but about “love” and “respect” for them has been a fundamental 
part of Erin’s process of becoming part of her local community. In explaining this 
to me at length, she implies her village’s moral superiority compared to other 
more urban or English places while at the same time retaining her own position 
somewhere in between. In doing so, she employs popular notions about rural 
and urban life to suggest that, while from an urban point of view leaving a young 
child or baby unattended might create an unnecessary risk, taking such risks is 
part of life “up here” because of the safety of knowing the other members of that 
community. What Erin also implies here is that, in a rural community like this, 
everyone shares responsibility for looking after children so, in claiming her own 
sense of responsibility for other local children, she is also demonstrating her role 
as a member of that community.  
 Erin suggested that part of the reason for Scottish people’s warmth 
towards children is their clan heritage, drawing on popular ideas about 
Scotland’s history as one based on communalism and strong kinship ties. This 
image of Scotland is of course well known and is promoted abroad along with 
other quintessential elements of Scottish heritage such as tartan, bagpipes and 
haggis by tourist agencies. As noted in the Introduction, respondents are largely 
uninterested in pursuing clan connections or other elements of Scotland’s 
heritage and instead focus on Scotland primarily as a natural, rather than 
historical, place. This is true of Erin too, whose own roots are in Ireland rather 
than Scotland or England and the greater congruence she sees in attitudes 
towards children between Scots and the Irish may be another way of claiming 
belonging for herself. Erin refers to clan to ground her claim about a particular 
facet of community life in rural Scotland, but she casts it less as an ethnic 
category than an inclusive affiliation of community in her imagery of “a real arm 
stretched out” to others. In contrast to roots tourists (Basu 2007), who promote 
essentialist notions of genetic heredity through tracing their clan lines, Erin 
draws on a model of clan that emphasises inclusivity and interconnection rather 
than the delineation of particular bounded groups. 
 Erin and Duncan may particularly appreciate local community spirit as a 
safety net in the absence of their own kin to help look after Rosie, should 
anything untoward happen. In their case, this is because both sets of 
grandparents have been dead for some time, but this point is also salient for 
other incomer respondents whose parents and siblings live elsewhere. It is not 
particularly unusual for British middle class young adults to move away from 
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their parents, and for many respondents (of all ages) the initial move away from 
their native homes was to university, so in a sense many had already made the 
choice to move away from their wider kin networks (temporarily at least) before 
they had ever thought of moving to Moray. Nonetheless, it is notable that, while 
these people clearly feel that having a sense of community and cultivating 
relationships of care with others are extremely important, their kin are not 
apparently a necessary part of this, a point I will return to shortly.  
 Two of the major annual events in Moray are the Lossiemouth Folk 
Festival and Speyfest, a folk music and crafts festival held in Fochabers, which 
bring people of different ages, tastes and classes together to dance, drink and 
enjoy themselves. In choosing to attend these events, which fall outside 
mainstream popular culture, participants engage in a self-conscious celebration 
of community and mark a feeling of togetherness and belonging with a 
specifically ‘Scottish’ flavour. Respondents take part in these activities also 
because of a general feeling that efforts to bring people together should be 
encouraged in an area with limited cultural activities and facilities. Folk activities 
like ceilidhs offer incomers an opportunity to sample and share in Scotland’s 
heritage and natives a chance to demonstrate their cultural expertise. Learning 
how to dance at a ceilidh or finding a new appreciation for folk music shows just 
how successfully an individual has woven himself into the cultural fabric of the 
place. 
One ceilidh that I attended in Aberlour, twenty-four miles upriver from 
Spey Bay, and held as part of the 2007 Spirit of Speyside Whisky Festival, 
exemplified the blend of tradition and innovation that seems so fundamental to 
contemporary Scottish identity (McCrone 2001). The band, a group of local boys 
in their mid- to late-teens with the usual set-up of guitars, drums, keyboard and 
vocals, played a combination of traditional ceilidh numbers with their own 
compositions, heavily influenced by both western pop music and Scottish folk, 
fronted by a young man wearing a kilt and a t-shirt with the slogan, ‘Eat Sushi’, 
who played a range of traditional instruments including bagpipes. Ceilidhs are 
inclusive events for people of all ages. The bands use traditional songs and 
accessible arrangements and everyone is expected to have a go. Since many 
people will not know the dances, the band usually ‘calls out’ the steps before the 
dance begins and if dancers find themselves spinning off in the wrong direction 
they will quickly find a helpfully firm arm steering them back onto the right 
course. Most dances only work if dancers work together to keep time and avoid 
collisions, so those who know the steps have a practical interest in supervising 
 149
those who do not.  
During a return visit to Moray in January 2008, I attended the Burning of 
the Clavie in Burghead. The origins of the festival, which takes place on the first 
day of the Julian calendar, are rather hazy, with some linking it to Roman 
custom and others to Norse, Pictish or Pagan ritual. A few other fire festivals 
take place in Scotland, including the Hogmanay fireball ceremony in 
Stonehaven, Aberdeenshire, the Up Helly Aa festival in the Shetland Islands 
and the Beltane fire festival in Edinburgh. While the Stonehaven ceremony is 
most akin to the clavie, Up Helly Aa draws on Shetland’s Viking heritage and 
Beltane is a contemporary version of a Pagan festival marking the beginning of 
summer. These festivals have become increasingly popular with tourists and 
locals alike and the Burning of the Clavie has in recent years become known 
locally as a quirky festive activity and was first on a list of ‘Top 5 Things to do 
this Weekend’ in the Scottish edition of The Times. These events seem to offer 
discerning tourists a more ‘authentic’ Scottish experience than the better-known 
ceilidhs, Highland Games or Edinburgh Tattoo. 
The Clavie King, the head of one of the old families of the town, leads 
the procession and oversees proceedings. The clavie was lit at the southern end 
of the village and carried down the main street that runs through Burghead like a 
spine. At this point it was a barrel – traditionally a herring barrel but now a 
whisky barrel – within a drum with long charred sticks coming out, which were 
removed and placed outside the residences of long-standing and prominent 
members of the community. The procession continued along the street, stopping 
outside these houses, with the men carrying the clavie shouting either “hip, hip” 
or “Burghead”, to which the crowd replied, “hooray”. All of the men were dressed 
in fireproof clothing and gauntlets despite reports I had heard that they are not 
properly equipped for the fire.  
The procession continued up the street past the last couple of houses 
and finally to a mound known as the Doorie Hill. The clavie was placed on the 
mound and more sticks were added. People crowded around and watched as 
the men who had led the procession gradually added more and more fuel until 
eventually fire started to sweep down the hill, threatening to engulf the men – 
who blithely walked in to add more fuel – and participants at any point. We could 
feel its heat from the opposite hill. Throughout, there were periodic shouts of 
“hip, hip, hooray” or “Burghead, hooray” and a sense of anticipation, excitement 
and danger in the air. Eventually, the fuel was spent and the clavie started to 
break up. The crowd dispersed and children started queuing up on the hill to get 
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a piece of the broken barrel until there was no more left. It is customary for 
residents to open their houses on Clavie night. We gathered instead at a local 
pub, where they were serving free haggis, neeps and tatties to fortify the chilly 
crowds. A few days later, Luke and I watched some footage of the event 
broadcast on national television and were surprised to notice that they had 
overdubbed the piece with bagpipe music despite the fact that not one piper was 
present. Indeed, there was no music at all except for the periodic chants of 
festival-goers crashing onto the surrounding waves. 
 Like the other villages and towns of Moray, Burghead’s population is by no 
means homogenous. It is only seven miles from RAF Kinloss and the Findhorn 
Foundation (see below) and there is constant movement in and out of the town 
as young people move away, incomers move in and tourists and holidaymakers 
come and go. The Clavie festival is overtly a celebration of local community. 
This is clear in the way that local dignitaries are honoured with the placing of 
pieces of the burning barrel outsides their homes and the institution of the Clavie 
King. It also employs particular sets of ideas about Scotland and rural life that 
differentiate the place and people. Burghead is the home of the family 
mentioned in the Prologue, but I do not know if those implicated in the theft of 
the sperm whale’s jaw are the same family who provided the Clavie King. 
Nonetheless, Burghead’s involvement in that theft similarly worked to suggest a 
singularity to the place and people, with the implication that they believed in 
ancient fertility rituals.  
 Watson shows that participating in activities that celebrate the specific 
nature of Scottish culture such as folk music and local history can help 
successful acculturation and integration into Scottish life (2003: 120). By taking 
part in ceilidhs and rituals like the Burning of the Clavie, respondents participate 
in, and reproduce, the idea that Scotland is a traditional place with a unique and 
valuable heritage. They know very well that the ‘tartan and bagpipes’ image of 
Scotland is largely mythical (Trevor-Roper 1983) and see the more extreme 
versions of that image as unappealing and anachronistic.47 
 Folk activities appear to respondents to carry a somewhat lighter load of 
cultural baggage than more touristic events like Highland Games, and thus 
seem more accessible and inclusive to incomer Scots. Having said this, for 
most, even folk activities were periodic and for special occasions and it is 
                                                
47 For example, I will probably never forget the look of appalled incredulity on Sophie’s face at the 
sheer amount of tartan that met our gaze upon entering a hotel in Glenshee, on the Balmoral trail 
in the Cairngorms. 
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notable that the local band, The Beaufighters, most of whose members are 
originally Scottish, prefer to play bluegrass rather than Celtic folk, though their 
set-list usually includes a cover of Nat King Cole’s ‘Route 66’ reworked as ‘Get 
your Kicks on the A96’, referring to the major route between Aberdeen and 
Inverness that passes through Fochabers. Everyday sociality for respondents is 
more likely to be found around a friend’s dining table, in the pub, by the beach or 
in someone’s garden. Such activities are not obviously Scottish, yet they remain 
an important factor in creating belonging since they cement the relationships 
with others that are a vital part of feeling at home for respondents.  
 Luke is one respondent who is unusually interested in Scotland’s history. 
This is no doubt due largely to the fact that while he was based in Spey Bay, he 
was studying for a postgraduate degree in archaeology. Luke grew up in 
England and primarily defines himself and his family as English. Both of his 
parents came from working-class London backgrounds, but “worked their way 
up” and by the time Luke, the youngest of three siblings, was born they lived in a 
sizeable cottage in an affluent part of Essex. Luke has a Scottish surname and 
often expressed a sense that he has a solid Scottish ancestry through both 
parents and from the first time I met him was keen to play this up, referring to 
himself as “a bit Viking”. I once visited Culloden battlefield with him and his 
mother, who was visiting from England as she was keen to see the spot on the 
site at which her own ancestors might have fought. Standing on the windswept, 
eerily quiet battlefield, she said, putting herself in the place of a Jacobite soldier, 
“I can feel the rain coming down into my eyes!” She clearly empathised with the 
men who had fought and died there as she tried to imagine the conditions they 
were in and concluded that she would not have been able to bear it herself.  
 Luke was based in Spey Bay while I was in the field, but spent some 
months studying in Kirkwall in Orkney. Orkney is the place where the clan from 
which he claims descent originates and he told me that before going there to 
study he had felt a pull to go there and experience “the home of his ancestors”. 
He had expected this to be a moving experience of homecoming, but was 
disappointed because, unlike his mother, whose experience at Culloden seems 
more in keeping with that of roots tourists, he did not experience a “personal 
connection” with the place. Instead, he felt a deep kinship with Spey Bay, 
despite a lack of any ancestry in the area, and concluded that this must be due 
to his connections and friendships with other residents there. Luke’s experience 
suggests that, while ideas like clan may be useful in forging connections with 
Scotland for some (Basu 2005a, 2007), it will not necessarily be accepted as an 
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integral part of one’s constitution if it is not backed up by an embodied 
experience of belonging.  
 Luke’s experience points to the important question of whether respondents 
see themselves as Scottish. Of course, some of them, like John, are Scottish, in 
the sense of place of birth and upbringing, but the majority originate elsewhere 
and even John’s thoughts about identity suggest his need to rethink and re-
establish his connections with his home, and to do so he uses the same idioms 
of belonging as incomers. Most English-born respondents would not describe 
themselves as Scottish, but would instead claim to be British, thus recognising 
both where they have come from and where they have chosen to make their 
lives, though of course the close association between ideas about goodness 
and their present lives implies a qualitative difference between the two. The 
structure of the UK as a group of nations within one country, as well as the 
combination of given and made knowledge in British kinship, is useful here in 
allowing such fluidity in identification. By locating themselves at the supra-
national level, respondents can stake a claim to belonging whilst remaining 
vague about where exactly they locate that belonging. This is in contrast to the 
roots tourists encountered by Basu, who tended to be highly specific about their 
origins, locating themselves in particular villages or even specific houses, thus 
giving materiality to their ancestral claims but also reproducing a sense that their 
ancestors did not move.  
 By describing themselves as British rather than Scottish, respondents can 
also pre-empt refutation of their claims of belonging. Their Scottish neighbours 
would, I think, be quite tolerant of the idea that they are at least in the process of 
becoming Scottish, as McCrone (2001) suggests. I cannot speak for other 
residents of Scotland, of course, but I can identify a slight uneasiness amongst 
respondents with the idea of claiming to be Scottish, which I would link both to a 
sense that they do not feel the need to refute their origins and to sensitivity to 
others’ ‘better’ claims to be Scottish. Nonetheless, while questions of national 
identity are of course important considerations for them, they tended not to 
speak in terms of identity or nationality so much as belonging; they do not try 
and set a place as home but instead focus on the experience of feeling at home. 
 For Luke, as for other respondents, a key part of belonging is the 
experience of being surrounded by, as Sophie put it, “people you love”. 
Preparing food and offering hospitality was vital to my fieldwork experience. I 
quickly lost count of the number of times I cooked for large groups of people, 
cleaned up the grill on the barbecue and helped Sophie, Luke or Willow magic 
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ever more crockery out of nowhere as the number of people invited to dinner 
steadily increased during the day. At these shared meals, food came from mixed 
sources including supermarkets, Organic veg-boxes,48 the local butcher, 
respondents’ own gardens and the shop at the Findhorn Foundation. A variety 
of dishes would be made to cater for the differing tastes and dietary 
requirements of guests and typically individuals would contribute different dishes 
or bring drinks to spread cost and effort. The efforts that went into these meals 
are an example of the work that respondents put into their connections with 
others and the complicated choreography of sourcing food for these meals 
offers a microcosmic view of living in a consumer society whilst also attempting 
to resist some of the values that are seen to go with that. It also shows that 
money can be used positively to enable sociality and as such, is inextricably 
linked with intimate and warm relationships (Zelizer 2005).  
At the many dinner parties held in the house I shared with Sophie and 
Luke, we would sit in the sitting room described earlier and Sophie would 
typically sit on the rug by the fire, often playing with Steve’s much-loved 
Labrador or any other visitors’ pets, leading the conversation, skilfully including 
all of her guests and noting links between people to stimulate conversation. The 
core group of neighbours, colleagues and close friends, who would have 
probably arrived early to help prepare the meal or try and catch some time with 
Sophie on her own to have a chat, would sit on the sofa and futon by the fire or 
the rug nearby. Guests and visitors would more likely sit on chairs around the 
dining table, included but slightly at a remove from the regular participants. As 
this suggests, a welcome hand is extended to all, but it is not always fully open – 
something must be retained for oneself, which is only shared with the core 
group of intimates. At some point in the evening, especially if alcohol was 
flowing, the core group of friends would come to dominate the conversation, with 
topics ranging from banality to profundity without warning or apparent reason. 
The predictability of the conversation did not matter as they had had these 
conversations before, in different colours and shades, and so understood the 
flow. They did not tire of them, as they were an outlet for knowledge of 
themselves, for true intimacy and for laying themselves bare. This once again 
demonstrates the importance of shared knowledge in this community.  
                                                
48 Veg-boxes have become popular in the UK in the last few years; they can revitalise business for 
small-scale farmers and provide for consumers of a more ethical bent. A local farmer delivers the 
boxes in Spey Bay fortnightly. The fruit and vegetables are all organic and almost all seasonal 
produce from his farm, though he also offers sidelines like organic confectionary, meat and dairy 
products. 
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 In the previous chapter, we saw the high value that respondents accord to 
compassion and altruism between people in close relationships and as a basis 
for action in relation to surrogacy. Friends in Spey Bay are expected to be 
closely involved in each others’ lives and to share confidences. Individuals are 
conceptualised as bound up in overlapping networks of acquaintance, 
reciprocation and mutual support and are encouraged to “be themselves”, 
however eccentric or singular that self may be. Of course, certain differences 
are less likely to be tolerated, such as denying climate change or expressing an 
enthusiasm for ‘blood sports’, but differences in ethnic origin, sexual orientation, 
age or socio-economic background are generally accepted as part of life and 
indeed, what makes people “interesting”. As such, there is a general sense 
amongst respondents that diversity and individuality are traits to be welcomed 
and even celebrated (see also Strathern 1992a: 22, 30, passim). This self-
portrait of a close-knit community as tolerant and mutually supportive is not of 
course unique to the area. What is particularly interesting here is to connect up 
this sense of difference with the deliberate choice to move away from 
mainstream British life.  
 Helping friends with problems is a regular feature of life and relationships 
between those who live in Spey Bay. Charlotte, who is in her mid-twenties and 
comes from rural East Anglia, worked in the wildlife centre for eighteen months. 
She arrived with her then partner Mark, an engineer at RAF Kinloss. Charlotte 
had studied marine biology at university in England and was keen to find a job in 
this field, so felt very fortunate to secure a job at the wildlife centre. This 
provided her with a ready social network, which became all the more important 
to her after Mark ended their relationship a year after they had first arrived in the 
area. She eventually left the area herself in order to follow a new direction in her 
career. She visits Spey Bay whenever she can, though she told me that she had 
not been able to face returning there for six months after she had left “because it 
was too hard” to go back to a place with so many happy memories and in which 
she knew she would feel a strong compulsion to stay.  
 Two examples from Charlotte’s experience illustrate some of what it 
means to be part of the groups of friends in Spey Bay. While Mark and Charlotte 
were still together, he was posted to Iraq for six months, his first active service. 
His time there caused tension in their relationship and his calls home were 
frequently distressing for Charlotte, as he seemed to her to be taking his fears 
and frustrations about being in Basra out on her. During this time, Charlotte 
often confided in her friends, especially Sophie, who regularly invited Charlotte 
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over in the evenings as she was worried about her being alone in her house in 
Fochabers. While Charlotte’s friends felt a certain amount of sympathy for Mark, 
given his difficult situation, they were shocked and angry that he should be 
treating Charlotte unfairly and jeopardising their relationship and felt a keen 
responsibility to help her through this difficult time. 
 An example from Charlotte’s professional life offers a slightly less 
straightforwardly positive picture of this community. Charlotte had some 
professional differences with her line manager, Michelle, in the wildlife centre. 
Charlotte objected to Michelle’s tendency, as she, and others, saw it, to demean 
her. This grated on Charlotte because the centre was otherwise a place marked 
by a sense of egalitarianism and democracy in which colleagues strove to 
evaluate each employee’s contribution in terms of effort and merit rather than 
where she stood in the organisational hierarchy. Charlotte, an extremely friendly 
and open person, had quickly struck up close friendships with the rest of her 
colleagues and volunteers. Michelle, meanwhile, had remained at a remove 
from the group, rarely socialising outside of work events. This was largely due to 
a lack of interest on her part in becoming part of the group, not least because, 
unlike Charlotte, she had lived in the area for some time and had a network of 
friends outside the wildlife centre. It was also because she did not quite fit in. 
She liked animals but was otherwise uninterested in environmentalism or ethical 
living and her approach to life was far more ‘conventional’ than others’. Charlotte 
initially received sympathy from her colleagues but over time, this began to even 
out as they expressed understanding for Michelle as well and deliberately 
avoided being drawn into “taking sides”, with some even making conscious 
efforts to strike up friendships with Michelle while also maintaining their 
friendship with Charlotte. This suggests that for them, the most important 
principle was to maintain the integrity of the group as a whole by avoiding any 
schism and a self-conscious resistance to favouritism and inclusiveness. 
 Teasing and joking is an important part of social life for the core group of 
respondents, reflecting their close intimacy. Inevitably, the other side to this is 
gossip and people did occasionally complain about information that they had 
told others in confidence somehow finding its way into circulation. However, it 
was commonly accepted that anything that one told another person would 
eventually become common knowledge. Trusting outsiders or newcomers to the 
group with sensitive information is also a means of testing the boundaries of the 
community. If people can accept the more negative aspects of life in such a 
close-knit community, with few secrets and a limited range of social activities, 
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that suggests that they can fit in there. Disseminating sensitive or confidential 
information about other friends then, while potentially infuriating for the subject 
of that gossip, is an important means of cementing group membership through 
shared knowledge.  
 
 
Figure 5: A beach barbecue, Spey Bay, May 2007.  
  
 Parties and other social events in Spey Bay celebrate and consolidate 
friendship. The intimate knowledge of others suggests that for respondents, their 
friends have come to be a sort of family. As we saw in the previous chapter in 
the discussion about sibling bonds, they do differentiate between the ties of 
kinship and friendship, suggesting that each relationship is characterised by 
different types of knowledge and that biogenetic kinship can bring a 
permanence that friendship may lack. Nonetheless, the intimate, ‘warts and all’ 
relationships that they have with their friends suggest that this difference can be 
gradually eroded to the point of meaninglessness. In this way, friendship in Spey 
Bay is reminiscent of that between the gay people encountered by Weston in 
San Francisco. For some gays and lesbians, Weston argues, a relationship 
between friends or lovers that is envisaged to endure is expressed in terms of a 
‘forever’ that ‘represents neither a will to eternity nor an immutable biogenetic 
connection, but rather the outcome of the day-to-day interactions that organize a 
relationship’ (1998: 76). As she says, ‘In this transformation of the dominant 
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biogenetic paradigm for kinship, permanence in a relationship is no longer 
ascribed (“blood is blood”), but produced’ (1998: 76). As for the friendships 
between respondents here, it is the work that goes into maintaining them that 
becomes significant (1998: 80). 
 The fact that respondents’ visions of the good life do not necessarily 
include living close to, and thus relying on the material and practical support of, 
their biogenetic kin is notable. While most have chosen to live apart from their 
families, they have not by any means severed their ties with them. Most of them, 
and especially the younger ones, have warm relationships with their parents and 
siblings and keep in regular contact with them by telephone. Spey Bay was 
often very quiet at Christmas, when people would typically leave to visit their 
families, though most saw them more regularly than an annual visit and many of 
their parents and siblings came to Moray to visit them. Many of the few 
respondents who originate in the area kept in close contact with their immediate 
family as well.  
 While those who work in the wildlife centre do span a broad age range, 
most tend to cluster around the early twenties to thirties age group and the fifties 
to sixties age group. The former group are generally of an age at which they 
have not yet had children and whose parents are not yet infirm, so such support 
may not be at the forefront of their minds. As we shall see in Chapter Six, when I 
discussed their future plans for parenthood with these younger respondents they 
did not indicate that they planned to move closer to their parents when they had 
children, though this is not to say that this might not change. In fact, the origins 
and location of their partner might well be more pressing, for those who are 
single and for those in relationships, since the partners of those already in 
relationships typically originated in different places anyway. Meanwhile, many 
older respondents’ parents are dead, and their own adult children live 
independently so for them the decision to live apart was a mutual one. 
 Like those members of the gay and lesbian community that Weston 
worked with who were disowned as a result of coming out, many of the 
participants in Pike’s study of American Neopagan festivals moved away from 
their natal families and homes as a result of being stigmatised for their religious 
affiliations and ‘alternative’ lifestyles, which makes their search for community 
amongst like-minded festival-goers all the more poignant. While there are some 
strong ideological and ethical overlaps between respondents here and the 
Neopagan movement, especially in the value put on nature and community, 
respondents here have not been turned away by their families and in fact most 
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are supportive of their choices to live in Moray. In particular, the idea that Moray 
is somewhere naturally beautiful with a community spirit was an idea shared by 
respondents’ families, and they appreciated the opportunity to participate in this 
when they visited. However, a few told me that their families were concerned 
that they might be missing out on career opportunities or on meeting future 
partners by living in such a tucked-away place, which betrays a wider perception 
that, while moving to the country may offer many benefits, these are most 
appropriate to those in later life. 
 While belonging for incomer respondents in Spey Bay is not based on 
ancestral connections to old families or centuries of residence, ties with other 
people and the land are still vital to feeling at home. This suggests the 
importance of choice in respondents’ ideas about the good life and points to 
their awareness of the importance of maintaining ties in the present, rather than 
relying on the privileges of birth and traditional identities. It seems that, in order 
to have a life that is ‘better’, respondents prioritise the place and what it has to 
offer over their native ties. Many would be happy for the geographical distance 
between themselves and their families to be shorter, yet it does seem that a 
certain amount of distance is also what allows them to manage their choice to 
reject certain elements of mainstream society in order to build a good life that is 
based to a significant extent on a positive appreciation of difference. 
 As Pike (2001a: 222) remarks for Neopagans, ‘“Family” and “tribe” have 
not disappeared as the locus of moral authority, but they have been redefined, 
no longer determined by birth, blood, name, and institutional affiliation’. Of 
course, even in those places where people do have such primordial links at their 
disposal, their employment of them is by no means predictable or 
straightforward (Cassidy 2002; Edwards 2000; Edwards and Strathern 2000); 
the facility to claim belonging or kinship using elements of both ‘given’ and 
‘made’ knowledge is inherent in wider cultural models of kinship and identity. 
This is reflected in the dual sense of the phrase, ‘at home’. Like the adopted 
Scots interviewed by Carsten (2000b), the Neopagans encountered by Pike 
(2001a, b) and the lesbians and gays in Weston’s (1998) study, respondents 
suggest that it is the effort of cultivating and conserving links between people, 
and between people and place, that is vital to belonging.  
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Belonging outwith 
 
Spey Bay is tucked away from other settlements, typically approached 
by a five-mile road alongside the Spey from Fochabers. Like respondents, I 
have experienced the sense of being enclosed by a ring of warmth and intimacy 
and the shift of perspective onto the small-scale of my immediate surroundings 
once in Spey Bay (cf. Allerton 2001; Ott 1981). Outside, one is unknown, part of 
a homogenous mass; this is both ideology and affective experience. As we have 
seen, residents of Spey Bay feel they are part of something. Key to this is the 
feeling of connection and shared knowledge between people, but also a sense 
of being on the edge, geographically and socially (see also Cohen 1982, 1987; 
Edwards 2000; Rapport 1993; Pike 2001a, b).  
The road to Spey Bay marks both a phenomenological and spatial 
boundary. Inside, one is part of something different and, by implication, better. 
Respondents seem to feel a positive sense of difference both in their social lives 
and relationships to the natural world. As such, the choice to live there is in one 
sense a form of cultural critique. American homesteaders’ visions of the bad life 
include excessive individualism, consumerism and industrialism, along with 
environmental degradation. They believe that this should be replaced with a life 
closer to nature (Gould 2005). Given the shared values between homesteaders 
and the respondents in this study, it might be assumed that they are similarly 
pessimistic about the current state of the world. Yet, while they can identify 
problems in the wider society, economy and politics as well as what is wrong 
with particular ways of living, they do not feel that the mainstream world that 
they retain one foot in is irrevocably degenerate. Rather than focusing on what 
is wrong with their previous lives, which they rarely talked about, they 
emphasised the positive experience of their current ones. The choice to move to 
Moray is primarily a positive choice towards achieving certain goals rather than 
away from an unpleasant past.  
Along with their nuanced and fluid way of thinking about nature, home 
and kinship, and their wariness at being thought of as ‘hippies’, respondents are 
sceptical about utopian community-building projects. This is clear from the 
contrast with the nearby Findhorn Foundation, a religious community whose 
members draw on Christianity and New Age teachings as well as nature worship 
and practical ecology (see Walker 1994). Findhorn village lies about twenty-five 
miles west of Spey Bay at the mouth of the Findhorn estuary. It has been settled 
since the seventeenth century, when it was a major seaport in the local herring 
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trade. Like Spey Bay, it is home to many incomers who have moved there for 
the lifestyle and proximity to the sea and the remains of a large icehouse mark 
its importance in the earlier fishing industry.  
I often visited the Findhorn Foundation, its shop, ‘slow food’ restaurant 
and vegetarian café, as well as Findhorn village’s stunning beach and pubs with 
respondents. Over time, I noticed a marked ambivalence in their attitudes to the 
Foundation, along with a shift towards greater identification with the village. As 
with dolphin aficionados, feelings towards the Foundation could veer from a 
feeling of ideological kinship to outright derision. No doubt this partly reflects the 
fact that the Foundation has a sizeable population drawn from quite disparate 
origins, whose reactions to outsiders were predictably diverse. Most interesting, 
I think, is what it says about respondents’ own sense of themselves and their 
community.  
The Foundation was set up in 1962 by Eileen and Peter Caddy and their 
friend Dorothy Maclean, who came to live, along with the Caddys’ three sons, in 
a caravan in Findhorn village after losing their jobs running a nearby hotel. In 
order to support themselves, they started growing vegetables and, despite the 
dry, sandy soil so close to the sea, were very successful which they attributed to 
having fortuitously accessed the plants’ spirits, which guided them. Eileen 
published a book about her insights and experience and people started to come 
to Findhorn to learn how to attune to the ‘intelligence of nature’. Some decided 
to stay and a community grew up around them just as the vegetables had.  
 Respondents tacitly recognise the congruities between themselves and 
members of the Findhorn Foundation, including the fact that many of them are 
incomers. They share an interest in protecting the natural world from harm, of 
living a good life, of resisting certain aspects of mainstream society and 
achieving personal fulfilment. However, respondents are sceptical about the 
Foundation’s view of nature as a spiritual, immanent force. For them, nature 
worship is “a bit silly” and, while nature does have transcendent qualities for 
them, it is not a deity.  
 Trips to the Foundation were ostensibly pleasurable activities, a chance to 
have a change of scene, to get a glimpse of their own ideals being put into 
practice, or simply to shop or have a gossip over a decent cup of coffee and a 
piece of chocolate and almond torte, yet respondents often expressed a 
subsequent sense of dissatisfaction. The main complaints levelled against the 
community’s members were that they were unwelcoming and haughty, that they 
had an unseemly interest in money and that they did not always prioritise 
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ecological principles. These complaints are not, of course, mutually exclusive. 
The first two were often a direct reaction to visiting the Foundation shop, which 
stocks a mixture of New Age crafts and wholefoods, staffed by community 
members who are, in my experience, not particularly friendly. The goods for sale 
are typically Organic and/or Fair Trade and from independent producers. Much 
of the fresh produce is from the Foundation’s own gardens, bakery and dairy. It 
is more expensive than most shops or supermarkets and, while respondents 
recognised that this was a reflection of differing costs of production, they did feel 
that many prices were excessive. This relates to their assumption that every part 
of the Foundation should operate on a non-profit basis because it is both a 
charity and a religious community. Of course, this also reflects the difference in 
claims between themselves and the members of the Foundation, who are seen 
as self-consciously and deliberately building a utopian community with particular 
set principles in contrast to their own more makeshift and organic lives. This is 
perhaps why they came to feel an increasing kinship to the villagers outside the 
Foundation. 
 The Findhorn Foundation’s ‘Ecovillage’, founded in the 1980s, is a 
collection of self-built homes of varying levels of grandeur from caravans, yurts 
and converted whisky fermentation vats to state-of-the-art eco-homes 
sandwiched in a roughly cleared forest between Findhorn village and the RAF 
Kinloss runway. When walking around with respondents on numerous 
occasions, they would often point out the conspicuously orange Calor gas 
canisters outside many of the homes. For them, this was an irrefutable sign that 
Foundation residents were prepared to compromise their ecological principles 
for their own wants. They also often remarked upon the closeness of the 
houses, speculating about the inevitable “politics” that would arise in such a 
close-knit community, and noted that many of the houses lacked gardens49, 
which seemed incongruous given their apparent reverence of nature.   
 Despite these complaints, we continued to visit the Foundation. It was, 
still, a “special” place, where they would take visitors from “down south” to show 
them this utopian community and, perhaps, remind themselves of how different 
they are. As both Pike (2001a) and Cohen (1987) argue, it is at the boundaries 
that we may most clearly glimpse the tensions of community identity. It is my 
                                                
49 Respondents also tend to have very small gardens and few opportunities to grow their own 
crops, as houses in the area tend not to have particularly large outside plots. In Spey Bay in 
particular, the volunteer accommodation is shared and does not have a garden because of its 
layout in the courtyard formation, though volunteers did grow herbs in pots on the windowsills. 
Sophie’s garden, meanwhile, is over-run by her chickens, though Rob and Helen, her next-door 
neighbours, are keen gardeners. 
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view that the Findhorn Foundation acts as something of an ideological foil for 
respondents. On a couple of occasions I heard Luke and Willow joke that, as the 
end of Spey Bay in which they live is effectively surrounded on three sides by 
water, it would be simple to build a moat along the fourth side and make it an 
island. They were reflecting on the fact that their lives are almost completely 
embedded in and attached to this place and an island seemed an apt metaphor 
(Abell et al n.d.). This also points to their sense that to some extent it would be 
desirable to set up a utopian community in Spey Bay, since individual lives there 
are in reality quite communal and it would provide a good environment for them 
to settle in, set up their own ecological businesses and eventually raise children. 
However, the initial costs of establishing this, as well as the fact that the land is 
owned by the Crown so unlikely to come up for sale, quickly put a brake on such 
utopian fantasies. Further, such conversations would usually end with the 
conclusion that their more organic community was ultimately better as they are 
equally aware of the negative sides of utopianism, in their recognition that it is 
difficult to live an ecologically blameless life, that tight-knit communities may be 
riven by internal tensions and that setting boundaries around one’s home is a 
process of exclusion just as it is of inclusion. 
 Instead of a utopia, Spey Bay might be more appropriately described as a 
heterotopia (Foucault 1986a). Foucault’s concept of the heterotopia is split 
between heterotopias of crisis, particularly related to life crisis events, and 
heterotopias of deviation. The community in Spey Bay would more likely fit into 
the second category, though of course it is structured by a sense of ecological 
crisis. Foucault specifically contrasts heterotopias with utopias on the basis that 
the former are real and the latter imaginary and idealistic. While utopias are a 
form of perfected society, heterotopias, which he argues exist everywhere, are 
‘counter-sites’ in which ‘all the other real sites that can be found within the 
culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted’ (1986a: 24; 
see also Hirsch 1995: 4). What utopias and heterotopias share is that they ‘have 
the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way 
as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to 
designate, mirror, or reflect’ (1986a: 24).  
 Pike (2001b: 160) similarly describes the Burning Man festival in Nevada 
as a heterotopia. For Neopagans, festivals are a site of home and community as 
well as a place in which the self is made and recreated.  Like other similar 
festivals around America, she says, Burning Man ‘provides a locus where 
cultural problems, and especially problems of ultimate meanings, are expressed, 
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analyzed, and played with. The festival is an important cultural and religious site 
that exemplifies the migration of religious meaning-making activities out of 
American temples and churches into other spaces’ (2001b: 157). American 
Neopagan festival-goers work to separate Neopagan experience from ordinary 
life, or ‘mundania’, in order to keep it sacred. One way they do this is by creating 
‘place myths’, which combine rumours, stories and images that create a sense 
of other-worldliness, which ‘may extol a place’s vices as well as its virtues’ 
(2001a: 19). Similarly, in Spey Bay, regular war stories of problems with the 
septic tank system and struggles with rodent infestations provided opportunities 
to set the place apart.  
 In Spey Bay, difference is further marked in the cultivation and 
celebration of eccentric behaviour amongst members of the community. I went 
to a Hogmanay party in Spey Bay village hall with Luke, Willow, Amy and Ingrid 
and as we were getting ready to go, one person remarked that we did not have 
costumes, which seemed strange considering the number of fancy dress events 
held in Spey Bay.50 One person suggested that we dress normally, but make our 
own hats. As we approached the hall together, some started to feel self-
conscious. After some discussion, we decided we should wear our hats, 
however silly we looked, because otherwise it would have been pointless to 
make them, but we all felt a little embarrassed as we made our entrance into the 
hall. Once we had found a table, opened some sparkling wine and settled into 
the party, the hats came to be a focus of the conversation, with much joking and 
teasing about our particular designs. So, while our hats had for a moment made 
us waver and feel self-conscious, through the evening they came to represent 
instead a positive perception of difference and, indeed, eccentricity.  
Strathern has described the individuality of persons as the first fact of 
English kinship (1992a: 14). In the modern period, she says, ‘the English were 
regarded both as a productive amalgam of diverse peoples and as a highly 
individualistic nation holding on to individualism as a transcendent characteristic 
of themselves’ (1992a: 30). Here we find another facet of the sense that Spey 
Bay is a place in which one can feel at home. This is a place in which one is 
known intimately and in which individuals have little time, or information, to 
themselves. In contrast to the idea that home is the privatised, domestic realm, 
                                                
50 Many parties held both in the village hall and privately in the homes of wildlife centre staff were 
fancy dress and many respondents felt that chatting about ideas of what to wear and going 
shopping together to source costumes beforehand was one way in which to extend the “fun” of 
parties before they had even started. They may also be an outlet for people who live in such close 
proximity to each other to temporarily take on alternative identities. 
 164
a haven from industry and alienating labour (Engels 1972; Carrier 1993), 
respondents feel at home in a network of people with whom they share values 
and knowledge but ‘lack’ primordial ties. Respondents feel that Spey Bay is a 
place where they can be themselves, however singular. The fact that this is 
accepted and celebrated by other members of the community creates a strong 
sense of belonging and kinship. It also, of course, inevitably serves to 
differentiate the insiders and thus excludes those whose difference does not fit. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cultivating a positive relationship with nature and being part of a 
community are the two central principles that structure respondents’ experience 
of building and living a good life in Scotland. These two connective impulses, 
towards nature and other people, are of course problematised by the fact that 
most respondents cannot claim original ties to the area or people there. Yet, 
seeing this as a problem belies the fact that a certain amount of fluidity in 
concepts of home, kinship and community is already present in the ‘idioms’ 
(Edwards 2000) of the ‘reproductive model’ (Strathern 1992a) of kinship and 
belonging in the UK. In the previous chapters we saw the malleability of 
grounding concepts like the maternal bond, altruism and human nature and 
earlier in this chapter I identified a similar fluidity in respondents’ ideas about 
cetaceans and wildness.  
Arguing against a romantic perception of community, Edwards states 
that ‘a particular kind of kinship thinking informs the generative possibilities of 
community. It is both an entity and a set of relations; it is both fixed and fluid. 
Community is mobilized to designate an inclusive set of people and to exclude 
others; who belongs to it shifts according to the reasons for formulating it’ 
(Edwards 2000: 247-8; see also Edwards and Strathern 2000). Erin’s comments 
about the differences between living in England and Scotland (and Ireland) 
fluently demonstrated how, as we have already seen with nature, the polysemy 
of concepts like home and community is a source of strength in making claims 
and negotiating connections. Erin drew out particular characteristics of people 
and place and played them off against each other to demonstrate both her own 
familiarity with, and thus attachment to, her new home, but also her reflexive 
position as someone who can see the good and the bad in both ways of living 
 165
and who has made an informed choice about her own vision of the good life. 
Connections between people entail obligations and claims, as do 
connections to place. In Moray, incomers ground their claims of belonging in 
terms of kinship to nature and to their friends. In so doing, they emphasise 
qualities of cultivation, conservation and care over primordial ties and statuses. 
They frame this as part of an ethic of good living, but also connect their actions 
up with the locale by focusing their efforts on the nature of the local 
environment. As in Bacup, Elmdon, Whalsay and elsewhere, both incomers and 
native residents are implicated in the maintenance of symbols of community, 
and in Moray the “local” wildlife is a primary signifier of the community and what 
makes it special. This is also another point of contrast with Findhorn and other 
utopian communities. The Findhorn Foundation in a community that has set 
certain expectations for its membership and models itself as having boundaries, 
however porous they may be in practice. Given this, it appears more inwardly 
oriented compared to the community of respondents here, who, in their efforts to 
embed themselves in this place, instead seem to reach outwards to their 
environment and to other people.  
Cultivating a relationship of care with one’s environment is not only about 
creating a feeling of belonging in a new home and claiming the right to live in a 
particular place, but also about building and conserving relationships. It seems 
appropriate therefore that feeling and emotion have figured repeatedly in this 
chapter. In Chapter One, I noted the importance of feeling, from the emotional 
aspects of maternal bonding to expressions of empathy and sympathy, in ethical 
claim-making. Talk of relations, whether to people, place or animals, provokes 
emotions. In the examples discussed here, respondents expressed feelings that 
are culturally closely associated with relationships between kin, friends or lovers. 
In their attachments to the environment, they constantly remarked upon its 
beauty, implying both Romanticism and romance. While ethical judgement may 
seem to foreground the balancing of different types of knowledge and 
commitment, it is also experienced emotionally. Just as the maternal bond is, 
primarily, a compelling feeling of attachment that causes women to act in 
particular ways, belonging to a particular place entails an emotional bond that 
models behaviour and creates responsibilities. 
The emphasis on caring, ethical action in the everyday lives of 
respondents returns us to some of their ideas about human nature and motive. 
Although their ideas about altruism and money are nuanced, they expressed a 
sense that human action should be motivated by ethical judgement and that 
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thinking of others was a key part of this. Respondents agreed that, assuming the 
surrogate mother was motivated ethically and did not bond with the child, on the 
whole the best outcome for a surrogacy arrangement would be for the child to 
be brought up by the intending parents. This suggests a sense that trusting the 
upbringing of the child to the intending parents is the most socially acceptable 
outcome for a surrogacy arrangement. It also points to an acknowledgment that 
biogenetic ties may not always be a sufficient basis for parenthood. It may be 
that this is linked to their experience of building strong ties of belonging to a 
place that is not their native home.  
Many respondents feel that one of the virtues of the place where they 
live is that it is a good environment for children. This idea has some interesting 
implications, including that children can thrive somewhere where they are 
distanced from their wider kin network but which offers a good quality of life and 
that a place that offers the right environment for children also offers the right 
kind of life for their parents. Undoubtedly these ideas are influenced in part by 
the emphasis in environmentalist rhetoric on preserving the environment for 
future generations. In classic anthropological theory on teknonymic societies 
(see Geertz and Geertz 1975: 90), it is argued that one effect of naming parents 
after children is to create a kinship system in which the focus is on the youngest 
generation rather than on progenitors. Implicit in respondents’ idea that Moray 
offers a good place for children to grow up is a sense that, by choosing to raise 
their children there, they may start to activate native ties to the place. Once 
again, this points to their temporal orientation towards the future rather than the 
past. Of course respondents have not formed a teknonymic society, but this 
different orientation is notable, especially, once again, in the contrast with the 
ideas of roots tourists and other genealogists, whose ideas and practice are 
markedly oriented towards connecting with the past rather than working in the 
present to make a good life in the future. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Charity Work 
 
Funny business, a woman’s career. The things you drop on your way up the ladder so 
you can move faster. You forget you’ll need them again when you get back to being a 
woman. There’s one career all females have in common, whether we like it or not: being 
a woman. Sooner or later we’ve got to work at it, no matter how many other careers 
we’ve had or wanted.  
 All About Eve  
 
 
 My voluntary work with the conservation charity in Spey Bay was the 
catalyst for most of the relationships I made with respondents and provided the 
means for participating in their daily lives. In this chapter I will focus on the work 
done by the staff and volunteers in the wildlife centre. I will therefore be 
extending on the themes of the previous chapter, in which we saw the 
importance of care and effort in creating belonging and connections with others 
in respondents’ lives. These efforts are given weight by cultural ideas about 
what constitutes good work and ethical action. In Spey Bay, this is 
conceptualised particularly in relation to ideas about cetaceans and the ethical 
imperative on humans to protect and care for them and their habitats. Such 
imperatives can link people together in a common purpose, provide the grounds 
for particular ways of acting and help sustain a sense of social responsibility.   
 Describing working life in Spey Bay is important not only because my 
observations of respondents’ lives are largely filtered through participating in 
their work, but also because, as for most people in Britain, they spend many 
hours of their days at work. This is given added salience by the perception that 
charity work, in particular, reflects a part of the self and the worker’s values. We 
will see here how wider ideas about charity, altruism and the gift are employed 
and reproduced in this work and in the ethical subjectivities of charity workers, 
donors and supporters. We will also see how ideas about localness, children, 
femininity and rural life are closely implicated in environmentalist work, and its 
success.  
 By describing charity work in the UK I am also contributing to a somewhat 
underrepresented area of anthropology, since, while there are many 
ethnographies of industrial work in the Western world and beyond, other 
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professions, including especially white-collar ones, have received less attention 
from ethnographers, though various scholars have started to chart the 
development of the professional environmental sector in the UK (see Grove-
White 1993; Macnaghten and Urry 1998; Yearley 1993). Macnaghten and Urry 
(1998: 73) have described a shift in environmental organisations in the late 
twentieth century from a consultative and non-confrontational relationship with 
government towards a more vocal role as campaigners and advocates seeking 
to find solutions to problems that are now accepted as real. As they note, this 
has entailed a complex relationship with the private sector, in that they have 
come to occupy a space that is seen as moral and principled compared to 
‘untrustworthy’ industry, yet use many of the same marketing techniques used 
by big businesses. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly common for businesses 
to boast environmentally friendly credentials however unrelated or even hostile 
to environmentalist aims their products and services may appear, so that 
environmental groups may be increasingly challenged in wresting symbolic and 
conceptual control over the terms of debate.  
 Berglund (1998) has carried out ethnographic fieldwork amongst 
environmental activists in various projects in one town in Germany, providing a 
valuable illustration of the kind of work such activists do and thus giving content 
to terms such as ‘environmentalism’. Her ethnography demonstrates that, rather 
than taking concepts such as science and nature as universal constants in our 
analysis, they should be treated as contingent categories of thought that are 
used for particular purposes and with specific effects. As she says, Euro-
Americans ‘mix and match nature and culture even as we struggle to be 
consistent in setting boundaries between them. We still act (and agonise) with 
nature in mind … it is upon the power that enables the establishing of those 
boundaries, that anthropologists are able to comment’ (1998: 13).  
 White (1996) has identified a strain in American environmentalist thinking 
that associates work primarily with the destruction, rather than appreciation, of 
nature. He associates this with a tendency amongst environmentalists to see 
their proper interaction with nature as appreciating it in leisure time rather than 
through physical labour. Undoubtedly, the appreciation of wildlife in Moray is 
largely seen as a leisure activity and particularly aimed at holidaymakers, 
implying that this is a place apart that can usually only be accessed in time out 
from usual patterns of work and consumption (see also Davis 1996). Many 
respondents enjoy outdoor pursuits in their spare time so in a sense see the 
natural world as both their place of work and their playground. While White 
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raises important points about the separation of humans and nature, work and 
leisure, in contemporary American life, his essay also betrays a sense that non-
manual labour is not real work. While wildlife centre staff are aware that their 
jobs are not particularly hands-on, there is no reason to suggest that what they 
do does not count as work, as is only too clear to them when facing a tight 
budget spreadsheet, a group of expectant school-children or after an exhausting 
day spent rattling a collection tin while dressed as a dolphin. 
 
 
 
Saving the whales 
 
The wildlife centre employs six full-time paid staff based in the centre 
plus another two who are not office-based and two more based in its offshoot 
centre outside Inverness that opened in 2007. During the summer, they employ 
around five residential volunteers who work full-time in the centre, guide on 
wildlife-watching tours out of Buckie and live in one half of the old fishing station 
manager’s house in Tugnet. They are provided with accommodation and a 
weekly food allowance and many explained to me that part of the appeal of 
working at Spey Bay was that, unlike many overseas conservation projects, they 
did not have to contribute towards their living costs to work there. This means 
that the work is more accessible for those of reduced means, and residential 
volunteers come from quite varied backgrounds. Residential volunteers stay for 
six months, so I came to know a couple of cohorts during my time in the field. 
Mostly, they were recent graduates in their twenties, from the UK or western 
Europe, but a few were also in their thirties or forties, taking ‘career breaks’.  
During summer, when the centre is open seven days a week, there are 
usually around ten regular “local volunteers”51 who offer a day of their time each 
week. In addition, there are at any time a varying number of additional more 
casual volunteers working in the centre and helping out at events and with 
particular projects. Non-residential volunteers include students getting work 
experience in conservation during their summer holidays, retired or school-age 
locals from Spey Bay or the neighbouring villages, recent incomers who support 
the cause and are interested in meeting new people and friends and partners of 
staff or more regular volunteers. All but one of the centre’s paid staff are female. 
                                                
51 Ironically, this was the category I fell into as I did not volunteer every day and paid for my 
accommodation myself. 
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Women residential volunteers also significantly outnumber men, but non-
residential volunteers are quite evenly split in terms of gender. The charity, 
whose headquarters are based in southwest England, but have four more 
international offices, also part-funds a scientific research project with Aberdeen 
University on the Black Isle, on the other side of the Moray Firth, and volunteers 
and staff typically participate in annual surveys of the Moray Firth cetacean 
population run by this team.  
 The two main categories of visitors to Spey Bay are families with young 
children and naturalists. The wildlife centre is made up of the shop, café, 
icehouse, wildlife garden and exhibition area, which also serves as a location for 
talks and children’s play area, plus, away from the public gaze, office, store-
room and volunteer accommodation as well as a car park and outside area that 
includes a grassy knoll which provides the best vantage point for wildlife-
watching. From the outside it does not look that dissimilar from a traditional 
collection of crofters’ cottages and inside it is compact, dark and, in the winter, 
quite cold. The very first sight that greets visitors on entering the centre is a 
display promoting the Adopt a Dolphin programme (see below). The shop is 
targeted at tourists and wildlife enthusiasts, selling books, soft toys, gifts, 
ornaments and clothes, typically with a wildlife theme though they also sell some 
‘Scottish’ items such as folk music CDs, tea-towels printed with humorous 
rhymes about Scotland and guides to the local area. The café is similarly aimed 
at the day-tripper market, serving sandwiches, ice cream, notoriously indulgent 
cakes and soft drinks.  
 The centre has a somewhat makeshift appearance, which partly reflects 
that fact that the building complex is not only rented from the Crown Estates but 
also listed, which effectively curtails any building or refurbishment work that 
goes beyond conserving what is already there. Volunteers and staff usually 
maintain and decorate it themselves in spare moments, giving it a homemade 
feel. Staff did feel that the centre could be smarter, and there were constant 
projects to improve its look and accessibility, but they reasoned that since 
admission was free, visitors could not really expect it be too flashy and if they 
spent more on its appearance it could have had an adverse effect on their 
fundraising, as it might suggest that potential supporters’ money was less 
necessary than was being claimed. Such concerns were, in any case, 
academic, as they simply cannot afford to spend large sums on the centre’s 
upkeep.  
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 The exhibition area is reached through the shop and consists of a series 
of interpretation boards with information about the Moray Firth dolphins, local 
wildlife, climate change and conservation. It is also the location of the sightings 
board, which records the most recent wildlife sightings at Spey Bay, Chanonry 
Point and elsewhere nearby. The rest of the exhibition is in the separate 
icehouse, usually only open in the summer as it is prone to flooding, where 
visitors are shown a DVD about whales and dolphins and given a talk on the 
history of Spey fishing and shown historical fishing equipment. 
 Thousands of visitors come to the wildlife centre each year, lured by the 
promise of seeing dolphins, ospreys, seals and other wildlife in their natural 
habitats. A large number of visitors are holidaymakers from England, and many 
of these are repeat visitors to Spey Bay and the wildlife centre. Many locals also 
visit the centre, either by themselves or with visiting friends and family, including 
especially children and grandchildren. They did not express any discomfort that 
those who work in the centre are mostly not Scottish and did not question their 
claims about the importance of their work. The centre is well known locally and 
has in a sense put the village on the map. A sizeable proportion of visitors that I 
met while volunteering in the centre expressed great love for the place, and saw 
a visit there as a treat. This reflects the current status of wildlife-watching as a 
leisure activity in this country and the pleasure that such experiences offer. 
 During summer, the centre is open seven days a week, from 10.30am to 
5pm. In winter it is only open at weekends though the staff remain employed full-
time and volunteers will be found work to do, often helping pack mail-orders, 
which are particularly popular in the run-up to Christmas. On a typical day in the 
summer, some of the paid staff will be working in the office, while the education 
officer might be engaged with a school group. At least one residential volunteer 
will be in Buckie guiding on the wildlife watching boat. The shop will either be 
run by a paid employee or residential volunteer with the help of one or more 
local volunteers. Further staff, often volunteers, will also be running regular talks 
in the exhibition space such as a guide to the best places to spot dolphins, with 
an emphasis on promoting reputable tour operators who do not harass the 
wildlife, as well as hourly tours of the icehouse. One member of staff will also be 
on the rota doing Shorewatch, an hourly dolphin survey (see next chapter). 
 Wildlife centre staff have daily direct contact with supporters and members 
of the public, so their work is an opportunity to “educate” people about the 
threats faced by cetaceans, focusing particularly on the Moray Firth dolphins, 
and to promote the interests and causes of the charity as a whole. Many local 
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school parties visit the centre during the spring and summer months to take part 
in educational activities laid on by staff. I helped out on many of these 
occasions, assisting children in making sea-themed musical instruments, 
participating in games that illustrate the importance of recycling rubbish and 
leading nature trails along the banks of the Spey. Staff also travel to local sites 
for special events. For example, I participated in a day’s exhibition at 
Aberdeen’s Maritime Museum as well as an annual weekend boat festival in 
nearby Portsoy, Aberdeenshire. Such events are multi-purpose, providing 
opportunities for fundraising, education, advocacy and the promotion of 
environmentally responsible behaviour in the local population.   
 
 
Figure 6: Wildlife centre staff grapple with their model of a minke whale surrounded by 
local children dressed as sea creatures before processing around Spey Bay as part of 
Save the Whale week, July 2007.  
 
 In the rhetoric of wildlife conservation, whales and dolphins need 
‘saving’, and there is a Save the Whale week in Spey Bay every summer. Until 
the middle of the twentieth century, when it ground to a halt almost as abruptly 
as it started in the eighteenth century, whaling was a highly lucrative industry in 
Scotland and nearby Peterhead was a significant whaling port. Towards the end 
of the industry’s career, whaling had, as with comparable economies like fishing 
and agriculture, become industrialised and many species had become 
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endangered and faced extinction. The International Whaling Commission (IWC), 
set up in 1946, originally acted as a self-regulating body for the industry but 
steadily shifted its position and in the 1980s placed an international moratorium 
on whaling. 
 Arguments against whaling reveal much about humans’ perceptions of 
these creatures. They also provide a model and impetus for action and many 
environmentalist groups treat the state of cetacean populations as an ecological 
bellwether. Anti-whaling views range from the conservationist camp, which does 
not see killing whales as wrong per se but objects to whaling on the grounds of 
species endangerment, to those who are against commercial whaling but allow 
for subsistence whaling by aboriginal groups, to preservationists who believe 
that whales are a special group because of their particular attributes and place 
in the ecosystem and therefore should never be intentionally killed (Stoett 1997: 
105; cf. Einarsson 1993). The charity in Spey Bay would primarily fit with the 
conservationist frame, though many individual staff members told me that they 
can see the argument for aboriginal whaling too, though they framed this in 
terms of ecological “sustainability” rather than primarily as a means of 
preserving a ‘traditional’ way of life.  
 What is particularly interesting about the global Save the Whale 
campaign is its successful establishment of an ethical imperative to protect 
cetaceans. Stoett states, ‘Environmental issues have ethics at their heart: 
questions of what constitutes proper human behaviour and proper relations 
between people and nature’ (1997: 108). This reflects once again the shift of 
environmentalism in British culture from Green politics to ethical living. Stoett 
points to the inconsistencies in established anti-whaling arguments and argues 
instead that, whatever the specifics of anti-whaling discourses, the wider 
problem of habitat destruction makes stopping whaling an ethical imperative for 
all humans (1997: 128). As he notes, the shift in worldwide attitudes to whales, 
from economic resources to hapless victims of the excesses of human industry, 
has gone alongside a marked depletion in cetacean stocks and both of these 
factors have contributed to the ending of whaling. Mixed claims may be brought 
into deciding why cetaceans should not be hunted, but what is generally agreed 
in the UK, and by all respondents here, is that they should be saved, rather than 
destroyed. In promoting their work, the charity that runs the wildlife centre is 
able to draw on both a sense that the local dolphin population is what makes the 
area special and worth conserving and a more global, though not uncontested, 
sense that ‘saving’ cetaceans is a good thing to do. The fact that most whale 
 174
and dolphin species are migratory is no doubt useful in this elision of local and 
global causes, though if we consider the comparison with the equally local 
salmon population, the importance of ideas about specific species becomes 
clear.  
  In the film, Local Hero (Forsyth 1983), which was filmed in Pennan, on the 
Moray Firth coast, a Texan oil company attempts to buy the village and its 
coastline to develop a refinery. I was reminded of the film when I first heard 
about American entrepreneur Donald Trump’s plans to develop a golf and 
leisure complex near Balmedie on the Aberdeenshire coast (within First Minister 
Alex Salmond’s Gordon constituency),52 which have been resisted by local 
environmental groups including the charity in Spey Bay. Their objections are 
based on the project’s siting on environmentally sensitive land, part of which is a 
SSSI. Trump’s proposals had an embattled course through the local council 
planning system and were finally approved in November 2008 after being 
referred to the Scottish Government. Trump, who has been keen to emphasise 
his family roots in the Western Isles throughout the process,53 plans to spend 
£1bn on a golf resort that will be ‘the greatest in the world’. No one doubts that 
this could bring considerable benefit to an area of Scotland that is in need of 
investment, though many are sceptical that the money will trickle down to 
ordinary people.  
 There was a feeling amongst respondents that the Trump case was an 
example of local government being swayed from taking the ethical course of 
action – protecting the natural world from exploitation – by the lure of money. 
While they did not suggest in so many words that those councillors who agreed 
to the proposal were taking ‘kick-backs’, they did see a clear link between 
financial “greed” and approval for the plans, which were defeated by one 
infrastructure services committee member’s vote in the November 2007 stage of 
the proposal. Those I spoke to saw this man’s action as a triumph for moral 
integrity and an example of bravery, reflecting their awareness that financial 
incentives may be hard to resist for most people and that standing up for one’s 
principles can entail sacrifice; indeed he was sacked from the committee shortly 
after the vote.  
 Local resistance to the Trump case is revealing in demonstrating the 
complexities of claim-making. For many, Trump’s claims to Scottishness rang 
                                                
52 I was not the first person to see the parallel – see Billionaire Donald Trump faces kilted 
curmudgeon opposing his Scottish golf resort plans, Daily Mail, 21st October 2007. 
53 See, in particular, Donald Trump on Lewis: Aberdeen Golf Plan is for my Mother, The Herald, 
29th July 2008. 
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somewhat hollow, and this is probably less to do with his criterion – the rather 
compelling fact of his mother’s Stornaway roots – than with what is at stake in 
accepting it. Once again, we see the fluidity in ‘given’ categories like nationality. 
Media coverage of the project was mixed, reflecting competing local pressures 
to protect the environment and invest in rural areas. There was a suggestion in 
some quarters that locals directly affected by the development were motivated 
by parochialism and there may be an added issue of class tension as the 
Aberdeenshire coast is quite economically depressed while golf, though a 
Scottish invention, is also a rich man’s sport, which Trump’s luxury complex 
does little to dispel. Respondents, however, tended to focus on preventing the 
“inevitable” damage the development would cause to an area of coastline that 
they described to me as “unique”, “special” and “rare”. In backing their claims, 
they pointed to the SSSI status and the responsibility to protect the area that 
that entails, suggesting this was an obvious ethical, and political, imperative. As 
such, their ire was focused not so much on Trump, who was thought simply not 
to understand locals’ attachment to the land, but on the apparently morally 
corrupt local councillors who were, it seemed to them, so quick to override 
environmental safeguards in pursuit of economic benefit. 
 For wildlife centre staff, the Trump case seemed only too familiar after 
their involvement in the Whiteness Head case. Nearly a month before the sperm 
whale described in the Prologue washed up on Roseisle beach, I attended a 
hearing at the Highland Council regarding the proposed development of 
Whiteness Head, the site of a disused oilrig fabrication plant outside Inverness, 
into a residential and leisure site. On the day, I had had a desperate telephone 
call from Sophie asking me if I could give her a lift to the meeting in Inverness as 
she had been called upon to represent the charity’s objections to the 
development at the last minute since no one was available to travel up from the 
English headquarters. The charity’s objections were based on concerns about 
the effects of increased boat traffic on the cetacean population due to the large 
new marina that was planned as part of the development. Whiteness Head is 
very close to Chanonry Point, a spit of uninhabited land on the northern side of 
the Inner Moray Firth which is known in wildlife-watching circles along with Spey 
Bay as one of the most reliable places to spot the Moray Firth dolphins, with 
almost daily sightings at the height of summer. 
Having driven Sophie to the council offices, I went in with her to lend 
moral support and had an opportunity to witness local political process for 
myself. The council chambers are set up much like the Scottish Parliament, with 
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councillors and interested parties seated in a horseshoe oriented towards the 
chairperson’s desk. Their desks are equipped with power points for laptop 
computers and microphones which light up when in use. A further layer of public 
seating, without desks, encircles this. The councillors themselves were all white, 
male and middle-aged and wore either dark business suits or more brightly 
coloured tweed suits. The only women present were the chairperson’s assistant, 
Sophie, the representative from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and me. Sophie, 
the MoD representative and I were also the only ones under thirty years old.  
Applicants and objectors were each allotted time-slots of ten minutes 
according to the official guidelines for such hearings (Highland Council 2006). 
First to present was the representative for the applicants, who went to some 
pains to detail the length of time and amount of effort and money the company 
had spent on every aspect of the plans as well the involvement of the architect, 
whom he consistently referred to as ‘Sir Terry’ in a manner that suggested both 
deference and familiarity. Throughout, he emphasised ‘best practice’ and the 
environmental and social credentials of the project, which seemed to be a pre-
emptive strike at the objections that he knew would follow.  
After the developers spoke, the councillors were allowed to ask 
questions and seek clarifications about the proposal, many of which focused on 
potential problems with increased road traffic. Once all the questions had been 
answered the objectors had their turn to speak. First was Jeff, a member of a 
local grass-roots conservation group. He talked about his observations of 
dolphin behaviour and boat-based human-dolphin interaction, claiming authority 
through the amount of time he had spent observing cetaceans, to argue that 
further boat traffic would be detrimental to them. His testimony had an emotional 
and anecdotal style. Sophie spoke next from a prepared statement, which gave 
clear reasons for the charity’s objections and argued that developments such as 
this should not be treated in isolation when deciding on their likely ecological 
and environmental impact. Last to speak was the MoD representative who 
spoke about the potential effect of the development on the operation of a nearby 
firing range.  
The councillors were given a chance to ask questions and seek 
clarifications from the objectors next. Almost all of the questions were directed at 
Jeff and Sophie and centred on statistical information, which Sophie had already 
noted was difficult to collect (see also Stoett 1997). The councillors seemed 
unconvinced that increased boat traffic would be detrimental to the cetacean 
population, though this was largely based on general feeling rather than 
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‘objective’ evidence – in contrast to their demands for statistical evidence, or 
“proof”, as they put it, from the objectors to support their views. The chairperson 
remarked that he had observed no problems in the cetacean population on his 
last fishing trip in the Moray Firth, while another councillor said that he was old 
enough to remember when people had gone out fishing for herring on the Firth 
and that that traffic seemed to have had no effect on the cetacean population. 
He concluded, “I’m concerned that we are suggesting that these dolphins and 
porpoises aren’t as resilient as nature intended”. This comment reflects a model 
of nature that diverges from respondents’ ideas, arguing for a laissez faire 
approach to ecological management based on a particular concept of natural 
competition. This highlights a tension within conservationist thinking between 
‘interfering’ with and ‘helping’ nature, which is of course also salient in debates 
about assisted conception (see Chapter Six). As implied by Willow’s comment 
about pandas in the previous chapter, conservation groups have to make a 
convincing case that the animals they work with need ‘saving’ while at the same 
time avoiding the implication that they are hopeless.  
Next, the applicants were allowed to respond to the objections. The 
previous spokesperson handed over to their “expert”, a biologist from St. 
Andrews University. He asserted from the start that everything he said would be 
based not on anecdote, but “scientific research and evidence”. He did not 
present any statistical evidence of the sort asked of the objectors, instead 
referring repeatedly to two papers he had written on the matter, which were not 
detailed in the proceedings of the hearing and which, it may not be far-fetched to 
assume, had not been read by most present. He relied to a great extent on ad 
hominem argumentation, focusing particularly on the contrast between his 
“scientific” and Jeff’s personal style. This again highlights the unequal demands 
for “scientific evidence” from each party to the case (cf. Thompson 2002; 
Yearley 1993). One of the first things the conservation charity teaches people 
about cetaceans is that knowledge about them is very limited because they are 
a difficult set of animals to study in the wild; presumably the biologist would have 
known this. The planning officer then announced that the development had been 
approved, subject to certain conditions, followed by a final set of questions from 
the councillors. In the closing comments the councillor who had commented on 
cetacean resilience above said he was concerned about the process of “place-
making” in this context, as he was worried that people would be moving in for 
the place, with no provision made for extra employment and industry.  
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Afterwards, Sophie railed against the set-up of the hearing, saying, “I 
don’t want it to be like this, but I can’t help but wonder if it would have made any 
difference to our case if I’d been a middle-aged man in a suit”. The development 
of Whiteness Head is, like the Trump development, a project motivated by 
commercial interest and enabled by money. In accepting the proposal, the 
council demonstrated commitment to the area’s ‘development’, bringing more 
money into the region by expanding the population and increasing tourist 
numbers, which is laudable in a context of concern about the country’s 
population ‘crisis’ and a national shortage of affordable housing, though, as we 
saw, some were concerned about the top-down engineering of communities that 
this implied.  
In this case, the conservation charity was in a difficult position because 
its over-arching aim is to protect the local cetacean population, which means 
opposing the site, yet revenue from tourism is its financial lifeblood. Recently, it 
has also been fighting to prevent the licensing of exploration for oil and gas 
deposits within the Moray Firth’s Special Area of Conservation (SAC).54 The 
common source of frustration for conservationists in these three proposed 
developments is the sense that despite stringent measures like SAC and SSSI 
protective statuses being in place, government bodies may countermand these. 
Their concern is that those making decisions about ‘exploiting’ environmentally 
sensitive areas like these may ultimately succumb to greed.  
 Sophie’s comment about being taken seriously if she were a middle-aged 
man reminds us that women must make difficult negotiations between their 
working and personal lives. Further, forms of authority are gendered and as the 
biologist made clear, scientific knowledge enjoys the greatest authority within 
this society (Culley and Angelique 2003: 446-7). The conservation charity itself 
is aware of the importance of claiming scientific objectivity and most paid staff 
have a background in the biological sciences (see also Berglund 1998: 153; 
Yearley 1993). Reference to ‘scientific proof’ is one of the most effective means 
of claim-making in Euro-American societies, despite the fact that science may 
not always live up to its ideals of objectivity (Latour and Woolgar 1986). Wildlife 
centre staff are involved in a range of scientific research, most of which focuses 
on collecting records of the numbers of cetaceans in the area through surveys, 
sightings data and “Photo ID”, where they take photographs of the dorsal fins of 
any dolphins sighted while guiding on wildlife-watching boats in order to identify 
                                                
54 The SAC designation is in recognition of the local cetacean population. 
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them and record their movements.  
 For charities like this one, having a solid foundation of scientific evidence 
is very important, though they face the problem that, as Sophie noted, 
cetaceans are difficult to study, being underwater and out at sea for most of their 
lives. A further complication to the status of science in the specific case of 
cetacean conservation is the ‘loophole’ of the IWC that a certain amount of 
whaling may be carried out ‘for scientific purposes’, a qualification that has been 
exploited, as anti-whalers see it, particularly by Japan. As in this case, one of 
the major obstacles facing charities and interest groups is gaining access to 
authoritative means of claim-making. This may be a function of inequalities in 
funding as well as uneven access to mechanisms of power.  
 Claim-making is always and inevitably an exercise of authority, as the 
examples described here demonstrate. The reproduction of ethical imperatives 
is key to bolstering the claims of environmental campaigners, and those who are 
pitted against them in such battles, and parties may survive or founder based on 
the kinds of appeals they make and the authority of their claims. In the 
Whiteness Head case the environmentalist lobby lost the battle, and one of the 
key factors seems to be the developers’ better access to scientific authority, as 
well as the councillors’ faith in nature’s resilience. The point here is not so much 
that the biologist or the councillors were able to point to specific evidence, but 
the kind of claims they made in their rhetorical performances.55 Sophie and the 
charity she represented made the mistake of reporting their own science in 
terms that implied an incomplete or contested knowledge. It seems, therefore, 
that rather than engaging in science wars with the biologist in the Council 
chambers, the best course of action for the charity would have been to draw on 
popular support based on the ethical imperative to care for the local wildlife.  
 
 
 
Fundraising: Giving money 
 
 The idiom of salvation – like charity, overtly Christian – suggests that 
cetaceans are helpless and that it is up to humans to help them56, as well as 
                                                
55 Incidentally, Jeff, Sophie and the biologist all originate in England and have English accents, so 
I do not think that their ‘outsider’ origins were significant in this battle, though that is not to say that 
they might have become useful if there had been some differentiation. 
56 This is in contrast to an increasing tendency to portray human subjects of charity as being 
empowered and a focus on universal human rights in arguing for specific causes. 
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implying that it is from humans that they need saving in the first place. The 
Adopt a Dolphin scheme is the charity’s financial backbone. On the charity’s 
website, it claims that, by joining the scheme, ‘you’re not just helping your 
dolphin, you’re helping us to protect whales and dolphins all over the world’. It 
then lists the different ways that the charity works to protect cetaceans through 
the money it raises from the scheme, for example: ‘Stop the deliberate killing of 
whales and dolphins for commercial and so-called “scientific” purposes,’ ‘Stop 
whales and dolphins falling victim to man-made threats such as pollution or 
entanglement in fishing nets,’ and ‘Prevent suffering in individual whales, 
dolphins and porpoises, whether in their natural environment or in captivity’.  
 The dolphins in the scheme are chosen by the charity and presented in a 
leaflet and on the website with a description of their characteristics so that 
potential adopters can pick the dolphin that most appeals to them. The term 
‘adoption’ posits a kinship link between adopter and dolphin, implying an even 
closer solidarity than between a mere cash donor and recipient and drawing 
attention away from the financial aspect of this transaction. The programme is 
largely marketed at children, though usually paid for by adults. This relates both 
to popular ideas about dolphins as appealing to children and taps into a wider 
sense that adults should work to prevent their children from having to face 
human-made problems of climate change and species depletion in the future.  
 The major supporters of the work at the wildlife centre are, as one staff 
member put it, “little girls who like pink”, who show their love for cetaceans by 
persuading their parents to pay to adopt a dolphin, raising extra funds for the 
charity themselves and even visiting the centre to try and see ‘their’ dolphin and 
buy souvenirs in the shop. In the previous chapter I mentioned the uneasiness 
of wildlife centre staff at the anthropomorphism of cetacean advocacy. In the 
scheme’s promotional material one female dolphin is described as ‘a great 
hunter and a very attentive mother’, while one male is ‘a social dolphin who is 
often seen splashing and leaping with others’ and another ‘is a very friendly 
dolphin always in a party mood!’ In order to make dolphins appealing to children, 
and particularly girls, they are not only anthropomorphised, but also 
domesticated and even infantilised.  
 The popular portrayal of cetaceans as benign and even helpless is 
reinforced by the gift received by adopters of a dolphin soft toy, along with the 
many other child-oriented depictions of cetaceans on display in the wildlife 
centre shop. This may partly be a reaction to the problem of reconciling the idea 
that gift-giving promotes social solidarity between humans with the act of giving 
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donations ‘to’ animals. This gift also represents a need for reciprocity between 
the charity, as agents working for the dolphins, and supporters; those who 
‘altruistically’ donate to charity must be rewarded with recognition (Gibbon 
2007). The toy dolphin and supporter pack providing information about dolphins, 
whales and the charity’s work to protect them, both provide this and serve as 
mnemonics of the adopters’ original choice to support the cause. The website 
says: ‘As recognition of your dolphin adoption you will receive a brilliant 
certificate, personalized with your name, showing how you are caring for and 
supporting the dolphins!’ 
 Charities like the one in Spey Bay rely on their causes’ economic value 
in order to help them. Popular ideas about dolphins portray them as intelligent, 
altruistic and beautiful. I heard from wildlife centre staff that many people who 
have visited dolphins in captivity argue that they appear to be ‘happy’, since the 
way their jaws sit gives them a perpetual ‘smile’, despite their drastically 
reduced life expectancy compared to cetaceans living in the wild. Conservation 
groups recognise that emphasising dolphins’ benign nature helps to secure 
financial and popular support for their cause; this is particularly clear if one 
considers the contrast with shark conservation. Nonetheless, as staff 
acknowledge, such one-dimensional depictions may entail compromising their 
ideals if dolphins must be made to appear more human in order to retain their 
place in the natural order.   
 Charitable institutions work, by definition, on a not-for-profit basis, but 
they are not immune to the ‘audit culture’ (Strathern 2000) that has pervaded 
professional organisations over the last few decades, and in fact may be 
particularly anxious to appear ‘accountable’, given popular and official ideas 
about charity. Key to this is fundraising, obtaining money through voluntary 
donations with (at least in theory) no expected material return. While it is, 
culturally speaking, relatively unsurprising for corporations to be unethical in 
their dealings, it is felt that charities should be as morally upright as possible, 
especially when it comes to their spending, as was suggested by respondents’ 
attitudes to the Findhorn Foundation in the previous chapter. Indeed, it could be 
said that one reward for donors is the reassurance that their gifts will be spent 
wisely. In the case of this charity, whose work is largely campaigning, research 
and education rather than hand-on conservation this may be all the more 
challenging as it is more difficult to point to where their funding actually goes. 
This is countered to a large extent by the personalisation of the dolphins in the 
adoption scheme, so that adopters feel as if their money is going to one 
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particular dolphin, rather than – as is more likely – funding a lobbyist’s trip to the 
IWC or educational leaflets promoting responsible wildlife watching. 
 As with many other charitable organisations, a large proportion of the 
funds raised by this charity go on staffing.57 In a briefing about the 2008 IWC 
annual conference that I sat in on, a senior member of staff visiting from the 
head office summarised the work he and his colleagues had done to defeat 
Greenland’s proposal to start hunting humpback whales, summarising in an 
ambivalent tone: “Hundreds of man-hours – person-hours – thousands of 
pounds, saved ten whales”. Just as there is a perpetual feedback of 
dependence on cetaceans to be both appealing and in need of saving in order 
to sustain this charity, like some financial ouroborus much of its budget is spent 
on the salaries of staff whose roles are in one sense or another to raise funds. 
However, they strive to spend their earnings ethically, thereby further supporting 
the overarching cause they work for.  
 Defining certain things or groups as in need of outside help implies not 
only that they are vulnerable and dependent, it also criticises the usual 
mechanisms of welfare provision, be that government, society or family, and the 
unequal distribution of wealth and power in the wider political economy. 
However, this is not straightforward across the board. As noted, Scots are 
known for being particularly supportive of political parties that promote social 
welfare such as Labour and the Liberal Democrats and this is true of 
respondents as well. Underlying the idea of charity is a critique of private self-
interest, yet this is complicated by the fact that, in practice, charities typically 
represent specific niche causes, in contrast to the state, which in some sense 
represents the common good. This is reflected in Mauss’ assumption that in 
industrial western societies with highly developed states, gifts come to appear 
increasingly voluntaristic as they lose their political functions as tools of the 
social contract (Parry 1986: 467; see also Strathern 1997). 
In the West, the notion of charity can be traced back to the Christian 
virtue of caritas, or selfless love. In Christianity, this is love for others and god, 
inspired by god. In contemporary usage, charity has come to focus more on 
charitable actions, though of course the concept condenses certain assumptions 
about human motive and charities must be careful to cultivate an ethic of 
altruism amongst supporters. Parry argues that in contemporary industrial 
societies like the UK, charitable good works and disinterested giving are the 
                                                
57 In their 2008 Annual Review they report spending 20% of their £2.4 million budget on 
fundraising, 7% on trading, management and administration and 59% on charitable activities. 
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counterparts to pure utility, resting on the ideas that persons and things are 
separate and on the spatial and qualitative ‘chasm’ between the earthly world 
and the transcendent realm of god (Parry 1986: 468).  
Parry argues that, in his analysis of the gift, Mauss stressed ‘a 
combination of interest and disinterest, of freedom and constraint’, but this is not 
self-interest: ‘It is not individuals but groups or moral persons who carry on 
exchanges’ (1986: 456; original emphasis). For Mauss, in industrial, western 
societies:  
 
[G]ifts come to represent something entirely different. Gift exchange – in 
which persons and things, interest and disinterest are merged – has 
been fractured, leaving gifts opposed to exchange, persons opposed to 
things and interest to disinterest. The ideology of a disinterested gift 
emerges in parallel with an ideology of purely interested exchange. 
(Parry 1986: 458; original emphases)  
 
The same people who make ‘pure’ gifts carry out financial transactions in their 
daily lives, but with the development of capitalism these different types of 
transaction come to be increasingly differentiated, so that gifts become laden 
with associations of altruism, love and emotionality while economic exchanges 
come to be conceptualised as divorced from human emotion and characterised 
only by rational calculation.   
 Donations to charity seem at first glance to be pure gifts, but the reality 
may be more complicated, since, as we have seen here, charities provide 
donors with non-monetary recognition of their altruism. Unreciprocated gifts and 
charity are condemned by Mauss because they deny obligation and create 
relations of asymmetrical dependence. Instead, Mauss implies, ‘The remedy for 
our modern ills is a system of social security founded on the old morality of gift-
exchange, to which we too are heirs’ (Parry 1986: 458-9). Writing about Titmuss’ 
(1997) problematic and partial application of Maussian gift theory to blood 
donation systems in the US and UK, Tutton (2002: 528) argues that the salience 
of Maussian gift theory to his work is its ‘metaphorical resonance’. For Titmuss, 
Tutton argues, the gift contained values of ‘social equality, altruism and 
community’, which for him were ‘embodied in the liberal welfare state’ (2002: 
528), which he saw as a defining part of British culture. Tutton reminds us that 
the combined ideologies of pure gift and pure altruism have a powerful ethicising 
and normative force. As with surrogacy agencies (Ragoné 1994), the rhetoric of 
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the pure gift provides donors and agents of charities with a moral grounding and 
an acceptable model of human motive. Such idealism also provides charities 
with perpetuity – the question of what would happen if endangered species 
either became extinct or over-populous is the elephant in the boardrooms of 
conservation charities the world over (Stoett 1997: 130).  
 We saw in Chapter Two that respondents think of pure gifts, like pure 
altruism, as rarely attainable ideals. At the same time, their actions suggest that 
such ideals may be appropriate goals to strive towards. Respondents 
demonstrated an acute awareness of the difficulties inherent in the idea that a 
surrogate mother gives ‘the gift of life’, suggesting that compassion toward the 
intending parents must be combined with a certain amount of self-interest for the 
surrogate mother or the relationship will be based on an uncomfortable power 
imbalance.  
 As with respondents’ ideas about commercial surrogacy, the example of 
fundraising suggests that, for respondents, money can be used to enable ethical 
projects, and that money may be an appropriate thing to donate to charity as a 
‘pure gift’. In another sense, though, charity donors ‘buy’ altruism – they spend 
and consume in order to support the causes that are important to them, and 
which are marketed and branded successfully by such charities. The role of 
individual choice in support for charities is evident in their efforts to market their 
causes, which itself eats up much of the funds they raise. Just as those who 
work in the centre strive to build a good life, supporters of the work at Spey Bay 
constitute themselves as ethical persons by giving their time or money 
voluntarily. They thus demonstrate what they think is worthy and make a claim 
about themselves as ethical subjects. In this sense, there is a tension between 
the posited voluntarism of charity donation and the moral and ethical 
imperatives that charities employ to garner support for their causes. 
 
 
 
Volunteering: Giving time  
 
 According to Scottish Household Survey data for 2007 (Scottish 
Government 2008a), Scotland has higher levels of volunteering than the rest of 
the UK. 30% of adults in 2007 had given up time for volunteer work, with work 
related to children being the most popular cause, while 6% volunteered in the 
category ‘the environment, animals’. Roughly equal numbers of men and 
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women volunteer in Scotland. The peak age range for women volunteering is 
thirty-five to forty-four while male volunteers’ age seems to make less difference 
to their volunteering. Those in paid work and living in less deprived areas are 
more likely to volunteer. The most likely types of volunteer work done by survey 
respondents were ‘generally helping out’ and ‘raising money’, which reflects the 
reality of volunteer experience in Spey Bay.  
 In the wildlife centre, the genders are more evenly balanced amongst 
volunteers than amongst paid staff, there is also a greater range of ages 
amongst volunteers, though most are either at the beginning or the end of their 
careers. Residential volunteers are primarily motivated by the future career 
opportunities that their experience working in Spey Bay will provide them. Quite 
a few that I have known have gone on to projects abroad or paid jobs within the 
environmental field in this country. Sophie, Ingrid, Amy, Luke, Willow and 
Charlotte all volunteered in the centre before securing paid jobs of various sorts 
in the charity and respondents recognise that many who have volunteered in 
Spey Bay feel the pull to return there all the more strongly.  
 The amount of time local volunteers make available to the charity varies 
according to their other responsibilities and their desire to engage in the work. 
Most of the female local volunteers also worked full-time and described their 
motivation for volunteering as a mixture of support for the charity’s aims and 
extending their social networks. The men, most of whom were primarily 
engaged in studying rather than paid work, tended to be either young men at the 
beginning of their careers looking to get some work experience or middle-aged. 
The latter were embarking on new phases of their careers or easing into 
retirement and consequently felt they had more time to devote to projects like 
this. No local volunteers had dependent children, but quite a few of the older 
ones had adult children.  
 Residential volunteers follow a set rota of work duties, as well as an 
individual research project, so the type of work they do is fairly evenly distributed 
amongst them. For local volunteers, whose work is seen to be the most 
voluntaristic, and consequently that most likely to be withdrawn without warning 
if the volunteer is unsatisfied, work duties are less clearly set, though it is hoped 
that they will join in with whatever needs doing. I observed that male volunteers 
tended to be much more enthusiastic about the ‘public’ side of the centre’s work, 
giving talks, taking visitors around the icehouse and doing Shorewatch, while 
female volunteers tended to be more nervous about public speaking and were 
more willing (or felt less confident refusing) to help with children and work in the 
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shop (cf. Blackstone 2004; Culley and Angelique 2003; Gibbon 2007; Wilson 
2000: 228).    
 Based on research amongst female volunteers in rural southwestern 
England, Little found that women’s ‘natural’ altruism and facility for caring was 
an important legitimising factor in their voluntary work and for many this was due 
to the ideological fit with their kinship roles (1997: 204). These helping activities 
fill in for gaps in state provision, so such gendered conceptions of altruism are 
therefore employed and reinforced by the state (1997: 204). Little notes the 
strong connection between ideas about women’s work, domesticity and rural 
life: 
 
[Women’s voluntary work] was seen to capture the “spirit” of rural living. 
It was seen to link closely to valued attributes of the rural community, 
including smallness, self-sufficiency, and a willingness to help out. The 
implication was that in undertaking voluntary work in the village school, 
women were benefiting the whole village and helping to preserve the 
traditional community. (1997: 206) 
 
Voluntary work was especially empowering for incomer women, who described 
activities like serving on the village hall committee as ‘helping them to feel “part 
of the community” and to “contribute to village life”’ (1997: 202; see also Hughes 
1997; Strathern 1981; Watson 2003: 117). At the same time, though, the 
unequal involvement of rural women and men in volunteering in Little’s study 
reflects both the less powerful structural position of women and the cultural 
devaluing of unpaid work compared to paid work, and the connections between 
these two inequalities (see also Moore 1998: 43).  
 Just as donors to the charity in Spey Bay are rewarded with token gifts 
that recognise and represent their altruistic gift, volunteers are rewarded with 
recognition of their efforts and access to a friendly and sociable network of 
people (cf. Wilson 2000: 215). Charity work like that described here is not 
obviously productive and, as I suggested earlier, it may not be even be 
obviously effective when funds go on campaigning, education and advocacy 
rather than direct action or goods production. Nonetheless, it seems to ‘produce’ 
relationships, as is implied by the terminology of the Adopt a Dolphin scheme. 
The fundraising work of volunteers and staff and the financial input of donors 
produce – or perhaps, conserve – connections between people and animals, 
people and the natural world and between individuals. This can be vital in 
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fostering a sense of belonging, as we saw in the previous chapter.  
 The work volunteers put into cultivating new roots in Scotland’s soil are 
also of course inextricable from their projects of building a good life and being 
good people. While volunteering may be highly rewarding (as it certainly was for 
me), this is balanced out by notions of helping out, altruism and community 
involvement that suggest a more interpersonal orientation to the work. Wilson 
argues that while volunteering clearly does provide volunteers with rewards and 
they may weigh up the amount of reward when deciding what kind of 
volunteering to get involved with, this may not be their reason for volunteering: 
‘A volunteer might feel good about doing the right thing, but she does not do it 
because it makes her feel good; rather it makes her feel good because she 
thinks she ought to have done it’ (2000: 222).  
 In capitalist economy, work and money are conjoined in the belief that 
work, and the time spent doing it, is best rewarded with money. For many, this 
reflects an assumption that, in a parallel process to the separation of gift and 
commodity exchange, work alienates the worker from her true interests so her 
wages are both compensation for this and a means for her to pursue those 
personal interests outside of work (Carrier 1993). This points to an assumed 
split between professional and personal selves. It also suggests that work is 
usually done for money rather than love, though money may be what enables 
the worker to do what she loves outside of work. The phenomenon of 
volunteering and the case of altruistic surrogacy both suggest that work may in 
fact be done and time given without financial reward. Similarly, we shall see in a 
moment that the ideals and motives of volunteers and paid staff in choosing to 
work in cetacean conservation are a similar mixture of ‘self-interest’ and 
‘altruism’.  
  
 
 
A labour of love 
  
 As with non-profit work in general, conservation work is based on 
qualities of caring and compassion, which are culturally associated with 
femininity. Just as donating money to charity is promoted under a rubric of 
altruistic gift-giving by fundraisers, working for charity is seen to entail sacrifice 
and to be motivated by responsibility and altruism, all traits that are culturally 
associated with femininity and domestic labour. Nonetheless, the young women 
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who work in the centre do so not only because they value the aims of wildlife 
conservation, but also because they want personally fulfilling careers. For most, 
this is their first or second job and often the first with significant responsibility. 
Cetacean conservation is the glamorous end of this field, and many of them had 
worked in ‘exotic’ tropical locations before coming to Spey Bay, which was part 
of the work’s appeal. However, the pay-off for such fulfilment is low pay 
compared to equivalent jobs in the private sector as well as the competitive 
nature of the work, which means that many people work as volunteers for a few 
years before securing a paid job. Yet, as Luke said in Chapter Two, it is possible 
to get paid for work that one loves doing. Indeed, it is something of a middle-
class ideal to find a paid career that is personally fulfilling and the paid staff in 
the wildlife centre repeatedly told me how, despite the petty problems and 
stresses of everyday working life, they felt very fortunate, as working for the 
charity in Spey Bay was a rare opportunity to be paid for doing a job that they 
loved. 
 Although the upper echelons of its England-based headquarters are 
male-dominated, far more women than men work in the wildlife centre and they 
often expressed frustration at the difficulty they experienced in recruiting men. 
Sophie told me of her disappointment that a female colleague had once told her 
that it was impossible to hold a high-ranking position as a woman in the 
organisation and have children because staff should be wholly dedicated to their 
work. As well as the gendered expectations for childcare that this suggests, it 
implies that conservation work is a vocation rather than ‘just’ a job and, given 
this, that there is actually a certain amount of blurring between the experiences 
and motives of volunteers and paid staff.  
 In fact, as Weber’s (1992) classic analysis of the calling suggests, 
capitalism works through particular ideologies about work and money that, 
although at times contradictory, are also mutually reinforcing. Surrounding 
charity work with connotations of altruism and compassion not only offers 
opportunities for those who participate in it to acquire particular ethical 
subjectivities, but also serves to legitimate inequalities in pay between particular 
sectors of the market and for different working roles. While in the case of the 
wildlife centre, this may not be based in any straightforward way in ideas of 
worldly asceticism, one clear lesson of Weber’s analysis is that the idea of 
human motive as a direct result of rational, maximising choices is not only 
flawed but a product of capitalist ideology in itself. Whatever the exact 
genealogies of individual respondents’ particular moral and professional ethics, 
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Weber reminds us of the close relationship between work and morality which is 
relevant to all forms of industry but seems particularly explicit in the case of 
charity work. 
 In her ethnography of London sex workers, Day (2007) describes these 
women’s strict distinction between their public lives as workers on the one hand 
and the private realm of home and love on the other. These women were 
scrupulous in demarcating boundaries which clients, as opposed to partners, 
could not cross and many were fastidious about washing and preventing the 
exchange of bodily fluids with clients, which Day argues is not only about 
hygiene, with all the assumptions about public and commercial dirt that that 
implies, but maintaining a rigid separation between their outer, public, working 
self and inner, private, personal self.  
 Strathern (1988: 142, 152) has noted that a key assumption of capitalist 
economy in the West is that work is exploitative, which is based on a particular 
way of viewing the person as a freestanding individual as well as specific 
assumptions about ownership. As Day (2007: 39-40) notes, the idea that a part 
of the self can be alienated, bought and sold as a worker while leaving space for 
the rest to remain as an authentic private, relational person is a ‘central fiction’ 
of capitalism. Like the gift and commodity (Parry 1986; Strathern 1988), the 
definition of one side of the dichotomy relies on the invocation of the other. 
Further, she argues, the private sphere in this context is more highly valued than 
the public, and this is linked to long-standing ideas about women’s proper 
location in domestic and private spheres. 
 The wildlife centre staff constantly berated themselves for letting work 
bleed into their personal lives. This problem was particularly acute for Sophie 
and Willow as they live next door to their work premises, are in managerial 
positions and socialise regularly with their colleagues. Charity work seems to 
blur the boundaries between the professional and personal, public and private 
for workers (Little 1997: 200). Along with the assumption that charity work is a 
vocation, choosing to work for a specific charity implies personal commitment to 
the cause, and many charities specify support for the organisation’s aims as a 
requirement for prospective employees in their recruitment packages. So, in 
securing their careers, charity workers are assessed not only on their skills, 
qualifications or experience, but also on their ethics.  
 For middle-class people in Britain, a person’s choice of career is thought 
to say something about the kind of ‘real’, private individual they are. For those 
who work in charities, such a choice is therefore also an ethical performance, 
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whatever individual vicissitudes may have brought her to a particular job or 
organisation. Specifically, it is assumed in Britain that someone working for a 
charitable organisation is not primarily motivated by money. It is common 
knowledge that non-profit sector jobs are less well remunerated than those in 
the financial sector, but this assumption is also indicative of the kind of values 
that are thought to motivate people to work for charity, including love, 
compassion and altruism. Nonetheless, as with other kinds of work, charity 
workers are rewarded for work that is thought to reflect their personal, private, 
ethical selves, with money. 
 Because of the stigma against their work, sex workers must do a good 
deal of rhetorical work to reclaim themselves as private women, but charity 
workers do work that is already culturally evaluated as good. As such, the fact 
that profession is a significant aspect of British middle-class identity works in 
their favour, as their chosen careers imply they are virtuous, principled people. 
On the other side of the coin, since charities aim to cultivate a sense of social 
responsibility in their supporters and the wider public, it may be that people who 
identify themselves as having a sympathetic ethical stance feel a particular 
responsibility to work professionally towards that stance.58 Nonetheless, such 
work clearly provides benefits, especially to those wishing to build an ethical life. 
 Gould notes that, since ‘Staying at home … is the central physical and 
symbolic act of homesteading’ (2005: 203); this raises questions about gender 
politics in homesteading. In practice, homesteaders take different approaches to 
the division of labour between heterosexual couples, with some recycling 
traditional roles and others working out new ones. Gould states that since 
homesteading is about resisting the division of labour along capitalist, industrial 
lines, this is the primary principle in the organisation of agricultural and domestic 
work between heterosexual homesteading partners. She suggests that this 
prioritisation is because homesteading is spiritual, ethical practice, so it eclipses 
homesteaders’ concerns about sexual equality (2005: 218). Yet, ethics, 
spirituality and capitalist economy are always informed by ideas about gender. 
Unlike homesteaders, but in line with mainstream contemporary middle-class 
expectations, the wildlife centre staff have entered the waged workforce. They 
expect to be able to build successful careers, to be self-reliant and independent. 
Their work is rather conventional, producing paperwork and using computers, 
telephones, e-mail and so on (cf. Trauger 2007). However, the values that 
                                                
58 A few of the wildlife centre staff and volunteers had actually been members of the Adopt a 
Dolphin scheme as children or young adults. 
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inform it and the location in which it is done are seen to be congruent with ideas 
of the good life.  
 Various elements of the work done in the wildlife centre seem to be 
linked with normative expectations of femininity and female labour. We have 
seen that women do much of the everyday work in the centre, while men act as 
volunteers or are part of the higher management team based in England and 
that charity work is thought of as a vocation rather than ‘just’ a job. We have 
seen that whales and dolphins are popularly thought of as particularly appealing 
to girls and that much of the charity’s marketing efforts reflect this fact. The work 
in the wildlife centre is primarily centred on caring for animals and educating 
children, both forms of labour thought of in this milieu as traditionally feminine. I 
have argued that personal values of compassion, altruism and love are seen to 
drive charity work and, as we saw in the first two chapters, these are traits 
particularly associated with maternal and domestic labour. We have also seen 
the importance of cultural ideas about rural life in the conceptualisation of work 
and volunteering in this setting. These ideas are central to respondents’ ideas 
about the good life, but are also inflected with specific assumptions about 
gender, money and the natural world.  
 It would be disingenuous to suggest that the work that the women in the 
wildlife centre do simply reproduces ideologies of femininity. While it does rely to 
a large extent on the successful implementation of a particular ethic that is 
thought, culturally speaking, to be informed by ‘feminine’ values, this is only a 
partial picture. While they want to be ‘good’ women, they also participate in 
traditionally male spheres. They have chosen to move away from their families 
in order to build good lives and have fulfilling careers. While their work may be 
informed by an ethic of care, it also entails ‘public’ activities of advocacy, 
campaigning, fundraising and scientific research. By doing ethical work, 
respondents straddle, and thus contest, dichotomies of public and private, work 
and home, commercial and altruistic, wild and domestic and masculine and 
feminine.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
   
 In contrast to one strain of environmentalist thought that posits a clear 
association between capitalism and ecological destruction (as in Lovelock’s 
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quote that heads Part Two), respondents have a nuanced attitude to money. All 
wildlife centre staff are involved one way or another in fundraising, a practice 
that immediately suggests money’s ethical potential. We have seen also that 
money is an important facilitator of the good life, in enabling the sociality that is 
such an important part of the experience of belonging and feeling part of a 
community in Spey Bay. In respondents’ working lives, money is a reward for 
‘good’ work and an instrument for achieving certain goals, so the ethical 
emphasis is on the motives that are seen to inform those goals and the ends to 
be achieved rather than the means with which they are effected.  
 In both cases of environmental ‘exploitation’ described here, they saw 
“greed” as a motivating factor for those in favour of the developments, yet 
placed the responsibility for this squarely on these individuals and their 
motivations rather than on money’s immanent facility for corruption. For donors 
and volunteers, making ‘altruistic’ contributions to charity is a means of marking 
their values and making a claim about their own ethical stance. This is not to 
imply that they volunteer only because they want to be ‘good’ people, but that 
this may be the ultimate reward for their contribution. In volunteers’ experience 
we see again the importance of time and effort in creating belonging and 
building good lives.  
 While respondents have not explicitly rejected capitalist modes of work 
by going ‘back to the land’, the realities of their working lives do seem to contest 
normative ideas about work, money, gender and charity, albeit in subtle ways. 
Ultimately, the work they have chosen suggests much about the people that 
they are, their values and priorities. This raises questions about the status of 
capitalist ideology in their lives. We saw in the previous chapter that they reject 
more extreme or utopian models of community-building in favour of a more 
pragmatic and balanced approach to ethics which draws on the ‘good’ elements 
from both mainstream and alternative ways of living. Similarly, here we have 
seen that they do not renounce capitalist ways of working or try to organise their 
lives without money.59 In contrast to popular and academic models of capitalism, 
they not only suggest that money can be used ethically, but that the experience 
of work in capitalist political economy is not necessarily exploitative or 
alienating, though this is not to suggest that their work is constantly rewarding 
and enjoyable, as I suggested earlier in noting its relationship to the calling.  
                                                
59 The Findhorn Foundation, by contrast, operates a Local Exchange Trading System (LETS) and 
an alternative credit system, the ‘Eko’, which members can use in the on-site shops and 
community organisations. 
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 The experience of the wildlife centre staff shows that work in twenty-first 
century Britain need not entail a neat separation between the public worker and 
the private self, nor that professional relationships are modelled simply around 
profit maximisation. Just as respondents mixed ideologies of love and money 
when talking about surrogacy, in their working lives, they contest the 
dichotomies that underlie formal models of capitalism. Rather than becoming 
alienated through labour, the wildlife centre staff do work – which may or may 
not be paid depending on whether they are volunteers or paid staff – that is not 
only avowedly ethical, but produces relationships, cultivates attachments and is 
seen as inextricably bound up with their private, personal selves.  
 In Chapter Two we saw that respondents were concerned that financial 
imperative might drive people into acting as surrogate mothers or blood donors. 
They also felt that while a surrogate mother should not be primarily motivated by 
money, it was acceptable for her to receive some payment, though they were 
clear that this should be viewed as compensation or expenses and thus clearly 
differentiated from the idea of ‘selling’ a child. With the exception of Erin, they 
thereby suggested that, under certain circumstances, money could be mixed 
with motherhood without corrupting those involved. This went alongside an 
assumption that money is an appropriate reward for services rendered, so that if 
one views a surrogate mother’s reproductive labour as a service, then it 
becomes appropriate to pay her for it. 
 Just as respondents argue that a surrogate mother can get paid for her 
reproductive services without it corrupting her morality or negating her claim to 
be motivated by altruism, they use different and even apparently contradictory 
models of work, payment and reward in their own professional lives. These 
examples of work and ideas about money illustrate the kinds of considerations 
that go into ethical judgements. They also resonate with Latour’s (1993) 
argument that modernist attempts to ‘purify’ elements of human culture are in a 
sense destined to fail since it is through the necessarily concurrent process of 
hybridisation that such ideas come into being. What the example of charity work 
as described here shows, then, is that, while ideologies of capitalism are 
omnipresent in these people’s thoughts and practice, they are ultimately 
ideologies and so may be called upon in flexible and contingent ways, weighed 
up against each other in ethical claim-making or brought into merographic 
connection in order to make sense of the contradictions of reality. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Choosing a Good Life 
 
We’ll tak a cup o’ kindness yet 
    For auld lang syne 
Robert Burns, Auld Lang Syne 
 
 
 Respondents put work into their connections with others, but these 
efforts cannot be separated off from their ideas about and relationships with 
themselves. In this chapter I will describe their ethical subjectivities through two 
examples that are both ubiquitous in their everyday lives and highly significant in 
their ideas about good living: their relationships with the local wildlife and their 
consumption. In the two previous chapters we saw how this wildlife is implicated 
in respondents’ relationships with the land and with each other. Here I will 
consider further how relations between humans and cetaceans in Moray are 
linked with ideas about ethical living and morality. I will also reflect on what it 
means to associate oneself with specific species thought of as “local”, “wild” and 
“endangered”.  
 As Cassidy notes, the animals that certain groups of humans identify and 
share their lives with can tell us much about that society and how it views itself. 
On horses in Newmarket, she says, ‘in attributing human properties to horses 
we reveal our perceptions of the nature of those properties and, by implication, 
of what it means to be human’ (2002: 126; see also Franklin 2007). For Cassidy, 
human-animal relations are a mirror onto human thought and culture. The 
anthropomorphising of horses in Newmarket and the inter-species identification 
it suggests, she says, ‘contradicts the category distinction continually identified 
by theorists as central to the modern perception of the relationship between 
humans and animals’ (2002: 136; see also Latour 1993). As she shows, the 
relationship is far more complex than binary oppositions between human and 
animal or domestic and wild would allow. Unlike horses (Cassidy 2002) or sheep 
(Franklin 2007), dolphins are viewed as wild animals, yet this is not a barrier to 
identification. Being ‘charismatic megafauna’, there is an accessible fund of 
popular knowledge about what dolphins are like for humans to draw upon. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, popular images of dolphins that emphasise their 
playful lovability may be particularly useful when trying to secure funding for 
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their cause, just as, in private, respondents reject that image for one of a more 
‘authentic’ wild nature. 
 For respondents, as for anyone else, everyday life entails choices and 
decisions. We have already seen some of the lived realities of such choices, but 
here I will consider further the role of choice in living an ethical life and being an 
ethical person. Of course, choice is not a neutral term in Western society, being 
popularly associated with consumerism and many of the ‘ills’ of contemporary 
life. It is perhaps apposite, then, that one of the most significant places in which 
we can see the prominence of choice in respondents’ lives is in their 
consumption decisions.  
 
 
 
The dolphin people 
 
 Every hour during daylight in the summer months, a member of staff from 
the wildlife centre stands, wrapped in warm clothing branded with the Spey Bay 
conservation charity’s logo, on the small mound by the icehouse with a pair of 
powerful binoculars and a stopwatch, clipboard and pencil. After scanning the 
sea for ten minutes, he records the time, visibility, sea state (on the Beaufort 
scale), type and number of birds and boats visible and any bottlenose dolphin 
sightings, by number, the time they were visible and their behaviour. This is 
“Shorewatch”, the hands-on research that they do at Spey Bay and one of the 
jobs I did regularly as a volunteer. Usually, dolphin sightings, being 
unpredictable, happened outside the allotted minutes of Shorewatch. At these 
times, a rush of excitement would pass through the wildlife centre as word 
spread that dolphins had been spotted. Watching cetaceans in the wild has a 
somewhat magical status in popular culture and I regularly heard the experience 
described using superlatives like “amazing” and “awesome”.  
 Dolphins are much more commonly sighted in the summer, not only 
because that is when they tend to be feeding in the shallower bays of the inner 
Moray Firth, but also because the seas are usually calmer so they are easier to 
spot. Typically the first sign for dolphin-watchers is a dorsal fin cutting through 
the water. Since bottlenose dolphins are grey (though they appear almost black 
from a distance) and the sea also has a rather greyish hue, they can be quite 
difficult to spot, but once seen they are unmistakeable, especially if they then 
begin to hunt or “play”, leaping through the air, throwing fish or slapping the 
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water with their tails.  
 In Spey Bay, it was difficult to avoid having conversations about dolphins 
and, to a slightly lesser extent, whales with locals and visitors alike and 
descriptions of watching them were a regular feature of conversation. Indeed, 
while in the field, cetaceans seeped into my mind so deeply that I regularly 
dreamt about them. When I first met one wildlife centre employee and described 
my interest in reproductive technologies, she replied, “Oh, did you know, 
dolphins do surrogacy? When the babies are born the females take turns to look 
after them”.60 Quite a few villages along the Moray Firth coast have dolphins 
painted on local village signs or in the decoration of shops and locally made 
greetings cards often display photographs of dolphins taken in the Firth. There is 
also a fashion for people to hang small blue plastic dolphin figures from their car 
rear-view mirrors. As noted, the wildlife-watching industry is growing steadily in 
the area. These ventures are relatively easy to set up as, given the history of 
fishing along this coast, most villages have established harbours and old boats 
that can be refitted for wildlife-watching cruises.  
 The local wildlife is an important selling point for local tourism. The coast is 
lined with bed and breakfasts, hotels, guest houses and quite a few caravan and 
camping sites with mobile homes perched on the edges of the coast so as to 
maximise the sea views which (mostly) English tourists stay in over the summer. 
Quite a few families in Spey Bay utilise the local landscape and wildlife in their 
own business enterprises including the family that runs the café in the wildlife 
centre. Not surprisingly, although the café is a separate venture from the 
conservation charity, it is decorated with many depictions of dolphins including 
stencils of leaping dolphins on the walls. They also display for sale some of the 
artwork of a local retired couple, also originally from Yorkshire, whose house in 
Spey Bay is crammed with their various arts and crafts projects, all of which in 
some way reflect the local environment, but especially the sea. Another retired 
couple in the village, from Perthshire, run a bed and breakfast that is explicitly 
sold to visitors on the promise of seeing dolphins, as the upstairs sitting room 
has an enormous full-length window that overlooks the bay and so provides 
ample opportunities for warm, comfortable dolphin-watching.  
 Locals view the resident dolphins favourably, which tallies with a popular 
attitude to these animals as benign, social, intelligent and even helpful to 
                                                
60 This quote is representative of a few initial responses in the speaker’s assumption that, by 
talking about surrogacy I was referring to a generalised sense of the term rather than its specific 
application in maternal surrogacy.  
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humans.61 Swimming with dolphins, though discouraged by conservation 
groups, is thought to be therapeutic for humans and is frequently listed as 
‘something to do before you die’. There are also a number of accounts of 
dolphins ‘saving’ humans from danger, such as a case from New Zealand which 
was made into a docu-drama by BBC2 shown in February 2008. In this case, 
some young swimmers were surrounded by a group of bottlenose dolphins, 
which appeared to be herding them together to protect them from an 
approaching great white shark. Dr Rochelle Constantine, from the Auckland 
University School of Biological Science, is quoted in the New Zealand Herald 
(24th November 2004) saying, ‘Dolphins are known for helping helpless things. It 
is an altruistic response and bottlenose dolphins in particular are known for it’. 
When I mentioned this ‘altruistic’ dolphin case to one wildlife centre employee, 
she dismissed the idea that dolphins could be altruistic out of hand, rolling her 
eyes and saying firmly, “yeah, whatever, they’re wild animals!” 
 As well as promoting responsible wildlife-watching, the conservation 
charity in Spey Bay works to educate people about cetaceans and the threats 
that they face to their lives and habitats. I observed many occasions in which 
centre staff taught adults and children about the local dolphin population and 
noticed that they typically played on these positive characteristics. They 
particularly emphasise the “similarities” between humans and dolphins, 
especially their high intelligence and complex communication skills, as well as 
their tendency to live in groups. By linking themselves with these animals, locals 
claim for themselves a distinctive and positive identity and imply that they share 
their characteristics. This subverts the view that northeastern Scotland is a rural 
backwater and suggests that residents have a superior relationship with the 
natural world to that of city-dwellers, a claim which has added salience in a time 
of increasing environmental awareness. 
 Early in August 2007, a minke whale calf stranded in Fraserburgh harbour, 
fifty miles east of Spey Bay at the mouth of the Moray Firth. Minke whales, 
recognisable from their disproportionately small dorsal fins, are the most 
common type of whale to be spotted in the Moray Firth and are therefore 
thought of as “local”. Fraserburgh is a busy industrial fishing port whose harbour 
                                                
61 Dolphins’ helpfulness and intelligence, as evidenced for example in their use by the US military, 
is well-established in Western popular culture, as in the film, Jaws 3D (1983) and television series, 
Flipper (1964; 1995), as well as Douglas Adams’ books, The Hitch-Hikers’ Guide to the Galaxy 
(1979) and So Long, and Thanks for all the Fish (1984), in which he humorously portrays dolphins 
as a more sophisticated species than humans who even have a ‘Save the Humans’ campaign 
when Earth is destroyed by aliens. For an interesting consideration of the ethics of human-dolphin 
interactions, recommended to me by Mark Simmonds (see below), see Thomas I. White’s (2007) 
In Defense of Dolphins: The New Moral Frontier. 
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is usually crammed with the enormous state-of-the-art hulls of deep-sea fishing 
trawlers. This calf had swum unexpectedly into the harbour, following a trawler, 
and was stuck there for three days, apparently too disorientated to swim back 
out. In discussions about the case both with local people and on the news, many 
mentioned reports, never fully substantiated, that an adult female minke, which 
quickly became referred to as “the mother” had been spotted swimming in the 
sea outside the harbour wall during this time.  
 This unusual incident attracted a great deal of local attention, with people 
of all ages crowding around the harbour walls to see the whale. As Severin 
Carrell, The Guardian’s Scotland correspondent put it, ‘Since the whale 
surfaced, Fraserburgh has discovered a new industry: eco-tourism. Car parks 
are busy with families unpacking cameras. Harbour authorities have erected 
crowd barriers and a sign stating: "Whale watching: entry to piers at own risk."’62 
Amongst these well-meaning onlookers, one young man took things too far, 
stripping to his underwear and jumping into the water to swim with the whale, 
emerging after thirty minutes to be arrested by Grampian Police.  
 Local conservation groups quickly sprang into action to try and coax the 
calf back out to the open seas. Amongst those involved in the rescue effort, 
there was a great deal of discussion about whether intervention was 
appropriate, with many worrying that their attempts to drive the whale out with 
underwater noise would be too distressing. Eventually, just as the humans 
began to lose hope that they could rescue the whale, it followed a small flotilla of 
dinghies out to sea. Willow was in one of these boats and enjoyed the chance to 
experience a hands-on cetacean rescue and returned to Spey Bay that evening 
to a hero’s welcome. 
 That national newspapers and television news picked up this story is 
probably partly due to the January 2006 case of the Thames whale, which had 
also captured the British public imagination.63 In a letter to The Guardian 
following Carrell’s article, Mark Simmonds, Science Director for the Whale and 
Dolphin Conservation Society, wrote: 
 
In your report of the good news that the young minke whale was freed 
from Fraserburgh harbour on Friday (Free Marvin, August 3), you refer to 
                                                
62 Free Marvin: can scaffolding and fish bait save the whale? The Guardian, August 3rd 2007 
63 See Minke whale escapes from harbour, BBC News online, 3rd August 2007; Rescuers resume 
attempts to save stranded whale, The Guardian, 3rd August 2007; Sound idea leads whale to 
freedom, The Times, 4th August 2007. The story was also covered by Channel Five news, 
amongst others. 
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the Thames whale rescue attempt, noting that some have advocated 
non-intervention in such cases. However, there is an enormous 
difference between the Thames and Fraserburgh whales. Minke whales 
naturally occur in shallow waters around the UK. Thus the Fraserburgh 
animal was released from a stressful and dangerous situation (a busy 
harbour) into its natural environment. The animal also appeared healthy 
and had never stranded. 
 
The Thames whale, by contrast, was an animal of the deepest seas: a 
northern bottlenose whale. It was hundreds of miles from "home" and 
already in considerable trouble when the rescuers secured it. This is the 
key point: when most whales and dolphins strand (or turn up in rivers) 
they are already highly compromised and unlikely to survive. Stranding 
also harms the animals because it causes unnatural pressure to internal 
organs. So the odds are almost always against the rescue teams and in 
many cases the most humane action is euthanasia. Rescue efforts are 
also made difficult by the sheer size of the animals. 
 
The UK has a well-established marine animal rescue network and while 
improvisation is often involved (such as the use of scaffolding poles with 
the Fraserburgh whale), in each emergency consultation with experts 
happens before any intervention. As we increasingly industrialise our 
coastlines and shallow seas, there will be more interactions with these 
animals. We should be proud of our rescue teams, but we also need to 
be realistic about outcomes. (Home truths about lost whales, The 
Guardian, 6th August 2007) 
 
As Simmonds’ letter suggests, the difference in these two cases was that, unlike 
the Thames whale, the Fraserburgh minke was in its ‘home’. Simmonds deftly 
delimits what is natural and unnatural here to make his case: what is unnatural 
is the industrialisation of the British coast and the beaching of whales in 
unfamiliar territory (much like the sperm whale in the Prologue), implying a 
correlation between the two, while coaxing this minke whale back out to the 
open sea is, by contrast, simply ‘giving nature a helping hand’. 
 Respondents discussed the story of the Fraserburgh minke whale 
repeatedly, which is perhaps because of the deep metaphorical resonance it 
may have had for a group of people so involved in cetacean conservation, but 
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also concerned with the future of their own community in a climate of social, 
economic and ecological change. In contrast to the sperm whale stranding in the 
Prologue, this was a chance not only to make a ‘hands-on’ effort to help a whale 
in distress, but a successful one that offered hope of salvation for the whale but 
also, symbolically, for the human community that had rescued it.  
 It is surely significant that this whale was a calf, given environmentalist 
rhetoric about protecting future generations and wider cultural ideas about 
children embodying progress and inheriting the world left to them by previous 
generations. The distant figure of the calf’s putative mother waiting in the nearby 
Firth, apparently unable to help it back from its reckless path into the harbour, 
added a particular poignancy to this particular stranding story for a group of 
people who we know to be concerned about maternal bonding. For 
respondents, the extra distress that separation from its mother would cause the 
calf was taken for granted, and reuniting them seemed to them to be the best, 
and perhaps only, way to ensure its survival. Indeed, once it swam back out into 
the Firth they rapidly lost interest, based on their assumption that it had returned 
to the safety of its mother, pod and home, and so no longer needed human 
assistance.  
 In identifying themselves with particular species, people draw upon and 
reformulate cultural ideas about those specific animals’ characteristics, which 
are, of course, no more ‘natural’ than humans’ ideas about themselves. While 
dolphins are thought of as particularly intelligent, this is a benign, even innocent, 
intelligence in contrast to a Western post-lapsarian model of humanity as 
fundamentally greedy and self-interested (Sahlins 1996). Dolphins and whales 
often stand in anti-whaling and environmentalist rhetoric as the victims of 
industrial greed, again implying associations with sacrifice and the slaughter of 
the innocents. Dolphins have a deep emotional appeal and multi-layered 
symbolic resonance for these people, which is closely related to wider ideas 
about these animals, nature and ethics, but which also draws on Christian 
imagery and doctrine. That dolphins are thought of as “social” is also pertinent 
and I often heard respondents and visitors to the wildlife centre describing 
cetacean pods as networks or communities of nuclear families, especially when 
they were talking to children. As well as standing for proper relationships to the 
natural world, then, dolphins represent a kind of ideal sociality.  
 Lévi-Strauss’ contribution to the long-standing debate on totemism was 
to move the debate ‘toward the intellect’ in his famous suggestion that 
apparently totemic animals (and plants) are ‘good to think’ (1962: 89). Particular 
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groups identify themselves with specific animals not because of their economic 
utility, he says, but their symbolic and metonymic efficacy. As Cassidy (2002: 
129) suggests, animals demonstrate the ‘flexibility’ of how people use analogical 
connections in the making of culture (see also Edwards 2000; Strathern 1992b), 
but they are not simply passive signifiers of human self-obsession, but dynamic 
agents. She shows this in the way that ideas about horses both reflect and 
reproduce ideas about the ‘natural order’ in Newmarket. As this suggests, 
animals are not only good to think but also good to act with. 
 While in Newmarket, people have an active, controlling role in horses’ 
lives as owners, breeders and trainers, in Moray, people play down such 
ownership of ‘their’ animals, instead emphasising that they are wild animals that 
are also “local” to the area, so more like neighbours than property or pets. Given 
that dolphins embody the values and motives that inform respondents’ efforts to 
protect the environment, it is perhaps no coincidence that they are popularly 
thought of as helpful and benign even to the point of altruism. In Moray, dolphins 
and whales stand for particular ideas about nature, and human relationships to 
it, as well as for proper inter-subjective relations. Ideal human-cetacean 
relationships promoted locally are based on compassion, support, altruism and 
even love, the same principles that respondents strive for in their friendships 
with each other. In the previous two chapters I showed how human-dolphin 
relationships help create connections and model ethical action. In the Prologue 
we also saw that coming into contact with a lost and malnourished dead whale 
was particularly sad for those respondents because it reminded them of the 
problems that these animals face in securing sufficient food and a safe 
environment to live in. All this suggests that, even in the Western world, a 
community may contain more than one species. 
   
 
 
Ethical consumption: An alimentary analogy 
   
 Respondents demonstrate and consolidate their connections to their new 
home through their commitments to protect it from harm. As well as 
campaigning to protect cetaceans, they aim to lead environmentally friendly 
lives, recycling as much waste as possible, using low-energy light bulbs, walking 
or cycling rather than driving and even growing their own vegetables and 
keeping (free-range) chickens. One main way in which they strive to protect the 
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environment is by making careful and responsible decisions about what they 
consume. There is a growing range of ‘ethical’ alternatives on sale in the UK, 
with food being a particularly well-developed sector in this respect. 
Supermarkets and chain stores dominate the markets of northeastern Scotland, 
but, as is the case elsewhere in the UK, the area has also seen a recent 
flourishing of businesses selling a more ethical way of life to consumers. Given 
its global image as a wilder, more natural place and its reputation as a farming 
nation with excellent produce, Scotland seems to be in a particularly strong 
position to exploit this market for more ethical foods.64 Ethical shopping may 
refer to quite a broad spectrum of concerns including cutting carbon emissions, 
improving the working conditions of food producers, anti-globalisationism, 
seasonality, supporting local businesses and improving the nutrition of self and 
kin, any and all of which may be employed to suggest a particular product’s 
ethical credentials. 
 Although a good life does entail certain sacrifices, respondents see people 
living in urban Britain, and particularly England, as being constrained by time 
and money from living a life that is both more personally fulfilling and which 
allows them the opportunity to cultivate relationships of care with their 
environment and other people. They reject excessive consumption and 
materialism on the grounds of environmental sustainability and because it 
seems to imply impoverished relations with others (cf. Gould 2005: 31). 
However, as we have seen, they do not think of money as bad in itself. We have 
seen that respondents are aware of the problems that come with utopianism 
and, once again, their consumption habits reflect their attempts to maintain a 
balance between ideals and the practical limitations of everyday life on the 
margins of the mainstream.  
 Respondents strive to be ethical consumers of food. A few are vegetarian 
or vegan and many of those who do eat meat aim to eat “happy meat” – that is, 
Organic, local and humanely reared and slaughtered meat – and fish from 
sustainable sources. Some also get their fruit and vegetables delivered in a 
‘veg-box’ and a few who have gardens grow some of their own fruit and 
vegetables. However, they do much of their food shopping in one of the two 
twenty-four hour superstores in Elgin, though they choose from the Organic and 
Fair Trade ranges wherever possible. Much as they express antipathy to 
                                                
64 This does, of course, contrast with the unenviable reputation of Scots as appalling cooks who 
do not know what to do with such bounty and the fact that Scotland has notoriously poor nutritional 
health for a wealthy, developed nation. (See for example Diet action plan targets ‘missed’, 
September 11 2006, BBC News online http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/5335212.stm). 
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supermarket chains, they do offer convenience and value for money and as 
such are seen as something of a necessity given the extra time, money and 
distance that sourcing food completely ethically would entail.  
 In Sophie’s kitchen, she has a small card on the wall with a list of fish with 
various symbols next to them. This list is produced by the Marine Conservation 
Society and represents those species that are and are not acceptable to 
consume according to the Society’s reckoning of stock sustainability. Sophie, 
like others who work in the wildlife centre, is fairly well-versed in the ethics of 
fish consumption and strives to eat that which is sourced sustainably, though 
she does occasionally succumb to her love of tuna sashimi. She and others tend 
not to eat a great deal of fish and usually get it from the fish and chip shop in 
Fochabers or when dining out in the pub in Findhorn which specialises in local 
seafood.65 While respondents value the fact that they live so close to a world-
famous salmon river, they do not go fishing themselves which is partly due to 
their sense that Spey salmon stocks are in decline (even though there is a Spey 
Fishery Board regulating this and one must obtain a licence to fish in the Spey), 
but also because they associate Spey fishing with more upper class ‘huntin’, 
shootin’ and fishin’’ leisure pursuits, which do not easily mesh with their sense of 
themselves. 
 Most respondents said that Organic foods are preferable to intensively 
farmed foods, being “healthier”, and suggested that choosing them is a means 
of protecting the natural world (James 1993; Reed 2002).66 Erin frames her 
preference for Organic foods as a concern for providing her family with the best 
nutrition that she can. She and her family rely on her husband’s salary from his 
work as a mental health nurse. Although she did not discuss their financial 
situation with me in detail, it was clear that while their income was adequate, 
they would like to be able to afford some luxuries such as foreign holidays and 
perhaps to live in a slightly bigger house than their cosy two-bedroom bungalow, 
ideally with more space for accommodating visiting friends and any further 
children. In fact, Erin told me with some pride quite soon after I met her that she 
and Duncan had managed to spend only £500 on their wedding including a 
honeymoon in Rome.  
                                                
65 In Scottish fish and chip shops, haddock is the standard fish on offer, in contrast to England 
where cod is most popular. Both are rated ‘5’, i.e. least sustainable, by the Marine Conservation 
Society in their list of ‘Fish to Avoid’ (Marine Conservation Society website). 
66 Franklin has shown that a significant additional factor in the current demand for less intensive 
farming practices in the UK is the discovery of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and the foot and mouth 
epidemic of 2001. As she notes, the foot and mouth crisis, in particular, provoked a new 
enthusiasm to return to traditional farming methods to reverse the perceived over-industrialisation 
of British agriculture (2007: 184-5). 
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 Erin and I discussed food shopping a few times, especially when I first 
moved to Moray and she gave me advice on where to find the best deals and 
recommended one particular supermarket for its well-priced range of Organic 
fruit and vegetables. Erin told me that she aims to buy Organic whenever 
possible and wherever it is not too much more expensive than non-Organic 
alternatives. She also grows some salads and fruits in pots in her tiny patio 
garden. There are a few everyday items like milk that she always buys from the 
Organic range. This is important to her, as items like milk are necessities but 
also do not vary a great deal in price, so the extra cost of Organic can be 
budgeted for. It also means that Rosie – who, incidentally is a very fussy eater 
who does not (yet) share her parents’ interest in good food – will be consuming 
something Organic every day.  
 Any sunny day in Spey Bay during the spring, summer and early autumn 
is an excuse to get friends together to eat their evening meal outside. Here I 
return to the commensality described in Chapter Three to give a sense of the 
preparatory shopping. Typically, the suggestion that friends have a picnic dinner 
would come from Sophie or Luke. A decision would then be made based on the 
weather and a quick survey of people nearby to see if they were available at 
short notice (which most of them would be). The next decision would concern 
what food to have and who will provide what. Usually, Sophie would make a 
good deal of the food or at least provide ingredients if she was very busy at 
work. If eggs were needed, she would provide them from the chickens she 
keeps in her garden. If she were less busy that day, she might use the time to 
drive over to Findhorn to pick up some “nice” items from the shop there such as 
Organic wine, artisan bread or hand-made sauces. I would often accompany her 
on such trips, making my own contribution, or if she was too busy I might go with 
Luke instead. We would often also visit one of the supermarkets in Elgin on the 
way back from Findhorn for more everyday items.  
 Often, such outdoor meals would be barbecues, in which case someone, 
often Luke or Amy, would visit the butcher in Fochabers, which stocks local 
meat, some of which is Organic. The butcher specialises in red meat and game 
including local venison and always has his own recipe haggis on sale in two 
versions: Haggis from Heaven and Haggis from Hell, the latter being a spicier 
version of traditional haggis with chilli. His goods are perceived by respondents 
to be more ethical than anything available in the supermarket in that they 
assume that the animals that produced the meat have had “better” lives and 
deaths and that their localness and seasonality means their production and 
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transport have impacted the environment less by producing fewer carbon 
emissions. The butcher, who is German, is also very friendly (and gently 
eccentric) and likes to chat about his products’ provenance and exchange recipe 
tips. Respondents value his warmth and knowledge and feel that by supporting 
his business they are contributing to the local economy and, thus, community. 
They also feel that, despite its superior quality, his meat is better value for 
money than comparable ethical goods bought at Findhorn or in farmers’ 
markets, for example.67 It also has the benefit of being in Fochabers, only five 
miles from Spey Bay, so necessitating a shorter car journey than a trip to Elgin 
or elsewhere, which is again “better” for the environment.  
 Other items of food, such as vegetables to grill on a separate barbecue for 
vegetarians, would probably come from veg-boxes or even respondents’ 
gardens, though the lack of space for gardens and tough growing conditions 
right next to the sea exposed to the north wind means that opportunities to grow 
food in Spey Bay are more limited than people would prefer. Everything else 
would usually come from the Co-Op store in Fochabers. This chain of mini-
markets is ubiquitous in northeastern Scotland. The Co-Operative Group formed 
in northern England in the nineteenth century out of the gradual association of 
various retail societies, based on the principle of cooperative management and 
rewarding members based on turnover rather than capital investment. It 
pioneered Fair Trade produce in its shops and its own brand Fair Trade wine 
and chocolate are particularly popular amongst respondents. While it might be 
tempting to see this promotion of ethical goods as simply an entrepreneurial 
response to the ethical living movement, therefore, in this case it also links with 
older efforts to improve business practices and the conditions of the working 
classes. The Fochabers Co-Op also stocks many local favourites including 
goods from a nearby bakery including butteries (an Aberdonian version of a 
croissant), morning rolls, Empire biscuits, pineapple tarts and snowballs. 
Despite this being a chain shop, the staff are thought of as friendly and helpful, 
which is probably also linked to its explicit promotion of ethical consumption and 
business practices. 
 Lévi-Strauss (1979) described the cooking of food as an analogy for the 
process of making culture. In this reading, cooking is a process of 
transformation and appropriation of natural products to human wants. In places 
                                                
67 Respondents would occasionally visit farmers’ markets, of which there are an increasing 
number in this part of Scotland, but most are a substantial drive away and held on Saturday 
mornings once a month, so are not particularly convenient and can be quite expensive. 
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like Scotland where most people buy their food pre-packaged from ‘faceless’ 
supermarkets, it may be that the process of cooking is not only about ‘culturing’ 
these raw materials, but also resisting a feeling of alienation from most of the 
food that is available, much as Miller (1988; see also Carrier 1990) has 
observed for council flat tenants in London who claim a sense of personal style, 
and thus counter alienation, through re-fitting the kitchens they are assigned by 
the State. Sophie’s family have an Organic small-holding in northern England, 
and she told me that while she did not have an ethical objection to eating meat, 
she thought it was better to eat locally produced, Organic meat, “where you 
know where it’s come from”, suggesting a need to overcome a sense of 
alienation from what she consumes, but also reminding us of the importance of 
knowledge in claim-making. As she says, it is pleasing to know the farmer who 
delivers one’s vegetables,68 the butcher who prepares sausages from his own 
recipe and the checkout staff in the local shop, just as it is reassuring to know 
that the Fair Trade wine one is drinking, while flown from Chile or Australia, did 
not at least exploit its producers. 
 British ethical goods, usually produced by small-scale businesses in rural 
areas, often set up by families or groups of friends, and driven by – and 
marketed on – particular values, seem to have had the ‘taint’ of capitalist 
production and exchange removed. The idea of ethical shopping thereby 
suggests a need to ‘clean up’ the process of shopping, echoing what Miller 
(1998) calls ‘the discourse of shopping’, according to which shopping is an 
individualistic and materialistic act. This discourse is implicit in the green 
movement’s critique of consumption: 
 
Here consumerism becomes the primary image for the destruction of the 
world. Consumption represents a violent rape of “mother earth’s” natural 
resources through mindless destruction, such that commerce itself 
becomes subsumed by consumption. Indeed in this rhetoric the 
consumer is no longer the duped victim of capitalism, rather it is the 
consumers themselves who by their irresponsibility pillage the world and 
exhaust it in their insatiable desires, thereby conniving with capitalism as 
the means to their ends. (Miller 1998: 97; cf. Lovelock 2000: viii) 
 
                                                
68 However, she did report having a conversation with him about a custody battle for his children 
with his ex-wife when he delivered the boxes one night as “a bit awkward” – ethical shopping may 
create closer relationships between producers and consumers, but there is a limit to how close 
they should be and how much knowledge should be shared. 
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This characterisation is more lurid than anything that respondents ever said to 
me, though they do generally believe that supermarkets are unethical and are 
aware of the discourse of shopping. While ethical shopping suggests that 
standard shopping is unethical, it does not necessarily imply that shopping is 
inherently unethical. Most do not spend a great deal of money on ‘luxuries’ for 
themselves and none of them would be interested in spending their money on 
items of conspicuous consumption like widescreen televisions. Instead, ‘treats’ 
would be a trip abroad, an item of clothing, a weekend in Edinburgh or 
equipment related to a hobby such as a surfboard or climbing gear. On the 
whole, they do not spend lavishly, which is no doubt due to the fact that none of 
them earns enough to amass a great deal of disposable income, but also 
reflects a general lack of interest in ostentation.  
 Ethical shopping signals the two-way traffic between supply and demand, 
as food producers and retailers have come to incorporate ethical concerns into 
their marketing with increasing frequency in the UK in recent years, so that 
these goods come pre-ethicised and perhaps, in Carrier’s (1990) terms, as 
ready-made possessions rather than commodities. In this way, the higher cost 
of Organic, Fair Trade or ‘natural’ goods is rationalised as a premium for the 
priceless quality of being ethical. This also points to the importance of choice in 
the building of the good life. For the respondents here, this is about ethical 
choices, but as Strathern has argued, choice is also a key component of English 
contemporary ideas about the individual. Indeed, choice, and particularly 
consumer choice, is one of the ideas that signals the movement from modern 
conceptions of the individual, nature and society towards ‘postplural’ ones. Key 
to this is her concept of the ‘plasti-class’, which represents the re-
conceptualisation of English society as stratified by socio-economic class to one 
in which all are assumed to have access to the ‘enabling technology [of] 
financial flexibility’ (1992a: 142) with the concomitant view that any difference in 
perspective is reducible to consumer choice.  
 As noted in the Introduction, Foucault (1997: 285) suggested that during 
early Christianity, concern for the self became tainted with associations of self-
love. He does not suggest a simple causal relationship between the two, but 
notes the contrast between Christian models of salvation through renunciation of 
the self (cf. Cannell 2006: 7) and the Classical ethical edict to care for, and thus 
know, oneself. In the context Foucault discusses, the work of renunciation is 
largely done by ascetic specialists, in contrast to the Protestant organisation of 
labour through the concept of the calling (Cannell 2006: 20; Weber 1992). We 
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have seen here that it is not always necessary to renounce the self to live an 
ethical life in the contemporary Western world. For respondents, ethical action is 
done to and by the self, but with others in mind; it is about the relations between 
individuals. Further, their ideas about how to live ethically, and the contrasts 
between these and other more utopian visions of community-building underline 
the point that even within small areas, people may draw upon rival ideas of 
renunciation and everyday ethics in structuring their lives.  
Foucault’s characterisation of Western morality resonates with what 
Strathern defines as the modernist view, and contrasts with the late twentieth-
century in which the dominance of choice creates a sense that morality is 
personalised (1992a: 152). In this postplural epoch, she argues:  
 
It becomes impossible to invoke selfishness with the same axiomatic 
condemnation [as in the modern epoch]. Attention to one’s own interests 
is now a virtue. Moreover, since morality is within, then it must 
necessarily take the form that in turn typifies the individual: the capacity 
to exercise choice. … The individual person who is the microcosm of 
(what was once external) convention is also the individual person who 
makes his or her own (what was once internal) choices. The individual 
does not just follow convention or have it imposed but “does” convention, 
that is, shows his or her capacity for morality, and thus makes explicit the 
fact that moral behaviour is contingent on the capacity for choice. But 
what the choice should be between, the norms and canons of behaviour, 
no longer need lie in institutions outside the individual. The person is his 
or her own reference point, a position that requires no negotiation or 
bargaining with others, least of all with a collective will. (1992a: 161-162) 
 
 Strathern argues that in the modern period, the environment was thought 
of as something that affected the individual organism and to which that organism 
responded. But now, as suggested by Miller’s characterisation of green ideas 
about consumption, society and the individual are seen to be consuming nature 
by using up natural resources to feed technology and in the consumption of 
natural resources as food (Strathern 1992a: 173). This has clear relevance for 
the idea of ethical food shopping, an idea that has become increasingly 
mainstream since Strathern was writing. Strathern says that in late twentieth-
century ideas, bodily functions like eating are no longer primarily associated with 
nature but with consumer choice. She argues that this goes along with a shift 
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away from modernist ideas in which nature is capable of combining the 
diversifying force of the individual and the relational capacity of society, and in 
which Nature stands as a separate entity that models relations and can be 
brought into merographic connection but which is also a separate self-regulating 
phenomenon. This is replaced in the postplural world by the sense that nature 
itself can be consumed and ‘the conceptual collapse of the differences between 
nature and culture’ so that it seems that ‘Nature cannot survive without Cultural 
intervention’ (1992a: 174). The implication of such a ‘collapse’ is, in Strathern’s 
view, the cancellation of the grounds by which English people model relations 
and think about nature, a point I will return to in the next chapter and the 
Conclusion. 
 In the twenty-first century naturalness remains a fundamentally important 
value in environmentalist thinking and in the conceptualisation of certain foods 
as better or worse for the environment (James 1993). What has changed since 
the late twentieth-century, though, is the terminology of the environmental 
movement and its purchase on popular discourse in the UK as elsewhere 
(Grove-White 1993; Macnaghten and Urry 1998; Milton 1993, 2002). In popular 
parlance, the ‘green’ movement and ‘greenhouse effect’ have been largely 
replaced with ‘ethical living’ and ‘climate change’. Respondents talk about “being 
environmentally friendly” and “shopping with a conscience” by buying “happy 
meat” and “ethical foods”. As such, goods are currently presented to the 
consumer as being better for the environment not only on the grounds of their 
naturalness but also their ethical status. 
 In his study of North London provision shopping published six years later 
than After Nature, Miller argues that, contrary to the discourse of shopping, for 
the participants in his study, ‘shopping was hardly ever directed towards the 
person who was doing the shopping’ and concludes: 
 
Shopping is not therefore best understood as an individualistic or 
individualizing act related to the subjectivity of the shopper. Rather the 
act of buying goods is mainly directed at two forms of “otherness”. The 
first of these expresses a relationship between the shopper and a 
particular other individual such as a child or partner, either present in the 
household, desired or imagined. The second of these is a relationship to 
a more general goal which transcends any immediate utility and is best 
understood as cosmological in that it takes the form of neither subject 
nor object but of the values to which people wish to dedicate themselves. 
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(1998: 12) 
 
As we have seen, much of the food and drink respondents buy is consumed in 
communal settings at shared dinners and parties and has been bought with 
others in mind. As ethical shoppers, they also consider producers and retailers 
when making choices about what to consume. Miller’s point that shopping for 
those in his study has a transcendent quality which reflects their values is clearly 
relevant to ethical shopping, as consumption decisions are self-conscious acts 
of ethical intention. While for Miller’s respondents it was largely conjugal or 
familial love that characterised this transcendence, for the people in this study, it 
is the ethics of a good life, relationships with friends and the prevention of harm 
to the environment and food producers that motivates respondents’ 
consumption decisions.  
 Miller’s observations of shopping in North London illustrate the centrality of 
ideas of love, devotion and care in family life. In Euro-American societies, love is 
a grounding concept or ‘meta-value’ (Lambek 2008). It is readily invoked, holds 
enormous rhetorical and ethical weight and seems self-evident (Miller 1998: 31; 
see also Miller 2004; Schneider 1980). The key difference between Strathern’s 
and Miller’s theories about English ideas about shopping is the place of meta-
value. Miller talks about love as a transcendent goal and cosmological value. By 
contrast, in Strathern’s postplural world, morality is an expression of personal 
choice manifest as style, so that ‘the individual is judged by no measure outside 
itself’ (1992a: 152). There is an underlying implication in Strathern’s analysis 
that the development of consumer choice is a bleak one, which clearly contrasts 
with respondents’ sense that it can in fact enable a good life. In one sense, she 
seems to agree with Lambek’s point about the contingency of ethical judgement 
when she says, ‘moral behaviour is contingent on the capacity for choice’ 
(1992a: 162). For her, what makes the postplural world different, though, is the 
collapse of stable reference points to inform those choices so that all that is left 
is the individual. 
 For Strathern, the tendency towards alimentary analogies in contemporary 
Euro-American ideas about individuals reflects a current sense that looking 
‘inside’ the person/consumer only reveals what he has chosen to consume 
rather than any relation to an external context or influence. The question posed 
by the example of ethical shopping as described here – and how it relates to 
respondents’ everyday lives and ethical claims more generally – is whether 
these people’s choices to consume ‘ethically’ are construed as just another 
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example of personal style, or whether the ethics they are consuming are 
transcendent values existing outside of themselves.  
  
   
 
Conclusion  
 
 Ethical shopping is a performance of an ethical identity: consumer 
choices mark the individual’s values. For respondents, ethical consumption is 
not only a concern for the ethical treatment of producers and natural resources, 
but also for their own wellbeing, based on cultural ideas about the connections 
between food and constitution (see also Miller 2004: 38; James 1993).  
 In the Introduction I noted the curious status of freedom in Foucauldian 
models of ethics and suggested that Lambek’s emphasis on conscious reflection 
is a fruitful way of thinking about the everyday practice and ethical claims of this 
group of people. Respondents’ pursuit of good lives is enabled and structured 
by choice. This is clear from the way that they have chosen to move to a 
particular place to build these better lives just as in the decisions they make in 
the supermarket, how they dispose of rubbish or of what they eat. In attending to 
their varying consumption decisions in particular, for example in those who will 
and will not eat meat, we see such conscious reflection in practice. 
Respondents’ consumption, while ‘ethical’ where possible, is not purely so – 
they constantly make judgements about when to buy Organic, Fair Trade, local, 
seasonal and when not to live up to these ideals.  
 In one sense, respondents’ ideas about money and choice seem to be a 
manifestation of Strathern’s ideas about consumer choice reflecting 
personalised morality, as ethical consumption is seen to reflect the consumer’s 
ethics. The question remains, however, as to whether the assumption that 
morality or ethics can be expressed in consumer choice, whether buying Fair 
Trade food or adopting a dolphin, necessarily means that this morality emerges 
without reference to any external standard or meta-value. It may be that, instead 
of signifying the penetration of consumer choice into all levels of social life, 
ethical consumption is a means of subverting dominant ideas about 
contemporary western political economy towards their own ends for this group 
of people who have positioned themselves on the margins of the mainstream. 
As we have seen, even something as apparently mundane as provision 
shopping can be infused with ideas of transcendent value. In Spey Bay and 
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Moray shopping reflects love and feelings of responsibility towards friends, 
community, the environment and the people who have produced the goods that 
they buy. Since they deliberately structure their lives around relations with 
others and given the influence of environmentalist discourse, it is difficult to see 
that they locate such values only within the self. 
 For respondents, ethical living is practised by individuals who live 
amongst others and everyday life entails constant, sensitive negotiations 
between the needs of oneself and one’s friends and neighbours. In this way, 
their experiences are similar to American Neopagans: 
 
For Neopagans, personal autonomy is both a turning inward to one’s 
own moral authority and the outward expressions of self that take place 
in relation to others and within a larger community. Neopagans 
constantly negotiate between the authority of the self and requirements 
for community life. The assumption that governs writing about 
contemporary moral life, namely that personalized religion necessarily 
means that each self is its “own moral universe,” neglects to consider the 
importance of relational factors to contemporary moral agents. (Pike 
2001a: 223; original emphasis) 
 
As Pike suggests, ethical subjectivity concerns individuals, but it is formed in 
relationships that cross the boundaries of the self as individuals come into 
contact with others. This suggests, further, that although individualism is very 
important, respondents may not separate out self and other in a straightforward 
way. That is, ideas about individual discreteness may be employed at the level 
of rhetoric to individuate both specific persons and the community, but an image 
of this group of people as intimately connected and mutually dependent is just 
as important and just as likely to be invoked.  
 Images of and ideas about cetaceans have been a recurring theme in 
this ethnography. This reflects their significance and ubiquity in everyday life in 
this part of the world, for respondents in particular but also for other local 
people. As I have argued, the way in which people talk and think about them is 
an illuminating angle on how they think about themselves, their relationships 
with the environment, the natural world and each other, but they are also 
significant in presenting a particular model of ethical action and compelling 
moral responsibility. The Moray Firth dolphins are in a sense ‘totemic’ for this 
group of people, in that they mark out this place (a place, of course, once 
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organised along clan lines) and its inhabitants, they are a taboo object of 
consumption69 and are venerated as special objects associated with 
transcendent or cosmological values. For Lévi-Strauss (1962: 16), totemism is 
the act of relating items that belong to the two fundamentally different ‘series’ of 
nature and culture. In paying close attention to respondents’ relations with 
cetaceans, I have aimed to show that, while animals may in one sense belong to 
the category of ‘nature’ for these people, they not only have shifting meanings in 
themselves, but also demonstrate that items that seem to fall into one category 
can easily slip into another. In this sense, respondents’ ideas about dolphins are 
not only metonymic but merographic – they link themselves and dolphins 
together in ways that illuminate their similarities while retaining the differences 
between them.  
 Respondents talked about fish much less than they talked about dolphins, 
and when they did it was often in connection with cetaceans, implying that they 
think of dolphins as consumers of fish before themselves. Clearly, concerns 
about the decline of the fishing industry and cetacean conservation overlap and 
their histories are closely linked. Similarly, both the change in attitudes to 
cetaceans as lucrative resources to be hunted and the tightening up of 
restrictions on fishing reflect contemporary shifts in Scottish economy which are 
evident in the new local industry of wildlife-watching as we saw in the Whiteness 
Head development in the previous chapter.  
 Both over-fishing and commercial whaling conjure up, for respondents 
and in wider British culture, images of humans exploiting and plundering natural 
resources in an unsustainable manner that implies fecklessness and greed in 
direct contrast to ideals of ethical consumption. Respondents lived through the 
targeted single-issue Green campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s including the 
effort to promote consumption of ‘dolphin friendly’ tuna. Given current concerns 
about sustainability, it is felt by most contemporary environmentalists that tuna 
consumption should generally be avoided altogether because it is so over-
fished, but this example points again to the close connection between fish and 
cetaceans. The dolphin-friendly tuna campaign came about as a response to 
large-scale fishing methods such as using driftnets in which dolphins and other 
unintended species can be caught as ‘bycatch’. As such, it paints a picture of 
humans acquiring food by means that not only deplete natural resources and 
                                                
69 Though of course this is not unusual, as most British people do not think of dolphins as 
appropriate for consumption. 
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put future food stocks at risk but also unintentionally kill valuable non-food 
species such as dolphins.  
 Dolphins are largely associated with nature and the natural world, though 
they seem to display a propensity towards ‘social’ behaviour that lends itself to 
anthropomorphism. When people ‘interfere’ in their lives, they seem, like the 
environment, to become at risk. In this way there is a parallel with the concerns 
expressed in the first chapter about the dangers of maternal bonding going 
awry. These parallels were not made explicitly by respondents, yet we glimpsed 
them in the case of the minke whale calf stranded in Fraserburgh harbour. One 
important point in this linkage is the status of nature. While its specificity shifts 
with usage, it remains as a grounding concept and source of goodness. It is 
something that can be interfered with or helped, implying that it is a self-
regulating, self-evident entity that is both transcendent and vulnerable to human 
action. 
 We have seen here that ethical living for respondents is an experience of 
being an individual with particular values and qualities while living as part of a 
community of like-minded others. These versions of the good life are centred 
neither on the self nor on others, but on the proper relations between 
individuals, who are seen to hold responsibility for the choices they make in 
defining their lives. As we have seen, these others are not even necessarily 
other people, but may be other species or the ecological environment. They may 
also be unknown or anonymous, though at the same time the more personal 
experiences of shopping locally and buying products that are re-personalised 
are positively evaluated. In contrast to the idea that morality has become 
personalised, a matter of consumer choice, their lives are structured around 
transcendent values and they live in a network of relationships.  
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PART THREE:  
A STABLE ENVIRONMENT? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tolling bell 
Measures time not our time, rung by the unhurried 
Ground swell, a time 
Older than the time of chronometers, older 
Than time counted by anxious worried women 
Lying awake, calculating the future, 
Trying to unweave, unwind, unravel 
And piece together the past and the future 
T.S. Eliot, The Dry Salvages 
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Chapter Six 
 
Climate Change 
 
A crisis perceived as ecological contains all 
Marilyn Strathern, After Nature 
 
 
 Respondents’ everyday practice is inflected by a sense of crisis, though 
they do not straightforwardly ‘reject’ the mainstream world and focus much more 
on making a better future than recapturing a golden past. Nonetheless, for the 
people we have encountered in this ethnography, one of their most important 
shared beliefs is that the world is facing ecological disaster because of the 
cumulative effects of human activity, which is creating a surplus of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere that will eventually bring about fundamental changes 
in weather systems with significant, and in many cases catastrophic, effects for 
habitats, animals and people. In the previous chapters I have focused 
particularly on their efforts around wildlife conservation, since this is the 
everyday and public manifestation of these concerns and because it gives their 
practice a more ‘local’ flavour. In this chapter I will explore whether they think of 
the world as mired in crisis and what it means to structure one’s life, a life that is 
ostensibly a ‘good’ one, around a sense of potential catastrophe.  
 I have aimed to show the fertile connections that respondents make 
between different parts of social life in their claim-making and everyday practice. 
In this final chapter, I return to their interview responses, juxtaposing their ideas 
about time, nature and ethics in their own reproductive plans with their ideas 
about assisted conception. As noted in the Introduction, while anthropologists 
who work on kinship in the UK have engaged productively with Strathern’s work, 
those who work on the natural world and environmentalism have been far more 
hesitant to do so (although see Berglund 1998). This strikes me as a missed 
opportunity, which I hope to have gone some small way to addressing here. The 
examples I present here suggest some of the ways that ideas about 
reproduction – once the most private and personal part of Western life – seem 
to reflect much wider ideas, including the status of nature and ethics in 
contemporary life.  
 In this chapter I will broaden my consideration of the importance of 
choice in these people’s lives by discussing the plans of the women who work in 
the wildlife centre for future parenthood. These women are in a sense 
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representative of contemporary shifts in women’s lives, having built careers that 
offer opportunities to fulfil their interests and which allow them economic self-
sufficiency. That the average age at which British women give birth has been 
steadily increasing over the last generation or so reflects this shift in 
expectation. Having children is now seen as a conscious choice, something that 
should properly be planned for. Maternal, and to a slightly different extent 
paternal, responsibility is now expected to encompass not only the quality of the 
relationship between parent and child, but also contains an assumption that 
children will be born into the ‘right’ conditions. We shall see what those 
conditions are here and the kinds of deliberations that go into judging how and 
when this “stable environment”, as Erin termed it, has been achieved. After 
considering respondents’ plans for parenthood, I will turn to some additional 
examples of their ideas about assisted conception in order to reflect further on 
the role of choice and change in their ideas about reproduction, but also to 
consider in greater detail how nature works in their claims. 
 
 
 
Crisis, change and choice in contemporary Scotland 
 
 Those living in marginal and remote places commonly express feelings of 
impending crisis threatening their community, livelihood or morality (Cohen 
1982: 7) and there is a sense in Scottish public discourse that it, like other parts 
of western Europe and North America, is undergoing a population crisis 
alongside major changes in family structure. In the Introduction I presented 
some statistical data on Scotland’s contemporary demography. Such data is 
published by the General Register Office on the Scottish Government’s website 
and so is readily accessible. It is also regularly presented in the Scottish and 
British media, suggesting that this is a familiar issue, as well as the interchange 
between popular and media discourse.70 Many respondents are aware of 
Scotland and the UK’s declining fertility rates and perceive family structures to 
have changed.  
                                                
70 A selection of media reports reflecting Scottish demographic anxiety: Breakdown of family 'to 
blame for all society's ills', The Times, 5th April 2008; Minister's concern over rise in number of 
teenage pregnancies, The Scotsman, 31st October 2007; Couples losing out in NHS infertility 
treatment lottery, The Guardian, 30th August 2006; Putting off childbirth defies nature, claim 
doctors, The Scotsman, 16th September 2005; Infertility in Europe to double in 10 years, The 
Times, 21st June 2005; Economy 'needs more babies', BBC News Online, January 13th 2004. 
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When I talked to Fiona about the low birth rate in Scotland she 
speculated, like others, that this decline was partly due to increased infertility 
and partly to individuals choosing to have fewer children. On the former, she 
said, “I’m absolutely sure it’s biological, it’s environmental. You only have to see 
all these fish changing sex71 to see we’re making such a mess of our 
environment, that we’re also messing ourselves up genetically”. Jenny was 
similarly concerned about the presence of extraneous hormones in the 
environment, claiming that oestrogen in water was contributing to a process of 
physiological feminisation in men (cf. Cadbury 1997), which she linked to the 
widespread presence of polluting substances in the industrialised world. 
Pollution suggests specifically anthropogenic environmental degradation and the 
spectre of gender-bending fish is a particularly rich image for this, metonymic of 
‘confused’ gender roles and barren nature. These unfortunate fish are no longer 
able to reproduce themselves as a direct result of human efforts to control their 
own fertility; they are the victims of individual choice. This is interesting since we 
have seen in previous chapters that respondents positively evaluate choice, in 
enabling them to live good lives and to put their ethics into practice.  
 The juxtaposition of ecology and demography was not uncommon in 
respondents’ interview responses. One example of this is Sophie’s response 
when I asked her whether she perceived a relation between contemporary 
lifestyles and the recent rise in infertility in Western societies:  
 
I think if you start saying that it’s the way people live their lives it makes it 
sound a bit like, ‘you’re doing something evil’, it sounds like that. But I do 
think that, I s’pose I’m a little bit drawn by the fact that when I was at 
university we had a couple of classes which talked about fertility and we 
were talking about farm animals, the lecturer was then just bringing into 
play that actually humans are pretty crap at being fertile if you compare 
them to the farm animals and the fact that we breed those over the 
successive generations to be really fertile. And because there are maybe 
some things that don’t naturally select out because people who can have 
some help to allow fertility – maybe there is an element of that, that 
                                                
71 A series of reports about fish ‘changing sex’ in response to the presence of female hormones 
from the contraceptive pill and HRT in water supplies have made headlines in recent years, 
reflecting a mixed anxiety about environmental pollution and infertility. See Fish stocks in danger 
as males change sex, The Guardian, 10th July 2004; 'Gender-bender' threat to marine life, BBC 
News Online, 17th July 2003. Although respondents’ talk was much more likely to be of marine 
mammals than fish, Willow also connected human reproduction with fish in her comment about 
egg donation in Chapter Two. 
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they’re all going a bit down the scientific route. So I’d be a bit averse to 
say, to go down the line that says, ‘oh well, we’ve almost asked for it’, 
but I do think that there are some things that we can’t get away from, that 
probably we are going to find it harder and harder. Then again, I 
suppose the other part would be from the ecologist’s point of view, I 
might say, well, there’s quite a lot of humans and maybe this is just the 
way it goes, maybe this is the way the cycle goes. 
 
Here, Sophie not only brings together ecology, agriculture and demography, 
drawing on her own training as a graduate in agricultural and ecological 
sciences but, in her opening comment, demonstrates her awareness of the 
ethical implications of judging other people’s choices. What is particularly 
interesting about this response is her reluctance to become pessimistic in 
predicting the future of human fertility, even though she simultaneously 
demonstrates her awareness that, compared to farm animals, there may be 
cause to make quite dire predictions for human fertility and that helping people 
who are infertile to conceive children may serve to reproduce problems that 
would otherwise “naturally select out”.  
 Ultimately, Sophie refers to “the ecologist’s point of view”. This seems 
apposite not only because of the central importance of ecology to her education 
and current work but also because this seems to suggest an overarching 
framework. As such, she is able to suggest with greater optimism than her 
knowledge of agricultural science might at first suggest that the current decline 
in fertility in the UK is in fact only the current turn of “the circle”. Sophie refers to 
ecological time as circular here and contrasts it again with the temporality of 
agricultural science, which she describes using the progressive linear imagery of 
“successive generations”, in contrast to traditional images of the circular 
agricultural year. This implies not only the significance of ideas about time in 
people’s perceptions of progress, change and crisis, but also perhaps that a 
cyclical notion of time may be employed to obviate a sense of crisis.72  
I have suggested that, in contrast to other British rural communities, and 
despite the importance of ideas about heritage and tradition in popular images 
of Scotland, respondents here are relatively uninterested in the past. In 
particular, they are not nostalgic nor do they express a desire to recapture a 
bygone halcyon age, and this is true of older as well as younger respondents. It 
                                                
72 Unfortunately, most other respondents did not talk about time in such explicit terms, so I can 
only suggest that such differences may be pertinent to Sophie. 
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seems likely that environmentalism is a key influence in this, in its primary focus 
on the prevention of future disaster in the present. Most respondents have after 
all moved away from their past connections in order to build good lives. In 
everyday conversation, they talk about their lives in the present and tend not to 
plan particularly far ahead, though they do think about the future. The work they 
do is about arresting the effects of past and present human activity that is 
harmful to the environment, but they did not speak of this in terms of recreating 
a traditional era that is more ‘in tune with nature’.  
We saw in the first chapter that respondents perceive changes in 
traditional roles for men and women in parenthood, with the assumption of many 
that men or women may take on the primary care-giving role for a child. While 
gender equality and respect for the rights of same-sex couples are both 
important values for respondents in general, a few did voice concerns about the 
effects of contemporary shifts in ‘traditional’ roles. As noted, Jenny works as a 
social care manager and so is repeatedly exposed to ‘dysfunctional’ families in 
her working life. When talking with her about contemporary parenting styles in 
an interview, she identified a tension between the “expectations, hopes … and 
dreams” and “reality” of parenthood today:  
 
Jenny: I think [the parenting roles of women and men are] different but 
hopefully complementary. I think, in our society now, the whole thing is 
completely – I don’t know, I’m probably jaundiced – I think the whole 
thing is very random, hit-and-miss, there are lots of ideals that people 
hold in their heads, that people don’t know their own roles and identities 
anymore, in gender. So I think how very difficult it is for people who have 
all these pre-birth conceptions of what the idealised version of being a 
parent might be, and whether they’re a drug addict or whether they’re a 
middle-class citizen, people are gonna have expectations, hopes for that 
child, and dreams. Then the reality of, like, perhaps sleepless nights, and 
a change in their couple relationship if it’s their first time – ’cos I think 
that’s crucial – and the stresses on relationships generally that exist in 
society now, they all impact on that parenting role. So it’s highly 
complicated, very difficult, very challenging, and within societal terms 
and within couple relationships, on your own emotional level also and 
also what people externally expect of you. I think there’s all this layering 
that goes on. It’s just so complicated now. It was probably a lot easier 
back, in some regards, back when there were defined gender roles. 
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KD: Do you think so? 
 
Jenny: I do, yeah. I’m not saying that I think there were necessarily all 
good things about that, because I can see why society’s evolved to the 
point we have – ‘evolved’ [is a] questionable word – but there’s a huge 
breakdown in, a gap, I think, between expectation and what is reality for 
a lot of people.  
 
Jenny expresses here a clear sense of change and even crisis in relationships 
between people, and especially families, in contemporary life. That she 
associates this particularly with changing gender roles is interesting, given that 
she is a woman in her early fifties with a full-time, demanding job, has two adult 
children whom she brought up by herself and provides her partner Paul with 
financial support while he is re-training as a counsellor, so in many ways 
represents precisely the kinds of changes that she is talking about.  
 Like Sophie, Jenny talks about time here, expressing her sense that 
society has “evolved” to a point that she characterises as “complicated” and 
multi-layered. Jenny’s contention that “it was probably a lot easier … back when 
there were defined gender roles” contrasts with what I have just said about 
respondents’ general lack of nostalgia. However, she says traditional roles 
made life “easier”, not better. Where she distinguishes the current period from 
previous ones is in a “breakdown”, not in ‘society’ or ‘the family’, but in the “gap” 
between “expectation” and “reality”.  
 It is worth recalling that Jenny was one of the respondents with the most 
‘liberal’ views on surrogacy, and seemed to be largely unconcerned by the idea 
of paying a surrogate mother for her reproductive labour, which some critics 
have described as making motherhood ‘male’ (Morgan 1985). Her marked 
ambivalence about changes in contemporary family relationships here suggests 
that, while she is loathe to prescribe a universal morality, as we saw in Part 
One, she does have concerns about how people have children nowadays, which 
is, I have suggested, also an ethical question. Jenny’s response here is not only 
morally concerned, but also sympathetic and in Chapter One she described her 
own experience of motherhood as combining difficulties and rewards. Her 
claims here offer another example of the kind of conscious reflection that goes 
into ethical claim-making, in that she is expressing the difficulty of balancing 
ideals or values – individuals’ expectations and dreams for the ideal family – 
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with the realities of contemporary life, which are for her increasing complexity 
and a sometimes bewildering amount of choice.  
  
 
 
The biological clock: Choice, time and money in planning parenthood 
 
In the contemporary British milieu, debates about how people have 
children are commonplace, reflecting changes in demography, but also in 
reproductive and sexual practices. With increasing usage of contraception and 
the development of assisted conception, parenthood has come to be seen as 
being chosen, or even achieved (Franklin 1997; Ginsburg 1989; Paxson 2004; 
Rapp 1999a). By examining some of the deliberations that go into pre-parturient 
respondents’ plans for future parenthood, I will consider how reproductive 
choice is linked to their expectations and their sense of control over their bodies, 
lives and futures in a context of demographic and ecological uncertainty, 
beginning with a reproductive crisis that happened during fieldwork.  
 Standing with me outside her back door in the biting January cold while 
her partner Mark watched football inside with Steve and Luke, Charlotte told me 
that she was going to see the doctor the next day to investigate whether she 
had polycystic ovary syndrome. She said, “It’s like I’ve said I don’t want children 
too many times and someone’s said, ‘ok’, and now the door might have been 
shut, I want to have them”. The previous summer, I had joined her and ten other 
friends celebrating her birthday in a pizza restaurant in Elgin. At the time, 
Heather, like Charlotte, lived in Fochabers with her partner and worked in the 
wildlife centre. She was just about to leave Moray to start a PhD in marine 
science at St. Andrew’s University. While talking about her career plans, 
Heather suddenly brought up the subject of when she should start thinking 
about having a baby. She expressed the difficulty of juggling her enthusiasm 
about her studies, and the future job opportunities they might lead to, with her 
desire to become a mother. Willow said quite firmly that she could not imagine 
herself having a baby without being married first. I asked if this was to do with 
her religion. She said, “No, I just can’t really see one [a baby] without the other 
[a husband]”. She then turned to Charlotte and joked that she would probably be 
pregnant within the year. Charlotte laughed and admitted that she had been 
“feeling broody” for about six months. She and Mark were planning to have 
children and get married within the next few years. But, as noted in Chapter 
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Three, he ended the relationship the following spring.  
 Charlotte’s main anxiety about her gynaecological problems was not her 
own health – after all, she was already living with the symptoms – but her future 
fertility. She expected to be able to make a free choice about when she would 
become a mother, and when her fertility came under question she felt that she 
had lost this freedom to choose. The experience of having a crisis in her 
assumed fertility and then losing the relationship with Mark caused a rupture in 
her planned life course, leading her to consider herself and her relationships 
with others in a new light. I had many conversations with her about this over the 
succeeding months and before she left Moray I interviewed her and asked about 
her plans for future parenthood. She said, “If I met somebody really quickly it 
might still be the plan for the next three years, but then comes the scary thought, 
what if there isn’t? What if I haven’t met anyone by the time I’m thirty? What do I 
do?”  
 While fortunately Charlotte’s case is not exemplary of other respondents’ 
experience, it does give voice to the kinds of considerations that go into 
planning parenthood as expressed by her and others in interviews. These 
include the assumption that parenthood is something expected, planned for and 
only appropriate within certain circumstances. Lauren said, “In a lot of ways 
now, I think parenthood is more of a choice and previously [it’s] been more of an 
expectation”. The specifics of reproductive decision-making reflect both 
demographic change and shifting gender roles in contemporary Scottish society 
and return us to many of the issues explored in previous chapters. The idea that 
one can make conscious choices about reproduction reflects expectations about 
individual autonomy, as well as ideas about the human capacity to control 
‘nature’ and ‘biology’ (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991: 322). The assumption that 
parenthood is now chosen and planned rather than an inevitable occurrence 
suggests that parenthood is therefore properly a site of ethical deliberation. If 
women choose to become mothers, then they may feel an extra responsibility to 
ensure that they have properly considered the implications of that choice 
(Ginsburg 1989; Paxson 2004). It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that 
surrogacy and other reproductive technologies are popularly treated as 
(bio)ethical issues in the UK. 
 Respondents believe that children should be born into a “stable 
environment”. The stable environment symbolises the expectation that parents 
should have secure careers, some financial stability, be in a committed 
relationship and have fulfilled those aspirations such as travelling or undertaking 
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further study that they need to do before they are ready to “settle down”. Clearly 
implicated in this is the assumption that women are more likely to ‘delay’ 
childbirth in order to establish their careers while in their twenties and thirties. 
Respondents perceive a clear correlation between lower birth rates and the 
trend towards having children later in life. Respondents of all ages assumed that 
the decision of increasing numbers of women to have children later was due to 
professional aspiration and said that having a career was a valid expectation for 
young women. 
 When I asked Sophie if she felt it would be appropriate for the Scottish 
government to try to actively increase fertility levels in the country, she 
concluded that the best thing for public bodies to do was provide as much 
information as possible about risks to fertility so that women could make 
informed choices about when to get pregnant. Responding to the specific 
question of whether women might be offered incentives such as tax breaks to 
have children earlier in life, she said: 
 
I suppose the variety of reasons why people might decide to delay 
having kids are so vast and it may be something that’s absolutely critical 
for them to feel like they could support a kid in the future. And in that 
case, they’re really trying to do something good and I always try and 
think about the child’s future as well. I don’t know what kind of, well I 
suppose then we’re talking about money, but it’s not just that, is it? It 
might be other things that they’re trying to gain experience of. I don’t 
think so, it goes against the grain a bit for me, that idea [of offering 
incentives].  
 
Sophie’s point that, in trying to provide their future children with the right 
conditions to “support” them, women who have children later in life are “really 
trying to do something good” reiterates the point that planning for parenthood is 
an ethical, as well as a practical, choice. In Chapter Three I reported Sophie’s 
sense that, after some years moving around the country and travelling, Spey 
Bay was the place that had made her want to “settle down” and it seems that the 
considerations that go into making a home are similar to those that go into 
preparing oneself for having children. As such, although environmentalist ideas 
posit a time of climactic chaos and ecological crisis in the near future, this 
suggests that respondents like Sophie hold a concurrent idea of the future as a 
time of stability, in their personal lives if not in the wider environment. 
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I noted in Part One that Nina was typically more rigid than others in her 
ideas about the ethics of surrogacy. She studied at Edinburgh University and 
worked on a conservation project in the Pacific before getting involved in the 
work of the conservation charity in Spey Bay in 2007. At the time that I 
interviewed her, her older sister had recently given birth to her first child, which 
Nina described as making her feel “very broody”. She said:  
 
I mean naturally, our bodies are ready to have children when we’re 
younger and I think women feel this [pressure to have a] career and 
succeed in the same way that men are and so having children is sort of 
put on the back-burner, I guess. I think being a young mum is good, I 
think it can be good for a child to have a young mum. I don’t think being 
an older mum is bad, that’s not what I’m saying, but I don’t think it’s a 
bad thing to have your children early and I think a lot people think it is, if 
you haven’t had a career first and had that sort of achievement in your 
life, that you’re doing something wrong. 
 
As this suggests, despite the overarching discourse of choice and personal 
autonomy, having children at the ‘right’ time is actually a difficult balancing act.  
I mentioned Charlotte’s concern that she might not have a child by the 
time she was thirty earlier. Other women I interviewed were similarly precise in 
the way they linked age to their plans for parenthood, explicitly linking choice 
and time, like Lauren: 
 
Although I don’t actively plan to have kids, I now have a number of 
friends who are married and having children, and it does start to occur to 
you how many years it would take to have a child. Like, best – well, 
shortest – scenario, you decide today that you want to have a child, you 
find out you’re pregnant in months, if you’re lucky, and then, so, basically 
best scenario would be a year until you get [pregnant], until you have 
your child, and for most people that’s not the case, particularly with the 
amount of birth control that we’ve all had, sort of – forced down our 
throats is a little bit violent – but there’s all the reasons why you may not 
conceive as quickly as you might, and if you’re starting at a later age you 
might not conceive as quickly as you might so it does start to occur to 
me, that, ok so if I’m ready in two years and then it takes me three years 
to get pregnant, it’s suddenly five years away, which occurs to me now, 
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but not in a way like, ‘I want a child at age thirty-one, therefore I should 
start’. I haven’t reached that particular stage in my life. 
 
For Lauren the decision to become a parent is one of deliberate timing that must 
be reckoned according to age and life-stage. As someone in a long-term 
relationship she also assumes that until she makes the decision to get pregnant, 
she will control her fertility through contraception, though there is an interesting 
ambivalence in her vivid suggestion – though she immediately corrects herself – 
that it is “forced down our throats”, bringing to mind Fiona‘s gender-bending fish. 
In contrast to the overarching discourse of choice, Lauren reminds us that one 
cannot precisely control the moment at which one will become pregnant, but 
only set the parameters within which it will ideally occur.  
 While the number of young male respondents I interviewed was lower than 
women, those I did speak to were somewhat more laidback about planning 
parenthood than women, including Jack, Lauren’s partner. He drew on his older 
sister’s experience of having an unplanned pregnancy in her late twenties and 
seemed unconvinced that fatherhood was something that needed a great deal 
of planning, despite the fact that at the time I interviewed him he was 
unemployed and Lauren was the sole breadwinner. He said: “maybe when 
[children] just come along it’s the right time, and you can’t plan and make it 
perfect. You just have to sort of deal with it”.   
 As well as reckoning the right time for parenthood, many women related 
their own plans for parenthood to the experience of family and friends, 
suggesting that having children is a stage in an expected life course and that 
individual lives follow roughly congruent, linear trajectories in line with other 
cultural ideas about progress (Becker 1994; Franklin 1997; Layne 1996, 2000; 
Strathern 1992a). Becker found through her study with infertile American 
couples that they experienced a crisis as they came to terms with the sense that 
their lives diverge from cultural norms and collective images of the human life 
course (1994: 386), and specifically the ‘core cultural construct ... that biological 
reproduction is an automatically occurring event, one that is part of the natural 
order of life’ (1994: 391). Some respondents expressed concern to me about 
people being under pressure to reproduce (see also Edwards 2000: 239). 
Sophie, for example, said, “I do think it’s important that life – an individual’s life – 
is not valued purely on whether they can reproduce or not”. 
 While respondents believe that they possess the autonomy to choose 
whether to have children, they are aware that this must be weighed against 
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specific expectations about nature, time, age and the connections between 
them. Willow summarised these points based on her own experience: 
 
Well, it’s difficult because I think our generation is quite lucky in some 
ways, ’cos we have got all these opportunities. I know that my mum said 
that when she was at uni., she had a choice of either doing nursing or 
teaching, and now we’ve got a lot more choice. So we’ve … suddenly 
been opened up to all these possibilities, but at the same time, we’re 
hemmed in by biology [laughs ironically], so it’s really hard. We go and 
get educated and we think, ‘well, hey, we want to do something with that 
now’, but at the same time, you know, you have to start having kids at 
some point. But I can totally understand why people are having kids 
later. By the time my parents were my age they were married. I think 
they would be a bit shocked if I turned round and said I was getting 
married, you know, they’d be, ‘oh, you’re far too young!’  
 
Sophie, who is a few years older than Willow, told me that when she was 
younger she had not envisaged herself having children, but had recently 
changed her mind:  
 
I think my reasoning at the time would have been quite selfish and I 
would have said, it just gets in the way of my life, actually, and also I 
don’t need kids to be happy. And it was a bit of rebelling from that which 
seems to be the norm. And I still feel that I don’t need them to be happy, 
but I just feel like I’ve changed on the view of whether I could see it in the 
future and I can now, rather than just me thinking, oh no, I can’t imagine 
such a tie, it would just be impossible, I couldn’t imagine a future with 
that kind of responsibility as well. And, you know, feeling a bit like, well, I 
can hardly look after myself, I’m not sure I can look after any kids just the 
way it is. But I think I feel a bit more, now, that what is most important is 
being able to care for them and that’s something I feel a bit more able to 
do. (Original emphasis) 
 
Sophie suggests here that with age she has developed a greater capacity to be 
responsible for herself and others, implying that she is more mature and less 
“selfish”. This indicates what she feels are the important qualities for a potential 
mother. It also implies both a sense of agency and a feeling that the desire, and 
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ability, to become a mother was something that came inevitably with age. In this 
sense, she echoes the tension between choice and expectation suggested by 
Willow.  
 I spent some time with Charlotte while she underwent a series of medical 
investigations into her gynaecological problems, which were later diagnosed as 
a combination of benign ovarian cysts and endometriosis. I got a sense from 
talking to her then that, while before she had been concerned about her fertility, 
the break-up with Mark had made the question of whether she might be infertile 
if not irrelevant then at least less pressing. This reflects a more general 
assumption that one cannot start to think about having children if one is not in a 
steady relationship. Eleanor reiterated this point when I discussed with her the 
current trend for British women to have children later in life than in previous 
generations: 
 
I think the trouble is the expectation of a good relationship. And I think 
that the expectation is there without the practicalities. And when – 
perhaps, you know, thirty, forty years ago – people expected to get 
married and not have huge expectations of what they wanted to do 
afterwards, or that it was all going to be wonderful all the time. I think 
now there’s the higher expectations so you’re not quite sure if this is the 
person you really want to settle down with and anyway there are so 
many interesting things to do that you’d rather do than risk settling down. 
And then suddenly you find that you’re in your thirties – certainly I was – 
so you’ve left it late. (Original emphasis) 
 
Embedded in both Charlotte’s experience and Eleanor’s comments here is the 
expectation of romantic love between parents, despite their awareness that 
relationships will not necessarily last forever.73 Eleanor identifies these 
contemporary expectations as both constraining and liberating, so that she 
actually describes settling down as a “risk”. In settling down with the right 
partner, young people today, she suggests, face a conflict between an 
assumption that they will have the freedom to choose their partner and the 
                                                
73 For both, this is a personal awareness as Eleanor is divorced from the father of her children and 
Charlotte’s parents divorced when she was a child. As noted in the Introduction, 18% of 
respondents, including Eleanor, are divorced themselves, though only a handful of them have 
divorced parents, so Charlotte’s experience is relatively unusual. There was a general impression 
amongst respondents and others I spoke to in the area that Moray is a place that some (though 
not most) people come to after suffering personal crises such as divorce, yet I am not aware of 
statistical evidence to support this. 
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weight of their expectations for a relationship so perfect that is better than the 
many other “interesting things to do”. Once again, she indicates a tension 
between personal fulfilment and expectation in the decision to have children.   
The importance of planning childbirth at the right stage in life reflects a 
sense that, just as women become fully women through motherhood (Davis-
Floyd 1992; Ginsburg 1989; Martin 2001; Oakley 1986; Rich 1977; Rothman 
1989; Wolf 2001), the decision to have a child is a milestone of adulthood. Paul 
found that a new sense of responsibility coloured his experience of fatherhood: 
“Getting married was like one step on the maturity ladder, actually having a 
child, it’s like a reality-check and I knew I needed to take some responsibility for 
the life and chop my hair off and get a job, get a house, and all that. It changed 
me a lot”. Instead of changing before his first child arrived, Paul realised that he 
“needed to take some responsibility” once the child was born. This contrasts 
with the assumption here of younger, pre-parturient women that they will have 
everything in place before they have a child. They want to be adults before they 
become parents rather than as a result of having children. Many expressed a 
sense that this was a generational shift and Lauren suggested that people are 
“probably allowed to be children longer, nowadays”. Younger respondents 
expect to be able to make their own decisions about when they became parents, 
not only because of a sense of autonomy, but also because they feel that one 
should be a responsible adult in order to become a responsible parent.  
 One important aspect of the stable environment, as suggested by Sophie 
earlier, is solvency, which Lauren acknowledged when I first asked her if she 
planned to become a mother, replying, “Financially? Clearly, no!” Laughing 
ironically, she explained, “I live at the bottom of my overdraft”. Financial stability 
is a desired and accepted pre-parenthood goal for respondents, enabling 
responsible parenting (Clarke 2004; Paxson 2004). While house prices and the 
general cost of living are lower in northeast Scotland than much of the rest of 
Britain, younger respondents envisaged financial strains when they did come to 
settle down.74 They felt that they should therefore build their careers not only out 
of personal fulfilment, but also to ensure a certain earning capacity in order to 
provide for their future dependants. Creating a stable environment is seen to 
take time and money and children are assumed to need certain things that cost 
money; if these are absent one risks being labelled a ‘bad’ parent. And yet, 
while a solid career might be necessary for a young middle-class woman 
                                                
74 It is worth remembering here that my fieldwork ended around a year before there were any 
major signs of the global recession that took hold in 2008.  
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wanting to be a ‘good’ mother, this assumption will be overturned once she 
becomes a mother because of the expectation that she will provide most of the 
childcare. 
 Amy, who is in her early thirties, spent many years travelling and working 
in conservation projects around the world and tried various different occupations 
before starting her current job in the wildlife centre. While she clearly enjoyed 
this exciting phase of her life, she also felt that her decision to have this lifestyle 
meant she might have missed out on some of the positive aspects of settling 
down: 
 
I think people need to do what they need to do. But then again, I feel it’s 
a bit of a shame as well, ’cos it’s like, I’ve enjoyed travelling and I think 
it’s taken me a while to get the job I want, but then, kind of, I do think it 
might have been nicer if I’d settled down maybe a couple of years ago ... 
But then, it’s just kind of what happens in your life. 
 
Yeah, I think when I do have children, I think I’ll be ready for them, ’cos I 
have done what I’ve wanted to do beforehand, instead of kind of, ‘oh, I’ll 
have children’ then ‘oh my god, but I still haven’t done stuff’. ‘Cos I have 
got one friend of mine who, I guess theirs was an unplanned pregnancy 
and I think, they’re not regretting having the child, but I think they’re 
regretting giving up a bit of their freedom.  
 
Like many of her other responses, Amy’s comments here are markedly 
equivocal. Clearly, she can identify both pros and cons to settling earlier and 
later in life. This implies once again the tension expressed by Willow between 
having the freedom to choose to go travelling and so on and the assumption that 
having children is a necessary and inevitable life event. Implicit in Amy’s 
comments also is the sense that parenthood and settling down will entail a loss 
of freedom (see also Miller 2004: 37). Based on her own experience of 
motherhood, Erin confirmed this: 
 
I’d lie if I didn’t say that there are sacrifices, there are compromises, that 
come with being a parent and they sometimes can be really, really 
difficult and costly. They can be costly. I mean, you know, it’s not life and 
death, but sometimes you feel that, whether it’s the old you that you 
don’t recognise so much any more, you know, as you change and as you 
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evolve and become a parent, there are times when you sort of get 
glimpses of, if I wasn’t a parent, I might be doing this, or I might take this 
opportunity or that opportunity.  
 
As we saw in Chapter Two, many respondents associate motherhood 
with self-sacrifice or abnegation. Lambek’s theory of sacrifice as a ‘pure’ form of 
beginning in which intention is cast forward (2007: 30) is congruent with the 
expectation that motherhood should be carefully planned because of the 
metaphorical death of the mother’s previous sense of self that Erin describes 
here. As Lambek makes clear, the ritual sacrifices he discusses are literal acts, 
while here we are dealing with the metaphorical relationship between 
motherhood and self-sacrifice. This returns us to Miller’s (1998) work on the 
structural congruence between food shopping in North London and ritual 
sacrifice. Sacrifice marks the intention to destroy and consume that which has 
been so painstakingly produced, whether the first harvest or the firstborn child. 
Miller argues that shopping, like sacrifice, ‘refers back to all the labour that has 
gone into working for the money to be spent, which may carry with it the 
resentments, the achievements and a host of other experiences of work’ (1998: 
94). This is particularly interesting here given the similarly sacrificial elements of 
the work that these women who work in the wildlife centre do.  
 The symbol of the stable environment in planning parenthood condenses 
both the sacrificial and rewarding aspects of respondents’ expectations for 
parenthood. It contains tensions and contradictions in its own fabric and reveals 
much about respondents’ ideas about what parenthood means and entails. The 
stable environment symbolises a point at which the main caregiver, which they 
assume will be the mother, will reorient her focus, reassess her sense of self 
and rethink her priorities. It suggests that, before becoming parents, both men 
and women will pursue projects of self-fulfilment and actualisation, which are 
then re-routed into their child (see also Miller 2004). This points once again to 
the importance of thinking of others in these people’s moral values and in 
parenthood and reproduction, but also the tacit recognition that their efforts to 
build good lives are both self-interested and other-oriented. The assumption that 
parenthood is chosen or controlled nowadays implies that how and when one 
has children is an ethical judgement. In contrast to popular discourse that links 
greater choice with individualism and consumerism, the act of choosing to 
become a parent is here linked with a new orientation of the self towards others’ 
needs, though, as we saw in Chapter Two, respondents also feel that having a 
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child of one’s own is, at the same time, inherently self-interested. 
 
 
 
Messing with nature 
 
 The important link between time and reproduction was also evident when I 
talked with respondents about assisted conception and particularly their ideas 
about older women using assisted conception to have children. In the long, hot 
summer of 2006, the story of Patti Farrant, the oldest woman to give birth in 
Britain, broke in the British press.75 This case provided a useful referent for my 
questions about this subject, which is an increasingly debated issue in Britain 
with its ageing population and assisted conception pushing the limits of when 
women can conceive children ever higher. Despite their general reluctance to 
prescribe ethics, many respondents were particularly concerned about women 
using assisted conception to have children late in life and this was linked with 
their ideas about nature and time.  
 We saw Lauren’s own keen sense of the importance of age in motherhood 
earlier. When talking about older mothers using assisted conception to conceive 
children later in life she referred to nature as a limiting factor: 
 
[T]here’s half of me that’s tempted to draw a very hard line and say, at 
some point, when you’re making choices not to have children – I don’t 
really like that medical science is pushing us beyond sort of natural 
human boundaries as far as it is. … I s’pose to some extent, there have 
to be some lines that you let nature take its course, and, you know, as 
hard as it is for the woman who doesn’t want, choose to have a child ’til 
she’s fifty, there are some natural limits there and there are kind of 
reasons why your body doesn’t want you to have a child when you’re 
fifty, and that partially is because you’ll be sixty-five when your child’s 
fifteen and, you know, you are pushing those situations. The sticky point 
– that men can still conceive at that point in time, so why are we, you 
know, why can you say that a man can do it but a woman can’t? But that, 
                                                
75 For examples of the varied media coverage of this story, see Doctor, 63, is Pregnant, The Sun, 
May 4th 2006; World exclusive: the first pictures of Britain's oldest mum, Daily Mail July 8th 2006; 
Critics attack 'absurd and undignified' pensioner who gave birth aged 62, The Scotsman, July 9th 
2006; Too old to be a mother at 62? Not if you have a nice house, good looks and a husband who 
had an unhappy childhood, The Guardian, July 13th 2006. 
 233
that’s the way, I mean, I hate to say it but that’s the way it is, is how I 
think I feel and I think that I quite like that there are some things, I 
s’pose, that are just, ‘that’s the way it is’.  
  
Here, Lauren employs nature in various ways to delimit what are appropriate 
reproductive choices and seems reassured that she can apprehend nature’s 
“limits” and “boundaries” to do so. In this way her response here is reminiscent 
of Paul’s contention in Chapter One that the law should be able to enforce a 
surrogate mother’s promise to waive her parental rights.  
 Lauren’s colleagues, Amy and Sophie, also linked appropriate age for 
childbirth with their particular conceptions of what is natural and noted the 
difference in length between men and women’s reproductive lives:  
 
Amy: [A]ge is a really tricky one. If they have left it too late, I think 
sometimes, it’s nature telling you that, yeah, you have left it too late. And 
I, it’s really hard, ’cos you want, ’cos it’s a big thing, I think, for woman to 
have children and if they just decide later on then it’s kind of like, why 
shouldn’t they have a child? But I think you kind of have to respect 
nature sometimes as well.  
 
Sophie: Personally, although it goes right against some of my right-on 
views, I think that that is nature, and – unless this is some medical 
condition which has meant that menopause has come in way earlier in 
life, if it’s natural – no, I don’t think there should be any intervention then, 
especially when there are kids who need homes and all those things. But 
that’s quite a personal view. (Original emphasis) 
 
Amy later told me that she felt uncomfortable with her own censoriousness and 
it is interesting to note both her and Sophie’s discomfort with their views. Sophie 
suggests that limiting women’s choice to have a child after menopause is not 
“right-on”, but it is natural. She experiences a conflict between what she feels is 
right according to her political self-positioning and what is right according to her 
conceptions of naturalness.  For all three women, this is a clear example of the 
contingent judgements that go into working out what is ethical in the tricky world 
of assisted conception. Each balances her idea that men and women should 
have reproductive equality against her concept of nature and ultimately nature 
wins out as the meta-value that should be “respected”. 
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 In his study of English couples’ attitudes to assisted conception, Hirsch 
(1993: 68) observed that his interviewees accepted the use of these techniques 
if they could be framed as ‘improving upon’ or ‘helping’ nature, as opposed to 
interfering with it. In talking about assisted conception, Andrew experienced a 
conflict between sympathy for infertile couples’ ‘natural’ desire to have a child 
and his concern that in achieving this, science might usurp nature: 
 
I think it’s really difficult because I think, in our society, or the human 
race as a whole, we’ve evolved beyond evolution. The fact that now, 
people who naturally can’t conceive can now conceive with science. 
There’s huge pressure on this planet in terms of resources for a number 
of people and so one part of me says, ‘if you can’t do it naturally, you 
shouldn’t do it at all’. On the other hand, I can totally, entirely understand 
on an individual level that if you want a kid then you’re gonna do 
everything that you can possibly do to have that child.   
 
 Paul echoed Andrew’s concerns about scientific progress when I asked 
him about his views on assisted conception, saying, “I don’t think we should 
necessarily be moving away from nature all the time into some world of science. 
It just seems the wrong way”. Both suggest that, with assisted conception, 
science may shift from being a tool for understanding and working with nature 
towards conquering it and diverging from it into, they imply, unknown territory. 
Key to this perception, also, is a sense of linear temporal progress. Both 
responses here are quite reminiscent of those collected by Hirsch in England. In 
particular, we see here not only ideas about protecting nature from science and 
technology, but also these people’s concerns about the proper relationship 
between individuals and ‘society’. This is expressed most clearly in the tension 
Andrew identifies between sympathy for infertile couples and preventing 
runaway “evolution” (cf. Hirsch 1993: 69).  
 When I asked Nina about assisted conception, she said she would “draw 
the line at people getting picky”, such as foetal sex selection or the creation of 
‘designer babies’, explaining that: “[I]t’s just playing god, really, and I don’t think 
it’s right. I think you should be satisfied with what you get and I think giving them 
the gift of a child should be enough. … I mean, if they can’t have children, fine, 
give them help, but then don’t start messing with nature more than you already 
have done”. Luke was also concerned about people “messing with nature”:  
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Well, on the one hand, you’re inclined to say, ‘you shouldn’t cheat 
nature’ and ‘this is Frankenscience’ and ‘you can’t mess around with the 
natural order of things’, but then on the other hand, we have been 
messing around with science and the human body and the natural order 
for a while now and who draws the line at where we stop? And it opens 
up a whole range of issues on things like cloning, stem cell treatment, 
who’s prepared to be the moral arbiter? I don’t think I am [laughs 
ironically].  
 
… I think people should have as much medical assistance as they need. 
I don’t think you can, but again for me, it comes down to the issue of who 
decides, I think, or I s’pose there are medical practitioners who would 
have the final say, but at what point do they start playing god? I think that 
would be my worry. 
 
Nina and Luke used the phrase ‘playing god’ to suggest that those who get too 
intimately involved in determining the particularities of birth and conception are 
claiming a power which is much greater than them and which should not be 
awarded to any one individual.  
 Luke seems in two minds about humans “messing” with nature and 
biology, but is clearly concerned about who takes the role of “moral arbiter” in 
deciding how far this should be allowed. He suggests that these decisions may 
be too important to be trusted to clinicians, as they may end up having control 
over decisions of life and death, or “playing god”. Luke’s attitude to nature here, 
as elsewhere, is more nuanced than Nina’s. His suggestion that humans have 
been “messing around with science and the human body and the natural order 
for a while now” is somewhat ambiguous. It suggests on the one hand that this 
“messing” has gone on too long and should be stopped, but on the other hand 
that nothing catastrophic has happened since people started so perhaps it is not 
as dangerous as we might fear. Luke’s concern about finding a suitable “moral 
arbiter” suggests he feels a lack formal ordinance on this ethical issue, yet in 
both his and Nina’s responses, as in Lauren, Amy and Sophie’s ideas about 
older mothers and Paul and Andrew’s claims about assisted conception, nature 
remains a constant reference point, however contingently each individual uses 
the term.  
 At the risk of repetition, let me recapitulate, then, some of the key phrases 
from the quotes in this section. In relation to the question of assisted conception 
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for older women, Amy describes the menopause as “nature telling you … you 
have left it too late” and argues that, “you kind of have to respect nature 
sometimes”. Sophie similarly describes women’s decreasing fertility with age as 
“nature” and also describes a medical condition of premature menopause as 
“natural”, and implies that because it is natural, if a woman seeks assisted 
conception because she has had an early menopause then that is acceptable. 
This suggests that Amy and Sophie both have a clear sense of what is natural 
and unnatural, yet they are also keenly aware of the fact that what is natural 
may not always be fair in terms of their political views. In a sense, then, they 
point to nature as an unknowable force whose limits can be discerned but 
whose logic might be somewhat mysterious. This is perhaps why Sophie makes 
a further reference to the ethical responsibility of people to care for “kids who 
need homes” to shore up her “personal view” that assistance for older women is 
wrong.  
 Andrew also refers to the wider picture, in terms of the “huge pressure” on 
global resources, as grounds for the view that, “if you can’t do it naturally, you 
shouldn’t do it at all”. He refers to nature in his formulation, “people who 
naturally can’t conceive can now conceive with science”, which as noted pits 
nature and science in dichotomous relation, but also grounds his claim that 
humans have “evolved beyond evolution”. Lauren similarly claims that “medical 
science is pushing us beyond sort of natural human boundaries” and describes 
“natural limits” and letting “nature take its course”. Paul meanwhile describes 
scientific ‘progress’ as “moving away from nature” and Nina talks about 
preventing people from “messing with nature”. Amy, Sophie, Lauren and 
Andrew’s responses are marked by equivocation, as they contrast their 
knowledge and ‘respect’ for nature with ‘social’ trends and expectations. Luke 
also does this, contrasting a more ‘hard-line’ view that emphasises “the natural 
order” against a more ‘liberal’ view that allows for people to have “medical 
assistance”.  
 Each of these respondents have slightly different ideas of what nature is, 
how far it should be “messed” with and what the consequences of ‘interfering’ 
with it might be. What they hold in common, though, is the sense that nature can 
be distinguished and characterised, but also that it should be respected and 
heeded. They also refer to it as if it were a self-regulating whole with discernable 
limits, boundaries and order, suggesting a mysterious and transcendent 
essence. Using nature as a reference point here shows the close relationship 
between ethics and nature in working out acceptable biomedical practice. As 
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suggested by the dilemma faced by Lauren, Sophie and Amy in the inequality 
between women’s and men’s ‘natural’ reproductive capacities, nature is what 
must ultimately provide guidance or in Luke’s terms act as the “moral arbiter”. 
Despite the fact that these three women, who in some sense represent the 
successes of feminism as independent, professional and successful women, 
feel that it is unfair that men can usually conceive children later in life than 
women, in arguing against medical assistance for older women, they acquiesce 
to nature and prioritise what they perceive to be the more important need to 
preserve and protect it from excessive interference. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Respondents expect that young women will want to take advantage of the 
opportunities that are similarly available to young men, and that this will 
probably entail ‘delaying’ parenthood. The pre-parturient women I interviewed 
expect to be able to choose when and how to become pregnant, just as they 
feel they can control their fertility by using contraception. Their reproductive 
capacities, bodies and lives are properly subject to their own control and are an 
effect of their decision-making capacities. All this implies a strong sense of 
personal agency in their visions of their own lives, yet because of the sense that 
pregnancy and childbirth must be fitted into women’s careers, as they will be the 
ones whose bodies and health are affected by it, and the assumption that they 
need male partners’ support to help them achieve this, there remains the sense 
that women – unlike men, whose reproductive capacities are theoretically 
endless – are ultimately “hemmed in by biology”, as Willow put it. Parenthood 
comes within a certain timeframe on an expected, universal life course, so the 
freedom to choose that they appear to possess is in fact limited. This is 
symbolised in the metaphor of the ‘biological clock’, which suggests both the 
ability to plan and control on the one hand and the inevitability of time’s passage 
and biological imperative on the other. 
 The creation of a stable environment signifies an individual’s readiness to 
become a parent, and part of this for women is a tacit acceptance that once they 
become mothers, their lives as individuals will be eclipsed by their children’s 
needs. The amount of thought and control that is expected to go into becoming 
a parent, from creating a stable environment, to designing a birth-plan to using 
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contraceptives, suggests that by choosing to become mothers, women exercise 
their agency in the knowledge of the kind of changes that this new status will 
bring about. The concept of ‘agency’ has recently been criticised for 
tautologously reproducing particular ideas of what freedom is (Laidlaw 2002; 
Mahmood 2005). The women here are well-educated, professional, middle-class 
and financially independent, in many ways the ‘daughters of feminism’, but 
seem, by choosing to become mothers, to be submitting to normative ideas of 
what motherhood is and how it should affect their lives. Yet to see this as a 
straightforward case of self-subjectification would be to miss the subtler picture 
of what is happening here. Instead, I have aimed to illustrate the tension 
between ideas of personal autonomy and freedom to choose as responsible 
adults on the one hand and biological imperatives and cultural expectations on 
the other. This has an added layer here in that these women are already 
building good lives and fashioning themselves as ethical people, which also 
entails certain sacrifices.  
 In the previous chapter, I showed how choice in many ways makes 
respondents’ lives as ethical people possible. Here, I have presented some of 
their more ambivalent ideas about choice, from Jenny and Eleanor’s ideas about 
the differences between expectation and reality for parents and couples today, 
to Willow’s sense of being free to choose yet “hemmed in by biology” to Amy’s 
uncertainty about whether she has made the right choice in postponing settling 
down until her thirties. Just as in Part One we saw respondents making 
judgements about the ethics of surrogacy by balancing values, we have seen 
here the kinds of values, ideals and norms that inform the choice to have 
children, whether ‘naturally’, as respondents here seem to assume they will 
have theirs, or through assisted conception.  
 I have emphasised the point that nature has many meanings for this group 
of people, as well as its specifically ethical flavour. Respondents’ ideas about 
nature are evidently ethically inflected, and nature is a source of goodness in 
their thinking, yet it is not only good. That is, as we have seen in their ideas 
about dolphins and here in the inequalities of women and men’s natural 
reproductive capacities, it may also be unfair, limiting and constraining. After all, 
while dolphins may signify much that is good, respondents would certainly not 
suggest that humans should live like dolphins or any other wild animal; clearly 
their version of nature is not a sanitised one. 
 Lambek (2008) distinguishes between choice and judgement in 
contemporary capitalist cultures, noting that the former is linked with economics 
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and commensurable values while the latter is more appropriate to the balancing 
of incommensurable ethical virtues. In emphasising judgement in ethical 
practice, he explicitly rejects obligation, since he says that this obscures the 
contingency of ethical practice: ‘Practice emerges through evaluation, the sizing 
up and fitting of action to circumstance. Yet judgment selects among 
alternatives not by means of a binary logic of exclusive acceptance or rejection 
but by balancing among qualities’ (2008: 137). Here, we have seen the 
importance of choice and judgement in these people’s thinking and practice and 
the difficult balancing acts and ambivalences that believing in the freedom to 
choose necessitates.  
 A sense of time and the contemporary epoch are clearly implicated in 
these ideas about choice and nature and, specifically, in the question of whether 
respondents perceive themselves to be in a world in crisis. We have seen in this 
and other chapters that they are concerned about changes in the world, and this 
is clearest in their thinking about the environment. Bloch (1992: 90) has 
described Christian millenarianists abandoning sexual and agricultural 
reproduction in recognition of the futility of earthly concerns prior to the Second 
Coming. Despite the catastrophic implications of ecological crisis, as well as 
their awareness of changing demographics, respondents here have not given up 
their everyday efforts to arrest climate change nor have they decided not to 
have children. They attribute this to biological imperatives and their sense that 
humans share a progressive life course. However, this also reflects the fact that, 
unlike millenarianists, worldly crisis is not mitigated for them by heavenly 
salvation. While nature is transcendent for them it is also earthly, so any attempt 
to prevent environmental catastrophe can only be done ‘in’ nature, since this is 
the victim of environmental damage as well as the source of future salvation. 
 Macnaghten and Urry (1998: 143) have shown that in the natural as well 
as the social sciences it is now accepted that there are many different types of 
time and that any distinction between ‘natural time’ and ‘social time’ is outdated 
and misleading. While modernity was associated with clock-time, along with the 
goals of mastery over nature and industrialised work patterns, the contemporary 
age is characterised by two further experiences of time as simultaneously 
imperceptibly fast, ‘instantaneous time’, and unimaginably slow, ‘glacial time’ 
(1998: 147). Glacial time is associated with environmentalist conceptions of the 
world, which also posit a planetary conception of space and appeals to a global 
citizenship (see also Franklin et al 2000). A sense of time as glacial and culture 
as global is necessary, Macnaghten and Urry argue, to create the ‘imagined 
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community’ that impels people to act in favour of the environment (1998: 152). 
As such, the environment is no longer an ‘other’ waiting to be mastered, but 
more like an intrinsic part of human experience. This has various effects 
including reinforcing the sense that environmental disasters affect us all; with a 
longer sense of time this becomes a matter of inheritance for future generations 
as well as a global commons. It also suggests fluidity in individuals’ and 
communities’ attachment to specific places. These ideas have clear relevance 
for the people we have met in this ethnography as can be seen in the careful 
planning that they put into their future children’s lives and in their sense that 
cultivating relationship of care can produce real attachments to other people, 
places and the environment.  
 Strathern’s analysis in After Nature is structured around how nature and 
kinship look in different ‘epochs’, which are inevitably experienced 
retrospectively and as crises. In the postplural epoch, she says, this crisis 
relates to a sense that there is ‘less’ nature in the world (1992a: 37), which is 
linked as we saw in the previous chapter with the idea that nature is now, like 
everything else, inextricably linked with choice and visible only as personal style 
(Strathern 1992a: 177). Epochs, for Strathern are ‘post-eventual’ and thus 
always ‘on the brink of collapse’, ‘for what [the epoch] gathers together in its 
own apprehension of the world is all those antecedent ideas … that bring one to 
the present moment but not beyond’ (1992a: 190). As I have already 
emphasised, Strathern’s ideas are inferences based on a ‘zeitnosis’ of the late 
twentieth century rather than an empirical description: 
 
Of course, Nature does not “really” disappear. On the contrary, late 
twentieth-century culture renders it more and more evident. … But 
postmodern aesthetics and Thatcherism alike most interestingly pull out 
from under our feet the grounding or reason for these constructs, and 
thus an anterior assumption about the conditions on which we so freely 
play. They take from each its former context in the other. The sense is 
that context itself has gone. (Strathern 1992a: 195) 
 
 Strathern’s crucial claim about nature in the postplural epoch is that its 
‘grounding function’ has ‘disappeared’ and she explicitly links this with 
environmentalist ideas: ‘[Nature] no longer provides a model or analogy for the 
very idea of context. With the destabilising of relation, context and grounding, it 
is no surprise that the present crisis (epoch) appears an ecological one. We are 
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challenged to imagine neither intrinsic forms nor self-regulating systems’ 
(1992a: 195).  
 In the last section of this chapter we have seen, perhaps most forcefully, 
the potency of nature as a grounding concept in respondents’ claims. But my 
aim has been to show throughout this and the preceding chapters that, in the 
post-Thatcher early twenty-first century ‘epoch’ of ethical living and globalised 
morality that these people live in, nature has not only not disappeared or been 
flattened, but continues to have a grounding function as well as acting as a 
transcendent meta-value. Indeed, it seems that their ideas contrast specifically 
with the notion that nature has lost its ability to provide context. This is not to 
suggest that ideas about nature now are exactly the same as they were in the 
late twentieth century or that we have ‘returned’ to modernist or even pre-
modern ideas of nature. What is does suggest, though, is the relevance, power 
and compulsion of nature in these people’s thinking and practice. The idea of 
nature as sublime is an established one in British thinking, but in these chapters 
we see a model of nature that is not only sublime, but also transcendent. Using 
nature in order to ground particular claims entails referring to a realm beyond 
humanity and for this reason it is perhaps unsurprising that many respondents 
draw on religious concepts when talking about nature. Respondents’ belief that 
nature has its own order, limits and boundaries suggests that it is something that 
exists independently of humans. As such, when they refer to nature as a 
transcendent meta-value, they contest the suggestion that it is a cultural 
construction or product of human thought.  
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Conclusion  
 
Surrogacy and the Good Life in Scotland 
 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
Through the unknown, unremembered gate 
When the last of earth left to discover 
Is that which was the beginning; 
At the source of the longest river 
The voice of the hidden waterfall 
And the children in the apple-tree 
Not known, because not looked for 
But heard, half-heard, in the stillness 
Between two waves of the sea. 
T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding 
 
 Has nature lost its capacity to provide context? Can it no longer ground 
claims, model relations or reproduce norms? That questions about nature are 
ones with epistemological, existential and cosmological (amongst other) 
ramifications demonstrates once more its potency. One of my main aims here 
has been to give an ethnographic representation of the meanings, value and 
status of this sticky subject for a group of people living in rural Scotland. 
Through their claims about the ethics of surrogacy and the ethical choices that 
structure and inform their everyday lives, we have seen nature’s polysemy and 
its capacity to ground claims, inform knowledge, model behaviour and 
reproduce norms. I have also argued that it is precisely nature’s ability to shape-
shift that strengthens, rather than weakens, the concept. A further reason for 
nature’s contemporary power that has emerged here is its close association with 
ethics.  
 In building good lives and making ethical claims, respondents in this 
study draw on nature in contingent and shifting ways that reveal the concept’s 
workings and power. This is one facet of the conscious reflection that goes into 
ethical judgement. This weighing up and balancing of values alongside personal 
and relational commitments and beliefs is the second important phenomenon I 
have aimed to capture here. I have shown that, in their practice and claims, 
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respondents balance and prioritise values and meta-values and negotiate 
cultural axioms and dichotomies in order to try and preserve certain principles 
and respond appropriately and logically to their ethical and relational obligations. 
It is significant that respondents’ nuanced approaches to ethical judgement 
contrast with public and legal representations of surrogacy, not least since those 
representations were based on expert interpretation of public opinion. We have 
also seen the realities of ethical work as well as the caring labour that goes into 
being an ethical person and how this overlaps for these people with ideas about 
belonging, community, family and identity. These efforts to live a good life 
demonstrate the difficulty of separating out self and other in such projects, with 
consequences for how we think about morality, choice and freedom in the 
contemporary Western world. 
 Connecting up a group of people’s ideas about an ‘extraordinary’ subject 
like surrogacy with their everyday choices, practices and experiences is a 
response to the point that kinship itself models relations and provides ways for 
thinking about connections. We have seen that in talking about surrogacy, 
respondents draw on other ‘domains’ of life. In particular, I have sought to show 
here the sophisticated way in which they handle ‘given’ and ‘made’ knowledge 
and I have repeatedly returned to questions of belonging. Belonging is clearly 
relevant to the ethics of surrogacy but is also a pressing concern for these 
people in their everyday lives, not least (although not only) because most of 
them are migrants to the area. We have seen how a cultural model that posits 
belonging as the interplay between the given and made structures morality, 
creates and breaks connections and sets up boundaries. One recurring 
response to the questions of belonging posited here has been respondents’ 
sense that it can be cultivated. These efforts in many ways mirror their work on 
behalf of the natural world. Cultivating a relationship of care with other people, 
with one’s home or with the natural world not only creates emotional 
attachments, but also reproduces moral responsibilities and ethical imperatives 
to continue acting in the same vein.  
 
 
 
Feeling for nature 
 
 The ethnography I have presented here speaks directly to Strathern’s 
work in After Nature, as is clear from the various engagements I have made with 
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this seminal text in the preceding chapters. Perhaps the most far-reaching 
implication of the idea that contemporary English society is after nature is that 
nature no longer provides a model for relations through the making of 
merographic connections. As Strathern puts it, ‘All the English have lost is what 
they once had, which was the facility for drawing partial analogies between 
different domains of social life’ (1992a: 142). In the modernist epoch, Strathern 
argues, nature, along with the other key concepts of individual and society, 
provided the means for making the connections that facilitated understanding 
and communication, reproduced diversity and generated progress. Nature 
provided, above all, a model of reproduction, and what it reproduced were 
relations. As such, postplural nostalgia is ‘for a relational view of the world’ 
(1992a: 189, emphasis omitted) that encompasses the connections people 
make at all levels. 
 In order to be ‘after’, nature must lose its relational facility, its capacity to 
model merographic connections. In this ethnography we have seen that 
respondents use nature merographically, connecting it up with different domains 
of social life in a manner that concurrently preserves its individual character and 
that of the domains to which it is connected. This was perhaps most obvious in 
Chapter Six, in which they spoke of “messing with” nature, but was also present 
in their ideas about how best to interact with, work upon and care for the natural 
world in Part Two and in their ideas about how nature is implicated in kinship 
and reproduction.  
 Throughout the chapters, I have described various aspects of 
respondents’ relationships with dolphins and whales as one important angle on 
how respondents think about nature, belonging and ethics. Cetaceans provide 
the grounds for relationships with people and place, an impetus for action and a 
model for ethical subjectivities. As such, it is worth remembering the real effects 
of this tropic mode of thought: ‘while culture is a world of the imagination, it is 
not a fantasy one whose power lies in the impossibility of realisation. On the 
contrary, it has its constraints and its effects on how people act, react and 
conceptualise what is going on around them: it is the way people imagine things 
really are’ (Strathern 1992b: 3, emphasis added; cf. Lévi-Strauss 1962: 102). 
 I noted respondents’ reluctance at being prescriptive in their ideas about 
surrogacy in the Introduction and Part One. One clear way in which nature’s 
relationality has emerged in this ethnography is in the way respondents speak 
about ethical subjects. Surrogacy involves other people, who cannot be divorced 
from their own contexts, commitments and moral values. While their motives 
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can be guessed at, respondents recognise that, as they do not know anyone 
involved in a surrogacy arrangement, everything they say about the practice is 
inherently speculative and abstracted from everyday life. This equivocation 
suggests at once the importance of empathy in claim-making for these people, 
which resonates with popular ideas about tolerance, individuality and diversity 
as particularly British traits. The importance of empathy also points to the close 
relationship between ethics and emotion. We saw this in their ideas about 
maternal bonding and their fears for surrogate mothers’ emotional resilience. 
We have also seen it in their everyday practice, in the way that people’s 
responsibilities towards their environment are tied up with emotional 
attachments to place, people and animals (see also Berglund 1998: 172; Milton 
2002). 
 My own attachments to the place I lived in and the people I lived with 
during fieldwork have, no doubt, been apparent throughout. I formed close 
friendships with many respondents. During fieldwork, I came to feel at home in 
Spey Bay, just as respondents do (though of course my reasons for being there 
were different), and this was no doubt facilitated by the fact that I was doing 
anthropology ‘at home’ as I am British (and indeed, half-Scottish, though it rarely 
brought me any local kudos) (see also Teman 2006). I should also note that, 
even before setting foot in Moray or conceiving of this project I was politically 
committed to what I consider to be my own ethical responsibilities towards the 
environment. I have deliberately left these attachments implicit until now, but I 
note them here as a means of reflecting on another subject that has similarly 
remained implicit, the ethics of anthropological fieldwork.  
 One of my aims in the account I have presented here has been to 
contribute to the burgeoning field of the anthropology of ethics. In this, I have 
been led by my experiences in the field and my analysis of my data, but this 
focus also points to wider currents not only in anthropology but also the cultural 
milieu in which I am situated. That an anthropology of ethics recognises the 
inherent connection between people’s moral values and how they live their lives 
seems to me a fruitful, and timely, direction for anthropology. It should also 
remind us of the (ethical) imperative to re-examine constantly the ethics of the 
discipline.  
 In this ethnography I have shown the importance of values such as 
altruism, reciprocity, love and sharing for the people I met in the field. Such 
values and attachments are also central to (or at least inescapable in) the 
ethnographic method. To be a good fieldworker, one must cultivate a ‘rapport’ 
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with one’s interlocutors and in a sense create an obligation upon them to 
respond to one’s – often intrusive, ill-informed or boring – questions. Of course, 
particular ethnographers will do this in diverse ways and the balance of power is 
always somewhat different when one is an anthropologist ‘at home’. I cannot 
offer a solution to this problem since it is, in my view, by its very nature an 
intractable one, but I would suggest that reflecting on the ethical nature of the 
relationship between fieldworker and respondent can at least add to our 
understanding of wider social dynamics. Key to this, it seems to me, is to reflect 
further on the emotional attachments inherent in the ethnographic method.  
 
 
 
An ethical epoch 
 
 Respondents see time as inextricably connected with nature and ethics. 
This was clear from their ideas about age and parenthood and their feelings 
about the ‘progress’ of science and technology, as well as the way that they 
devote time to their attachments to others and to ethical work. Both in their 
views on surrogacy and in their own cultivation of belonging and connection to 
others, we saw the importance of making, giving and putting in time in building a 
good life. This has a further dimension given that their lives are framed by a 
sense of impending catastrophe. The early twenty-first century has its own 
particular set of crises, and reproductive technologies may no longer be ‘new’, 
but popular and media discourse remains anxious about such techniques. 
Concerns about anthropogenic effects on the environment have also grown in 
visibility and force and fears about demographic and social change have not 
diminished. While the nature of the epoch may have changed since After 
Nature, the sense that this is an age marked by present and future crisis has 
not.  
 Implicit in much popular, and some academic, concern about 
reproductive technology is a sense of moral degeneracy – this is perhaps 
particularly clear in the debates surrounding commercial surrogacy. As we saw 
in Chapter Two, one way in which people may express anxiety about surrogacy 
is in identifying an inappropriate connection between motherhood and money. In 
talking about a surrogate mother’s motives for entering a surrogacy 
arrangement, respondents made moral commentaries on human nature and 
choice. But this was not the only context in which they spoke about money, 
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motive or choice. In fact, we have seen that both choice and money are 
necessary elements of their everyday lives and ethical work, from fundraising on 
behalf of cetaceans to ethical consumption and creating a stable environment 
for future children. This suggests, in contrast to some environmentalist 
discourse that identifies consumer culture as morally hollow and as the driving 
force behind ecological destruction, not only that money and choice may be 
amoral enablers of ethical practice, but also that it is the individuals who make 
choices and spend money who bear ultimate responsibility for what follows on 
from that. Here again we see the exercise of conscious reflection in ethical 
judgement and, with it, a sense that having the freedom to choose – or to make 
the right choices – is an important part of a good life.  
In the Introduction I noted the ‘discovery’ within academia that nature is a 
‘construct’, so that it no longer makes sense to argue from the position that it is 
the ultimate dichotomy to society. I have noted the congruence between certain 
ideas about nature and about god in respondents’ ideas and in the wider culture 
of contemporary Britain and argued that it is in large part the reconceptualisation 
of green politics as an ethical movement that has facilitated its increasing 
purchase in British society in recent decades. This implies that ethical discourse 
has become intensified in this particular period of history, an argument that 
seems to be demonstrated further by concurrent debates over reproductive 
technologies. Indeed, the more journalists, academics and politicians decry the 
degradation of the UK’s moral fabric and the more laypeople decide to recycle 
their waste, cut down on foreign travel or shop ethically, the more it seems that 
this is an epoch in which ethics is at the forefront of people’s minds. These 
points of course raise further questions: how are current conceptions of ethics 
related to the decline of institutionalised religion in the UK and elsewhere? And, 
what, then, is the relationship between god and nature in twenty-first century 
Britain? 
 
 
 
Nature, after all… 
 
Despite their concerns about impending global environmental 
catastrophe, respondents do not seem at sea in a meaningless world. The data I 
have presented here suggests, in fact, that nature is their primary moral, 
ecological and cosmological reference point. Nature acts, for them, as a source 
 248
of goodness, a transcendent meta-value with the power to ground claims, model 
behaviour, create statuses, enact relationships and impel action. In particular, 
we have seen here a version of nature that has a particularly ethical flavour. 
When nature emerges primarily as an ethical object that has not lost its 
grounding function and can still be used to make and model merographic 
connections as it has here, this raises questions about its relationship to its 
previous and concurrent versions as a baseline, as bestial or as a boundary. I 
have aimed to show here that ethical nature is not only a benign, innocent or 
virtuous reference point; its effects can be repressive, exclusionary and unequal.  
I have focused particularly on the way in which respondents use nature 
as a grounding concept and as a source of goodness. This could be interpreted 
as a somewhat cynical implication that nature is simply a useful concept that 
people can refer to in the absence of a strictly defined morality, religious code or 
legal framework. This is not my intention. It is my view that nature is for 
respondents a real, tangible thing that exists ‘out there’ in the trees, birds and 
seas and which requires conservation and care, but also a vital force, at once 
benign and dangerous, but absolutely worthy of respect which it is not in 
anyone’s interests to denigrate, ignore or destroy.  
While I have argued that nature is not, at least primarily, a spiritual 
concept for respondents, it does seem to have both transcendent and 
cosmological properties and a sense of natural order is evident in what many of 
them have said in the preceding chapters. In Chapter Five, I quoted Strathern’s 
argument that, in the postplural world, moral choices are no longer tied to stable 
reference points such as nature and that as a result, ‘the norms and canons of 
behaviour … no longer need lie in institutions outside the individual’ (1992a: 
162). This assumption that moral behaviour can only be rationalised according 
to reference points outside the individual opens up a conceptual gap. In the 
postplural world, she says, the individual looks beyond himself for reference but 
cannot find anything better than himself in which to locate his desires and 
choices so this gap is closed. Respondents here do not turn inwards in making 
moral decisions and find sufficient grounds to support their claims or structure 
their lives, but instead look out into their environment and see nature. It is this 
nature – and the elastic gap in between themselves and it – which provides 
them with a powerful reference point. This idea of nature is not the same nature 
that Strathern describes for the modern period, though of course that is an 
important part of its genealogy. This nature is not a historical artefact and 
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respondents’ use of it is not nostalgic. Instead, it is future-oriented, presently 
active, polysemous, encompassing and transcendent.  
I am hesitant to describe respondents’ visions of nature as new, but they 
are clearly related to the particular time and place in which they emerge. In an 
echo of her ideas about merographic connection, Strathern (1992b: 3) argues in 
Reproducing the Future that for Euro-Americans, ‘culture consists in established 
ways of bringing ideas from different domains together’, but ‘new combinations – 
deliberate or not – will not just extend the meanings of the domains so 
juxtaposed; one may expect a ricochet effect, that shifts of emphasis, 
dissolutions and anticipations will bounce off one area of life onto another’. In 
the idea that nature is intrinsically ethical that we have encountered here, we 
see another twist of the kaleidoscope – nature, rather than society, as the 
source and arbiter of morality.  
I started with an account of going to see a dead whale with some of my 
friends. That December morning, I found myself on a bitterly cold beach in 
northeastern Scotland surrounded by people with downcast eyes, huddling into 
their Gore-Tex jackets and circling an enormous dead body. The weather was 
so overcast that it was difficult to tell what time of day it was, adding to my sense 
that this experience of seeing my first, dead and mutilated, sperm whale was 
utterly strange. I revisited the scene with Luke later that day. Hurrying with a 
mixture of trepidation and excitement, we came to the bank of sand dunes that 
overlooked the sandy open grave. The whale’s wretched, ransacked body, so 
lifeless a few hours earlier, was moving. Silenced by confusion and shock, then 
laughing with a mixture of revulsion and relief at this magical realist sight, we 
understood our mistake. The tide had come in so that the water was just high 
enough to almost cover the whale but not enough to wash it away, so that it 
remained tethered to the beach by its own weight, while its tail and what 
remained of its head swayed and crashed like a circus animal trying to break 
free from its cage.  
As I have returned to this scene in thinking and writing about my time in 
the field it has taken on a deep resonance. Most obviously, it says much about 
respondents’ relationships with whales and dolphins and the natural world. But 
the atmosphere of awe, reverence and mourning, the feeling of being there, 
compels further reflection. This whale was one casualty of an unstable 
environment; its death was a real consequence of climate change and human 
destruction of wild habitats. Yet it also signified something wider than that. It was 
treated as an object of veneration, so it is apposite that its missing teeth should 
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have been the subject of so much concern, in that they are perhaps the closest 
that environmentalists might get to holy relics. This whale represented not only a 
vulnerable natural world and relationships in crisis, but also a transcendent 
reality and a reason to make things better. 
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